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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the political economy of post-war Japan using a theoretical 
framework that combines Antonio Gramsci's ideas about hegemony and crisis in 
capitalist society with feminist political economy analyses of social reproduction under 
capitalism. The study theorizes Japan since the 1990s as facing a multifaceted crisis – 
what Gramsci would term an organic crisis – and seeks to understand the crisis in the 
context of Japan's post-war period of prosperous, stable and hegemonic political 
economic order. Moreover, it demonstrates how central to contemporary Japan's overall 
crisis is a crisis of social reproduction, characterized by a rapidly aging and shrinking 
population and a chronically low birth rate, among other things. This crisis of social 
reproduction is dialectically related to other dimensions of Japan's more general organic 
crisis, including its prolonged period of economic stagnation since the 1990s and the 
widespread degree of mistrust towards political institutions held among the public, which 
fostered a wave of reformist politics in the 1990s and 2000s. The dissertation is thus an 
attempt to theorize post-war Japanese political economy by exploring the key economic, 
social, and political conditions that served as the basis for the robust hegemonic order of 
the early post-war era. It considers how those conditions were transformed by a variety of 
structural, institutional and political forces, beginning in the 1970s, and how as a result 
many of the same conditions that had initially anchored the hegemonic order came to 
undermine its basis and ultimately bring about a deep-seated and multifaceted crisis 
beginning in the 1990s, which has thus far defied resolution. After providing an original 
account of post-war Japanese political economy from the 1950s to the 2000s, the 
concluding chapters of the dissertation first examine the current period since the return to 
power of Abe Shinzo in 2012, exploring how Abe has sought to solve the organic crisis, 
before finally considering four potential scenarios for the future, as various competing 
social forces in Japan struggle for a resolution to the organic crisis based on different 
ethico-political visions, exploring the barriers and contradictions inherent in each of 
them. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
Nearly thirty years after the 1989 crash of the NIKKEI Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
the Japanese post-war boom seems now to be little more than a distant memory. Today 
crisis defines Japanese politics and may do so for many years to come (Noble 2012). This 
crisis has economic, political, social and ecological dimensions. More than two decades 
of economic stagnation have led to an unraveling of Japan’s post-war class compromise 
including its famed lifetime employment system (Osawa et al 2012; Schoppa 2006). The 
cost of stagnation to the state has been high: public debt is now 2.5 times GDP; the 
highest level in the world (MOF 2017). Moreover, poverty, income inequality and 
precarious employment have increased since the late 1980s (Wakatabe 2015). Politically, 
after 38 years of stable Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule, the 1990s and 2000s 
witnessed unprecedented political turmoil, with various periods of rule by non-LDP 
coalition governments and "reformist" LDP leaders, culminating in the landslide victory 
for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, followed only three years later by 
voters' staunch rejection – and the subsequent self-destruction – of the DPJ. Socially, 
Japan faces the challenge of a shrinking and aging population (a phenomenon known as 
shōshikōreika) (Noble 2012), as many Japanese youth see the traditional family as either 
unappealing or unviable (Nemoto 2008; Ratherford et al 2001; Schoppa 2006), dynamics 
that deepen the economic malaise. As the ratio of elderly people to working age people 
increases, the costs of health care and social security are increasing just as the size of the 
tax base from which to pay for those programs declines (Itoh 2000).  
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This situation is sharpened by gender dynamics. While women have traditionally 
been disadvantaged in the public sphere (Nemoto 2013; North 2009), public officials are 
now calling upon them to fill labour shortages whilst returning to their traditional roles as 
mothers in an effort to revive Japan’s birthrate (Kawai 2009). Ecologically, Japan must 
determine how to negotiate the energy challenges posed by climate change in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear situation and the anti-nuclear movement it begat 
(Calder 2013; Koyama 2013). While some elements of the crisis, including Fukushima, 
are recent, the crisis itself is not new (Katz 1997). And yet, though these problems 
suggest the need for broad changes in Japanese political economy, the crisis has so far 
created little impetus for systemic change. Even when the government has acknowledged 
the need for significant changes, such as under the current Abe administration, it has thus 
far failed to deliver policies capable of overcoming these daunting challenges. 
In this context, with the possible exception of Schoppa (2006), to date no single 
integrated approach to the crisis and its implications for Japan that draws upon both 
Japanese and English language sources has been offered.  Instead, the various aspects of 
the crisis have been taken up in separate literatures. For example, much has been written 
about the implications of the economic crisis and the class implications of Japan’s shift 
towards economic liberalism (Cerny 2005; Grimes 2012; Kawai 2009; Reitan 2012; 
Watanabe 2007). Similarly, a great deal of research has examined the gender implications 
of shifting social norms surrounding production and reproduction in the face of the crisis 
(Hanochi 2003; Liddle and Nakajima 2004; Mackie 2013; Miura 2012; Nemoto 2013; 
North 2009; Takeda 2005; Yoda 2006). Finally, a fair amount of attention has been paid 
to the cultural and political implications of nihonjinron, or Japan’s nationalist cultural 
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ideology of uniqueness, exceptionalism and most importantly, ethnic homogeneity 
(tan'itsu minzoku) (Befu 2009, 2001, 1993; Lebra 2004; Oguma 2002; Revell 1997; 
Sugimoto 2009). What is needed is an integration of these different dimensions of the 
crisis within a coherent analysis.  
This dissertation provides one of the first analyses of Japan’s multidimensional 
crisis that draws upon both Western and Japanese primary sources. It also represents 
possibly the first attempt to use Gramscian, feminist political economic and other 
historical materialist theoretical tools to understand not only the causes and implications 
of Japan's economic crisis (known as the lost decade of the 1990s; sometimes referred to 
as the "lost two decades" to include the 2000s as well) but also how the economic crisis 
intersects with ecological, demographic and political crises. It is therefore perhaps the 
first project to systematically explore Japan's crisis as a multifaceted, complex and long-
term "organic crisis," to use the Gramscian term (Gramsci 1992). 
It is difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the crisis explored in this dissertation, 
not only for Japan but also for other countries that are home to social, economic and 
political dynamics and contradictions similar to the Japanese case. While Japan's 
economy has remained stagnant for nearly twenty-five years, public debt has soared and 
continues to grow. Yet as the population ages and declines, the tax base is shrinking and 
the costs of caring for a rapidly aging population will likely continue to grow for decades 
unless drastic measures are taken. It is thus clear that Japan is facing a deep crisis with 
both political-economic and socio-cultural roots. This dissertation therefore explores the 
complicated web of factors that underlie this crisis, demonstrating how it has evolved and 
why leading actors within the state and civil society have thus far been unable to 
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adequately resolve its contradictions. It provides not only a thorough analysis of these 
complicated challenges facing contemporary Japan but also uses Japan as the empirical 
focus of research that dialogues with wider theoretical discussions about production, 
social reproduction, hegemony and crisis in the contemporary global political economy. 
Moreover, this research has an historical and geographical significance that extends 
beyond Japan: insofar as many of the dynamics observed in Japan are also present in 
similar countries, whether Western European countries such as Germany and Italy or East 
Asian newly industrialized countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, this research has 
wider comparative and international relevance as well. 
 
Research questions 
In exploring the lineages and consequences of the current conjuncture in Japanese 
political economy and society, I situate my research around the following questions: 
First, how can we understand the multifaceted crisis facing contemporary Japan as the 
result of contradictions emergent within the development of the social, cultural, political 
and economic structures of Japan's post-war hegemonic order? Second, what are the 
implications of the crisis for the future of Japanese society and political economy and for 
the continued viability of Japan's post-war hegemonic order? 
 
Theoretical framework 
As it traces the lineages of the current crisis and how it can be explored in the 
context of a specific set of ruling relations within Japanese society and political economy, 
this dissertation is primarily animated by an engagement with two interlocking theoretical 
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approaches: Gramscian political economy and feminist political economy. It engages 
with theoretical debates on political power, focusing on how ruling elites maintain power 
and popular support during periods of crisis, particularly through the dissemination of 
cultural, political and economic ideas that justify their authority within society (see, for 
example, Gramsci 1992). Moreover, it links to debates in cultural studies concerning 
cultural nationalism, patriarchy and economic liberalism. It also considers historical 
evidence of the nature of the global shift away from the mixed economies of the post-war 
era and towards neoliberalism since the 1980s and assess the significance of this 
transformation for Japanese political economy (Ruggie 1982). This is not to assume that 
Japan has merely followed Britain, the United States and other countries in adopting 
neoliberal policies and principles but to explore how the global neoliberal context has 
impacted Japan's specific political economic order, variously described as creative 
conservatism (Pempel 1982) and developmentalism (Johnson 1982). Finally, it engages 
with feminist discussions of the significance of the gendered division of labour for 
production and social reproduction in developed countries (Bakker 2007, 2003; Vogel 
2013).  
As it trace the contours of Japan's hegemonic order, what Gramsci would term its 
ruling historic bloc, the dissertation relies on the theoretical contributions of not only 
Antonio Gramsci (1992) but also a number of important neo-Gramscian thinkers who 
have applied Gramsci's ideas to the modern global political economy (Cox 1996; Gill 
1993, 1993a, 2008, 2012). In particular, Robert Cox's Production, power and world order 
(1987), which mobilizes a synthetic theoretical approach to the study of world order, and 
its dialectical relationship with domestic political orders partly inspired by Gramsci, 
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represents another theoretical and methodological influence for this work. However, 
rather than attempting to uncritically shoehorn the Japanese case into the conceptual 
spaces offered by these theories, it seeks to re-appropriate and nuance them in dialogue 
with the existing literature on Japanese political economy and the empirical features of 
my case study. Nonetheless, this research fits within the Gramscian political economy 
research program insofar as it frames the crisis as a deep-seated organic crisis driven by 
structural contradictions in the Japanese political economy that take their root in the 
hegemonic order that has evolved since at least the end of the Second World War. In part, 
then, I situate this research as an empirically rigorous demonstration of some of the 
theoretical tools laid down by Gramsci and neo-Gramscian political economy scholars. 
Beyond mobilizing this Gramscian theoretical framework to orient its 
understanding of power and hegemony in post-war Japan, this dissertation engages 
directly and critically with existing literature on the political economic development of 
post-war Japan (see, for example, Itoh 2000; Johnson 1995, 1982; Katz 1998; Murakami 
1980; Okimoto 1989; Schoppa 2006; Vogel 2006). In that sense, it provides an updated 
account of the rise (and fall) of Japan in the post-war era, building on the empirical and 
conceptual work laid down by previous authors. Yet part of its tasks is also to 
demonstrate shortcomings and limitations in this literature and how they can be overcome 
through the theoretical framework that it uses.  
Because questions of gender and social reproduction represent a significant part of 
my understanding of the crisis, the research also draws on literature relating to these 
themes in feminist political economy (Bakker 2007; Bakker and Silvey 2008; Gill and 
Bakker 2003). In particular, it engages with feminist theorizations of the contradictions 
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between capitalist production and social reproduction that are manifest under capitalism. 
it provides a robust empirical demonstration of how these contradictions have been 
manifest in Japan and in so doing provide new insights into the nature and causes of 
crises of social reproduction under contemporary capitalism. Ultimately the sort of 
theoretical bridge building between feminist and Gramscian political economy that I hope 
to advance further has already been developed in the work of Gill and Bakker (2003). 
Therefore, the novelty of this approach is less in bringing these two approaches together 
than in elaborating and enriching them through the Japanese case study. 
 
Outline of argument 
With regard to my two questions about the nature of Japan's post-war order and its 
implications for both the post-war boom and subsequent and ongoing organic crisis, I 
begin with a hypothesis about the dominant or hegemonic social forces behind Japan's 
post-war order. Following Robert Cox (1996), I understand hegemony as involving 
material, institutional and ideological dimensions. Based on this conceptual blueprint, I 
want to suggest that the core of Japan's hegemonic ruling elite or historic bloc has 
consisted of a triad of actors: the LDP, the state bureaucracy (especially the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and former Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), now the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and the keiretsu business conglomerates, with 
supporting roles played by well-organized groups in other segments of the economy, in 
particular the petit bourgeoisie of small businesses and farmers (Okimoto 1989; Vogel 
2006). Their hegemony is held in place ideologically by certain ideas about politics and 
economics but also by ideas about gender, class and nation. For example, the lifetime 
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employment system was only possible because of the gendered division of labour; the 
"traditional family" model of a breadwinner husband and housewife (kindai kazoku); and 
certain migration policies that tended to be exclusive; among other gendered and raced 
cultural constructs, including the notion of Japan as a homogeneous ethno-nation, or 
tan'itsu minzoku.  
Ultimately there were contradictions within this model and it has slowly 
unraveled due to both these internal contradictions and external pressures (Itoh 2000; 
Katz 1997). Yet policymakers seem unsure of how to deal with the crisis, partly, I argue 
because of the complexity and depth of the contradictions that have exacerbated it. 
Therefore, part of what is at stake in the crisis is how this complex web of cultural, social, 
political and economic ideas, institutions and power relations collectively helped produce 
the post-war order, maintaining hegemony for the ruling constellation of forces while 
ensuring the continuity of a rapidly expanding productive economy, a stable regime of 
social reproduction and a relatively hegemonic political order led by the LDP. Yet these 
forces are ultimately driven by internal contradictions that have led to the current 
conjuncture of organic crisis. The resolution cannot be achieved simply by addressing 
one or two linkages in isolation from the others. 
As far as the implications of this crisis for the future of Japan, while it is certain 
that the contradictions that have led to the crisis and the crisis itself will only worsen as 
long as its underlying causes are not tackled, I suggest that tepid or superficial reform 
policies such as those attempted thus far will only postpone or displace further crisis. 
Only fundamental structural changes that resolve the deep class and gender contradictions 
of society can allow Japan to permanently overcome the crisis. While the coming decades 
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will likely see a struggle over competing solutions to the crisis and competing visions for 
Japan that empower some social groups while excluding others, without these changes 
the crisis will ultimately only deepen and its contradictions will only become more 
difficult to defer and displace.2 Ultimately, part of the argument developed here is that 
Japanese capitalism was successful up until the 1990s by externalizing a number of its 
contradictions related to the international political economic, class-based, gendered and 
environmental effects of production, social reproduction, industrialization and 
development. The crisis is an expression of many of these contradictions, and the crisis 
did not simply "begin" in 1990: its seeds were already being sown decades before then 
(Itoh 2000). To overcome the crisis, it is likely that a system that can overcome or at least 
better internalize these contradictions in a way that is stable and socially just will be 
needed. 
 
Outline of chapters 
 Seven chapters follow this introductory chapter. Chapter Two provides a review 
of existing approaches to the study of Japanese political economy in the post-war era. It 
surveys the work of a range of thinkers, focusing primarily (though not exclusively) on 
English-language contributions, and considering primarily how existing approaches have 
sought to explain the causes of Japan's post-war boom on the one hand, and the more 
recent period of crisis on the other, while also giving space to different characterizations 
of Japan's model of welfare provisioning and social reproduction, a dynamic often 																																																								
2 For example, the state has so far introduced some modest social welfare policies that have softened the 
blow of long term stagnation to the working class, preventing growing income inequality, immiseration and 
the rise of precarious work from being greater challenges than they otherwise might have been, but it has 
only slowed rather than reversed these trends and at the same time incurred a growing budgetary deficit. 
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missing from dominant explanations for both the economic boom and the crisis. While 
the chapter surveys a range of approaches to understanding the post-war boom and post-
1990s crisis, including institutionalist, Weberian, neoliberal and régulationist approaches, 
it finds that while many of them have merit, none are convincing in their ability to 
account for both the period of economic boom and the more recent turn to crisis. On the 
other hand, the chapter finds one contribution – that of Marxist political economist 
Makoto Itoh – to be more convincing in its account of the underlying structural bases for 
the changing conditions of the entire post-war era. However, while many parts of Itoh's 
argument are ultimately incorporated into the argument of the present work, the argument 
developed here also differs from Itoh's significantly by emphasizing not only the 
structural economic conditions of the post-war order (and the contradictions that emerged 
within them and gave rise to the crisis) but also the underlying cultural, social and 
political conditions that underlay Japan's post-war hegemonic order and the way these 
other dynamics interacted with the economic structural factors in both complementary 
and, ultimately, contradictory ways. 
Building on the analysis of existing approaches to the study of Japanese political 
economy in Chapter Two, Chapter Three gives an overview of the theoretical framework 
used in the dissertation. While the argument ultimately accepts many of the empirical 
premises explored in the preceding chapter, including but not only those of Itoh, this 
chapter is more concerned with developing in abstract terms the underlying 
methodological and theoretical underpinnings of the approach taken. To that end, it 
focuses on various methodological elements of the approach before showing how this 
overarching theoretical approach, taking the survey of existing approaches to 
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understanding post-war Japanese political economy as its point of departure, can develop 
a concise overarching original argument about Japanese hegemonic order in the post-war 
era. First, it acknowledges the underlying methodological point of departure for the 
dissertation as a whole as rooted in the dialectical historical materialism of Karl Marx's 
philosophy of praxis. Second, it adopts an understanding of political economy rooted in 
the thinking of Antonio Gramsci that draws on a wide range of Gramscian concepts, 
including those of hegemony, historic bloc, relations of force, organic crisis, 
trasformismo and the modern prince, as well as Marx's concept of Bonapartism. Third, in 
its treatment of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, it develops a framework of the 
conditions necessary for hegemonic order. To that end it builds on the work of James 
O'Connor (2003) to see political legitimation and capital accumulation as two conditions 
necessary for stable capitalist hegemony. However, it seeks to go beyond this by positing 
a third condition of hegemonic order. Drawing on the work of Isabella Bakker and 
Stephen Gill (2003), it sees social reproduction as a further condition (dialectically 
integrated with the others) of hegemonic order that requires special consideration. 
Fourth, building on these Gramscian foundations (particularly his understanding 
of the relations of force in the struggle over hegemonic rule), it considers Robert Cox's 
understanding of the dialectical interaction of world order, domestic social forces, and the 
state as the basis for exploring conditions of political order and hegemonic rule, while 
adding social reproduction as a fourth level of social praxis through which hegemonic 
orders are contested and maintained. Fifth, though admittedly underdeveloped for lack of 
space, it includes recognition of the importance of political ecological questions to the 
understanding of political economy and hegemony and the inherently contradictory 
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relationship between processes of capital accumulation and ecological vitality. Finally, 
drawing on both the insights of Bakker and Gill (2003) and those of James O'Connor 
(2003), it develops an original understanding of the basis for hegemonic order as rooted 
in a ruling regime's ability to maintain three conditions of political legitimation, capital 
accumulation and social reproduction, and explores the theoretical underpinnings of these 
concepts as relevant to Japanese political economy and society, using this theoretical 
framework to present a basic sketch of the overall argument of the dissertation. The 
chapter ends with a brief word about the methods of data collection used in the 
dissertation. 
Four historical chapters then follow this sketch of the theoretical approach. 
Chapter Four examines conditions in the post-war period from 1950 to 1972, the height 
of Japan's post-war hegemonic order. It argues that key to Japan's post-war success was 
the establishment of a hegemonic order led by a historic bloc that represented a wide 
range of societal interests and that was therefore able to successfully balance 
requirements of capital accumulation, political legitimation and social reproduction. It 
first considers the degree to which this period saw the three requirements for stable 
hegemonic order maintained, finding that in general, the high rate of economic growth 
and investment, the high degree of egalitarian growth in incomes, political participation 
and support for the LDP, the robust birth rate and rapidly improving health indicators and 
rates of education attainment suggest that all three requirements – capital accumulation, 
social reproduction and political legitimation – were maintained.  
Second, it explores the reasons for the success of this hegemonic order, 
considering eleven overarching conditions for its successful maintenance during this 
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period. These eleven conditions cover the following areas: 1) global geopolitical 
conditions; 2) global political economic conditions; 3) the electoral and party system; 4) 
the state form and the bureaucracy; 5) production and the role of capital; 6) production 
and the role of the working class; 7) production and the role of the petit bourgeoisie; 8) 
institutions relating to social reproduction and the family; 9) structural demographic 
conditions and welfare institutions; 10) the role of post-war nationalism and cultural 
ideology; 11) political ecological conditions. The chapter thus explores dynamics within 
each of these fields and the role played by conditions within each in reinforcing and 
maintaining the hegemonic order. Third, it posits that in the context of the above 
conditions, the post-war hegemonic order was characterized by a historic bloc that was 
led by the LDP, bureaucracy and corporations but that incorporated the interests of a 
range of social forces, including blue and white collar workers and the petit bourgeoisie. 
This historic bloc was thus the backbone of Japan's post-war hegemonic order and a 
major underlying basis for its success. 
Chapter Five then explores dynamics of the late Shōwa Period from 1972 to 1989. 
It argues that Japan's post-war hegemonic order began to slowly encounter changes to the 
underlying conditions that supported it beginning in the 1970s. These changes gradually 
accumulated, and ultimately led to growing contradictions both between the roles 
performed by Japan's social, political and economic institutions versus the roles they 
were supposed to perform as well as among institutions that had previously functioned 
complementarily but were, however, now contradictory. The chapter is divided into two 
sections. Section one outlines the changes to conditions of hegemonic order and considers 
three types of change that are significant in this period. First, structural changes include 
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not only changes to the structural conditions of global political economy due to 
globalization, technological innovation and the end of the Dollar-Gold Standard but also 
changing demographic conditions. In both cases, these changes represent underlying 
conditions largely beyond the control of the Japanese state. 
 Second, political changes refer to significant policy changes, either in response to 
changing structural conditions or as a backlash against the very basis of Japan's original 
post-war order, and include, most prominently, welfare expansion under Tanaka Kakuei 
(1972-4), fiscal retrenchment under Suzuki Zenkō (1980-82), and neoliberal reform under 
Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-87). Third, what I call institutional changes but also referred to 
as path-dependencies or institutional drift (Hacker 2004), represent a slow shift in the 
function or nature of institutions to the point that they no longer perform their original 
role and may go from a complementary to a contradictory relationship with other 
institutions and with the hegemonic order as a whole. These include the mounting costs 
of Japan's lifetime employment system to firms; the growing costs (and diminishing 
returns) of infrastructure spending; and the negative repercussions of Japan's LDP-
dominated mixed member electoral and party system. In section two, the paper then 
outlines the overall implications of these transformations for the hegemonic order; for its 
ability to fulfill requirements of political legitimation, capital accumulation and social 
reproduction; and for the relations of force within Japan's historic bloc. 
Next, Chapter Six considers the Heisei Period from 1989 to 2012. This era 
marked the onset of a deep seated and multifaceted organic crisis that implicated all three 
of the requirements of hegemonic order: political legitimation, social reproduction and 
capital accumulation. While the 1990s and 2000s saw a constant push for political reform 
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and the election of the first non-LDP led governments (in 1993-1996 and 2009-2012), as 
well as LDP governments led by the reformist Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996-1998) and the 
anti-establishment Koizumi Jun'ichirō (2001-2006). Finally, in 2009, then, voters 
emphatically rejected the LDP, electing the DPJ to power in a landslide. Yet even the 
DPJ proved incapable of managing Japan's arcane political and administrative system, 
and were swept out of power just three years later in 2012.  
Economically, beginning in the aftermath of the end of the economic bubble in 
the early 1990s Japan entered a period of nearly continuous economic stagnation – very 
low growth punctuated by periods of recession – that has more or less continued into the 
present, despite numerous efforts to restore conditions for profitable accumulation that 
have oscillated between neoliberal deregulation policies on one hand, and pump-priming 
Keynesian stimulus spending on the other. Finally, with regard to social reproduction, 
Japan's fertility rate cratered in the 1990s, while the size of the workforce peaked in 1995. 
Indeed, the total population began to shrink in 2008, while ballooning welfare costs could 
only be covered fiscally with an ever-growing deficit. This chapter then argues that 
paradoxically, the causes of this crisis can be found in the same eleven conditions given 
for the earlier period of success in the post-war era. Due to changing political, 
demographic and structural economic dynamics, many of these conditions now serve as 
reasons for the entrenchment and intractability of the crisis. In other words, the conditions 
that initially supported Japan's hegemonic order came to account for its unraveling and 
the obstinacy of the crisis that followed, while attempts to reform institutions without 
attempting to structurally reorder the balance of forces within Japan's ruling historic bloc 
only made things worse. 
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Chapter Seven then turns to examine how things have developed since the return 
of Abe Shinzō, who has been Prime Minister since 2012. It argues that the unlikely return 
to power of Abe (who was briefly Prime Minister in 2007) after three years of rule under 
the DPJ has seen arguably the most successful attempt to reorder hegemonic ruling 
relations, albeit in terms that are reactionary, since the onset of crisis. It explores the 
curious ways in which Abe has restored the LDP's stranglehold on power – helped by a 
thoroughly disorganized opposition – and generated public support for a policy agenda 
that was largely heralded as bold and courageous. It holds that the period since the return 
of Abe in 2012, the LDP-led hegemonic order has – at least on the surface – reasserted 
itself, largely breaking the political impasse that had existed for the previous two decades 
and winning six consecutive elections with nearly a two-thirds' majority of seats between 
it and its coalition partner Kōmeitō. However, though Abe's return has brought not only 
renewed LDP dominance but also a renewed optimism about the future for many 
Japanese, this has occurred in a deceptive fashion similar to the way Marx framed the 
historical French leader Louis Napoleon and developed his concept of Bonapartism. 
While Abe's political comeback was driven by bold promises of economic and social 
revival similar in some ways to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal in 1930s United 
States, the reality has been far different: while capital has enjoyed the benefits of a stock 
market boom, Abe's policies have done little to solve problems of economic stagnation, 
population decline and aging and economic precariousness and inequality.  
Moreover, since 2017, Abe has taken a further shift to the right by reviving his 
agenda of constitutional revision and militarization whilst simultaneously pushing 
through a bill to introduce immigrants and maintaining promises of free day care and 
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university education. I argue that Abe must therefore be seen as hiding a neoconservative 
agenda behind a veil of progressive Keynesian rhetoric. This posture may be effective in 
restoring LDP-led political dominance – on more conservative terms that before – but it 
cannot provide a long term solution to Japan's crisis insofar as underlying structural 
contradictions continue to go unresolved. This chapter begins by outlining the key 
policies of the Abe government in terms of how they relate to the conditions of organic 
crisis that continued into the 2010s. It considers both the rhetoric of Abe's policy aims 
and the political consequences thereof, as well as the reality of the Abe administration's 
achievements. It largely breaks these up into economic, social and political, including 
foreign, policy. Next, it considers the consequences of the Abe administration's policies 
for Japan's hegemonic order. It asks whether contradictions exist between these policies, 
such as the commitment to a renewed ethno-nationalism and the transformation of Japan 
into a country that is welcome to immigrants. Lastly, it shows why Abe's agenda is 
unlikely to resolve the organic crisis insofar as his approach continues to only address the 
superficial consequences of the crisis rather than the underlying structural contradictions 
that have prevented its resolution thus far. 
Finally, Chapter Eight reconciles the historical analysis of hegemony and crisis in 
post-war Japan with the current conjuncture and with an eye towards the future. It 
discusses four different "ideal-type" scenarios for what future awaits Japan, in light of the 
analysis provided in the dissertation overall, considering the political, economic and 
social consequences of each of them. It explores how each scenario would fulfill 
requirements for social reproduction, political legitimation and economic accumulation, 
while considering the barriers and contradictions inherent in each model. First, it lays out 
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a scenario where more draconian conditions for social reproduction are put in place: a 
sort of nationalist conservatism, or neo-conservatism, which in some ways reflects core 
elements of Abe's agenda and the direction the LDP has taken over the past 19 years 
while also harkening back to the political program of former Prime Minister Nakasone. 
Second, it proposes a more neoliberal model that has political antecedents in Koizumi 
Jun'ichirō's (2001-2006) policies as well as the regulatory reform advisory panel of the 
early 1980s known as Rinchō II and more recently with the right wing faction of the DPJ, 
including Noda Yoshihiko (Prime Minister 2011-12) and Ozawa Ichirō (DPJ leader 2006-
2009), while also echoing some of Abe's policies, particularly the third arrow of 
Abenomics that has stressed trade liberalization and labour market and agricultural 
deregulation, among other things.  
Third, it proposes a return to the good old days under a revival of the 
communitarian model of the post-war era. This approach continued to have a significant 
amount of support until at least the postal privatization of 2007 – which partially 
dismantled the system for financing pork-barrel spending through postal savings – and 
still carries much weight among elements of the LDP, including among lawmakers 
affiliated with agricultural and construction sector interests, but looks increasingly 
unlikely given the contradictions that emerged from this model previously and its 
incompatibility with economic globalization. Fourth, a democratic socialist or social 
democratic path remains the most difficult but best option from the perspective of 
progressive social reproduction. This option clearly received a high degree of political 
support in the 2009 election and was supported by left wing elements of the DPJ, such as 
Kan Naoto (as well as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)). At the current conjuncture, 
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such a coalition seems highly unlikely to emerge, but given precedents of successful 
social movement and community organizing in Japan, as well as the deepening severity 
of structural challenges, it may be more likely to emerge in the future. Whether the 
Japanese ruling regime – either as its current constellation of forces or in a different form 
– takes these insights to heart remains to be seen. 
 The dissertation ends with a brief concluding chapter that considers some 
overarching conclusions of the research, engaging with a number of core themes that 
span multiple chapters and assessing the implications of these findings for our 
understanding of Japanese political economy in the post-war era as a whole. Finally, it 
recognizes some of the limitations of the overall project and outlines some potential 
directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Existing approaches to Japanese political economy 
This chapter discusses the evolution of post-war Japanese political economy 
through a critical literature review that explores four questions. First, it considers how the 
existing literature has accounted for Japan's post-war economic success, particularly until 
the early 1970s but in some cases until as late as the 1990s. To this end, it focuses on the 
varying explanations given in the work (see, for example, Murakami 1984; Johnson 
1982; Pempel 1982; and Okimoto 1989), critically assessing their merits and limitations. 
It considers Weberian, institutionalist, neoliberal and Marxist approaches to this question, 
dealing with each in turn. Second, it considers a range of leading analyses of Japan's post-
war political order, and the research debate over the relationship between Japan's post-
war electoral and political system and the 38-year period of unchallenged LDP one-party 
rule that lasted from 1955 to 1993. Third, it considers how leading contributions have 
addressed or explained the period of economic crisis facing Japan since at least the 1990s 
(see, for example, Schoppa 2006; Itoh 2000; Vogel 2006; Lechevalier 2012; Katz 1998). 
Fourth, it considers how previous approaches have dealt with the issue of social 
reproduction in Japan. While considering briefly the institutional work of Leonard 
Schoppa – one of the only North American scholars to take the issue of social 
reproduction seriously – it focuses mainly on the insights of Marxist scholar Makoto Itoh 
and feminist scholars Mari Miura and Mari Osawa, as well as Margarita Estevez-Abe.  
This chapter thus serves as the point of departure for the development of the 
original theoretical framework used in this dissertation, which will be the focus of the 
next chapter, and subsequently for the body of the dissertation, beginning in Chapter 
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Four, where I systematically examine post-war Japanese history in the context of the 
methodological and theoretical framework developed in the next chapter and in 
conversation with the leading works surveyed in this chapter. 
 
Creative conservatism and the developmental state: Japan's postwar boom 
 During the postwar era Japan's economy grew more rapidly than almost any 
economy in history. Between 1946 and 1976, the economy grew 55-fold (Johnson 1982). 
GDP grew faster than ten percent per year through the 1950s and 1960s and then by four 
percent per year during the 1970s and 1980s (Itoh 2000). Through this rapid 
transformation Japan emerged as not only one of the wealthiest but also one of the most 
equitable societies in the world while simultaneously maintaining among the lowest rates 
of public welfare expenditures in the world (Schoppa 2006). Though there were always 
limitations to the Japanese model of development, the remarkable success of Japan's post-
war growth is hard to deny. However, the reasons for these successes are far from 
obvious. According to Katz (1998), dominant theorizations of the political economy of 
Japan within American political science discourse have tended to fall within two broad 
camps: traditionalism and revisionism. While traditionalists argue that nothing 
fundamentally differentiates Japan from other major capitalist countries, revisionists 
claim that certain features of Japanese political economy and society and culture more 
generally fundamentally differentiate it from other industrialized countries and thus 
necessitate a different foreign policy response from the perspective of the American 
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state.3 However, particularly since the 1970s, it has been the revisionist paradigm that has 
assumed a greater degree of legitimacy and explanatory purchase. While this perspective 
originated with James Abegglen's (1958) The Japanese factory and was popularized with 
Ezra Vogel's (1979) Japan as number one, it was especially with Chalmers Johnson's 
(1982) MITI and the Japanese miracle that this position came to be robustly theorized 
and empirically documented. 
Johnson (1982) seeks to provide an institutional explanation for Japan's growth, 
arguing that the state played a significant role in creating the conditions for rapid 
industrialization and economic growth. However, in contrast to James Abegglen's "Japan 
Incorporated" thesis, Johnson rejects cultural essentialist explanations of Japanese 
success. Decrying claims by Abegglen and others of some innately Japanese propensity 
to work hard, sacrifice personal gain for the good of the nation, cooperate with coworkers 
and obey superiors, Johnson argues that Japan's developmental model emerged as a 
response to the pressures of catch-up development, late industrialization and a lack of 
access to resources. Moreover, in the postwar context, the consensus around economic 
growth and economic mobilization emerged as a result of the horrors of war, depression, 
and occupation. Johnson also disputes rational choice explanations of Japan's period of 
rapid economic growth that reject the role of the state in enabling rapid growth and 
instead locate it solely with the hard work and optimal decision-making of individuals 
and firms. Instead, Johnson's institutionalist model recognizes the importance of three 
distinctly Japanese practices of labour management (lifetime employment, enterprise 																																																								
3 Virtually all scholarship on Japanese political economy written by American academics implicitly 
assumes an American perspective, evaluating Japanese institutions and policies according to American 
standards and values and evaluating Japan's post-war rise in terms of American interests, what Gill (2012) 
calls "imperial common sense" (506). 
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unionism and the seniority wage system) but goes further to emphasize a particular role 
of the state, orchestrated through the bureaucracy, quite distinct from those of other 
countries: the developmental state. 
Johnson (1982) understands the developmental state as a state form that prioritizes 
economic growth and industrialization over all other policy areas. Moreover, and in 
contrast to both the American and Soviet models of economic development, Johnson 
characterizes Japan's model as plan-rational. Unlike the American market-rational 
approach, the state is expected to play a much greater role in the economy, directly 
managing industrialization and commerce at the national level through both macro-
economic policy creation and micro-level direct management and guidance of firm-level 
activity. However, unlike the Soviet plan-ideological model, government and 
bureaucracy-led planning is not seen as an end in itself but simply a means to the end of 
economic growth and industrialization. 
Johnson (1982) draws our attention to four elements of the developmental state 
that he sees as integral to Japan's success. First, the developmental state has a small, 
inexpensive, but elite bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial talent available. Japan's 
bureaucracy may have been more powerful and more effective in industrial policy 
direction than other countries, but it was actually smaller in terms of personnel and 
budget. Therefore, the second element of this model is a political system in which the 
bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively. Johnson 
suggests, "this means effectively that the legislative and executive branches of 
government must be restricted to 'safety valve' functions" (1982: 313). The third element 
of the model is the perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the 
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economy. In implementing its industrial policy, the state must take care to preserve 
competition. Johnson sees excessive intervention and a failure to ensure that the economy 
retains its basic competitive market form as factors leading to the crisis in the 1940s. The 
final element is a pilot organization: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). Johnson argues that MITI had the right balance of powers in order to be effective 
without being all-powerful; carefully orchestrating industrial, financial, and trade policy 
in concert with the Cabinet, Bank of Japan, Ministry of Finance (MOF), and keiretsu 
(business conglomerates)4 while maintaining a balance of power between these 
institutions and itself. 
 Alongside Johnson's idea of the developmental state, Pempel's (1982) notion of 
the pragmatic approach to politics taken by Japan's ruling elite – what he terms "creative 
conservatism" – as a driver of its post-war success has also been influential. Pempel 
argues that "what sets off the politics of public policy in Japan is a twofold combination: 
first, the conservative nature of the social support base of government in Japan; and 
second, the relative strength and cohesiveness of the Japanese state apparatus" (11). 
However, key to maintaining such a cohesive political project has been the creative, fluid 
and flexible creation of policies and setting of priorities. In other words, the overall 
operative framework of the regime is conservative, but it is nonetheless highly adaptive 																																																								4	Keiretsu refers to the business conglomerates that emerged after the post-World War II breakup of the 
family-owned zaibatsu. Keiretsu involve groups of businesses, often centered around a major bank and 
with interlocking boards of directors. The main types of keiretsu include horizontal keiretsu, described 
above, which often included members corresponding to each major industry (steel, chemicals, shipping, 
trading, insurance and banking, though often including electronics, food and beverages and other industries 
as well) or groupings of firms from various industries, and vertical keiretsu, or a grouping along a supply 
chain (e.g., Toyota as the lead firm with many smaller parts manufacturers and other auto industry firms as 
subordinate members of its group). While there were six main horizontal keiretsu until the 1990s, the 2000s 
have seen various mergers result in only three, focused around the three main banks, Mitsubishi UFG, 
Sumitomo-Mitsui and Mizuho (see also Murakami 1996).	
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and dynamic in the face of challenges. This creative conservatism is reflected in the 
tension between consensus and conflict: while decision-making processes are highly 
consensus-driven and the value ascribed to consensus leads many to forego private gain 
for the sake of social harmony, consensus is not permanent but is periodically punctuated 
by moments of conflict. The tendency for unions to largely acquiesce to the demands of 
capital – except during the annual shuntō spring offensive, when they formed a united 
offensive in pushing for sectoral wage increases – is indicative of this dynamic. While the 
narrow focus of the labour movement within enterprise unionism prevented it from 
assuming a greater social or political role and thus from becoming an effective voice 
within the LDP, its periodic militancy helped cement the lifetime employment model, 
state policies geared at full employment and a fairly equitable distribution of income 
through most of the postwar era (Pempel 1982).  
However, though this periodic labour militancy and the relative strength of unions 
within the narrow confines of the individual firm facilitated a more egalitarian and 
communitarian model of development, the absence of a coherent unified workers 
movement and especially the relative insignificance of workers to the LDP's electoral 
coalition led to a relatively minimalist welfare state until at least the 1970s. The state 
focused on development and industrialization without significant welfare spending and 
with a tax base that was far lower than other industrialized countries. Nonetheless, 
Pempel reminds us that this conservatism was also "creative." The regime’s ability to 
respond boldly and swiftly to policy challenges, such as by implementing strong 
measures to deal with pollution and other environmental problems in the 1970s or by 
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rapidly expanding social security programs in the 1970s (and more significantly in the 
1990s), is strong evidence of this (Schoppa 2006). 
In some ways uniting the perspectives of Johnson and Pempel, Okimoto (1989) 
has argued for a nuanced perspective that attributes equal importance to the directive role 
played by MITI in industrialization and to the space left for the market for flexible 
accumulation. While Okimoto's work involves a specific focus on how MITI was able to 
guide the creation of a globally competitive high technology sector in the 1980s, in many 
ways his contribution is to expand on the basic theorization of the developmental state 
laid down by Chalmers Johnson, to show how it evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Implicitly at least, Okimoto locates the keiretsu, MITI and the stability of LDP rule as 
three fundamental underlying factors behind the success of the developmental state. 
While Okimoto provides a systematic account of what made MITI such a successful and 
influential institution, many of his points reiterate Johnson's groundbreaking work. 
However, for our purposes his analysis of the roles played by the keiretsu and LDP are 
worth considering in depth. 
Okimoto shows how the keiretsu system enables banks to finance their own 
keiretsu affiliate firms in times of crisis rather than forcing them to rely on government 
bailouts as in the United States. Under this system, downstream and upstream small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) affiliated with the lead firms have to absorb much of the 
shock in the system to keep it smooth for lead firms but they also draw enormous benefits 
from the direct links and easy access to financing and markets. The ability of these 
subordinate firms to absorb shocks (through the cancellation or suspension of contracts) 
was one factor that enabled the success of the lifetime employment system. While their 
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patterns of boardroom interlocking and reciprocal financing arrangements are much more 
coordinated than the free enterprise model of American capitalism, keiretsu are not 
monolithic and differ markedly from the pre-war zaibatsu. Interlocking ownership occurs 
across keiretsu: for example, Mitsubishi has shares in and makes loans to Sumitomo 
keiretsu members (see also Grbic 2007). Okimoto argues that the keiretsu system was 
probably necessary for MITI to orchestrate the industrial policy efforts that it made; 
certainly a high level of concentration and coordination within industry was necessary for 
the consensus-based model across industry that MITI relied on to be effective. 
For Okimoto, the third factor in Japan's successful developmentalism has been the 
LDP, which has ruled Japan nearly continuously and with only two breaks since 1955. 
Okimoto argues that the LDP's success can be understood as a result of its pursuit of two 
overarching goals: industrialization and the maintenance of political power. In the first 
case, it has left much of the leeway of policymaking to MITI; in the second case, it has 
sought to simultaneously reward its supporters through economically inefficient subsidies 
(to farmers and small business) while at the same time constantly modernizing and 
updating its approach in the face of a rapidly developing and changing domestic political 
economy. As farmers became less numerically significant and more financially 
burdensome, the LDP was able to greatly reduce their subsidies without losing their 
political support in the 1970s. Rival factions in the LDP prevent it from becoming enough 
of a unified and centralized institution to try to monopolize party control over the state 
and bureaucracy. Yet because factions are not rooted in ideology or social cleavages but 
in personal and historical rivalries, they have never threatened to split the party. Okimoto 
sees that there are four elements of LDP's grand coalition: clientelist relations with 
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farmers, doctors and small businesses; patronage to industry; big business lobbying; and 
generalized voter support. While the LDP has long used various policies of preferential 
subsidies or pork barrel spending to shore up support from the first three groups, recent 
decades have seen an increasing importance of generalized voters in cities, leading the 
LDP to become more of a mass party. The shift to policy areas more important to urban 
voters such as social welfare, environmental protection and quality of life led to a 
resurgence of the LDP in the 1970s as other parties failed to capitalize on the 
opportunities posed by the contradictions of Japanese industrialization. 
 These three accounts: Johnson's developmental state; Pempel's creative 
conservatism and Okimoto's triad of power rooted in the bureaucracy, keiretsu and LDP 
share two main things in common: an institutionalist methodological approach and an 
emphasis on the role of the state in fostering and maintaining conditions for successful 
development. Taken together, they offer three insights: First, they demonstrate the 
importance of significant state intervention in the economy through the bureaucracy, and 
in particular through MITI and its highly effective and targeted industrial policy. Second, 
they point to the critical role played by the LDP as a political force that was conservative 
yet creative, able to maintain control and adapt to changing dynamics and sustain its 
overall grip on power by being flexible, recognizing the need to cater to a wide range of 
stakeholders (i.e., big business, farmers, and small business) while pursuing policies that 
benefited workers economically (especially with the lifetime employment system) 
without giving space to them politically. Third, they speak to the importance of a 
cohesive and collaborative relationship both between the state and industry and within 
industry, through the keiretsu system, shingikai government-business councils (that 
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sometimes included organized labour as well) and the dangō system of intra-industry 
collusive government contract negotiations (that reinforced clientelistic relationships 
between small businesses and government officials) (Okimoto 1989; Johnson 1995).  
On their own, these explanations are useful in accounting for the successes Japan 
enjoyed in the post-war era, at least through the 1970s. Their shortcomings lie less in 
their inability to explain the success of the high-growth period than in the way these 
explanations appear incompatible with the following twenty years of economic decline, 
suggesting that these accounts on their own are unable to explain contradictions in the 
Japanese model that ultimately led to the long-term crisis. The rest of this chapter will 
indirectly draw our attention to the problems with this regime of accumulation5 by 
examining the various ways in which the crisis has been explained within existing 
literature. After reviewing a number of institutionalist and neoliberal accounts of 
Japanese political economy in the post-bubble period, I will sketch the blueprint of a 
synthetic theory rooted in historical materialism that is able to integrate some of the 
insights of earlier theories while embedding them within an overarching framework of 
capitalist contradictions and organic crisis. 
However, it is important to note that not all leading institutionalist analyses of the 
post-war Japanese model share these assumptions. Providing a somewhat contrarian 
approach to understanding the period of rapid economic approach, Yasusuke Murakami's 
(1996, 1984) neo-Weberian approach also highlights the role of the state in providing 
conditions for rapid economic growth, but from a perspective that nonetheless recognizes 																																																								5 Here, a regime of accumulation refers to the set of economic, political and social institutions and 
relations, both formal and informal, state and non-state, that exist to aid the process of production and 
capital accumulation in a given society, including regulations and policies aimed at firms and relations both 
among firms and between firms, the state, and labour groups. 
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the fundamental significance of favorable structural global economic conditions. To start 
with, Murakami considers the influence of cultural factors on the Japanese development 
model, the "Japan Inc." thesis of Abegglen as largely unsatisfactory for explaining 
Japan's post-war boom. Murakami (1984) claims that post-war industrial development 
was buttressed by general structural conditions of gradually falling costs of production, 
and that this was the fundamental driver of growth. The demand provided by the 
American market and technology transfers from the United States were among the 
primary causes of this.  
Murakami's argument thus contrasts with those of Pempel and Johnson, who have 
emphasized the role of the state as a more fundamental driver of growth. Nonetheless, 
Murakami argues that under these overall conditions favorable to growth, the state still 
had a role to play in limiting the contradictions that emanated from these conditions. In 
particular, the state played a crucial role in reducing the tendency toward over-
competition that were caused by the general trend of falling costs of production. It did 
this by promoting cartelization (setting up barriers to competition that would prevent 
bankruptcy and help restore conditions for profitable accumulation) and export-oriented 
dumping-like policies (which serve to spur a rebound in domestic production, thus 
promoting accumulation) on an industry-specific basis during periods of economic 
stagnation. Conversely, it promoted domestic demand-driven production and market 
competition during periods of economic growth.  
Murakami argues that this overall developmentalist approach kept Japanese 
capitalism in a state of stability and balance, never becoming too market-driven to 
become unstable (through a constant wave of start-ups and bankruptcies, hirings and 
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firings) and never becoming so state-controlled as to stifle market-driven innovation and 
international competitiveness. He emphasizes how this produced a remarkable degree of 
stability in Japanese industry: in steel, automobiles and synthetic fibers, there was very 
little change in the rank order in size of the ten largest firms from the early 1950s to the 
mid-1960s, even as the scale of production increased ten-fold (in the case of steel). 
Nonetheless, Murakami recognizes that this had a negative effect on firms in many 
countries, and argues that the protectionist barriers that ensured this stability existed far 
longer than they were necessary economically or justified politically by Japan's relative 
economic backwardness. Either way, Murakami shows how Japanese state-led 
developmentalism was an important part of the post-war boom, though perhaps more as a 
means of ensuring systemic stability than in actually promoting rapid accumulation.  
 
Institutional approaches to the study of Japanese politics 
Aside from the focus given to political economic structures and institutions in 
explanations of Japan's post-war order, a number of approaches have considered the 
institutional logic of Japan's post-war political and electoral system, often understanding 
them as providing the basis for political stability, anchoring ruling relations while also 
structuring the distribution of power and goods in Japanese society at large. While these 
three approaches to understanding Japan's political institutions are not meant to represent 
explanations for the economic successes of the post-war period, they do provide implicit 
arguments about the ways Japan's political institutions operated to produce several 
decades of stable political order under LDP one-party rule, issues that are highly relevant 
to our consideration of the causes of Japan's stable and hegemonic post-war order overall. 
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One of the leading approaches in this respect has been Curtis's (1988) survey of 
the Japanese political system from the 1950s to the 1980s, which points to several 
features of Japan's political institutions that have promoted stability and thus facilitated 
economic growth and development. Curtis argues that even though the LDP maintained 
power, the political system changed significantly between the 1950s and 1980s. In 
particular, he posits that there was a move from confrontational and polarizing politics in 
the 1950s to consensual and moderate politics in the 1980s, which enabled the LDP to 
retain its dominance even in the face of changes to its core support groups, such as 
farmers and small business owners, which declined in number throughout the postwar 
period. 
Similarly to Curtis, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (2009) offer a rational choice 
institutionalist explanation of Japanese political and social order that eschews cultural 
explanations for Japanese social conditions, instead arguing that Japanese function like 
all other humans as rational actors attempting to maximize gains within the institutional 
structure of the given political system. Rather than reflecting any primordial Japanese 
cultural characteristics (such as groupism or respect for authority), the way agents act 
within Japanese politics is conditioned by the particular characteristics of Japanese 
political institutions. The de facto one party rule of the LDP up to 1993 then was less a 
product of the Japanese electorate's preference for one party rule than of the institutional 
advantages that accrued to the LDP via the electoral system. Consequently, the authors 
predicted that with the electoral reforms of 1993, which brought about the end of the 
multi-member electoral system and its replacement with a hybrid system combining 
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single member districts and proportionate representation, Japanese politics would be 
transformed, and the era of LDP dominance would definitively end. At the same time, 
they predicted that many of the institutions that the LDP and other parties developed 
internally to help win elections, including candidate-centered political support groups 
called kōenkai, the highly decentralized policymaking body of the LDP called the Policy 
Affairs Research Council (PARC), and LDP's intraparty factions, would disappear, no 
longer relevant in the context of a transformed political system. 
Offering a more recent analysis of political institutions that bridges the gap 
between analyses of the pre-reform period – what was known as the 1955 system of 
unaltered LDP rule under a mixed-member electoral system and lasted until 1993 – and 
the post-reform changes to Japan's political institutions and ruling relations, Krauss and 
Pekkanen (2010) have argued that rather than declining, many of the key institutions of 
the LDP – the PARC, kōenkai and factions –remain relevant to the LDP even after 
electoral reform. Rather than understanding these institutions as inherently created to help 
win elections and distribute powerful positions (both nationally and within the party) in 
relation to the constraints and incentives posed by the Japanese electoral system (as 
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth do), Krauss and Pekkanen argue that these internal LDP 
institutions developed for particular historical reasons, not simply as effects of the 
electoral system. Krauss and Pekkanen then give evidence that these institutions have not 
declined in importance since electoral reform. Indeed, at the time of writing (2019), it 
appears that at least the PARC and factions are witnessing a renaissance within the LDP, 
even if central party organs for fundraising and political support have undermined the 
kōenkai. 
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The long decline: Theorizing crisis in Heisei Japan 
 Though many of the theorizations of Japan's post-war boom, including those of 
Johnson, Okimoto, Murakami and Pempel, were successful in explaining dynamics in 
Japanese political economy until the 1990s, events since then force us to reconsider many 
of their insights. While the period up until the 1990s saw rapid and then moderate GDP 
growth, the period since the 1990s has seen Japan's economy virtually stand still: Japan's 
nominal GDP (measured in yen) in 2014 was less than in 1996 (Sekai Keizai n.d.). 
Moreover, unemployment and inequality have grown while public debt has skyrocketed 
(Wakatabe 2015). Now a quarter century old, Japan's prolonged economic crisis greatly 
overshadows the preceding period of rapid industrialization. What accounts for this 
seemingly sudden change in economic fortunes for Japan and why has this crisis proven 
so intractable? According to Vogel (2006), explanations for Japan's current conjuncture 
of crisis fall into two camps. On one hand, policy-centric analysts such as Pempel (1998), 
Johnson (1995) and Vogel himself tend to associate the long period of economic 
stagnation since the 1990s with relatively superficial, incidental or easily reconcilable 
failures of policy (see also Posen 1998; Krugman 1998; Harada 1999). According to 
Vogel, this position sees the extended crisis as the result of a culmination of technical 
policy mistakes to narrow problems, including mistaken Bank of Japan interest rate 
settings both before and after the bubble; banking regulation that came too late in the 
crisis; and consumption tax hikes that were poorly timed to coincide with the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. According to this perspective, then, Japan's model remains no less suited 
to the contemporary world than to that of forty years ago, and can be made to work again 
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if only it can be slightly tweaked to adjust to the narrowly circumscribed new challenges 
of the world today. 
 On the other hand, a number of thinkers on both the left and the right have 
attributed Japan's problems to far deeper structural challenges (see, for example, Itoh 
2000; Katz 1998). They have argued that Japan's continued economic growth after the 
mid-1970s (when other developed countries faced serious crises of stagflation) came 
about not because of but in spite of its development model, or that the model consistently 
overshadowed or exacerbated deep contradictions, only postponing an inevitable crisis. 
According to these explanations, Japan's period of growth in the 1950s through to the 
1970s and not the period of crisis since the 1990s is what must be seen as an historical 
anomaly. Moreover, Japan's developmentalist model poses significant barriers to 
overcoming the crisis and must be substantially overhauled if the crisis is to be overcome. 
After reviewing the argument for the policy-centric perspectives I will examine structural 
explanations of the crisis. 
 In his sociological insitutionalist sketch of reform in the 1990s, Vogel (2006) 
argues that far from standing still in the face of growing challenges, Japan has chosen a 
path to reform that follows the path dependencies of the old system, keeping certain 
elements of it intact while remodeling others and forcefully rejecting any wholesale 
adoption of the American neoliberal model. However, unlike some of the structuralist 
critiques developed below, Vogel does not see the lack of deep structural reform and 
liberalization as a result of unresponsive institutions or stubbornly laggard politicians, 
instead characterizing the modest reforms that have taken place as adequate and 
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politicians and bureaucrats and the Japanese people just do not want reforms that would 
make Japan … more competitive yet less stable or that would attack structural problems 
at the expense of massive unemployment or other social dislocation … why should we 
expect the Japanese political system to deliver reforms that the Japanese people do not 
want?" (45). Vogel points to an array of policy changes in labour relations, corporate 
governance and finance and argues that these changes have been brought about through a 
combination of rational economic, institutional and sociological incentives.  
Vogel argues that with regard to policy reform, "the government pursued 
incremental reforms; packaged delicate political compromises, with considerable 
compensation to the potential losers; and designed reforms to preserve the core 
institutions of the Japanese model in the face of new challenges and to build on the 
strengths of those institutions as much as possible" (218). At the same time, corporations 
"strived to adjust as much as possible without undermining … cooperative relations [with 
workers, banks and suppliers] and to leverage the benefits of these relationships to 
overcome their problems" (218). To the extent that liberalization has happened, in all of 
these areas, it has been executed carefully so as to cause as little disruption as possible. 
Vogel predicts a continuation of this trend of gradual reform and policy drift within the 
overarching contours of the existing model. 
Ultimately, while there is value in Vogel's mobilization of a sociological lens and 
engagement with the varieties of capitalism literature in challenging the assumed virtues 
of a liberalization model for Japan, there are major limits to Vogel's rather rose-tinted 
appraisal of the status quo. Regardless of how Japanese people and bureaucrats may feel 
about the current conjuncture, and regardless of whatever affinity they may have for the 
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existing system, there are obvious contradictions with the existing model that Vogel's 
narrow and superficial policy-focused analysis misses. The public may be satisfied with a 
system that has been kept mostly intact, albeit under conditions of economic stagnation, 
but insofar as this status quo has only been preserved in the face of ballooning public debt, 
a rapidly shrinking workforce and social security and healthcare costs that are projected 
to skyrocket, it is unclear how much longer such a model will be sustainable, something 
that Vogel's relatively narrow focus obfuscates. 
In a similar vein, Pempel (1998) explored the implications of creative 
conservatism in the 1990s, reaching similar conclusions as Vogel. Pointing to electoral 
reform, the increase in welfare spending and the reduced role of bureaucratic industrial 
policy, Pempel argued that a regime shift had already taken place and that Japan in the 
1990s would be different from Japan in the 1960s. However, as with Vogel, this frame of 
analysis is concerned with superficial policies and institutions, and misses the importance 
of structural political economic conditions. Pempel may recognize the superficial 
problems facing Japan (the flawed multi-member district electoral system, the lack of 
adequate eldercare institutions for a rapidly aging society and the fiscal and financial 
problems associated with the bubble economy and the bad debt crisis) but he fails to 
understand these as mere symptoms of deeper problems. In that context, while the 
changes that have taken place appear to Pempel as a regime shift, in reality, the 
underlying structures that brought about many of these problems remain largely 
unchanged. Ultimately, it is hard to justify the perspective that Japan has already 
remodeled itself or gone through a regime shift, or a transformation in the core power 
relations among major social forces within the state, economy and society. Although 
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certain reforms have succeeded in addressing superficial symptoms of the crisis as they 
have appeared, as I will show below fundamental contradictions underlying the crisis 
remain largely unresolved. For Pempel and Vogel, the changes to Japanese political and 
economic institutions needed to overcome the crisis were already made in the 1990s. 
However, twenty years later, the idea that Japan reformed a little bit – just the right 
amount – in response to a relatively circumscribed set of challenges appears increasingly 
untenable. 
A further policy-centric perspective is that of Rosenbluth and Ties (2010). They 
share the optimism of Vogel about Japan's prospects in the coming decade, but imply that 
the changes in Japan's political institutions and economic policies have been 
transformative rather than merely incremental. They see the 1990s as a period in which 
Japan successfully reformed its political process from one of corrupt clientelism to one of 
responsible, policy-centric and competitive party politics; while the economy shifted 
away from the closed-door convoy model towards a liberal and competitive market 
model congruent with the changing global economy. In particular, the electoral reform of 
1994 is seen as a key turning point. The old system of multi-member districts where 
candidates from the same party competed against each other was replaced by a system 
that combined first past the post with proportional representation, ended the intra-party 
competition that had led to factionalism within the LDP and had decreased the 
significance of policy-based campaigning in relation to network-building and clientelism. 
With the electoral reform, the policy imperatives of the LDP shifted away from appeasing 
various factions and the clientele groups from which they collected votes and towards 
building a coherent, party-wide policy agenda.  
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In the economic sphere, this also involved a reduction in subsidies to 
unproductive industries and agriculture, which had also existed as a vote-buying 
mechanism that worked against the interests of economic efficiency. Koizumi's 2001 rise 
to power within the LDP, despite lacking strong factional backing among the party elite, 
and his willingness to pursue policies such as postal privatization that defied established 
factional and clientele group interests (the postal zoku6 was one of the most entrenched 
policy circles and the postmasters association was one of the most significant clienteles 
for the LDP) further demonstrate this trend. Overall, Rosenbluth and Thies thus expect 
that this new system will ultimately prove to be more viable as a model for Japan in the 
twenty-first century than the model that brought it such rapid economic growth in the late 
twentieth. 
In contrast to this policy-centered approach, a number of theorists have stressed 
the need for a structuralist accounting of Japan's economic malaise. Writing from a more 
neoliberal perspective, Katz (1998), for example, argues that the crisis is fundamentally 
rooted in deep structural flaws in the Japanese model of capitalism. The same 
developmentalist approach to industrial policy that had enabled rapid economic growth in 
the 1950s and 1960s had led to the development of an unbalanced and in many ways 
inefficient economy since the 1970s. Katz argues that while the Japanese state played an 
important role in the early stages of industrialization through an industrial policy that 
promoted the development of fledgling industries through subsidies and protections and 
therefore hastened the speed of industrialization, these policies are long-outdated and 
																																																								
6 The term zoku literally translates as "tribe" and refers to mostly backbench LDP lawmakers with 
specialized knowledge personal connections with the bureaucracy in a particular policy area. It is discussed 
further is Chapter 4. 
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incompatible with the mature and declining industries of the post-1970s era. Instead 
weak, uncompetitive industries are kept afloat at the expense of internationally 
competitive ones and the economy as a whole is dragged down by their weight. 
Katz (1998) argues that at around the time of the first oil shock in 1973, Japan's 
leading exporters had already reached a high level of international competitiveness and 
that the phase of MITI-led catch-up development should have ended and been replaced 
with a more liberal, regulatory approach to state intervention in the economy without 
protections and barriers to imports. However, this did not happen and the state instead 
maintained its dirigiste approach to the economy, continuing to restrict imports and 
providing protections to declining industries in sectors such as construction, retail, and 
shipbuilding. While imports rose faster than GDP during the industrialization of most 
now-developed countries, in Japan they grew slower; imports in 1990 were lower as a 
percentage of GDP than they had been in 1950. By the 1980s, Japan was exceptional in 
its virtual lack of imports for anything other than crude natural resources that did not exist 
in Japan, such as oil and coal. By refusing to open up other industries to foreign 
competition, MITI protected them from pressures that might have curtailed corruption, 
domestic price gouging and industry collusion. Instead, with declining productivity in 
many protected uncompetitive industries, the Japanese economy could only grow by 
bolstering its trade surplus and borrowing. By setting up restrictions in imports, the state 
(through MITI and the Fair Trade Commission) allowed domestic cartels to charge high 
prices domestically and use their inflated revenues to sell their products abroad for 
below-market prices. Super-competitive exporting firms gave the image of a highly 
advanced economy overseas, but domestically the economy was riven by contradictions 
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and problems. For Katz, the crisis of the bubble economy was thus a culmination of this 
downward spiral that began in the 1970s. Domestically, high prices dampened 
consumption and led firms to re-invest a significant share of revenue each year for 
export-oriented production. It is out of this dynamic that the popular phrase "rich Japan, 
poor Japanese" emerged. 
In arguing the need to fully abandon the protectionist model, Katz (1998) claims that 
the solution to the crisis is not for Japan to simply emulate the United States. Concretely, 
however, his four policy prescriptions closely resemble this. First, he argues that Japan 
must move to a more competitive electoral system less captured by interest groups and 
more driven by the interests of the middle class electorate. Second, Japan must establish a 
more competitive and less cartelized domestic economy. Third, it must remove barriers to 
imports and inward FDI so that uncompetitive sectors can face the pressures of 
competition and improve their efficiency (or lose out). Finally, it must create a financial 
system where risk is individualized and borne by the individual rather than shared or 
dispersed throughout a financial grouping as the keiretsu system allowed (and most 
companies' bad decisions or liquidity crises were bailed out either by their keiretsu banks 
or by the state). Katz admits that such a system would lead to a significant rise in 
unemployment but argues that within a few years the ten million or so jobs lost by the 
shock of liberalization would be back (though we might assume that global competitive 
pressures would make it unlikely that these jobs would be high-paying or protected 
through the lifetime employment system). 
 Making an argument similar to Katz, Anchordoguy (2005) has argued that Japan's 
period of economic stagnation since the 1990s can be explained by its inability to 
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effectively reform a highly interventionist economic system no longer compatible with a 
globalizing world economy. Like Katz, she argues that Japan's model of "communitarian 
capitalism" involves a highly inefficient system of protections for inefficient firms and 
unproductive workers that hold back more productive firms and workers, undermining 
the competitiveness of the economy as a whole. While this may produce a relatively high 
degree of equality of outcomes (something that Anchordoguy does not seem to value very 
highly), it stifles the entrepreneurial energy of Japanese people and renders Japanese 
firms less competitive than they otherwise would be in world markets. Moreover, lacking 
proper means to reward bold, risk-taking activity (such as significant dividend payouts to 
executives), the system stifles risk-taking, holding back Japanese leadership in cutting-
edge industries such as information technology and biotechnology, while incentivizing 
firms to make low-risk, low-reward decisions only. Anchordoguy maintains that while 
the communitarian capitalist system may have been effective in an era of Fordist mass 
production where Japan could easily benefit from new technologies provided by more 
advanced economies (in particular the US), these institutions are not effective in 
promoting growth and innovation in the economies of leading countries who need to 
develop cutting edge technologies themselves. In response, like Katz, Anchordoguy calls 
for greater liberalization and deregulation of the Japanese economy, removing protections 
and supports for inefficient producers and workers and vested interests, and creating new 
incentives for productive workers, executives and firms, implicitly calling for the 
abandonment of Japan's coordinated market economy form and convergence with the 
liberal market economy form discussed in the varieties of capitalism literature (see also 
Hall and Soskice 2001). 
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 With parallels to Katz and Anchordoguy, Schoppa (2006) has tried to explain why 
the Japanese state has been relatively slow to respond to long-term problems of industrial 
hollowing out and demographic decline that are symptomatic of the crisis. Though 
different in many respects, Schoppa implicitly shares many of Katz's assumptions about 
the causes of the crisis: the Japanese economy is over-regulated; the labour costs of the 
lifetime employment system make it uncompetitive; the state and lead firms distort the 
market by propping up inefficient sectors; state spending on infrastructure is too high; 
and the lack of an external, fluid labour market poses barriers to global competitiveness. 
While Schoppa shies away from advocating a full neoliberalization of Japanese economy 
and raises concerns about the American or British model, there should be no doubt that 
his Third Way prescriptions would have severe consequences for the working class, 
exacerbating already worrying trends of growing poverty, inequality and unemployment 
(Wakatabe 2015). Moreover, in deriding infrastructure spending in transportation and 
construction, he misses the way this has served as an integral element of Japan's "welfare 
through work" strategy (Miura 2012). With an already large budgetary deficit and public 
welfare provisioning that remains comparatively underfunded, it is unclear how further 
neoliberalization could do anything but make an already precarious situation even worse. 
Therefore, while the neoliberal critiques of Katz, Anchordoguy and to a lesser extent 
Schoppa are correct in pointing to deep structural contradictions in the Japanese political 
economy, the root causes of this structural crisis must be located not in Japan's 
interventionist or protectionist industrial policy but in capitalism itself, among other 
things. 
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 In contrast to these neoliberal critiques, Makoto Itoh (2000, 1992, 1990) has made 
a forceful argument about deep-rooted flaws in the Japanese political economy, but from 
a perspective rooted in the thinking of Marxist political economist Kōzō Uno. To begin, 
in stark contrast with Johnson, Okimoto and others who continued to extol Japan's system 
well into the 1990s, Itoh shares the long term structural crisis perspective of Katz, 
arguing that "the Japanese economy has been in continuous downturn since 1973, 
initiated by the inflationary crisis of 1973-75" (Itoh 2000: 1).  
Itoh understands the high growth period until 1973 as being historically 
exceptional and contingent on at least four conditions: 1) a favorable international 
environment led by easy access to the American market and the guarantee of security 
under the US security umbrella; 2) the availability of new technologies, mainly from the 
United States, which enabled easy industrial upgrading; 3) favorable conditions of trade, 
especially cheap oil and other raw materials which Japan needed to import; 4) the 
availability of cheap and docile (male) labour, ensured by the steady movement of mostly 
young people from the countryside to the cities. The fourth point is especially important 
in how it relates to Japan's famed lifetime employment system. Companies could pay 
workers a very low starting salary while guaranteeing them permanent employment and 
annual pay rises. Given the relative youth of the Japanese workforce, this system of 
overexploiting young workers (while underexploiting older workers) helped to guarantee 
firms a very high rate of accumulation (as long as the workforce remained young) while 
simultaneously providing workers with the conditions of job security and life-course 
stability needed to ensure worker loyalty and dedication to the firm. 
		 45	
Under these labour conditions, patterns of accumulation for manufacturing capital 
were able to raise labour productivity by nearly ten percent a year during the 1950s and 
60s, more than making up for the six percent nominal annual increases in wages. Firms 
also made rapid investments in capital equipment to the tune of 22 percent a year, 
facilitating future growth in labour productivity and accumulation (Itoh 2000). Moreover, 
high private savings among Japanese workers enabled the Bank of Japan to keep interest 
rates low, which ensured that banks could maintain easy access to credit. However, this 
model, and in particular the favorable conditions that had underscored it, eventually 
eroded. 
Itoh argues that the decision of the Nixon Administration to abandon the Dollar-
Gold Standard, in part a response to the export threat of Japan and Germany, led to 
inflationary crises around the world (Itoh 2000). This, coupled with the oil shock of 1973, 
led to a substantial increase in raw materials costs, which Japan relied on heavily as 
imports. At the same time, as the flow of workers from the countryside to the cities 
slowed, workers found themselves in a stronger position to negotiate wage increases. 
While this led to an expansion in workers' purchasing power during the 1970s, it led to a 
contraction in the rate of accumulation. These dynamics underscored the initial decline in 
Japan's rate of growth from 10 percent over the period from 1955 to 1973 down to 4 
percent from 1974 to 1990. 
 Itoh (2000) suggests, then, that the crisis did not begin in 1990 with the bursting 
of the real estate bubble but in 1973 with the breakdown of the Dollar-Gold Standard and 
the first oil crisis that massively increased its import costs. Consequently, the period from 
1973 until the bursting of the bubble in 1990 was marked by a succession of policies 
		 46	
designed to restore conditions for profitable accumulation. Initially, by embracing 
emergent technologies and shutting down old plants, Japanese industry was able to 
increase exports to the US, restore a trade surplus and renew conditions of productivity 
growth as well as GDP growth in the late 1970s. However, this period was punctuated by 
the second oil shock of 1979, as well as the end of the US Dollar-Gold standard and the 
revaluation of the yen that ensued, factors that ultimately undermined exports and stifled 
growth. While the mid-1980s saw a return to growth and a greater export surplus, it was 
quickly undermined by the effects of the 1985 Plaza Accord and the soaring yen, which 
led to depressed profits in manufacturing, growing unemployment and reduced GDP 
growth. Subsequently, while the late 1980s period of the real estate and financial asset 
bubble brought back strong GDP growth and profits for firms, as well as a decline in the 
budget deficit, it only occurred through the rapid expansion of asset values (especially in 
real estate) and not through real growth in the productive economy. 
 For Itoh, then, while the period up until the early 1970s was marked by robust 
GDP growth, increasing wages and rising labour productivity, a variety of factors, 
including the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Dollar-Gold standard and the system of 
fixed exchange rates, economic globalization and the decline in the rate of profit (which 
was partly a result of Japanese industry catching up with the US and no longer enjoying 
the benefits of being a technological follower) destabilized this regime of accumulation. 
The 1970s and 1980s was thus a volatile period in which the state attempted to adjust to 
the new reality whilst maintaining much of the old system, managing to mostly hold 
things together superficially while structural contradictions deepened beneath the surface. 
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Ultimately, however, these contradictions could not be displaced and in the wake of the 
bursting of the asset bubble, a prolonged period of economic stagnation set in. 
 For Itoh (2000), the period since the 1990s has been characterized by five 
significant structural challenges to the Japanese political economic order. First, the 
deflationary spiral in stocks and asset prices severely depressed investment and recovery 
through most of the 1990s. Even today, we can see this tendency continuing, as the 
government has lowered the interest rate below zero and yet still cannot induce 
significant borrowing and investment on the part of capital. Second, and reiterating the 
point made by Schoppa (2006) and Katz (1998), the 1990s and 2000s have been beset by 
an industrial hollowing out, as major firms have moved many and in some cases all of 
their export-oriented production overseas. Third, consumer confidence has continued to 
be stagnant, falling continuously even before the scheduled consumption tax hike that has 
already been postponed until fall 2019. A public unwilling to spend even under 
conditions of comparatively low consumption taxes has severely undermined the capacity 
for the economy to escape deflationary pressures.7 Fourth, the ballooning public debt, 
which now accounts for 930 trillion yen, almost 200 percent of GDP (MOF 2016) not 
only raises challenges for the long-term fiscal viability of the state but also consumes an 
increasing share of the state budget for interest payments (Itoh 2000). Finally, and most 
significantly, the decline in Japan's population, exacerbated by a low birth rate and 
rapidly aging society has further reduced labour productivity while additionally 
burdening the state with rapidly escalating welfare and social security costs. With Itoh, 
																																																								
7 And low rates of domestic consumption have not been counterbalanced by high rates of consumption 
abroad either: the number of outward tourists is virtually unchanged since 1996 (despite more than 
quintupling in the two decades prior to 1996) (JTB 2019). 
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we can thus see the progression from a period of genuine expansion until the early 1970s 
to a transitory period of moderate growth that was beset by contradictions and finally to a 
period where the contradictions deepened, conditions for growth diminished, and the 
crisis became entrenched. 
 In addition to Itoh's Marxian analysis of the crisis, another critical approach to 
understanding it has come from the French regulation school, including Robert Boyer 
(2014) and Sebastien Lechevalier (2014). In particular, Lechevalier (2014) has argued 
that Japan's economic crisis, the lost decade, came about primarily as a result of 
neoliberal restructuring that began in the 1980s under Nakasone. Arguing that such 
restructuring of the economy was actually unnecessary at the time and done for political 
as well as ideological reasons, Lechevalier then contends that the economic bubble and 
subsequent crash, as well as the social disruptions caused by the economic crisis came 
about because of an incoherent transition away from the old model of Japanese capitalism 
without a coherent plan to replace it with something of a functional equivalent. Instead of 
fully reordering its political economic regulatory regime along American lines, for 
example, the transition involved an uneven shift towards American style institutions in 
some areas, while retaining Japanese style institutions in other areas and even reforming 
institutions in a continental European style in others. This institutional incoherence has 
thus replaced the high degree of institutional synergy that previously existed (such as the 
synergy between the long-term and secure financing relations between firms and lead 
banks within a business network on the one hand and the long-term and secure 
relationship between labor and capital characterized by lifetime employment on the other), 
		 49	
causing contradictions that have prevented a return to profitable conditions for 
accumulation, thus precluding any return to consistent growth. 
 While there is certainly much of merit with the approach of the regulation school, 
and the analysis of this dissertation draws much insight from the approach, Lechevalier's 
analysis is nonetheless excessively charitable to the realities of Japanese political 
economy in the 1970s and 1980s. While the neoliberal direction (inconsistent as it may 
have been) that Japan began to chart under Nakasone is no doubt partially to blame for 
the bubble economy and for the chronic under-consumption and deflation that has 
followed (as well as mounting social problems), it would be a mistake to argue, as 
Lechevalier implicitly does, that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the 
traditional Japanese regulatory regime up until the 1980s. As my analysis will show (and 
as others such as Schoppa, Itoh and Katz have done), the success of this model was 
overdetermined by favorable structural conditions, notably a young population and 
favorable global conditions, that overshadowed gaping inefficiencies inherent to the 
model. While the conditions of crisis that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s could have 
been averted, neither a continuation of the status quo of Japanese style political economy 
nor a shift to neoliberalism (whether fragmentary or consistent) could have ameliorated 
the underlying structural contradictions inherent in the Japanese model. Needless to say, 
there are reasons, rooted primarily in the nature of Japan's political order, why a different 
type of transformation that in hindsight might have worked was not pursued, which will 
be of concern to us in later chapters. 
 
The welfare state and social reproduction in post-war Japan 
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While the approaches of Itoh and Lechevalier provide important insights into the 
contradictions that emerged out of the post-war model, both in terms of its growing 
incompatibility with neoliberal globalization and of its increasing inability to ensure that 
the capitalist and working classes could continue to benefit absolutely, they do not 
directly incorporate a gendered analysis of Japanese political economy and the role of 
social reproduction in either the period of economic growth and political stability or in 
the later period of crisis and stagnation. How have feminists integrated the role of gender 
and reproduction into their understanding of Japanese political economy? Before we can 
explore how the roles of gender and reproduction are integrated into understandings of 
political economy in general, it is necessary to consider how the post-war Japanese 
welfare state has been theorized and what its gendered implications have been. Building 
on the work of Tarō Miyamoto (2007), Mari Miura has produced one of the most 
innovative models for explaining the relationship between production and reproduction in 
post-war Japan, using a model that she calls "welfare through work" (Miura 2012). 
Miura's concept of "welfare-through-work," the Japanese system of social welfare, takes 
as its point of departure the welfare state schematic famously developed by Gøsta Esping-
Andersen (1990) that posits a three-world model of welfare states under capitalism.  
Esping-Andersen argues that welfare states emerged as a result of different 
configurations of class interests in government, particularly in the early twentieth century. 
Across Europe and North America, three different models of welfare states emerged, 
depending on prevailing configurations of class forces. In North America and the UK, 
where the capitalist class was most politically dominant, limited, residual welfare states 
emerged that provided limited provisioning and left as much room as possible for market 
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forces. In contrast, in continental Europe, more conservative, statist and landed interests 
achieved political dominance, along with the more subordinate consent of less well-
established bourgeois classes. Less wedded than their Atlantic compatriots to the values 
of free markets, and driven to achieve a modernization project that could keep the social 
fabric of traditional class society intact, they instituted programs that were more 
expansive than their liberal counterparts but highly stratified, designed to entrench rather 
than overcome traditional class differences and gender roles whilst pacifying and 
coopting subordinate classes into the overall state-building project. Finally, in Nordic 
Europe, organized labour and their social democratic parties were able to achieve 
political ascendancy in the early 20th century, buttressed by class coalitions with agrarian 
interests that were far more inchoate than on the continent. These red-green8 coalitions 
built social democratic welfare states characterized by high levels of spending on 
programs that were universal in scope and designed to promote social equality and human 
freedom, dismantling rather than entrenching traditional social hierarchies and gender 
divisions. 
While Esping-Andersen's model has been highly influential, it has been criticized 
for being unable to adequately categorize the Japanese model. Esping-Andersen himself 
has admitted difficulty in finding a place for Japan in his model in later work, 
characterizing it as an outlier, or a liberal-conservative hybrid. Miura takes Esping-
Andersen's basic three-category model as a starting point, locating each category as the 
meeting point of two axes: on one axis is the extent to which the state provides support 
																																																								
8 While "red-green" has in recent decades signified electoral alliances between social democratic and 
ecologist political parties, in pre-war and early post-war Scandinavia, the term signified alliances between 
social democratic and centrist agrarian political parties (see also Esping-Andersen 1990). 
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for income maintenance, through programs such as unemployment insurance, social 
security, disability pay and bereavement pay; on the other is the extent to which the state 
actively supports employment maintenance, actively intervening in the economy in order 
to keep unemployment to a minimum, through infrastructure spending, protections 
against dismissal, and other proactive make-work policies. 
 Though far simpler than Esping-Andersen's model, this two-axis model of Miura's 
largely replicates his categories. Miura characterizes countries that generally provide low 
levels of income maintenance and employment maintenance as "workfare" states, which 
correspond with the market-based liberal welfare model characteristic of the Anglo 
countries. She lists countries that provide low levels of employment maintenance but high 
levels of income maintenance and similarly mirror the conservative welfare model of 
continental Europe as "welfare without work". Countries that provide high levels of both 
income maintenance and employment maintenance cohere with the social democratic 
welfare model of Scandinavia. Miura terms these countries "welfare with work." 
However, based on her two-by-two model, a fourth category not present in Esping-
Andersen's model appears, one that provides low levels of income maintenance (i.e., 
relatively little funding for unemployment insurance, old age security and disability pay) 
but high levels of employment maintenance. She terms this model "welfare through 
work" and cites it as the welfare model of Japan (as well as Switzerland). 
How have the Japanese state and capital mediated the tension between capitalist 
tendencies to maximally exploit labour – beyond its ability (or willingness) to reproduce 
itself – and its need for human labour to be reproduced intergenerationally? How has the 
current crisis come to manifest the state's increasing inability to effectively mediate this 
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contradiction? Though a comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this chapter, in 
part, they have done so through a rigorously enforced and protected gendered division of 
labour geared at producing and safeguarding stable male breadwinner families whereby 
women could be relied on wholly to take care of domestic labour including childrearing 
(and occasionally fill gaps in the labour market as an industrial reserve army). This policy 
regime can best be characterized as "welfare through work" and has included several 
critical elements (Miura 2012), including (nearly) full male employment, lifetime 
employment, housewife tax incentives, and barriers to women's full participation in the 
workforce.  
First, through make-work projects, the state has actively sought to maintain full 
male employment through public financing, giving contracts away to companies in the 
construction industry in particular in order to re-employ working-age men during periods 
of economic downturn and heightened unemployment (Miura 2012). Second, through the 
lifetime employment system, companies have historically guaranteed permanent 
employment and progressive pay rises as long as their workers stay fully loyal to the 
company, accepting job transfers and long overtime hours (Miura 2012; Vogel 2006). 
Importantly, both of these policies have been implemented in lieu of generous welfare or 
unemployment insurance transfers, which have traditionally been minimal by 
international standards.  
Third, by providing tax deductions for secondary incomes under 1,030,000 yen 
(the equivalent of a 20 to 25 hour work week at or near the minimum wage), the state has 
promoted women's roles as housewives by incentivizing them to stay home or only work 
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part time (and in the process penalized dual breadwinner households) 9 (Miura 2012). 
Finally, by imposing barriers, both implicit and explicit, to women's full employment as 
permanent, career-track workers along the lifetime employment model,10 the state has 
tried to ensure that for most women, getting married was almost invariably the easiest 
means of ensuring economic security. Through all of these policy measures, the state has 
rigorously enforced a gender division of labour that reinforces women's economically 
subordinate relationship to their working husbands and entrenches their role as domestic 
workers. The system was thus designed specifically both to guarantee the stability of the 
male breadwinner/female housewife model and to make alternative arrangements difficult 
for women. While this produced a highly patriarchal social system that was oppressive to 
women (as well as to men, who were expected to work tremendously long hours), this 
system was successful in providing women with both the expectation and the means of 
bearing the burden of social reproduction work, including, crucially, childrearing.11 As a 
result, the Japanese state was able to ensure a birth rate capable of sustaining the 
domestic workforce.12  
 A further contribution to the study of social reproduction in post-war Japan of 
note is that of Margarita Estevez-Abe (2008). In an argument that in many ways 
corresponds with that of Miura in seeing programs for employment maintenance, and 																																																								
9 While less than five percent of men aged 25 to 55 worked in non-regular jobs (including part time, 
contract and dispatch jobs), nearly half of all women worked in non-regular jobs in 2000 (Miura 2012).  
10 Initially there were firm legal barriers that prevented women from being forced to work overtime which 
paradoxically reduced their employability; but otherwise there were always cultural expectations that they 
would only work until marriage or the birth of their first child so they were put on an employment track that 
made it impossible to be a breadwinner (see also Itoh 2000). 
11This tendency is demonstrated by Japan's "M-curve," where female employment is initially high for 
women in their early to mid twenties, but then dramatically drops during the childbearing years in the late 
twenties to mid forties before rising again, albeit only in a non-regular capacity (Itoh 2000; Schoppa 2006). 
12For example, in 1973, the fertility rate in Japan was 2.1 (MHLW 2012) 
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mechanisms to tie welfare provisioning –both corporate and publicly funded – to 
employment, Estevez-Abe argues that the development of Japan's welfare system had 
much to do with the post-war electoral system. Insofar as the multi-member district, 
single non-transferable vote system enabled (and required) that the LDP run multiple 
candidates against each other in the same district, the system encouraged campaigning 
based on candidates' personal appeal rather than simply the party label (since party label 
alone would not help specific candidates within a party get elected). Ultimately, this 
meant that the party was relatively weak institutionally, and struggled to control the 
impulses of LDP lawmakers anxious to win favor among their constituents with targeted 
(rather than universal) spending, particularly through public works and agricultural 
subsidies. Moreover, Estevez-Abe argues that since this electoral system tended to 
produce stable LDP majority governments, the LDP had a disincentive to raise taxes (she 
argues that unpopular though necessary policies such as taxes are likely to result in 
electoral losses for majority governments and are therefore more likely to be 
implemented by minority or coalition governments where blame can be shared), and thus 
had little means for funding universal programs, instead favoring more direct copayment 
arrangements as well as tax subsidies. Estevez-Abe shows how this system came to be 
increasingly tenuous after the 1970s, when economic growth slowed and population 
aging (combined with electoral threats from the left) necessitated greater social spending 
and the deficit quickly ballooned.  
Ultimately, however, due to the inertia caused by an electoral system that made 
credible promises of constituency-targeted pork-barrel spending the easiest guarantee of 
victory for individual candidates, things were slow to change, only shifting in the 1990s 
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when electoral defeat for the LDP enabled a new coalition of parties that eventually 
coalesced into the DPJ, the main opposition to the LDP since the 2000s. The new 
electoral system that combined first past the post with proportional representation 
produced a series of LDP-led coalition governments that were more responsive to the 
need for both tax raises and the expansion of universal programs as well as ultimately 
more willing to make cuts to agricultural and small business subsidies as well as restrain 
public works spending, measures that hurt the traditional base of the party. Estevez-Abe 
posits that electoral reform has gone some way to resolve contradictions in Japanese 
political economy, which she primarily equates with the electoral system and the 
clientelist and inefficient system of public administration and economic management it 
produced. Nonetheless, she also cautions that insofar as Japan has shifted to a more 
explicitly Westminster style electoral system with strong cabinet authority (rooted in the 
Prime Minister), more robust party affiliation and a weakened bureaucracy, it is at risk of 
seeing a shift to more neoliberal political order, as electoral incentives now strongly favor 
tax cuts, even if reduced state revenue necessitates spending cuts. 
Though Estevez-Abe's approach holds some merits in pointing to the 
contradictions caused by an electoral system that strongly oriented the LDP towards 
building an electoral coalition with relatively well-organized petit bourgeois interests 
(particularly in the underdeveloped countryside) that was ultimately neither very 
responsive to working class interests (as in social democratic countries) nor to those of 
capital (as in the US and UK), there is little evidence that electoral reform has done much 
to help Japan escape systemic political economic crisis. Indeed, it is now twenty-five 
years since electoral reform and economic growth remains lethargic while social 
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problems, including poverty and inequality have only worsened. Moreover, there is little 
evidence that the institutional political problems caused by the old system have been 
solved despite the shift to a new, pseudo-Westminster style electoral system. This 
includes not only corruption and the excessive influence of factional politics in the LDP's 
internal dynamics but also the lack of a credible electoral alternative to the LDP (despite 
the brief three year reign of the DPJ from 2009 to 2012). While electoral reform clearly 
had a major impact on Japanese politics in the immediate moment, it is clear, particularly 
in the aftermath of the DPJ's disastrous three-year reign, that the reforms did little to 
upend the underlying structures of Japanese political order, and recent years have seen in 
many ways a continuation to the old patterns of factionalism, corruption, bureaucratic 
rule and clientelism. 
Within Japan, another influential voice on welfare politics has been that of Mari 
Osawa (2013). Osawa has argued that Japan's welfare system can be characterized as 
following a "male breadwinner model," which she contrasts with the "dual support 
model" of Scandinavia and the "market-oriented model" of the Anglo countries. In this 
sense, her formulation reflects Esping-Andersen's three-group typology, rather than 
Miura's four-group typology, and places Japan with what Esping-Andersen characterized 
as the conservative or Christian democratic countries of continental Europe. Osawa 
shows how Japan's welfare system developed on the premise of single income 
breadwinner families, and shares with Miura an understanding of how this model was 
supported through a range of welfare policies.  
However, arguably providing a more critical edge to her analysis than Miura, 
Osawa also shows how this model only served to exacerbate the insecurity of families 
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and households who did not enjoy a male breadwinner income, including low-income, 
dual income families and single-mother households, showing how despite having the 
most egalitarian distribution of income based on market income alone (before transfers) 
of any country, Japanese welfare programs did little to combat inequality and poverty, 
and Japan's after-transfer distribution of income was more unequal than most developed 
countries. Osawa points to how Japan has consistently had among the highest rates of 
child poverty, and how compared to other countries, an extremely high percentage of 
households below the poverty line have two working parents. Overall, Osawa's largely 
empirical analysis suggests that in addition to providing carrots to incentivize the male 
breadwinner, female housewife model that Miura discusses, Japan's welfare system 
produced intense pressures on families that strayed from that norm. Osawa shows how 
measures driven by Ministry of Health and Welfare bureaucrats in the 1980s and 1990s 
attempted to challenge this dynamic by creating more robust social supports for working 
mothers in particular, but were generally rebuffed by more powerful bureaucrats in 
Finance and Construction ministries already committed to the infrastructure spending of 
the construction state. In other words, unlike its myriad institutions of employment 
support, particularly for male workers (the "welfare through work" component), Japan's 
traditional welfare system was in no way designed to promote stability and egalitarian 
outcomes, only acting as a last-minute safety-valve to support people living in poverty 
from destitution, not to actually pull them out of poverty. However egalitarian the 
Japanese social order may have been in the post war period, Osawa's analysis suggests 
that it was in spite of, rather than because of, the Japanese welfare state. 
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Overall, then, we can see how interpretations of the roles of Japan's welfare 
institutions, both formal and informal, in anchoring political and economic order, and 
their roles in not only the period of successful and stable hegemonic order until the 1990s 
but also during the period of crisis that has continued since then. The next chapter will 
seek to anchor some of the empirical and theoretical insights about the Japanese welfare 
regime within a broader discussion of social reproduction under capitalism in its overall 
presentation of the theoretical framework used in this dissertation. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided an overview of the existing literature debate over the 
political economy of post-war Japan. It has considered the literature debate of four main 
issues: 1) accounts of the causes and conditions of Japan's post-war boom; 2) 
explanations of Japan's political institutions and their influence on Japanese political 
economy overall; 3) explanations for Japan's period of crisis since the 1990s; and 4) 
explanations of Japan's model of welfare and social reproduction. It has considered how 
these various research questions have been considered from a range of theoretical 
perspectives, including institutionalist, neoliberal, Weberian, Marxist and feminist 
perspectives. It has thus explored how these four issues: the institutional and structural 
reasons for Japan's sustained and rapid economic growth in the postwar era; the 
institutional and structural reasons for the LDP's enduring monopoly on political power; 
the causes of Japan's quarter century of economic stagnation, as well as other political 
and social problems since the 1990s and the inability to find viable solutions to them; and 
the nature of Japan's institutions of social reproduction and their relationship with its 
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model of economic accumulation, have each been explored, largely separately in the 
literature. Building on this review, then, the rest of the dissertation will provide an 
analysis of Japan's post-war order that attempts to integrate these four issues. The next 
chapter will lay out a theoretical framework for this analysis of post-war Japanese 
political economic order that is primarily rooted in the work of Antonio Gramsci, while 
the four chapters that follow will each use that theoretical framework to explore the 
causes, conditions and consequences of political economic order of different eras of post-
war Japanese history. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical and analytical approach 
 Building on the analysis of existing approaches to Japanese political economy 
developed in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to develop an original theoretical 
framework for the analysis of Japan's post-war political economy. In doing so, it develops 
six elements of this framework, going through them in turn before providing an overall 
analysis of the theoretical perspective as a whole. First, it considers the basic 
methodological point of departure of this original work in historical materialism, 
borrowing from Gill (1993) and others to sketch out some of the underlying philosophical 
assumptions behind this approach. Second, within the Marxist canon in general it locates 
inspiration with the work of Antonio Gramsci (1992) in particular and provides an 
analysis of the work of Gramsci, including an exploration of Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony. Third, building on the basic formulation for hegemony provided by Gramsci, 
it seeks to parse out an original interpretation of the conditions necessary for hegemonic 
order, building on James O'Connor's (2003) explanation of political legitimation and 
capital accumulation as conditions necessary for hegemonic order by adding social 
reproduction as a third condition. Thus, the chapter's fourth aim is to provide an 
orientation towards feminist political economic understandings of social reproduction 
under capitalism.  
After this brief segue into a review of feminist political economic discussions of 
social reproduction it returns to its engagement with Gramsci, exploring Gramsci's 
notions of historic bloc, relations of force and considering their relevance to the analysis 
of post-war Japan. It then takes the Gramscian lens further into the post-war era through 
the neo-Gramscian approach of Robert Cox (1987), considering Cox's emphasis on the 
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dialectical interplay between world order, the state and domestic social forces in the 
building and maintaining of a hegemonic order as well as Cox's adaptation of Gramsci's 
concept of the relations of force. Next, it returns to consider a number of additional 
Gramscian concepts that are significant to the analysis of later chapters, including 
trasformismo and the Modern Prince, as well as Marx's (1977) conception of 
Bonapartism. Finally, it briefly considers the methodological and moral significance of 
incorporating a political ecological lens to the study of political economy and hegemony, 
not least in the context of global climate change. After developing these various elements 
of the theoretical framework, it then seeks to provide new life to the analysis, 
synthesizing these various elements into a cohesive theoretical framework and 
concretizing them in the context of post-war Japanese political economy. The chapter 
thus ends with a brief overview of the overall argument of the dissertation written 
through the theoretical framework developed here. 
 
Historical materialist methodology 
In contrast to many of the prevailing approaches to the study of Japanese political 
economy, which have predominantly been institutionalist or neoliberal in their 
orientation, this dissertation is anchored methodologically in a commitment to historical 
materialism. Historical materialism takes as its starting point a rejection of positivist, 
reductionist and methodological individualist assumptions of realism and liberalism (Gill 
1993; Maclean 1981). Rather than understanding theory and research as practices of 
detached objectivity, it sees theory as dialectically interwoven with praxis. As we study 
the world, we shape it, and it, in turn, shapes us. This is, however, different from some 
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variants of post-structuralism that may reject entirely the notion of a world independent 
of discourse. For historical materialists, there is a real, material world, conditioned by 
human ideation as well as by extra-discursive structural and historical conditions that set 
the conditions of possibility for human action. However, for Gramsci, if the relationship 
between theory and praxis is not unilinear but dialectical, then we have an obligation not 
only to understand the world but also to intervene in it ethically (Gill 1993). The social 
justice dimension of historical materialist theory is thus not merely a kind afterthought 
but rooted in its very epistemological foundations. 
 Thus the dialectical approach of historical materialism leads us to an 
epistemology that rejects the positivist separation of theory and praxis while also 
rejecting the anti-foundationalism of some other post-positivist approaches. Moreover, 
we see how these epistemological commitments lead directly to an understanding of 
theory (united with praxis) as an inherently ethical project. However, in addition to its 
opposition to the positivist underpinnings of many realist and liberal approaches that take 
natural science as their template for understanding the social world, historical materialism 
is founded on a rejection of methodological individualism and reductionism, instead 
understanding social reality as a dialectically interwoven totality (Gill 1993). Rather than 
seeing objects of inquiry as discrete, homogeneous individual units, historical materialists 
see them as necessarily parts of a greater whole, as well as wholes in their own right with 
their own constitutive parts. This is no truer than in historical materialists' understanding 
of the state. Rather than assuming states to be unitary and independent actors, exogenous 
to the international system and functionally detached from their domestic political 
spheres (as some realists may assume), historical materialists see states as deeply 
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imbricated with other actors and social forces, domestically, internationally and 
transnationally. Their interests and identity are never given but always in flux through 
dynamic engagement with the wider world. 
 Historical materialism thus rejects the subject-object dualism of positivism and 
the reductionist underpinnings of other structuralist approaches. But how does it actually 
explain social reality? Perhaps the best way to answer this question is to consider the 
historical materialist approach to four issues: history, power, continuity and change. The 
remainder of the section will chart the basic theoretical underpinnings of historical 
materialist understandings of these four concepts and in doing so provide a better 
understanding of what historical materialism can offer to the field of IR that may make it 
more adept at explaining continuity, change, and social reality in general, than other 
leading theories. 
 Historical materialists generally believe, to paraphrase Marx, that people make 
their own history, but not under conditions of their own choosing.13 In any given era, 
human agency is constrained by history: the conditions of the possible are historically 
given, though the direction towards which they are pushed is never pre-determined. The 
course of history is shaped by structural dynamics, themselves the distilled effect of past 
processes and struggles. History thus poses constraints on human action, but does not 
rigidly determine it. One of the most important insights of historical materialism, 
beginning with Marx but perhaps reaching its apex with Braudel (1980), has been an 
appreciation of the ultimate historicity of even the most seemingly permanent structural 
																																																								
13 Though stated most famously by Marx, as Williams (1983) has noted, this conception of history and 
human agency can be traced at least as far back as eighteenth century Italian philosopher Giambattista 
Vico. 
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conditions. Braudel's theory of history shows how the global political economy has 
always been embedded in deep structural foundations that largely go unnoticed and set 
the conditions of possibility for social life in any given moment, but that gradually 
change over the course of history and cannot be taken as permanent and unending 
conditions. Nevertheless, "history," in this way, poses real structural constraints to human 
action that are not eternal and universal but that may nonetheless be deeply embedded in 
practices of daily life. Braudel's conception of history thus enables us to understand 
elements of both continuity and change in world politics. Rather than understanding 
history as a simple linear process, Braudel draws our attention to the importance of 
different conceptions and rhythms of time: both the events-time that we can perceive over 
the course of a year or a human lifespan and the longue durée of slow moving time that 
may appear as permanent but in reality is dynamic. Neither the longue durée nor events-
time alone can explain the course of continuity and change in history; the two are in 
practice co-constitutive in particular conjunctures. 
 A further question for historical materialists relates to cause and effect. While 
positivists assume that there exists a simple and linear relationship between the two, 
historical materialists understand the relationship to be much more complex and 
dialectical (see also Harvey 1996). To posit cause and effect is to assume that either of 
these can simply be isolated, separated from the web of social relations that gives them 
life, without destroying the very concreteness of the thing itself. For historical 
materialists, phenomena cannot be known outside of the web of social relations through 
which they are produced and reproduced. For example, Chapter Six of this thesis 
discusses the organic crisis of Heisei Japan (1990-2012), attempting to analyze the 
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critical context and conditions of the crisis. However, isolating discrete "causes" and 
"consequences" is easier said than done. Are the rise of poverty and insecurity since the 
1990s causes of the crisis, or consequences? On one hand, poverty and insecurity might 
be seen as consequences of the crisis, given that they are clearly negative phenomena that 
resulted from preceding policy and structural changes. On the other hand, they could 
equally be understood as causes of the crisis, insofar as they directly impacted both the 
deflationary spiral (due to chronically low consumer demand) and the drastically low 
fertility rate that has prompted a major crisis of aging and population decline. Thus, 
rather than speaking in simplistic terms of cause and effect, the thesis tends to focus more 
on conditions and dynamics of both Japan's hegemonic order and organic crisis. 
Conditions here imply both a notion of a state, or the way things are, and a requirement, 
or something that is necessary. Dynamics imply a notion of change and causal force. 
While an important methodological anchor to the approach developed here, 
historical materialism on its own is too general a paradigm to serve as a theoretical 
framework on its own. Within this overall historical materialist methodological context, 
then, I want to engage more specifically with the insights of Italian social theorist 
Antonio Gramsci. 
 
Hegemony 
 Since the English translation in 1971 of Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 
Antonio Gramsci's thought has become widely influential within critical political 
economy in general, and international political economy in particular. Originally from 
Sardinia, Gramsci moved to Turin when he was a young man where he observed at first 
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hand the power struggle between capital and labour. Gramsci became a leading figure of 
the Italian left, even rising to leader of the Italian Communist Party, before he was 
imprisoned under Benito Mussolini. However, as an Italian growing up in the era 
following national unification, democratization and industrialization, Gramsci was also 
acutely aware of the ways in which the superstructural context of Italy differed from that 
of Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution, and of the political and social impacts of this 
difference for revolutionary struggle. His socialist political philosophy thus differed in 
many important ways from that of the leaders of Russian Revolution. 
Why is this neo-Gramscian approach able to serve as the starting point for a 
theory of Japanese post-war political economy and social order? Gramsci built on the 
political and economic understanding of capitalist exploitation and class struggle found in 
Marx and Lenin by adding a cultural dimension to the understanding of how political 
order is made and maintained under capitalism, particularly in popular democratic 
countries. Thus while capitalist society is clearly dependent on economic growth and 
accumulation to be successful, it is also dependent on political legitimation, or consent to 
ruling relations, by a significant majority of people, including the working class. 
Moreover, this cultural dimension of hegemony is mediated – and given teeth – through 
various political, economic and social institutions that regularize relations of domination 
in ways that are seen as culturally acceptable (though never wholly uncontested) within 
civil society. While this consensual dimension of capitalist class-based rule is always 
inevitably combined with the threat of the use of coercive force, or violence, in order to 
maintain existing power relations, coercion can never be enough to ensure political 
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stability, and can therefore never be enough to ensure the viability of capitalist society in 
general. 
 Gramsci termed this understanding of consent married with the threat of coercion 
as hegemony and used it as the basis for his explanation for why capitalism continued to 
function and garner political support even in societies where the working class was 
empowered electorally. Gramsci said much about the conditions under which consent – 
and hegemony – can be maintained, and even more about what might be needed for a 
counter-hegemonic movement, what he termed the modern Prince and associated with the 
Communist Party of Italy, to successfully carry out a revolution under conditions of 
capitalist hegemony. While these issues will be taken up in later chapters, for now it is 
enough to think more carefully about the concept of hegemony, in relation to Japan. 
 
Hegemony and hegemonic order  
 In this dissertation, then, hegemony, or what I term hegemonic order, refers to the 
condition of a stable political and social order rooted in a broad-based degree of consent 
and support from the majority of people, including various social classes, for existing 
conditions of political and economic ruling relations. As discussed above, hegemonic 
order requires a cultural and political dimension of consent from the majority of people to 
be possible; without this consent, only violence and coercion can be used to stave off the 
threat of revolution, and violence and coercion are themselves incompatible with stable 
capital accumulation, since the latter requires willing workers and consumers as well as 
conditions for secure investment and guaranteed private property rights. However, in 
addition to this general degree of political legitimacy, hegemonic order, at least under 
		 69	
capitalism, also requires conditions for stable capital accumulation. Without these, not 
only is the material basis for the capitalist system and for capitalist class based rule 
absent; many of the material conditions for political consent to that rule – such as an 
economic basis for stable employment for the majority of people, or the tax revenue 
needed to fund social programs – are also absent (see also O'Connor 2003).  
Clearly, hegemony requires not only activities to secure consent, or what I will 
call political legitimation, to ruling relations, but also activities to ensure stable capital 
accumulation. Yet these two requirements of hegemonic order do not always go together, 
since fundamentally unjust and exploitative class relations sit at the very heart of 
capitalism. While attempts to reduce class antagonisms and ensure broad-based working 
class support for political order – such as full employment guarantees, workers' rights or 
publicly funded welfare – run the risk of undermining conditions for stable capital 
accumulation, attempts to shore up conditions for stable capital accumulation – such as 
through the enclosure of common lands or more recent policies of deregulation, 
privatization and corporate tax cuts – run the risk of creating social dislocation and 
political discord. One of the key questions for our study, then, is how the tension between 
these two requirements of hegemonic order can be finessed.  
This dissertation posits that one of the keys to understanding Japan's post-war 
political order, and both the period of success, known as the Japanese miracle, up until 
the 1980s and subsequent period of crisis, known as the lost decades, since the 1990s can 
be understood by looking at attempts to maintain hegemonic order by pursuing conditions 
conducive to political legitimation and capital accumulation, as well as dealing with the 
contradictions and negative externalities that emanate from the inherent tension between 
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these two dynamics. In this way, I borrow from James O'Connor (2003), who also drew 
on the importance of these two requirements of the capitalist state. As O'Connor (2003: 
6) argued: 
the capitalist state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory 
functions—accumulation and legitimation … A capitalist state that openly uses its 
coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses 
its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that 
ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capitalist accumulation risks drying up 
the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity and the taxes 
drawn from this surplus. 
However, while political legitimation and capital accumulation are important 
requirements of stable hegemonic order, I want to argue that there is a third requirement 
of equal importance that must be taken into account: social reproduction. 
 
Social reproduction 
Marxist analyses of the capitalist system's dependence on and dialectical 
relationship with a system of social reproduction goes back as far as Marx and Engels, 
including sections of Capital Volume I that deal with expanded reproduction as well as 
Engels’ Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. However, while these ideas 
received relatively little attention within Marxist scholarship for nearly a century after 
Capital's publication, since the 1970s interventions of various feminist political 
economists, but most notably Michele Barrett (1988), Lise Vogel (1983) and Wally 
Seccombe (1974) have attempted to make up for lost time. Early feminist approaches to 
the analysis of social reproduction sought to bring questions of women’s domestic labour 
into analyses of power and production within capitalism more generally (Bakker and 
Silvey 2008). While some, such as that of Michelle Barrett (1988), were skeptical about 
whether feminist theory and gender-blind Marxism could every really be united 
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theoretically and proposed a "dual systems" approach that sought to conceptually separate 
capitalism and class-based exploitation with patriarchy and gender-based oppression, 
others supported the argument of Vogel discussed above, that saw the two as 
fundamentally interconnected. Indeed, Marxist scholars as far back as Wally Seccombe 
(1974) have pointed to the way the gendered division of labour in general, and women's 
unpaid domestic labour in particular, enabled men to work long hours outside of the 
home, and thus formed a key basis for the extraction of surplus value.14 
In its most basic terms, the concept of social reproduction refers to the need to 
restore the vitality of human beings (and their labour power), both day to day and 
intergenerationally across society. As Bakker and Gill (2003) have argued elsewhere, this 
includes various elements, including biological reproduction of the species though 
childbirth and childrearing, physical reproduction of individual labour power through the 
daily provision of meals, shelter, and the maintenance of health and hygiene, and cultural 
reproduction of communities and societies through education, training, socialization, as 
well as caring for the young and the elderly. 
Social reproduction and the gendered division of labour not only serves as a basic 
precondition for capital accumulation, as Seccombe argued; it also serves a more general 
basis in the reproduction and maintenance of the work force on a biological level, and of 
capitalist society more generally on a cultural level. Social reproduction, its gendered 
construction, and its complex relationship with capitalist production are thus necessary to 
																																																								14	While there is insufficient space here for a thorough treatment of debates from the 1970s and 1980s of 
the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, suffice it to say that contemporary approaches generally 
recognize that the two are intrinsically interrelated, but that neither is wholly reducible as a function of the 
other.	
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understand both the reproduction of capitalist hegemony and, following Vogel, the 
reproduction of patriarchal social relations. 
Moreover, "different forms of social reproduction can be associated with various 
social formations", as "patterns of social reproduction are shaped by and also shape 
socio-economic and political orders" (Bakker and Silvey 2008: 3). In this way Bakker 
and Silvey transcend the tendency to see social reproduction, or "householding" as one 
more mode of production existing as an adjunct to the dominant capitalist system, but to 
see reproduction as a dialectically related to production, whatever its form, and situated 
"within a conceptualization of governance that involves both the public and the private 
processes and mechanisms that shape social and economic outcomes" (4). 
Thus, feminist approaches such as those of Vogel, Seccombe and others enable us 
to see how social reproduction is intrinsically and dialectically interwoven with 
production, and that the contradictory role of social reproduction, and its gendered effects, 
for capitalism plays a significant part in entrenching patriarchal relations within 
capitalism. Building on the work of earlier thinkers who attempted to bring together 
historical materialist theories of capitalism with feminist theories of patriarchy (Barrett 
1988; Vogel 1983; Seccombe 1974), Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill have recently 
attempted to incorporate feminist understandings of social reproduction with Gramscian 
understandings of hegemony, and exploring how the contradictory relationship between 
production and social reproduction under capitalism – particularly in the context of post-
Fordist neoliberal globalization since the 1980s – works to both reinforce and destabilize 
hegemonic ruling relations, while examining the reciprocal implications for production, 
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reproduction, and their relationship to one another in an era of profound political 
economic transformation. 
 
Conditions for hegemonic order 
For our purposes, it is important to recognize that social reproduction exists in 
dialectical tension with capital accumulation and with production more generally, while 
also being a precondition for the very existence of capital accumulation. Moreover, it is 
important to take a broad and inclusive view of social reproduction: rather than equating 
it simply with domestic labour in the home, to understand it as a web of institutions and 
practices, both inside and outside of the home, in the formal and informal economy, 
provided by the market, the state, and volunteer community organizations as well as by 
private households, including activities such as education, health and welfare. We 
therefore refer to the mix of institutions and practices for fulfilling requirements of social 
reproduction that might exist at any one time as a regime of social reproduction. In the 
case of Japan, therefore, understanding what practices and institutions constitute Japan's 
regime of social reproduction, how they empower certain groups and identities while 
disempowering others, how elements of the regime might complement or contradict other 
elements of Japan's architecture of hegemonic order, including its regime of accumulation 
as well as practices of political legitimation, and finally how the regime of reproduction is 
affected by changes, structural, institutional and political, to the conditions of political 
and social order. Building on the work of O'Connor (2003), then, I argue that we can 
provide a pithy evaluation of the degree to which hegemonic order is being maintained – 
in basic terms – by focusing on these three basic requirements for it. 
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What conditions characterize or enable these three requirements for hegemonic 
order? With regard to capital accumulation, this includes conditions that ensure capitalist 
profitability and accumulation, as well as having sites for profitable investment in the 
future. With regard to social reproduction, this refers to conditions that ensure that 
workers' labor power and society in general can be reproduced both day-to-day and 
generation-to-generation. Social reproductive functions can be provided either within the 
family, through the private sector, through volunteer programs or through public 
provisioning (i.e., the traditional welfare state). Finally, political legitimation involves the 
challenge of gaining and maintaining popular consent to ruling relations from the public, 
including subaltern classes. To what degree and through what means subaltern classes are 
coopted into the consensual framework of the ruling regime then becomes a key question 
in our study of the dynamics of hegemonic order. 
While these three conditions are all necessary for stable hegemonic order on their 
own, we must also consider how they mutually reinforce each other. Capital 
accumulation is a requirement not only directly for the maintenance of the capitalist 
system and for the continuity of capitalist class rule but also, insofar as the capitalist 
economy is the basis for the employment of the majority of people and for the provision 
of goods and services, indirectly as a means of ensuring the basis for the other two 
functions, social reproduction and political legitimation. Political legitimation is a 
requirement directly so as to ensure that ruling relations can remain largely consensual 
rather than coercive (and in extreme cases a lack of political legitimation can lead to 
revolution), but also indirectly as a means of ensuring conditions necessary for stable 
capital accumulation. This includes what Gill (1998) has called “the three C’s”: 
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consistency, credibility and confidence, all of which require conditions of consistent 
economic policies, general guarantees of private property rights and workplace stability 
(Bakker and Gill 2003).  Social reproduction, finally, is, as Bakker and Gill (2003) have 
shown, a requirement both for the maintenance of conditions necessary for capital 
accumulation (which is dependent on the continuous supply of human labour of 
appropriate degrees of skill, things that are generated through processes largely external 
to the production process) and in most cases for the maintenance of conditions necessary 
for political legitimation, since workers are unlikely to consent in the long term to a 
system that deprives them of even minimal conditions necessary for the reproduction of 
their labour. 
These three questions are thus dialectically interwoven: while production cannot 
be sustained without reproduction, reproduction inherently requires a re-allocation of 
social labor away from production and towards reproduction. While redistribution is also 
often necessary in the long term to ensure political legitimation, it necessarily allocates 
resources away from capital and towards other social needs. In these ways, then, we must 
understand reproduction, accumulation and legitimation as operating in complex and 
contradictory ways, simultaneously preconditioning and undermining each other. 
 
Historic bloc  
While the fulfillment of these three conditions – capital accumulation, political 
legitimation and social reproduction – may be necessary to the maintenance of a 
hegemonic order – in other words, ruling relations that hold their basis in consent given 
by the public in addition to the threat of the use of force – we must also ask how a 
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hegemonic order is formed, what social forces it represents, and what subaltern forces it 
excludes. While certain critical accounts of political order in capitalist societies have been 
characterized (perhaps inaccurately) as providing simplistic analyses of power relations, 
arguing that the capitalist class alone holds power, directly or indirectly, and their 
interests alone are reflected in political decision-making (see, for example, Marx and 
Engels 2008; Miliband 1969), a Gramscian orientation of power and hegemonic ruling 
relations sees things differently. Following Gramsci, I want to understand the power 
relations inherent in any hegemonic order as being constituted through an historic bloc, or 
a coalition of different and even competing class and social forces that are brought 
together in history to form a coalition of rule. Gramsci saw how modern Italy of the 
risorgimento brought together rural land owners, the urban bourgeoisie and the clergy 
into a ruling coalition, with each group compromising certain goals in order to maintain a 
ruling coalition with broad-based support.  
However, while such an analysis recognizes how hegemony requires compromise 
among a broad range of social forces in order to maintain power in the long term, we 
must not mistake this recognition of the broad and cross-class nature of historic blocs for 
a total flattening of power relations. Within any historic bloc, certain social forces – 
generally the ruling economic class as well as core elements of the state with high 
degrees of institutional power – possess stronger bases of support, whether economic, 
military, political or cultural, and form the core element – what has been called a power 
bloc (Jessop 2012) – of the historic bloc. Therefore, not only compromise and consent but 
also power and coercion are inherent in hegemonic ruling relations, and a hegemonic 
order wherein the power bloc is unable to impose its will on other, secondary social 
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forces is just as unstable as one where the power bloc refuses compromise and 
cooperation. In the case of Japan, as I will develop further in Chapter Four, the post-war 
era saw the creation of an historic bloc that incorporated a broad range of social forces, 
including farmers, the petit bourgeoisie, middle-class sararīman, blue-collar workers and 
their families, but that was ultimately led by the tripartite leadership of the LDP, the 
bureaucracy, and corporations. However, while all of these groups were incorporated into 
the historic bloc and had their interests represented to some degree, that degree varied.  
Figure 1 presents a three-level hierarchy of the post-war Japanese historic bloc. 
The LDP, business and bureaucracy represent the top layer of the hierarchy, as the 
driving force behind post-war Japanese politics. In contrast, at the second level, groups 
including farmers, small businesses and doctors are represented. These groups generally 
enjoyed high degrees of political integration and were able to directly affect politics but 
were not fundamental agents of change and relied on the upper level of forces to advance 
their interests. Finally, the lowest level, which effectively included privileged and secure 
workers and their families, were incorporated as well, though much more tenuously: their 
ability to influence policy and to enjoy policy benefits was highly mediated by capital, 
partially reflecting the corporatist nature of unionism that developed in post-war Japan. 
Moreover, in times where Japan faced challenges to the conditions of hegemonic order 
(such as an economic downturn), these groups were the first to feel the pinch. Their 
integration into the historic bloc is thus more ambiguous and shifting. 
While this three-level hierarchy shows how Japan's post-war historic bloc was 
broad-based, it is important to note that however broad-based it was it was never 
universal. The circle on the right side of Figure 1 indicates all of the groups who were 
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excluded from the historic bloc, and in many ways their omission and suppression is just 
as illuminating as the study of the constituent forces of the historic bloc itself. 
 
 
	
Figure 1: The post-war Japanese historic bloc (left triangle) and the groups excluded from it (right circle). 
 
Explaining change: Conjunctural and organic 
While the above analysis shows how an historic bloc provides the political and 
social basis for hegemonic order, we must also ask what types of conditions are needed to 
ensure a balance between requirements for stable social reproduction, capital 
accumulation, and political legitimation? I argue that three types of conditions exist: 
structural conditions, political conditions, and institutional conditions. Structural 
conditions include conditions of world order and global political economy, as well as 
structural demographic conditions. Political conditions include more immediate 
conditions that result from political action, such as an election or a major policy 
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bureaucracy and Cabinet, exist somewhere in the middle: they are neither as easily 
mutable as political conditions, nor are they as immutable as structural conditions. 
 These three types of conditions also signify three types of changes. Over time, 
structural, institutional and political changes impact the overarching conditions for 
hegemonic order. Though the categories employed here vary somewhat from those of a 
conventional Gramscian analysis, there is some overlap with Gramsci's understanding of 
the difference between the organic and conjunctural. For while conjunctural changes 
occur relatively quickly and immediately, and thus closely resemble the notion of 
political changes developed here, organic changes are much more slow moving and 
gradual, and thus fit more closely with the notion of structural change (the category of 
institutional change falls somewhere in the middle). For Gramsci, the "organic" refers to 
relatively permanent, underlying structural conditions. Organic phenomena are deeply 
rooted, slow to evolve, but ultimately of greater significance than conjunctural 
phenomena. In contrast, the conjunctural refers to immediate and spontaneous events and 
phenomena. Conjunctural changes tend to be more superficial but they can also signify an 
organic crisis, or a breakdown of organic structures due to the intensification of 
contradictions. While these different temporal orientations toward change are relevant to 
the analysis of post-war Japanese hegemonic order as a whole, they are particularly 
important to Chapter Five, which explores the transitional period of the 1970s and 1980s. 
While this notion of different types of changes is central to historical materialist 
analysis, another way in which Gramsci develops the distinction between the organic and 
the conjunctural is in his orientation toward crisis. In particular, it is Gramsci's concept of 
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organic crisis – and its dialectical relationship with hegemonic order – that is the focus of 
the next section. 
 
Organic crisis 
Gramsci (1992) understood organic crisis as conditions under which "the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born" (276). It thus describes a deep, multifaceted, structural 
crisis that spans various elements of society, with many morbid symptoms reflected in 
everyday life. For Gramsci, an organic crisis involves a serious rupture to the stable basis 
for hegemonic order and forces a transformation of the ruling historic bloc. Part of the 
question in understanding organic crisis, then, is not only to locate the various interrelated 
elements of the crisis (which may involve economic, political, demographic, cultural, 
ecological, or other elements), how they overlap and make easy solutions to the crisis 
difficult, but also what implications various attempts to resolve the crisis might have for 
the political relations of force built into the ruling historic bloc. 
The distinction between organic and conjunctural is equally important as a means 
of differentiating different types of crisis. While a conjunctural crisis involves an 
immediate, short-term disruption of conditions needed for the stable reproduction of 
existing structures of hegemony (such as a stock market crash), an organic crisis indicates 
a crisis rooted in deep-seated contradictions within the structures that constitute a 
hegemonic order, as with the Italy of the 1920s and '30s that Gramsci lived in or 
contemporary Japan. Unlike conjunctural crises, organic crises tend to evolve more 
slowly over time, emerging gradually. Moreover, because they take root deep within the 
structures of a hegemonic order, they cannot easily be solved or overcome without a 
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reorientation of hegemonic order, enough to solve the contradictions at the root of the 
crisis. Given that such solutions often come at significant costs to the forces of 
hegemonic order, it is unlikely that such radical change will be sought immediately: 
instead, attempts to solve the crisis merely by displacing its symptoms temporary will 
likely be pursued. However, this is not a long term or permanent solution, and the crisis 
cannot be solved until the structural contradictions underscoring it are alleviated, 
including through a reordering of ruling relations within the historic bloc. 
 
World order, forms of state, social forces 
While Antonio Gramsci's thinking of hegemony and organic crisis is of 
significant value to our understanding of post-war order in Japan, there are certain ways 
that his theory can be further enlivened in order to be more relevant to conditions in the 
contemporary world. For example, Robert Cox (1987) has developed a theoretical 
framework for exploring conditions of political economy since the 19th century from a 
perspective that draws on the insights of Gramsci, among others.  
 Gramsci's conception of politics emphasizes not only the state but also civil 
society as a realm wherein power relations are manifest and where the creation, 
maintenance and contestation of hegemony take place. Gramsci's concept of the integral 
state – the fusion of the narrowly defined state and the wider civil society that surrounds 
it – draws to our attention the need to see how struggles for power are manifest not only 
within the state – among parties, or between the government and the bureaucracy – but 
also between the state and civil society and within different segments of civil society, 
whether class-based or otherwise. Building on this insight of Gramsci's, Cox seeks to 
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expand the analysis further, but adding another level of analysis: world order. For Cox, 
world order acts as a structural constraint on both states and civil societies, though one 
that is malleable and in flux. It provides conditions of permissiveness to particular 
domestic regulatory regimes – state-society relations – and thus must be understood as a 
level of analysis that is ontologically separate from – though intrinsically interlinked with 
– the domestic level.  Cox thus presents a formulation that suggests that there are three 
different though dialectically interrelated spheres wherein these power struggles take 
place: world order, the state, and civil society. 
 Cox draws our attention to the need to understand the state as a dynamic and 
heterogeneous entity and for this reason he uses the term "forms of state" to refer to it. 
Rather than observing one universal model of the state, Cox sees a multiplicity of forms 
of state, which vary over time and space, changing as the overarching conditions of world 
order and the underlying dynamics of civil society themselves change. As for civil 
society, Cox uses the term "social forces" to encapsulate all of the entities in struggles 
over power that take place outside of (and inside) the formal realm of the state. This 
includes the productive economy, which Cox sees as taking many forms over time, 
depending on the presence or absence of four types of production relations, coercion, 
custom, clientelism and contract. For Cox, these social forces play a key role in 
developing certain constellations of state forces; he argues that forms of state are "largely 
a product of the configuration of social classes within a historic bloc on one hand and the 
permissiveness of world order on the other" (147-8). Together, the form of state and 
constellation of social forces struggling for power in the productive economy form a 
mode of social relations of production.  
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 While Cox emphasizes the importance of both social forces "below" the level of 
the state in the productive economy and "above" the state at the level of world order, 
recent contributions to global political economy have stressed the increased significance 
– particularly since the 1970s – of transnational actors to world political affairs (Gill 
2003; van Apeldoorn 2004; van der Pijl 1998). For Gill and others, the transnational is a 
level of social order that is neither international (i.e., comprising the relationships "in 
between" various fully formed and autonomous national states) nor domestic (solely 
rooted within the fixed boundaries of a particular national state formation), but manifest 
in a way that transcends the very notion that the international realm is populated merely 
by autonomous national states within their own hermetically sealed domestic societies: in 
other words, global politics can be directly impacted by sub-national actors (such as 
corporations, organizations or even individuals) that participate in global politics not 
merely indirectly through their respective state, but directly.  
 Within Cox's formation, therefore, states are too often assumed as the vehicles for 
transmitting the interests of domestic social forces into the domain of world order, and for 
instituting the prerogatives of world order as domestic policy in ways that subsequently 
affect domestic social forces. This approach, however, masks the way that otherwise 
domestic social forces can directly lobby and impact policy and politics both at the level 
of world order and within other states, such as the way the American toy retailer 
Toys"R"Us (through its partnership with McDonald's) successfully lobbied the Japanese 
government to relax restrictions on big-box retail stores in the late 1990s (Kay 1996). 
Such forces are clearly not direct features of world order themselves, since they may be 
completely dissociated from both international institutions and the institutions of the 
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states from which they emanate, while their actions may be merely bilateral, directing 
attention merely to one aspect of policy or political economic relations in one country, 
with little concern for "world order" as a whole. Moreover, they cannot simply be 
categorized as domestic social forces, insofar as they find themselves able to directly 
effect change in foreign countries, without even requiring the services of their home 
country as a weigh-station. A transnational approach, which recognizes these transactions 
that cross borders without being crystalized within the narrow confines of "Foreign 
Policy" is therefore needed to understand these dynamics. 
 
Relations of force 
While this distinction between the three levels of analysis – world order, the state, 
and society – can provide a degree of conceptual clarity in our analysis of the struggle 
over ruling relations, we must also ask what forces and factors drive that struggle and 
wider processes of social change? What forces manifest to transform history, either 
through the daily course of events or over the course of decades or centuries? For 
Gramsci, the relations of force within social formations shape processes of change and 
continuity. Gramsci sees the relations of force as the conditions of possibility for social 
transformation: instruments of power necessary though not sufficient for the realization 
of social change (or for the maintenance of status quo arrangements). For Gramsci, 
relations of force involve military, political and social components, and their united 
deployment is central to both the maintenance of and resistance to hegemonic rule. 
However, while relations of force may generally be dominated by the hegemonic or 
ruling regime, in moments of crisis, when the ideological or material foundations of 
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hegemonic rule become destabilized, there exists the potential for social transformation, 
insofar as counter-hegemonic social forces possess the capabilities to alter or transform 
the relations of force and to displace the existing hegemonic formation. For Gramsci, 
then, the mobilization of relations of force is a necessary prerequisite to the prevention or 
realization of transformative social change. 
 In international relations theory, Gramsci's formulation of the relations of force 
has been adopted as a blueprint for many historical materialists to explain processes of 
continuity and change – the maintenance and contestation of existing power 
configurations – in the global political economy. Cox (1987) has reworked Gramsci's 
earlier formulation to explain the relations of force as the combination of material 
(including not only military but also political economic forms of power), institutional and 
ideational or ideological configurations of power central to the maintenance (and 
contestation) of hegemony in the global polity. Cox explores how this conceptual 
blueprint can help us understand relatively long and relatively stable periods of 
hegemonic order under pax britannica and pax americana respectively, as well as the 
gradual erosion of the structural bases for their hegemony that led to crises and eventually 
(at least in the case of pax britannica) to their decline. Cox's model further challenges the 
one-dimensional understanding of power relations implicit in neorealism that focuses 
exclusively on horizontal power struggles between nation states by conceiving power as 
multidimensional, and manifested on vertical (hierarchical) as well as horizontal axes. 
The hierarchical, imperialist relations inherent to pax americana and pax britannica are 
just as important as horizontal rivalries between states to the global political order. 
Moreover, such hierarchical relations extend beyond interstate conflicts and are 
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increasingly manifest between states and non-state market actors in the global political 
economy. 
 This question of the relations of force and the ways various social forces struggle 
to maintain or overturn hegemonic ruling relations, depending on degrees of material, 
institutional and ideational relations of force is thus highly significant to our 
understanding of the drivers of social change overall. In that context, we will return to the 
concept of the relations of force in our discussion of the future direction of Japanese 
hegemonic order in Chapter Eight. 
 
Bonapartism and trasformismo 
If organic crisis results from inherent tensions and contradictions within an 
historic bloc, how might conditions of hegemonic order be restored in ways that entrench 
the power of prevailing ruling forces? Chapter Seven uses concepts of Bonapartism and 
trasformismo, developed by Marx and Gramsci respectively, to explore Japan under the 
reign of Abe Shinzō since 2012. While Gramsci developed a concept with some 
similarities, which he called Caesarism, in the Prison Notebooks, I employ a variation of 
this concept closer to Marx's notion of Bonapartism developed in the 18th Brumaire 
(Marx 1977). Marx saw how in response to the conditions of social crisis that pervaded 
France of the 1840s, it was unclear whether the moment had come for a working-class 
revolution that would complete the emancipatory project of the French Revolution of the 
1790s. However, this opportunity came to naught as Louis Napoleon seized power, 
drawing support from a wide range of social forces but most importantly from the 
peasantry and the petit bourgeoisie, the two largest classes of France at the time. Marx 
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shows how for each of the different class forces in France, Louis Napoleon offered a 
different solution to the social crisis. Yet in practice, once taking power, Bonapartism 
represented little more than a preservation of the status quo that had led to the crisis in the 
first place.15 The somewhat adapted version of Marx's original concept of Bonapartism 
that I use here reflects a dynamic where in a moment of crisis, an inspirational figure 
emerges who offers a way out of the crisis through transformative change, yet ultimately 
only serves to further entrench existing ruling relations, further prolonging and 
sharpening the crisis conditions. Part of Chapter Seven is an attempt to consider how and 
whether Abe Shinzō's return to power since 2012 might be considered as Bonapartism, 
albeit through a somewhat flexible usage as I employ here.16 
 Similar to Bonapartism, whereby a would-be ruler promises to be everything to all 
people, while really representing little more than a continuation of the status quo, 
Gramsci's concept of transformism, or trasformismo is useful for understanding the ways 
through which efforts that develop organically from within civil society that are opposed 
to hegemonic order and that seek to challenge it might be co-opted and repurposed by 
ruling elites, disarmed of their counter-hegemonic potential and repurposed to extend the 
degree of normative legitimacy enjoyed by the ruling regime. Thus in our discussion of 																																																								
15 It is in reference to this that Marx (1977), paraphrasing Hegel, states that history repeats itself, "the first 
time as tragedy, the second time as farce" (300). 
16 While Marx's conception of Bonapartism implies a leader attempting to break a deadlock among 
competing social forces under conditions of non-hegemonic class struggle from the outside, as Chapter 
Seven will show, contemporary Japan clearly differs from this in many ways, both because of the lack of 
any strong oppositional force to LDP hegemony and because of Abe's role as anything but an outsider to 
the LDP. Nonetheless, as a leader he has sought to frame himself as transformative and determined to solve 
the political impasse that has been characterized by over two decades of political decay, economic 
stagnation, demographic crisis and passive social resistance through bold and decisive policies that appear 
to represent the interests of a broad swathe of social forces – while in reality working to reassert the 
dominance of a conservative ruling elite, including through authoritarian measures. In this sense there are 
important ways in which the use of the concept of Bonapartism – interpreted more broadly than Marx may 
have envisioned – can be useful to our understanding of Abe's political project.	
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the ways Japan's ruling regime has weathered challenges from subaltern groups and the 
political forces that represent them to pursue more progressive policies that enable greater 
inclusion within the historic bloc by these groups, we must consider how trasformismo 
has operated as a strategy by the ruling elite to coopt the forces behind these challenges 
without being forced to accept any shift in relations of force among the various elements 
of the ruling historic bloc. 
 
Passive Revolution 
A similar concept to Bonapartism and trasformismo used to describe the ways through 
which threats to hegemonic order are repelled and the power of ruling classes is restored 
lies with Gramsci's concept of passive revolution. Gramsci sees passive revolution as a 
revolution from above, whereby a ruling elite might reorder power relations within an 
historic bloc in response to conditions of organic or conjunctural crisis without provoking 
any challenge to its own power. This sort of revolution thus differs markedly from the 
more active revolutions experienced in moments of true counter-hegemonic upheaval, 
such as the Russian, French and Chinese revolutions. In contrast Gramsci saw Italy of the 
resorgimento as undergoing a passive revolution, as the old, agrarian and ecclesiastical 
power structures largely retained their authority despite the shift into modernity and 
capitalism. Indeed, the same can be said for Germany, where the Junkers remained the 
dominant class force after German unification, and Japan of the Meiji Restoration, where 
a group of high-ranking samurai led the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and held 
oligarchical political power over the first sixty years of modern Japan (beginning in the 
1870s). In the context of this dissertation, Chapter Eight will consider whether a passive 
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revolution of this sort, where prevailing class power relations within the hegemonic order 
can be maintained through a recalibration of political order in response to the organic 
crisis facing contemporary Japan, in both the neo-conservative and neo-liberal programs 
offered as potential future attempts to solve the organic crisis facing Japan. 
 
Counter-hegemony and the (post-) Modern Prince 
 In contrast to these expressions of the ruling elite's attempts to restore conditions 
for hegemonic rule under crisis conditions, we must also ask how subaltern classes might 
transform ruling relations and seize power themselves. Important in that regard is 
Gramsci's concept of the modern prince, which Gill (2008) has updated into the post-
modern Prince.17 Gramsci drew his inspiration for the Modern Prince from Machiavelli's 
Prince, which represented a political ruler interested in ruling based on what Gramsci 
termed the national popular collective will. For Gramsci, the modern equivalent of this 
prince was the Communist Party (which he led) and saw as the key vehicle for achieving 
a successful counterhegemonic revolution, first through a process of war of position 
(socio-cultural change and the intellectual and moral reform of society led by organic 
intellectuals of the left) and then through a war of movement (the swift seizure of 
political through a revolution, election, or coup). Chapter Eight thus partially considers 
how and whether any counter-hegemonic force, a "Japanese (post-) modern prince", 
might form to seize power and push for a permanent resolution to the organic crisis that is 
																																																								
17 Focusing on transformative politics at the global level, Gill (2000, 2003) sees the post-modern Prince 
partly in embryo in the transnational network of progressive social movements that developed in the 1990s 
in opposition to neoliberal globalization, what has been referred to as the "alter-globalization movement" 
and has been embodied by the World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see also Gill 2012). 
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progressive and democratic, while considering what social forces might coalesce to form 
such a movement.  
 
Political ecology 
While social reproduction and gender have often been neglected in discussions of 
Japanese political economy, including both those of the period of rapid economic growth 
and that of political crisis, as I discussed in the previous chapter, recent approaches by 
Miura and others have sought to integrate gender and reproduction into analyses of 
Japan's overall political economic regime. In contrast, one issue that remains almost 
completely neglected is that of the natural environment. While it may have been 
something easily taken for granted in previous decades, in the wake of the alarming 
destruction of the biosphere and catastrophic effects of climate change that appear an 
almost inevitable consequence of capitalism as we know it, it is almost impossible to 
imagine how any sound and thorough critical analysis of political economy – whether 
that of Japan or elsewhere – can continue to ignore the environment, the way ecologies 
shape and constrain pathways of development and policymaking and conversely how 
environments are shaped (and so very often destroyed) as a result of political economic 
processes. 
 This dissertation is not meant to be a "political ecology of post-war Japan" and the 
incorporation of a political ecological dimension is therefore sure to disappoint some. 
Nonetheless, it is imperative to at least engage on a basic level with some of the political 
ecological challenges posed by Japan's post-war hegemonic order and what the 
consequences of those have been. This includes not only issues of environmental 
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destruction but also access to natural resources, including energy in particular, the 
varying availability of which has had major impacts on the pathway of Japanese post-war 
development. 
 
Towards a Gramscian feminist approach to the Japanese post-war order 
Adding the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework developed here to many of the 
insights of the previous chapter, I argue that Japanese political economy has, since at 
least the early 1970s, been beset by a number of structural contradictions that have 
deepened over the course of the past forty years and that can only be overcome through a 
significant restructuring of Japanese political economy and social relations. These 
contradictions emerged out of changes in the conditions that underlay the post-war 
hegemonic order. However, rather than having their root causes addressed, they were 
only addressed superficially. Policies that ensured the basic hegemonic order could 
remain intact were pursued instead of those that addressed the core contradictions. 
However, as overarching conditions amenable to the existing order were replaced with 
those that undermined it, it became increasingly difficult for the state maintain the 
existing hegemonic order in the face of these contradictions.  
 In order to understand the contemporary conjuncture of Japanese political 
economy, we must ask two questions: First, what characterizes the relations among 
various social forces and how did those relations secure and reproduce the hegemonic 
order during the post-war period? In other words, what conditions enabled and reinforced 
the hegemony of the ruling historic bloc? Second, in what way were those relations 
characterized by or dependent on contradictions, which eventually became destabilizing 
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forces for the existing order? After exploring a basic blueprint for understanding the 
configuration of ruling relations among social forces integral to the maintenance of the 
hegemonic order, I will consider three basic contradictions that emerged over time as a 
result of these social relations and that ultimately served to undermine the stability of the 
hegemonic order. 
 Building on Okimoto's (1989) (non-Gramscian) blueprint for post-war ruling 
relations in Japanese society, I argue that the post-war order was characterized by an 
historic bloc that centered on three core forces: the LDP, the keiretsu and the bureaucracy 
(and in particular MITI).18 However, what was ingenious about this hegemonic project 
was how it could legitimately claim to represent a wide range of social forces, including 
white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, farmers, small businesses, large corporations, 
small firms and even housewives. Nonetheless, while each group enjoyed benefits and 
supports from the system, each also bore costs associated with its reproduction. For 
example, white-collar workers for large corporations benefited from steady pay raises, 
lifetime employment and relatively low income taxes (Steinmo 2010). However, they 
paid for this by providing total loyalty to the company and by refraining from organizing 
as a class politically (Pempel 1982). Similarly, blue-collar workers benefited from this 
system by having relatively stable employment as publicly funded infrastructure projects 
continually provided jobs, what Miura has termed "welfare through work" (2012). 
However, they lacked the same benefits of lifetime employment and their labor was more 
flexible (Steinmo 2010). Farmers benefited through substantial price subsidies and small 																																																								
18 Among these three institutions (and especially the bureaucracy), there was an overwhelming 
concentration of graduates from Tokyo University, and the Faculty of Law in particular, creating a clique of 
elites across sectors with interpersonal connections dating back to their early twenties, what has been 
known as a gakubatsu (Johnson 1982; Kerbo and McKinstry 1995). 
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businesses received strong market protections and tax subsidies (Okimoto 1989; Katz 
1998). However, in both cases, a lack of adequate publicly funded welfare provisions 
rendered them unstable even as they relied on the state's favor in other ways (Schoppa 
2006).  
Leading corporations benefited immensely from the support of the state, relying 
heavily on MITI and the MOF for access to financing, information, and technology but 
they were simultaneously expected to bear the costs of welfare for their workers and 
faced relatively high corporate taxes (Miura 2012; Schoppa 2006; Steinmo 2010). 
Similarly, their subsidiary firms benefited from the keiretsu system by having relatively 
secure access to markets and access to capital through preferential and long-term 
relationships with lead firms and banks. Conversely, they were expected to act as shock 
absorbers in times of economic downturn so that the lifetime employment provisions of 
lead firms could be maintained (Okimoto 1989). Finally, housewives benefited indirectly 
from a system designed to provide male breadwinners with a family wage under secure 
conditions over the course of a career. This saved them from having to work long and 
hard hours as their husbands were doing. However, these women were not only highly 
dependent on their husbands but were also highly limited in their ability to pursue careers 
of their own. Moreover, housewives were forced to bear much of the burden of social 
reproduction and care work, not only for their husbands and own children but also for 
their parents and husband's parents given the underdeveloped public eldercare system that 
existed until the late 1990s (Schoppa 2006).  
 Clearly, each group had to pay a price to keep this system afloat and not everyone 
benefited equally. Nonetheless, this LDP-led ruling regime appeared committed to 
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consensually representing the interests of a broad swathe of social forces and played a 
significant role in ensuring conditions of systemic stability. Indeed, the hegemonic nature 
of this political order is reflected in the fact that during much of the post-war era, as many 
as ninety percent of Japanese people identified as members of the middle class. 
Ultimately, the pervasive hegemony and widespread legitimacy of this order played a 
significant role in promoting Japan's rapid economic rise. Thus in addition to the 
favorable international conditions of the post-war era that Itoh (2000) outlines and the 
specific developmental strategies effectively developed by MITI that Johnson (1982) 
emphasizes, we must recognize how the broad popular base of Japan's post-war 
hegemonic order was a major contributor to the success of Japanese capitalism. While 
this hegemonic order may have been rooted in the triad of the LDP, bureaucracy and 
keiretsu it relied on consent from virtually all segments of society, including farmers, 
small-business owners, salaried workers and housewives. 
 As the next chapter will show, this stable historic bloc provided, along with a 
number of other structural conditions, one basis for the robust hegemonic order that 
characterized the first two decades of the post-war. However, in the wake of structural 
demographic changes and changes to the conditions of world order as well as institutional 
changes, beginning in the 1970s this system encountered contradictions that gradually 
deepened and eventually came to undermine the ability of the existing order to 
simultaneously elicit popular support and legitimacy from a wide range of social forces 
while maintaining conditions for profitable accumulation and stable social reproduction. 
In particular, I want to examine three contradictions at the heart of Japanese political 
economy and consider their implications.  
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First, there is a contradiction between the international political order that began 
to emerge in the early 1970s (what would ultimately come to be characterized as 
globalizing neoliberalism) and the regulatory regime of Japanese capitalism. On one 
hand, Japanese capitalism has relied on a certain set of relationships between labour, the 
state and capital and between fractions of capital: relations that are often rooted in non-
market norms and institutions that may be seen as antithetical to the neoliberal order that 
has become dominant at the global level. These measures include internal labour market 
protections, (what remains of) the lifetime employment system, and protectionist barriers 
to foreign competition in agriculture, construction, retail and other industries (Johnson 
1995; Katz 1998), policies which all run contrary to the globalizing project of 
disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill 2008). On the other hand, Japan's economy relies on the 
international market for exports and thus is highly dependent on a liberal trading order at 
the same time as neoliberalism poses challenges to many elements of the existing regime. 
While the Keynesian era balanced a liberal international political economy with 
interventionist domestic political economies, this changed with the rise of neoliberalism. 
While Japan must deal with outside pressures to neoliberalize and become more 
competitive in the global economy, many of its firms have themselves been leaders in the 
project of economic globalization. However, insofar as firms such as Toyota have sought 
to evade domestic barriers to accumulation by moving operations overseas, it is no longer 
the case that what is good for Toyota is good for Japan, if it ever were so to begin with 
(Katz 1998). 
Second, and building on the work of Bakker and Gill (2003) in theorizing the 
dialectical relationship between capitalist production and social reproduction, I argue that 
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there is a contradiction between dynamics congruent with capital accumulation and the 
conditions necessary for social reproduction under Japanese capitalism. The system has 
relied on women in particular to reproduce men's labour power both on a daily basis 
(through the provisioning of meals and other domestic labour necessary for household 
maintenance) and from generation to generation (through childrearing and eldercare). 
However, while the capitalist system requires labour's perpetual reproduction for its own 
continuity, under the traditional family model it was largely assumed that women would 
naturally bear the burden of social reproduction without adequate support from the state. 
Moreover, as women have increasingly been forced to enter the workforce due to labour 
market shortages, the rise of precarious labour and the decline in jobs that can pay a 
family wage, it has only become more difficult for them to bear the full burden of 
reproducing society, reflected in a birth rate that was among the lowest in the world in the 
1990s and 2000s (Tanaka 2010; see also Miura 2012; Osawa 2013).  
While gender relations must be seen as one dimension of this contradiction 
between conditions conducive to stable social reproduction and those necessary for 
capital accumulation, we must also recognize how changing demographics operate as 
another dimension and how the aging of society has exacerbated challenges relating to 
the maintenance of the existing regime of production and social reproduction and of the 
vitality of the hegemonic order more generally. Japan's lifetime employment model 
rewards workers' loyalty to the firm and willingness to accept low pay initially by 
providing them with permanent job security and regular pay raises over the course of a 
career. This system thus compensates for the relatively high salaries given to older 
workers by super-exploiting younger workers. During the high-growth era this system 
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was highly effective because it furnished Japan with a young workforce committed and 
motivated by the guarantees of lifetime employment and progressive pay rises, willing to 
work hard and work overtime even though their pay was relatively low, conditions which 
partly enabled a high rate of return for capital. However, the age balance of Japanese 
industry has radically shifted over the past fifty years and it has gone from one of the 
youngest to the oldest industrial society in the world. Firms have responded to this by 
supplementing their aging permanent workforce with low-paid and insecure temporary 
and dispatch workers but these measures have only increased the precariousness of the 
working class, further disrupting conditions for stable social reproduction.19 
Finally, we must recognize class as a third contradiction that has increasingly 
posed problems for the existing order as the period of rapid economic expansion has 
given way to one of prolonged stagnation. During the era of expanded reproduction of 
capital, growth rates were high enough to ensure that labour and capital could both reap 
steady benefits from capital accumulation: wages increased along with profits and the tax 
base and state budget could grow without undermining capitalist profitability. But after 
the post-war model started to disintegrate and GDP growth disappeared this has changed 
from a positive-sum into a zero-sum game and it has thus been increasingly impossible 
for the state to maintain this balance.20 Policies designed in the interests of capital, such 
as labour market deregulation or consumption tax increases only increase labour's 
																																																								
19 Beyond the challenges that aging has caused for the lifetime employment system, it has also created 
budgetary pressures for the state. The growing costs of eldercare and healthcare have further posed 
challenges to the prospects of balancing social reproduction and capital accumulation (Itoh 2000). 
20 In other words, to continue to distribute benefits of the system evenly so that hegemony can be 
maintained (all the groups can be placated while capital accumulation can be maintained). 
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insecurity, leading to increased unemployment or dampened consumer spending.21 
Squeezed between the need to restore conditions for profitable capital accumulation and 
the need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the working class, the state has instead 
followed a course of tepid reform, allowing regulations and protections to gradually 
wither while inflating the national debt and without reaping any benefits in terms of 
economic recovery. Furthermore, while political legitimation for the LDP was long 
dependent on the clientelist relationship it enjoyed with various interest groups from the 
petit bourgeoisie, neoliberal structural and political pressures have led to a dismantling of 
many of these clientelist arrangements, in ways that have undermined the stability of the 
LDP's traditional electoral coalition. 
Thus, by the 1990s these various contradictions that had developed out of changes 
to the structural and institutional conditions that undergirded the period of stable 
hegemonic order in the 1950s and 1960s had deepened, pushing Japan into a deep, 
multifaceted, organic crisis, with particularly striking political, economic and 
demographic dimensions, each reflecting the declining capacity for the hegemonic order 
to maintain conditions for robust political legitimation, secure capital accumulation, and 
stable social reproduction. While the period since the 1990s has witnessed various 
attempts to resolve this crisis, these efforts have thus far proven insufficient. Indeed, 
unless they can fundamentally address the deep underlying contradictions between 
Japan's hegemonic order and regime of regulation on one hand and the structural 
conditions within which they are situated on the other – measures that would likely 
																																																								
21 Indeed, every time the consumption tax rate has increased it has caused a recession. 
		 99	
require a significant reordering of power relations within Japan's historic bloc – future 
attempts to solve the crisis are unlikely to be successful either. 
 
A brief word about method 
 While the preceding sections of this chapter have focused on the theoretical 
framework used in this dissertation, a brief word about method is in order. This 
dissertation relies predominantly on textual and historical analysis based on both primary 
and secondary sources in English and Japanese. Given the large volume of scholarship in 
English – and the even larger volume in Japanese – on the subjects of Japanese political 
economy, Japanese welfare institutions, and Japanese politics more generally, as well as 
my own greater fluency in English (as well as that of my likely audience), I have engaged 
primarily with English language secondary sources, while focusing on Japanese language 
texts to fill gaps in the English language literature. On the other hand, the majority of 
primary data sources come from Japanese government sources, most of which are only 
available in Japanese. 
 While I initially set out to conduct interview research in addition to historical and 
textual analysis, after careful consideration I decided to eliminate this component of the 
fieldwork, primarily due to the already significant volume of information available from 
existing primary and secondary print sources. Some readers may take issue with the 
methodological rigor of a study that relies on only existing textual sources (whether 
secondary accounts or government statistics) but, considering the scope of the project, I 
consider the methodological approach taken to be wholly appropriate to the object of 
research and to be able to substantiate my arguments. In the conclusion to this 
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dissertation I will consider in more detail some of the methodological and conceptual 
limitations of this research, as well as ideas for future research that might build on the 
broad-lens research presented here through more targeted and empirically oriented 
investigation. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has sought to provide an overview of the theoretical framework 
used in this dissertation. It develops six aspects of this theoretical framework. First, it 
considers the basic philosophical point of departure of the dissertation within historical 
materialism, exploring some of the methodological implications thereof. Second, it 
acknowledges more narrowly the core theoretical inspiration for the perspective 
developed here in the work of Antonio Gramsci (1992), providing an overview of many 
of his core concepts, including hegemony, historic bloc, passive revolution, trasformismo, 
and the modern prince, among others. Third, synthesizing Gramsci's notion of hegemony 
with O'Connor's (2003) understanding of political legitimation and capital accumulation 
as the core requirements of the capitalist state, as well as with Bakker and Gill's (2003) 
conception of social reproduction and its dialectical relationship with production under 
capitalism, it posits a three-fold conception of the conditions necessary for hegemonic 
order as political legitimation, capital accumulation and social reproduction. Fourth, it 
uses the work of Robert Cox to develop a modified version of Gramsci's original 
conception of the relations of force, considering their relevance for understanding 
conditions of political and class struggle in Japan. Fifth, it briefly considers the 
importance of using a political ecological lens in order to understand what is at stake in 
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Japanese political economy of the post-war era. Finally, it provides a few brief thoughts 
on the methods of data collection employed in this work. Building on the theoretical 
framework developed in this chapter, the rest of this dissertation will sketch an analysis 
of Japan's postwar era from a Gramscian perspective. Starting with Chapter Four's take 
on Japanese political economy of the early post-war (1952-1972), the next four chapters 
will provide an analysis of the conditions of Japanese hegemonic order from the post-war 
to the present before Chapter Eight considers the implications of the analysis developed 
here for the future. 
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Chapter Four: The post-war hegemonic order 
This chapter explores the political economy of Japan in the early post-war era, 
beginning with the return of Japanese sovereignty in 1952 and ending in the early 1970s 
with the first oil shock and the two "Nixon Shocks" internationally and the introduction 
of major welfare reforms under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1972-74) domestically. 
1974 was the first year that Japan experienced a recession since the 1940s (World Bank 
2019) and retrospectively came to be the end of the period of rapid GDP growth (around 
ten percent per annum) and the start of a period of medium growth (around four to five 
percent), while 1972 brought the end of American occupation of Okinawa and the 
reversion to Japanese control, an event that Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (1964-72) saw as 
necessary for finally drawing closure to the post-war period. More importantly, this 
period saw the construction and entrenchment of the Japanese post-war hegemonic order, 
let by the tripartite rule of the LDP, the bureaucracy, and large corporations.  
This chapter argues that key to Japan's post-war success was the establishment of 
a hegemonic order led by a historic bloc that represented a wide range of societal interests 
and that was able to successfully balance requirements of capital accumulation, political 
legitimation and social reproduction. The chapter outlines eleven key conditions that 
enabled and maintained this period of relatively stable hegemonic order (at least 
domestically). Nonetheless, this order was dependent on a number of factors that 
ultimately proved difficult to maintain over time. In the long run, changing structural 
conditions, in particular the rise of neoliberal globalization and domestic demographic 
shifts, combined with the high costs of keeping such a broad coalition of social forces 
placated caused strains in the Japanese model to emerge, as the next chapter will show.  
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The post-war hegemonic order 
 The post-war saw the development of a hegemonic order led by the three forces of 
the LDP, the bureaucracy and corporations. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the 
degree of stability and efficacy of a hegemonic order (at least under capitalism) can 
generally be considered by examining the degree to which it maintains three 
requirements: capital accumulation, political legitimation, and social reproduction. It is 
therefore worth considering exactly to what degree it was capable of fulfilling these three 
requirements. First, with regard to capital accumulation, the success of Japan's post-war 
economic development is obvious. Gross domestic product grew more than 35-fold from 
14 billion dollars in 1951 to 498 billion in 1975, with an average rate of annual growth of 
more than 10 percent (Gordon 2003). Real wages in manufacturing tripled, growing by 
roughly 5.8 percent per year from 1955 to 1975 while nominal wages grew tenfold, 
increasing 12.2 percent a year over the same period (Itoh 1992, 1990). This was made 
possible by robust labour productivity growth, which averaged 8.5 percent from 1955 to 
1975 and grew five-fold (Itoh 1990). The rate of investment was also extremely high, 
reaching 25 percent of GDP in 1973 (Itoh 2000). Finally, unemployment was low 
throughout the period, never rising above 2.5 percent (Nenji Toukei 2014), while 
industrial employment grew and agricultural employment fell steadily over the entire 
period. Overall, these metrics indicate unambiguously the success of capital accumulation 
in post-war Japan. 
 With regard to political legitimation, it is less clear how to measure "success," but 
several metrics can be used to help us evaluate the effectiveness of the post-war 
		 104	
hegemonic order in this regard. For example, though the 1950s saw very animated 
student and labour movements that opposed the LDP and its foreign policy in particular, 
the LDP did very well in elections, successively winning a majority of the vote under an 
electoral system that was far more open and democratic than what had existed before the 
war and where turnout was high, averaging 73 percent of the electorate. Indeed, Japan's 
post-war constitution, created by the occupying forces, was developed with the express 
goals of liberalization, democratization, and a permanent commitment to peace. The last 
of these goals was particularly resonant with Japanese society in the aftermath of the 
horrors of the war and helped to enhance the legitimacy of the new political order. 
Moreover, through the 1960s, the labour movement, and to a lesser extent the student 
movement as well, became less militant, willing to engage with the state and capital and 
form compromises. Another contributory factor towards the high level of political 
legitimacy was the high degree of income and wealth equality that developed in post-war 
Japanese capitalism, despite the rapid speed of industrial development. Statistics show 
that Japan's income inequality decreased from the 1950s through the 1970s even as GDP 
grew more than tenfold (Minami 2008). Overall, these various measures give reason to 
suggest that the post-war order received a high degree of political legitimation.  
 Finally, with regard to social reproduction, there are clear measures with which 
we can deem whether any existing social order is successful or not at ensuring the 
reproduction of human labour, both from day to day and from generation to generation, in 
socio-cultural as well as biological terms (see also Bakker and Gill 2003a). At the 
biological level, the fertility rate is the most straightforward measure of intergenerational 
social reproduction, while other indicators – particularly health indicators – provide a 
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measure of the degree of to which requirements for social reproduction are being met at a 
biological level on a daily basis.22 At the socio-cultural level, it may be more difficult to 
"measure" degrees to which social reproduction is maintained, but we can consider 
whether households are able to maintain time and space for the provision of care for 
dependent populations (especially babies and children) as an indicator of social 
reproduction on a daily basis and rates of educational attainment as an indicator for socio-
cultural elements of social reproduction intergenerationally. In all of these measures, 
Japan scores well: its fertility rate fell from the very high levels immediately after the war 
to a stable level at around the replacement rate of 2.1 by 1956, where it remained until the 
mid-1970s (CAO 2018), while life expectancy grew from 59.7 (58.0 for men and 61.5 for 
women) in 1950 to 72.0 (69.3 for men and 74.7 for women) in 1970 (CAO 2012). 
Meanwhile, educational attainment rates grew steadily: while less than half of Japanese 
students attended high school in 1950, by the 1970s more than 90 percent did so, with 
female and male rates nearly equal (MEXT 2006). Moreover, admission to top 
universities was highly egalitarian (though overwhelmingly male), with 40 percent of 
students admitted to national universities coming from households in the bottom two 
quintiles in 1961 (and still 31% in 1971) (Gordon 2003; Kerbo and McKinstry 1995). 
Overall, we can see how this period was clearly one where the hegemonic order 
was relatively capable of balancing requirements of capital accumulation, political 
legitimation and social reproduction. The next section will consider in detail what 
conditions enabled and maintained this hegemonic order during the post-war period.  																																																								
22 For example, the recent rapid growth of lifestyle-related diseases, including type-2 diabetes and obesity 
in many parts of the world are indicative of a great many people no longer having the time, money, or 
nutritional education to procure healthy meals and therefore points to a failure of institutions of social 
reproduction, with serious social and economic consequences.  
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Conditions of post-war hegemonic order 
Eleven conditions were primarily responsible for the success of Japan's post-war 
hegemonic order. This next section will go over each of them. In general, they relate to 
four core areas: conditions of world order; dynamics of the Japanese state; political-
economic and class relations; and Japan's regime of social reproduction. While this 
chapter shows how the eleven conditions developed in ways to maintain Japan's 
hegemonic order in the post-war period, Chapter Six will show how in many ways 
changes to these same eleven conditions paved the way to Japan's prolonged and 
systemic organic crisis since the 1990s. Understanding the causes and conditions of the 
organic crisis that has characterized Japanese society since the 1990s, therefore, requires 
an understanding of the period of hegemonic vitality that preceded it, and the contingent 
conditions that maintained that social order. 
 
Geopolitics: The Yoshida Doctrine and the US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) 
 The first condition of the post-war hegemonic order was the high degree of 
stability provided by Japan's location within Cold War geopolitics as a staunch US ally in 
the Pacific. During allied occupation after World War II, Japan's military was fully 
disbanded, while the 1947 post-war Constitution explicitly forbade remilitarization. 
Instead, Japan's security was fully covered by the United States, who maintained a 
substantial military presence on Japanese soil (and even more so on Okinawa, which was 
not reverted until 1972) even after the return of Japanese sovereignty in 1952. In the 
aftermath of a devastating war, where approximately three million lives were lost, this 
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security was understandably of utmost concern, particularly considering that by 1949 
Japan was surrounded by three communist states (the USSR, the People's Republic of 
China and North Korea) and two other authoritarian former colonies (the Republic of 
China in Taiwan and South Korea). 
On August 15th 1945, Japan declared its unconditional surrender to the Allied 
powers, marking the conclusion of the Pacific War. Japan was subsequently occupied, 
ostensibly by the Allied Powers but in practice by the United States, led by General 
Douglas McArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). After Japan 
gained full independence with the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, a debate ensued over post-
independence foreign policy. The JSP and JCP, which had opposed the terms of the treaty, 
fought vehemently to avoid a military alliance with the US, instead favoring a foreign 
policy rooted in pacifism and neutrality. In contrast, the LDP sought to push through the 
US-Japan Security Treaty (known as Anpo in Japanese), due to pragmatic concerns more 
than ideological ones. Indeed, according to Rosenbluth and Thies (2010), Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru (1946-47, 1948-54) was not particularly concerned about the communist 
threat and would have made peace with Mao, but saw the Security Treaty as a cheaper 
foreign policy than rearmament. This pragmatism formed the underlying basis for Japan's 
security policy in the post-war era, known, after Yoshida, as the Yoshida Doctrine. 
The Yoshida Doctrine was essentially characterized by a pragmatic decision to 
take a passive and pacifist orientation to domestic security and defense concerns, and 
instead focus the state's attention on national reconstruction, industrialization and 
international trade (Saltzman 2015; Dian 2015). Under the Yoshida Doctrine, 
constitutional bans on militarization imposed by the United States served as the basis for 
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excusing Japan from playing an activist and interventionist role in geopolitical security in 
the Cold War, sparing it of not only a heavy defense budget but also of problematic 
altercations with its postcolonial neighbors. Instead, Japanese security was guaranteed 
through a wide-ranging security alliance with the United States that was first renewed in 
1960 (against much protest from left wing forces) and again in 1970 (with little ordeal) 
(Ikeda 2011; Nakajima 2011). This security alliance involved the direct deployment of 
American troops in Japan in exchange for guarantees of Japanese security. Under the 
terms of the Anpo, the US stationed troops indefinitely at a range of military bases 
throughout Japan (including in the Greater Tokyo Area), as well as in Okinawa.  
As Dian (2015) has shown, the Yoshida doctrine amounted to a compromise 
between the aims of progressives animated by pacifist values and conservatives driven by 
concerns over the spread of communism. Thus although Yoshida himself was by no 
means a progressive, and never saw Japan's renouncement of war or militarization as 
permanent, he shrewdly forged a foreign policy doctrine that could unite all political 
forces in post-war Japanese society.23 By combining official pacifism on one hand with a 
commitment to alliance with the US and an unambiguous position for Japan under 
conditions of Cold War bipolarity, the Yoshida Doctrine did enough to appease both 
sides of what was unquestionably the fieriest political flashpoint of the early post war era.  
This is not to argue that the terms of the Yoshida Doctrine went uncontested. As a 
compromise position between progressives and conservatives, it left neither side fully 
satisfied: while left wing political parties and labour unions engaged in some of the most 
militant protests of the post-war era in the run-up to the renewal of the Security Treaty in 																																																								
23 According to Saltzman (2015), Prime Ministers Shidehara and Yoshida both claimed that it was their 
choice to include Article 9 as a way of proving to the world that Japan was not militaristic. 
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1960 (protesting alliance with the US over a fully neutral foreign policy), some 
conservatives within the LDP remained frustrated by Japan's foreign policy "impotence" 
and yearned for the day when constitutional amendment would bring remilitarization. 
Nonetheless, shortly after the 1960 flashpoint over the Anpo's renewal, progressive 
militancy abated, while conservative voices remained relatively quiet for several decades, 
and a high degree of stability and hegemonic consensus emerged over Japanese foreign 
policy under the Yoshida Doctrine (Hook and Gilson 2011).24 
 What impacts did Anpo and the Yoshida Doctrine have on Japan-US relations? 
To be sure, the security alliance served as the bedrock for US-Japan relations and secured 
Japan as a bastion of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, Anpo 
guaranteed for Japan a high standing as an irreplaceable American ally and did much to 
ensure an amicable trading relationship between the two countries. Moreover, relations 
with the US served as a conduit for re-establishing diplomatic and trading relations with 
other Asian countries, in particular, Korea, the ASEAN nations, and, after 1972, the 
People's Republic of China.  
What other impacts did Anpo have on Japanese hegemonic order domestically? 
The geopolitical context of Anpo also helped shore up hegemony for the LDP by 
guaranteeing US support for the LDP (and make economic concessions), since the US did 
not want to risk losing Japan as a close ally in Asia through the election of a JSP or JCP 
government. Moreover, Anpo was crucial to Japanese capitalism insofar as it provided 
not only relations for secure accumulation but also access to the US market; it locked 																																																								
24 The Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialist Party remained opposed to Anpo throughout 
the post-war era, while other centre-left parties (Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)) 
adopted a stance more in line with the LDP. Thus, a clear minority of a quarter to a third of voters 
consistently voted for parties that vehemently opposed the Anpo until the 1990s. 
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Japan in, both politically and economically, to its relationship to the US, which was very 
important to Japanese capital. 
Finally, Anpo and the Yoshida Doctrine allowed the state to focus much more on 
economic development, such as with Ikeda's Income Doubling Plan, the hallmark policy 
of the LDP in the early 1960s that sought to double the GDP by the end of the decade and 
achieve living standards of western countries, rather than on foreign policy (LDP n.d.a). 
Indeed, for conservatives, the low posture on foreign policy issues and the loss of 
autonomy on defense issues under the Anpo was a price worth paying for post-war 
growth and prosperity (Dian 2015). 
Overall, we can see how Japanese foreign policy in the early post-war era was 
characterized by a high degree of deference to American foreign policy and security 
interests, in keeping with the Yoshida doctrine, out of the interest of a) keeping Japan 
away from Cold War proxy wars like the Korean and Vietnam Wars; b) ensuring that 
Japan could continue to enjoy strong and preferential access to the American market for 
trade; and c) keep the spread of communism and socialism in check, both domestically 
and internationally.25 The Anpo, and Japan's relationship with the US was central to this, 
and the bedrock for Japan's revival as a major economic power in East Asia. 
 
Global political economy: The Bretton Woods System 
																																																								
25 The threat posed by the JSP was both a negotiating chip used by Satoh in Okinawa negotiations (arguing 
that a bad deal for Japan would mean a JSP victory) and a reason for the LDP to favor a structural 
dependency on the US for trade and security purposes (since only the LDP could ensure amicable relations 
with the US, Japan had much to lose from a JSP victory insofar as it remained dependent on the US) (Ikeda 
2011). 
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 The second condition for Japan's post-war hegemonic order was the liberal 
trading order set up under the Bretton Woods system. As Cox (1992) has shown, such a 
system allowed for a relatively liberal regime of free trade between countries whilst also 
permitting a high degree of state intervention in domestic political economies, reflecting 
what Ruggie (1982) has referred to as "embedded liberalism". This system perfectly 
matched with Japan's economic policy, which, as Johnson (1982) has shown, was 
actively interventionist in industrial policy but nonetheless dependent on exports for 
economic growth. An international political economic order that accommodated both of 
these elements of Japanese domestic political economy was thus tremendously beneficial 
to Japan's post-war economic boom, facilitating not only rapid economic growth but also 
a high degree of economic stability, a requirement for Japan's egalitarian lifetime 
employment system and thus for labour peace more generally. 
 Prior to and during World War II, global trading relations had been anything but 
liberal, and largely dominated by intra-imperial trade, with major imperial powers trading 
with their colonies or quasi-colonies, such as Latin America's relationship with the US. 
For Japan, this dynamic had served as part of the impetus for empire building, and 
Japan's relatively backward position, and in particular its lack of access to natural 
resources, had left it vulnerable to shortages in the factors of production necessary to 
drive economic growth. Indeed, this vulnerability had been one force prompting Japanese 
imperialism in Korea and Manchuria, and later was partly responsible for the Japanese 
entry into the Second World War, in part as a response to blocked access to crucial fossil 
fuel resources controlled in Euro-American colonies and imperial spheres of influence. 
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Needless to say, the results of this political economic order were disastrous, not only for 
the Japanese but also for the victims of Japanese imperialism in Asia. 
In the aftermath of inter-war fascism, American, British and other world leaders 
sought to remake international political economic relations along liberal lines but in a 
way that granted states a high degree of latitude in managing domestic political 
economies (Ruggie 1982). The architecture of this system was first laid out at the Bretton 
Woods conference in 1944. The Bretton Woods System (BWS) was initially composed of 
the IMF, the World Bank and GATT. Overall, what were the impacts of the BWS for 
Japanese hegemonic order? In general, it reinforced the stability of LDP-led rule by 
producing a stable trading order while also allowing a strong degree of permissiveness 
towards the high degree of state intervention, both through supports to export industries 
and barriers to imports, for Japanese industrial development. In particular, hard quotas on 
foreign exchange for imports and investment respectively existed after 1950, severely 
limiting the degree to which Japanese capital had to compete with American and other 
foreign capital domestically (Weiss 1986). Moreover, under the embedded liberal 
paradigm, Japan had the freedom to import American technologies while also 
maintaining the authority to determine which technologies could be imported so as to 
influence the trajectory of domestic industrialization in ways that advanced the 
developmentalist agenda of MITI and other sectors of the bureaucracy (Weiss 1986).  
 A further way in which the embedded liberal paradigm benefitted Japanese 
industrialization can be observed in the trading relationship that developed with the US. 
While Japan's proportion of imports from the US fell from 44 percent in 1950 to 29 
percent by 1970, Japan's proportion of exports to the US grew from 22 percent in 1950 to 
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31 percent by 1970 (Hook and Gilson 2011). Japan's overall exports grew in value from 
298 billion yen in 1950 to 8.8 trillion yen in 1972, a 30-fold increase, while imports grew 
from 348 billion to 7.2 trillion. Moreover, while Japan had an overall trade deficit for 
most years until the mid-1960s, starting in 1965 exports surpassed imports, leading to a 
1.6 trillion yen trade surplus in 1972, driven by growth in exports of textiles and steel 
initially, and later, electronics, ships and automobiles (EPA 1981; MOF n.d.).26 While 
Japan's entry into GATT in 1955 forced it to abandon quotas in favor of tariffs on most of 
its imports, it retained tariff rates at close to 20 percent on average until the 1970s, while 
rigid barriers to inward foreign investment remained intact (Flath 2000; Weiss 1986). In 
various ways, then, the embedded liberalism of the Bretton Woods System and the 
trading relationship with the US that developed under that system served as a major 
condition for Japan's post-war boom. 
 
The electoral and party system: The rise of LDP dominance 
 The third condition of Japan's post-war hegemonic order was its electoral and 
party system. In particular, its electoral system did two things for LDP-led political order. 
First, it promoted LDP party hegemony by splitting the opposition vote and ensuring that 
no single opposition party could ever rationally choose to run enough candidates so as to 
actually threaten to win an election overall. Second, it promoted intraparty competition 
and a highly decentralized LDP (though this emerged historically) that encouraged a 
highly localized politics that helped ensure a distribution of political goods (pork-barrel 
spending) throughout the country in order to combat uneven development while also 																																																								
26 The share of steel consumed in the US that was imported from Japan grew from less one percent all the 
way to 7 percent over the course of the 1960s (Flath 2000). 
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further entrenching LDP dominance. In these ways, the electoral and party system served 
as a key basis for ensuring stable LDP dominance without sacrificing the democratic 
legitimacy of the system overall. 
 What characterized Japan's post-war electoral system? While much changed in the 
immediate post-war to Japan's political institutions, such as the granting of suffrage to 
women and the transformation of the House of Councilors (Upper House) from a 
hereditary to an elected institution, one thing that did not change was the retention of the 
pre-war multi-member non-transferrable voting system. Within this system, voters each 
cast ballots for individual candidates in their electoral district, and between two and five 
candidates were elected depending on the size of the district. This meant that in most 
districts, parties seeking to win a majority of seats overall had to run multiple candidates 
who directly competed with each other. The implications of this intraparty competition 
were significant for the development of Japanese politics. 
 While the first few post-war elections saw a range of parties enter government, by 
the mid-1950s Japanese party politics had settled into a relatively stable pattern after 
mergers brought about the formation of two major parties: the Japanese Socialist Party 
(JSP) on the left, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on the right. However, while 
the various centrist and conservative elements that constituted the LDP managed to 
maintain party unity over the ensuing decades, this was not true for the JSP, which split 
in two in 1960 with the formation of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).27 Moreover, 
in 1964, Kōmeitō, a new, centrist party affiliated with the Buddhist organization Sōka 
																																																								
27 The DSP was formed from members who had formerly been part of the pre-merger Rightist Socialist 
Party (remaining JSP members were mostly from the old Leftist Socialist Party). The DSP's split was 
mainly driven by disagreements over the JSP's opposition to Anpo (Ikeda 2011). 
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Gakkai, formed. For three decades until 1993, then, Japanese politics was characterized 
by a relatively stable dynamic: on the right, the LDP would win roughly half of the votes 
(and seats); on the left, the four opposition parties (the JCP, JSP, DSP and Kōmeitō) 
would share the other half. In no election did any single party even come close to 
surpassing the LDP in votes. However, this should not be surprising: in no election did 
any other party run anywhere near enough candidates to challenge the LDP. 
 Readers familiar with first-past-the-post electoral systems will be aware of the 
tendency for parties that once held a majority of seats to suddenly see a significant 
decline in their seat count, or else see a party that previously held few seats suddenly 
make a major breakthrough. In Canada, the Progressive Conservative Party's 1993 defeat, 
where it was reduced to 2 seats, down from 156 before the election, or the New 
Democratic Party's 2011 breakthrough that saw it win 58 out of 78 seats in Quebec, up 
from 1, each demonstrate the potential for a groundbreaking transformation in fortunes. 
In post-war Japan, this was not the case. Because each district elected multiple members 
and each party was allowed to run multiple candidates, the number of candidates each 
party nominated depended on their pre-election expectations. In this context, the strategy 
of a party audaciously running more candidates than they were likely to win seats could 
backfire and see the candidates split the party's overall vote in such a way that led them to 
fail to win any seats at all. Afraid of this scenario, the four minor parties rarely ran more 
than one candidate per district, while the LDP often ran three or more.28 Thus, in most 
cases, the LDP as a party was almost guaranteed to win at least an overwhelming 
																																																								28	Moreover, in many cases even one candidate was too many for the JCP, DSP and Kōmeitō, and their 
candidates often finished just outside of the electoral cutoff.	
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plurality of seats even before elections took place.29 Even if they were to suffer a 
significant loss of support, the electoral effects of this would likely be minimized unless 
voters somehow arranged to evenly distribute their votes among the opposition parties 
instead of, for example, mainly voting for the JSP and thus allowing their (single) 
candidates to run up massive vote totals in each district without ultimately leading to 
much of an impact on the overall seat distribution. 
Clearly, this electoral system brought significant benefits for the LDP and 
virtually guaranteed their stable rule, while the opposition parties remained marginal.30 
However, it was not as if the opposition parties could have easily bridged their 
ideological differences: though all generally sided against the LDP (at least until the 
1990s), this did not mean that they sided together. The ideological gap between the DSP 
and the JCP, for example, was significantly wider than the gap between the DSP and the 
LDP. Moreover, the LDP's policy fluidity and lack of a core ideology meant that in many 
cases, the LDP adopted (or rather co-opted) policies that opposition parties supported, 
while opportunities to join parliamentary committees, as well as the consensus-based 
decision making that characterized Diet (legislative) deliberations ensured that being in 
opposition did not render them voiceless (see also Curtis 1988). 
 Thus, we see how Japan's multi-member district electoral system contributed 
significantly to LDP-led hegemony by creating major structural barriers to other parties' 
abilities to contest for power. The LDP benefited doubly from maintaining a veneer of 																																																								
29 However, while this was true for the LDP overall, individual candidates often faced intraparty 
competition, as slightly more LDP candidates ran in each district than were likely to win. To avoid being 
the unlucky loser, then, LDP candidates were forced to engage in rigorous electioneering, as the next 
section will show. 
30 Though not marginal enough to prompt their merger into a unified, non-LDP party: by each winning 
enough seats to stay relevant, opposition parties opted to stay small and divided.	
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democratic legitimacy (and actual sustained electoral success)31 while in practice never 
facing any realistic threat of losing power, and consistently playing with a loaded dice.  
 However, while the LDP as a whole rarely faced threats of losing office, the same 
cannot be said for individual LDP candidates, who had to fight hard to guarantee that 
enough of the moderate and conservative vote went to them (as opposed to their fellow 
LDP candidates from the same districts). This ensured that supporters and lawmakers 
alike always remained mobilized and engaged. Indeed, as Stockwin (2006) has argued, 
given the relatively set party preferences of the electorate, it was intraparty competition 
among LDP candidates, rather than interparty competition from candidates of the left 
parties, that provided the strongest motivation for active election campaigning. Within the 
LDP, then, this electoral system played a role in facilitating the development of three key 
institutions: factions, kōenkai and the PARC (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). 
Kōenkai are political support organizations formed by individual candidates – and 
not parties – as means of securing both votes and fundraising in their constituencies. They 
emerged after 1952, as a means of evading campaign-financing and electoral campaign 
restrictions (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). Kōenkai drew membership – often in the tens of 
thousands – from a wide swathe of groups within constituencies, including youth, women, 
farmers, salaried workers, and small business owners, and organized a wide range of 
social clubs, professional and hobby associations, including music, arts (such as the tea 																																																								
31 Many have emphasized the degree to which the LDP benefited from mal-apportionment of districts in 
favor of rural voters as a key basis to their electoral success. While this was certainly part of the reason for 
their success, it is often over-emphasized. From 1960 until the 1990s, the LDP never received less than 42 
percent of the vote, and only received less than 45 percent once, while the second best JSP never received 
more than 29 percent. Under these electoral imbalances, even a more evenly distributed electoral system 
would likely result in relatively stable LDP governments, while a pure first-past-the-post system would 
have resulted in consistent landslide electoral victories. Therefore, it was the electoral disincentives of 
running enough candidates to seriously challenges for power that minority parties faced that was the actual 
reason behind the LDP's unrelenting electoral success, rather than a rural electoral bias. 
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ceremony), and outdoor and indoor sports (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). Kōenkai thus 
provided a setting for community engagement and participation structured around the 
personality of a single electoral candidate. Candidates usually spent significant amounts 
of time and money on their kōenkai, not only on the myriad club activities and excursions 
but also in attending numerous weddings, funerals and other major events for members, 
all in the name of building their personal appeal within the community. In exchange, 
kōenkai provided candidates with a major source of fundraising (from both membership 
and from the wider business community that was often affiliated with kōenkai) as well as 
a stable bloc of loyal voters, even including members who were supporters of other 
parties (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). In the context of intraparty competition, kōenkai 
ensured that votes would not all coalesce behind one LDP candidate and instead divide 
between two or three so as to ensure they each won election.  
What were the consequences of kōenkai? First, they promoted a highly clientelist, 
personalized brand of politics: voters would support candidates based on their personal 
appeal, as well as potential government spending they could bring to the community, 
rather than the programmatic agenda of a party. Second, they prevented the centralization 
of the LDP's party organization. While LDP leaders tried to increase the power of the 
party relative to kōenkai, and even abolish kōenkai, on several occasions, these efforts 
were unsuccessful, and the great size of kōenkai spending, coupled with the importance 
of kōenkai support over party support meant that the LDP remained decentralized (Krauss 
and Pekkanen 2010). Third, and unlike the support groups of the JSP, JCP and Kōmeitō, 
which were much more clearly defined along class-based (and in the case of Kōmeitō, 
religious) lines, LDP kōenkai were built in ways that were highly personal and largely 
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apolitical, drawing membership from a range of social classes. Overall, the kōenkai 
played a major role in ensuring stable and consistent electoral and financial support for 
LDP candidates in a way that promoted their re-election under the multi-member system; 
of keeping the LDP a highly decentralized coalition party; and in maintaining an 
orientation of Japanese politics that was personal rather than ideological, appealing at a 
personal level to voters from a wide range of class positions, and thus weakening the 
appeal of the class-based rhetoric of the JSP and JCP.32 
Along with the kōenkai, a second major institution that developed in this era, 
particularly in the LDP, were party factions. If kōenkai served as the basis through which 
candidates for office built support and shored up votes, factions were the means through 
which powerful lawmakers built stable coalitions of supporters within the Diet in order to 
ensure their power and influence over major party and governmental bodies. As with 
kōenkai, factions were largely apolitical, with members joining and recruiting for 
personal and strategic rather than ideological reasons. Lead factions would recruit 
promising candidates and provide them with nominations and funding, highly valuable 
goods in the context of intraparty electoral competition. Once elected, faction 
membership served as a means of gaining access to positions on both legislative and 
party policy committees, enabling officials to gain experience and gradually rise in status. 
At the top, factional membership provided the basis for the distribution of key cabinet 
and party leadership posts, and party presidents would usually allocate these posts in 																																																								
32 Candidates from other parties, especially the JCP and Kōmeitō, also had kōenkai that functioned in 
largely non-ideological ways similar to the LDP (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). However, while this likely 
brought some electoral success (the JCP's kōenkai membership far exceeded party membership), it was 
never able to win over elites or bring in significant financing (aside from what the JCP obtained from 
subscriptions to its newspaper, Akahata). Emphasizing personality while downplaying ideology thus 
worked well for the party of the capitalist status quo (the LDP) but was an ineffective political strategy for 
the transformative left. 
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relation to the relative strength of each faction, while ensuring that factions that backed 
their leadership bids were especially rewarded (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). In exchange, 
faction members would be expected to provide loyal votes for their leaders in party 
leadership contests. As Okimoto (1990) has shown, this orientation of LDP party politics 
around non-ideological yet powerful factions ensured that major ideological differences 
never led to party cleavages. In contrast, other parties saw the development of ideological 
factions that significantly undermined party unity, leading to the breakup of the JSP and 
the creation of the DSP in 1960 (only five years after the JSP's formation), while 
providing a major barrier to unification among the left opposition parties. 
A third and final institution central to the internal workings of the LDP was the 
Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC). PARC served as the LDP's key 
policymaking body, and given the continuity of LDP majorities in both Houses until 1990, 
this effectively made it more important to the policymaking process than the Diet itself. 
In order for any piece of legislation to gain party approval (and thus be presented in the 
Diet), it must pass the scrutiny of the PARC, even before it goes to Cabinet. The PARC 
was comprised of many dozens of divisions and within each committees and 
subcommittees (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). Each LDP lawmaker held positions on 
multiple PARC committees, while PARC committee assignments were often divided 
based on factional allegiance. As lawmakers gained experience, their roles within PARC 
committees increased. With enough terms in the Diet, anyone could position themselves 
for top leadership positions within PARC. 
While PARC's influence over the policymaking process is notable on its own, 
PARC is even more important as the institutional basis for Japan's clientelistic politics 
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and as the institution responsible for cultivating zoku lawmakers, or LDP lawmakers – 
usually backbenchers without influence over cabinet – with a strong background in a 
particular policy domain and with strong ties to bureaucrats in the corresponding ministry 
or department. Zoku lawmakers, many of whom were concentrated in the Construction, 
Transport, and Agriculture ministries – all areas with high amounts of discretionary 
spending – were influential in generating close relationships with bureaucrats that 
enabled them to be the LDP's key means of collaborating with bureaucrats in the detailed 
process of policy formation (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). By forging amicable links with 
zoku lawmakers, bureaucrats were able to obtain budgetary increases for their ministry or 
department from the LDP. Zoku lawmakers then used their influence as a bridge linking 
bureaucrats with the LDP party mechanism to help craft policies that included 
government spending in their own constituencies, what has generally been referred to as 
"pork-barrel" spending. The PARC thus served as a vehicle for empowering backbench 
zoku lawmakers, for forging ties between bureaucrats and low-ranking party officials 
outside of the cabinet, and for generally taking power away from the cabinet (and even 
the Prime Minister) over policymaking (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). More than anything, 
however, its significance lay in the way it helped foster a highly collusive, clientelist 
form of politics rooted in the LDP-bureaucracy power nexus.  
 
The state form: The rise of bureaucracy-driven governance 
The fourth condition of Japan's post-war hegemonic order is the strong role 
played by the bureaucracy and the synergistic relationship that developed between 
bureaucrats and elected officials. Partly due to the high degree of decentralization of the 
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LDP's power structures and the weakness of cabinet, and partly due to the degree to 
which bureaucrats were empowered in the 1940s after many of the wartime lawmakers 
were purged, bureaucrats had a preponderant role in policy creation in the post-war era. 
In a way, a division of labour developed between the bureaucrats and the lawmakers: 
while bureaucrats, isolated from electoral pressures, could be left to deal with long-term 
national policy (in particular industrial and economic as well as welfare and fiscal 
policy), lawmakers sought to influence the direction of funds for construction, public 
works and other targeted expenses towards their own local constituencies so as to 
maintain electability. The rational planning of a bureaucracy capable of looking beyond 
the two or three year window of an election cycle thus corresponded effectively with the 
long-term orientation of Japanese capital, while the more targeted pork-barrel politics of 
elected officials was more effective in maintaining democratic political legitimacy for the 
system while also balancing against the effects of an industrial policy oriented around the 
interests of big business. 
Given the endurance of LDP domination, which officially began in 1955 with the 
formation of the party but could just as easily be dated back to 1949, when the Liberal 
Party of Yoshida Shigeru won the first of two majority governments prior to LDP 
unification, it is tempting to equate the Japanese state with the LDP, and to see its other 
administrative organs and the bureaucracy as mere vehicles through which the LDP's will 
is transmitted. However, the reality was much more complex. Chalmers Johnson (1982) 
famously said that in Japan, "the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule" (154). While 
such an assertion is no doubt hyperbolic, there is no question that the bureaucracy played 
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a significant role in the shaping and implementation of policy, often in ways that escaped 
the discretion the LDP. 
 Overall, the bureaucracy, and in particular the fractions of it related to the 
Construction state or developmental state (Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Finance, 
MITI) had a significant degree of autonomy in both the creation and implementation of 
policy, more so than in most other industrialized countries. However, it would be a 
mistake to therefore suggest that the bureaucracy had more power than the elected (LDP) 
government, or that LDP governments were required to bend their wills to the 
bureaucracy. The LDP and the bureaucracy had a close, symbiotic relationship because 
the LDP was concerned mostly with 1) winning elections; and 2) broad, long-term policy 
goals, such as economic growth or the maintenance of social order. Beyond these general 
goals, the LDP was relatively flexible and not deeply concerned with ideology or the 
minutiae of policy. The bureaucracy in no way sought to negate or undermine either of 
the LDP's prerogatives. On the contrary it worked effectively to implement them at a 
micro-level. Nonetheless, in cases where the will of bureaucrats fundamentally 
contradicted with the interests of the LDP, it was clearly the LDP who had the final say. 
This is evinced by the refusal by both the Cabinet and industry to follow MITI directives 
to concentrate the auto industry into two firms (Nissan and Toyota) (Okimoto 1988). 
 Along with the LDP, the bureaucracy also developed a symbiotic relationship 
with private capital, and in particular the keiretsu. There were two elements to these 
connections. The first was the transfer of personnel between the bureaucracy and the 
private sector through amakudari, discussed below. The second was bureaucratic 
organization and supervision of advisory committees, or shingikai, which incorporated 
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business leaders, including those from the Japanese Business Federation (Keidanren), as 
well as other stakeholders (sometimes including labour unions) into negotiations over 
policy formulation.  
 Overall what role did the bureaucracy play in entrenching the hegemonic order of 
the post-war era? It clearly played a significant role, not only through effective policy 
creation and execution, but also by effectively depoliticizing much of what went on in the 
Diet. Insofar as the direction of policy was less on the partisan directives of the LDP and 
more directed by professional bureaucrats, an arms' length removed from the partisan 
world of electoral politics and who were widely respected in general, not only was the 
ideological content of policy (aside from security policy, discussed previously) reduced, 
but the understanding of it as ideological was also quelled. The overwhelming 
transpartisan support that much legislation received is testament to this: Diet sessions 
(aside from with Anpo) were rarely characterized by the LDP forcing its agenda upon the 
JSP and JCP and was usually much more consensual. This, in turn, facilitated a wider 
societal appreciation for the work of the bureaucracy as in the common interest. The 
bureaucracy was thus a fundamental part of what made the post-war order hegemonic.  
 Another key element was the relationship between big business and the 
bureaucracy, characterized by the dynamic of Amakudari. Amakudari, which literally 
means "descent from heaven," refers to the tendency for senior bureaucrats to "retire" 
from their positions and gain appointment on the boards or in advisory roles of private 
corporations or special public corporations, usually in the fields of the bureaucratic 
department that formerly employed them. Unlike in many countries, where personnel 
may flow informally between the public and private sectors, amakudari appointments are 
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directly arranged by the bureaucracy as a deliberate and open means of maintaining 
linkages between the bureaucracy and the entities under their jurisdiction (Mizoguchi and 
Ngyuen 2012). Amakurari appointments not only bring insider knowledge of the 
bureaucracy to corporate boards, but also enable the bureaucracy to disseminate its values 
and orthodoxy into the corporate sector, ensuring a harmony of interests between the two. 
Moreover, the amakudari system influences bureaucrats' policymaking to be in the 
interests of the corporations they may serve on the boards of in the future.  
 According to Mizoguchi and Nguyen (2012), amakudari, which dates all the way 
back to the Meiji era, expanded during the period of high-speed growth in the 1960s, and 
developed partly due to the structural constraints of the bureaucracy. Japan's bureaucracy 
relied on a rigid internal labor market, characterized by experience-based promotion that 
saw bureaucrats amass decades of service within the same ministry where they first 
started before being promoted to executive ranks. Given that only a select number of 
bureaucrats could be promoted to top positions, amakudari developed partly to ensure all 
bureaucrats that they would enjoy job security (and generous financial compensation) 
even if they were not the beneficiaries of internal promotion, thus guaranteeing that top 
talent would continue to flow into the bureaucracy. Moreover, it ensured continued 
commitment to the ministry, even by those bureaucrats who know they were unlikely to 
be promoted (Mishima 2017). 
 Amakudari thus played a crucial role in cementing the link between the 
bureaucracy and the private sector, not only providing a safety valve for the career 
stability of bureaucrats, who generally received only modest salaries at the beginning of 
their careers, but also ensuring that bureaucratic influence could extend to the 
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corporations over which a bureaucratic department had jurisdiction, and for ensuring, 
from the perspective of firms, that they had direct communicative channels with the 
bureaucrats that regulated them, thus enabling them access to bureaucratic favor in many 
cases. Thus, while it served as the basis for a close and cooperative relationship between 
the bureaucracy and private (as well as semi-public) enterprises, it also served as the basis 
for widespread and institutionalized corruption, including the recurrent problem of kansei 
dangō (bureaucratic bid-rigging) (Mishima 2017). Nonetheless, in the early post-war era, 
amakudari was important as a means of maintaining the highly collaborative relationship 
between the bureaucracy and private capital that ensured general acceptance of the 
bureaucracy's key leadership role within developmentalism. 
 
Production and capital: Japanese developmentalism and the keiretsu 
The fifth condition of the post-war hegemonic order was the role played by big 
business and the high degree of coordination and cooperation that developed among firms 
and between firms and the state. This high degree of coordination resulted in a high 
degree of hegemonic support across all sectors for Japan's economic model and also 
contributed to the stability of the overall economic system. The key elements of the 
system are as follows: 1) relationships between firms of the same keiretsu, especially 
with banks, and 2) relationships between firms and the bureaucracy, through MITI and 
the Ministry of Finance in particular. Japan's highly stable post-war growth was partially 
rooted in these highly complementary relationships. 
Before the Second World War, Japan's economy was dominated by a small 
number of oligarchical, family-owned conglomerates called zaibatsu. The zaibatsu – 
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some of which dated back to the 17th century – exercised extensive control over the 
Japanese economy, with each conglomerate holding major interest in numerous economic 
sectors, including mining, shipbuilding, trading, banking, and construction. The zaibatsu 
also exercised extensive political influence, as the primary vehicles for campaign 
financing, and their relationships with the royal family, the military, and politicians from 
Japan's two main pre-war political parties (Rikken Seiyūkai and Rikken Minseitō) were 
extremely close. Moreover, and they had a major influence on Japanese imperialism in 
Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. In the context of the zaibatsu dominated economy, 
Japanese society was extremely unequal and polarized, with a small elite of extremely 
wealthy capitalists and nobility juxtaposed to a mass of desperately poor peasants and 
workers. Indeed, zaibatsu control over the economy, politics and society was seen as a 
major reason why Japan's brief period of liberal democracy during the 1920s and early 
1930s, known as Taisho democracy, failed to consolidate and ultimately led to extreme 
militarism and fascism. In the aftermath of war defeat, the occupying forces thus blamed 
the zaibatsu, and their unchecked power, for the failure of Japanese democracy, and 
consequently elected to break them up. The zaibatsu were thus disbanded, and their 
various component parts were turned into independent companies. Moreover, zaibatsu 
families were dispossessed of their ownership rights, and the resulting companies were 
largely self-owned. However, in the early years following the return of independence, the 
various companies that had previously formed zaibatsu conglomerates came back 
together into new interlocking business networks called keiretsu (see also Gordon 2003).  
These keiretsu networks were characterized by cross-shareholding and financing, 
usually centered on a major bank that provided secure, long-term financing to member 
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companies. In many ways, the post-war keiretsu were copies of the pre-war zaibatsu, 
with Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Fuji (formerly Yasuda) each holding interests in a 
full range of fields, including banking, insurance, trading, steel, shipping, mining and 
chemicals. However, in both their ownership structures and the relationship between 
member firms, there were also important changes compared to the pre-war zaibatsu, 
particularly due to the end of family ownership patterns. 
What types of relations exist between firms in a keiretsu? Japanese keiretsu can be 
largely grouped into two categories: vertical keiretsu and horizontal keiretsu (Murakami 
1996). According to Murakami (1996), vertical keiretsu are defined by an upstream-
downstream network of relations, often known as subcontracting or distribution keiretsu 
(supply or value chain keiretsu). On the other hand, horizontal keiretsu are cross-sector 
networks. Horizontal or bank keiretsu are primarily bound together over the issue of 
financing, yet few firms obtain all their financing from their keiretsu bank. Moreover, the 
debt guarantee is a key part of financial keiretsu relationships, ensuring financial stability 
for member firms. Vertical keiretsu have generally emerged spontaneously at the will of 
firms, and not at the bequest or facilitation of the bureaucracy. Cultivating Keiretsu 
linkages takes time, and exit is also difficult (due to barriers and disincentives) so firms 
have an incentive to endure difficult economic times and stay involved with keiretsu, a 
dynamic that further aided long-term economic stability (Murakami 1996).  
While the term keiretsu is usually used in a narrow sense to refer to the group of 
companies directly linked through cross-shareholding and direct financing from a major 
bank, we can also conceive of the Japanese economy as a whole involving a more general 
structure of linkages. Indeed, each major firm within a keiretsu itself is linked to a range 
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of smaller firms, both distributors and suppliers, with which it has a semi-stable 
relationship. Given the extent to which small and medium-sized enterprises dominate the 
Japanese economy, the role of these linkages with small firms should not be overlooked. 
Daniel Okimoto has shown how this relationship between lead firms and smaller firms 
settled into a symbiotic pattern: access to large firms ensure small firms a high degree of 
stability, while small firms nonetheless exist as shock-absorbers in the system for large 
firms during times of economic contraction (Okimoto 1988). We can also think of Gary 
Gereffi's work on value chains (see, for example, Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005) 
and see how keiretsu networks represent neither the market pattern of business relations 
characteristic of North America nor the hierarchical model of the pre-war zaibatsu, but 
rather a captive or relational network, depending on the power balance of its members. 
While relations among large firms in a horizontal keiretsu might be characterized as 
relational networks, those between lead firms and subordinate firms in a vertical keiretsu 
fit the category of captive networks. 
What were the benefits of keiretsu relationships for Japanese capitalism? How did 
keiretsu organization complement the role of the bureaucracy in driving economic 
development? Keiretsu networks served as a major basis for stability in the Japanese 
economy. In particular, this was achieved in three ways. First, the special relationship 
between keiretsu member firms and their core bank ensured that businesses could always 
rely on stable access to credit, even during times of economic downturn or when market 
signals alone might deter creditors (Anchordoguy 2005). This prevented bankruptcies, 
and is the strongest reason why Japan experienced less than half as many bankruptcies in 
the post-war period as the US. Second, the practice of cross-shareholding, or mochiai 
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among keiretsu firms, which accounted for as much as 75 percent of all stock, ensured 
that firms were generally protected from hostile takeovers (Estevez-Abe 2008). Moreover, 
the high proportion of stable shareholders corresponded well with the orientation of post-
war Japanese capitalism that prioritized long-term growth and market share expansion 
over American-style quarterly profits and shareholder value, enabling firms to largely 
ignore the interests of their shareholders (Anchordoguy 2005). Fourth, keiretsu linkages, 
as well as the wider linkages that took place at the level of industry and in the Japanese 
economy as a whole among firms through organizations like the Japanese Business 
Federation (Keidanren) promoted cooperation and restrained competition among firms, 
even among rival keiretsu (Anchordoguy 2005). This ability to control "excessive 
competition" is often seen as a major factor behind the high degree of stability 
(Murakami 1984). Finally, as the next section will show, keiretsu networks enjoyed an 
institutional complementarity with both the lifetime employment system and 
subcontracting, by facilitating labour market security and stable networks with smaller 
producing firms (Lechevalier 2014). In all these ways, we can see how the keiretsu 
system was a major factor behind the stable growth of the post-war era, promoting trust 
relationships among Japanese firms and between firms and the bureaucracy. Moreover, 
the stability that this system ensured was a precondition for the highly stable employment 
system that will be discussed below. In other words, the highly coordinated form of 
Japanese capitalism that emerged in the postwar (out of the pre-war system of zaibatsu 
conglomerates) not only provided important preconditions for stable capital accumulation 
within the Fordist-Keynesian world system, but also enjoyed strong institutional 
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complementarities with other labour, welfare and political institutions, thereby promoting 
political legitimation and stable social reproduction as well. 
 
Production and labour: Enterprise unionism and lifetime employment 
 The sixth condition for Japan's post-war hegemonic order was the role of the 
working class and the core relationship that developed between capital and labour. In 
particular it was a relationship characterized by a high degree of economic empowerment 
for workers (through high wages, an egalitarian distribution of wealth, generous benefits 
and strong job security) combined with a very low degree of political empowerment (with 
parties backed by labor unions never even once joining government). Japan was thus able 
to simultaneously maintain a lean welfare state and small tax burden while ensuring a 
high degree of equality and nearly full male employment (see also Chiavacci and 
Lechevalier 2017). This meant that while politically it was invariably capital that 
exercised control (with workers only seeing their needs met indirectly via capital rather 
than directly through the state), socio-economic outcomes more closely resembled social 
democratic countries, and partly for this reason political legitimacy remained high. 
Japan's post-war employment regime has often been characterized by the concept 
of lifetime employment (Okimoto 1988). Though some firms developed lifetime 
employment provisions beginning in the 1930s for their core workforce, the concept 
became especially dominant during the period of economic boom beginning in the mid-
1950s. Unlike in North America, where workers routinely make mid-career job changes, 
whether voluntarily or not, such a phenomenon has been relatively unusual in post-war 
Japan. Owing in part to paternalistic traditions and in part to labour laws that granted 
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strong protections to workers against dismissal,33 corporations have often taken on the 
role of an extended family for their workers under relationships characterized by loyalty 
on both sides. As a consequence, when workers are hired – usually directly out of high 
school or university – they are expected to work for that company for their entire career, 
and they can expect that the company will continue to keep them employed until they 
retire. While workers are expected to work long hours,34 accept job relocation and 
reassignment, companies are expected to provide full job security, fringe benefits and 
stable pay raises. While starting pay is generally low (ensuring firms could benefit from a 
young workforce early on), this is compensated by the guarantee of long-term growth in 
wages (Okimoto 1988). Moreover, in cases of labour market contractions, dismissals 
were avoided at all costs, with job relocation, transfer to an affiliate firm (usually a 
member of the same business group or keiretsu), or in some cases early retirement for 
senior workers the preferred options (Okimoto 1988). However, while lifetime 
employment ensured far-reaching job security – at the cost of total loyalty to the firm – it 
was not the only means through which Japan's employment regime was maintained.  
Along with the lifetime employment system, we must consider a second element 
of Japan's post-war labour regime: the role of enterprise unions, their relationship with 
firms (including through the Spring Offensive, or shuntō) and their relationship with the 
state (including through the shingikai). Japan's pattern of labour organization in the post-
war era has been characterized as "enterprise unionism" (Akimoto and Sonoda 2009; 																																																								
33 Unlike in the United States and elsewhere, employers were not allowed to dismiss workers simply to 
increase profits; dismissals were only allowed in cases where an employee violated the terms of 
employment or in cases where layoffs were proven to be the only means of avoiding bankruptcy or 
insolvency. 34	In some cases beyond the point of physical and mental exhaustion, resulting in health problems and 
sometimes leading to death through suicide or illness, a phenomenon known as karōshi, or death from 
overwork.	
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Chalmers 1995; Jeong and Aguilera 2008; Sakoh 1990; Weinstein 1994). Enterprise 
unions have constituted up 95 percent of all unions (Chalmers 1995), while over 90 
percent of unionized workers belonged to enterprise unions (Jeong and Aguilera 2008). 
Enterprise unionism differs from craft industry-wide unionism in that the locus of labour 
organization is confined to the firm. While Japan has, throughout the post-war era, had a 
number of national labour federations – usually aligned with one of the major left wing 
political parties, including Sohyō (aligned with the JSP), Dōmei (DSP) and Sanbetsu 
(JCP), as well as the neutral Chūritsu Rōren – along with industrial unions within each 
national federation, these federations were weak and decentralized, little more than an 
aggregation of the enterprise unions that comprised them, with little institutional power of 
their own other than the ability to push for wage negotiations in the annual Spring 
Offensive of bargaining (Jeong and Aguilera 2008). 
Enterprise unionism emerged as the dominant model of unionism in post-war 
Japan as a result of class struggle and the role of the state in repressing industrial and 
national unions. During the pre-war and wartime period, unionism was heavily repressed 
by the state and capital. While labour activists tried to develop national or sector-level 
unions, the lack of a history of cross-sector unionization, combined with the high degree 
of repression against labour organization that spanned across firm lines proved major 
barriers. In contrast, many firms accepted, and even encouraged, intra-firm labour 
organization, particularly under terms that emphasized collaboration or corporate 
paternalism rather than class struggle and confrontation with management (Jeong and 
Aguilera 2008). While labour unions were completely eradicated during the first half of 
the 1940s under the wartime totalitarian government, the US occupation saw the 
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introduction of guarantees for workers' rights to organize, collectively bargain and strike. 
This period saw a rapid surge in unionization: the number of unionized workers grew 
from zero in 1944 to a peak of 6.8 million in 1948 (Jeong and Aguilera 2008).35 These 
unions built on the pre-war institutional model of enterprise unionism but in a much more 
militant fashion, given their newfound freedoms and the economic and social upheaval of 
the immediate post-war. However, as with the pre-war period, the period beginning in 
1948 saw a return to repression, as the SCAP and the Yoshida government both took 
action to break up the most militant unions through purges. Corporations, for their part, 
tried to disarm unions by setting up alternative and management-sanctioned "second 
unions," which were successful in coopting white collar workers, a strategy of divide and 
conquer (Jeong and Aguilera 2008). In this context, "Japanese labour lost the hope and 
energy needed to keep up the struggle to institutionalize a system of horizontal unions 
beyond the enterprise by the early 1960s" (Jeong and Aguilera 2008: 119). 
Enterprise unionism thus came to be the dominant form of labour organization in 
post-war Japan. As far as its significance for the post-war hegemonic order, three things 
are of note. First, the corporatist and inward-looking nature of enterprise unionism meant 
that workers generally prioritized the interests of the firm over class struggle. 
Ideologically, this served as an important basis for the very low level of labour unrest 
from the 1960s on, in contrast to the highly turbulent late 1940s and 1950s. Second, given 
the full incorporation of the union within the firm, enterprise unions enjoyed a significant 
collaborative role with management, and managers often came with significant 
experience in union leadership (Sakoh 1990). The division between management and 																																																								
35 Pre-war levels of roughly 380,000 were already reached by 1945 (Jeong and Aguilera 2008). 
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labour was thus institutionally, as well as ideologically, minimized. Third, enterprise 
unionism did not mean that workers were completely powerless: workers generally 
expected – and received – a significant share of profits, believing that their compensation 
ought to be reflective of the firm's profitability and competitiveness (Sakoh 1990). 
Fourth, enterprise unions generally limited membership to regular workers, withholding 
membership from the auxiliary workforce of part time and casual employees (many of 
whom were women) and subcontractor firms. This policy reflected management's 
concern for business-cycle flexibility and the union membership's concern with their own 
security, and received tacit support from the state (Jeong and Aguilera 2008). Overall we 
can see how the labour management regime enhanced the hegemonic order.  
 
Production and the petit bourgeoisie: Clientelism and the old middle class 
The seventh condition of the post-war hegemonic order was the way the old 
middle class, including both farmers and petit bourgeoisie, particularly in the 
countryside, were incorporated into the processes of post-war modernization and 
industrialization. According to Sugimoto (2011), although Japan is often seen as a 
country of large corporations with their sararīmen, it is in fact more accurately 
characterized as a country of small business. Emanating from the Edo period (1603-1868) 
class model, with artisans, farmers and merchants as the three main classes under the 
samurai class, the petit bourgeoisie, whether in agriculture, small-scale retail, or small-
scale industry, was the overwhelmingly largest source of employment in post-war Japan, 
while even today more Japanese are employed in small business than in many other 
industrialized countries (Sugimoto 2011; see also Hashimoto 2001). What characterized 
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the petit bourgeoisie, and this shift in its composition, in the early post-war era? What 
were the implications of this changing middle class for the post-war hegemonic order? 
While the majority of Japanese worked in agriculture until the post-war period, 
they were by no means "middle class," and indeed functioned more as a peasant class 
until the post-war era. During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan was 
characterized by tremendous class inequality in both cities and the countryside. However, 
after World War II, the occupying forces understood that one reason for the rise of 
Japanese fascism was the weakness of the Japanese peasants as a class, both politically 
and economically. Predicting that the success of Japanese liberal democracy in the post-
war era depended on relatively high levels of economic equality, they instituted a radical 
land reform policy that divided all rural land parcels above ten hectares and granted 
property rights to the cultivators. With the swoop of a pen, Japanese cultivators went 
from de-facto peasants to petit bourgeoisie: between March 1947 and October 1948, the 
proportion of tenant farmers fell from 43.5% to 7.5% while 4.5 million acres were 
transferred (Babb 2005). This great land redistribution in rural Japan was a foundational 
step in the post-war development model, and ensured that, according to Murakami (1996) 
"the farming class did not feel left out of Japan's economic success." (198).  
In this context, Japan's large and newly empowered petit bourgeoisie of farmers 
and small business people developed a high degree of political organization and used it to 
cultivate a highly clientelist relationship with the state. Primarily, there were four main 
organizations that served as vehicles for organizing petit bourgeois interests politically: 
the Association of Japan Agriculture Cooperatives (hereafter Nōkyō), the National 
Federation of Small Business Associations, the Japan Medical Association, and the 
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National Association of Special Postmasters. All four of these organizations (as well as 
others such as the Japan Nurses Association) developed close relationships with 
bureaucrats and with zoku lawmakers of the LDP, ensuring that their interests were 
represented in policies. For farmers, this included generous production and tax subsidies, 
protections against import competition, generous publicly subsidized pensions and 
publicly funded employment (often in construction) during the agricultural off-season. 
For small businesses, this involved tax subsidies, protection against competition and for 
small businesses associated with construction related industries, access to public works 
funding. Similarly, doctors received tax subsidies and LDP backing in medical fee 
negotiations with the bureaucracy, while special postmasters received access to funds for 
local infrastructure investment and privileged rights to sell insurance through their post 
offices (Estevez-Abe 2008). In exchange, these organizations all remained strong 
supporters of the LDP, providing a stable bloc of votes from their members. 
However, while these interest groups that generally represented the petit 
bourgeoisie, and farmers in particular, ultimately came to be the most reliable source of 
the LDP's electoral coalition, this was not initially true. For example, in the immediate 
post-war era, the JSP was more popular with farmers, riding on their support to finish 
first in the 1947 election. However, after conservative parties gained control in 1949, they 
moved to shore up support from farmers by establishing and funding agricultural 
cooperatives under conservative leadership (Babb 2005). In the context of the economic 
boom that followed, these institutional path dependencies settled and farmers increasingly 
identified as petit bourgeois rather than as workers, further entrenching their support as 
part of the conservative electoral condition led by the LDP after 1955. The clientelist 
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relationship between the LDP and farmers, as well as small business owners, was further 
strengthened in the late 1950s when the Kishi government instituted special pension 
benefits for farmers and small business owners (Estevez-Abe 2008). 
By the 1960s, these early institutional measures to shore up electoral support from 
farmers and small business owners had been institutionalized into a clientelistic 
relationship developed between these groups and the LDP and that also included key 
sectors of the bureaucracy, including the Transport, Agriculture, and Construction 
ministries. On one hand, this involved highly protectionist barriers to competition 
(including from large fractions of domestic capital as well as foreign firms and imports) 
and tax loopholes. On the other hand, it included generous subsidies including rice 
subsidies as well as extensive public works spending that mobilized local small 
businesses during times of economic downturn. As Estevez-Abe (2008) has shown, such 
policies served as proxies for direct welfare spending; they also had the effect of 
mobilizing strong political support for the LDP from the petit bourgeoisie by directly 
appealing to small and medium-sized businesses, rather than the workers of those 
businesses, directly. These policies thus served as the basis for mobilizing a relatively 
large segment of the population, one which often possessed a high degree of social import 
within local communities and whose interests were aligned more with the capitalist class 
than with the working class, to be a major and active political constituency. What 
followed was a strong degree of support by local small businesses for local LDP 
politicians, often supporting their kōenkai and encouraging regular workers within those 
firms to join the kōenkai. In each case, the personal touch that can only be achieved 
through small-scale human interactions, both between small and medium enterprise 
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(SME) owners and their workers and between SME owners and local politicians, 
buttressed the political incorporation of those employed by SMEs into kōenkai. 
 
Gender and the family: Extended families and the gendered division of labor  
While the first two characteristics of Japan's post-war welfare-employment 
regime, lifetime employment and the construction state, have centered on male workers, 
either the protected core workforce of large firms supported by corporate welfare or the 
somewhat more precarious auxiliary workforce protected through government-funded 
employment maintenance programs (in particular through infrastructure spending), these 
two pieces of the puzzle cannot be understood without a recognition of how they relate to 
a third element, a rigid gendered division of labour (Miura 2012). While the above 
measures applied primarily to men, for women the conditions were very different. 
Though granted legal and political equality with the post-war constitution, women 
maintained a traditional social role primarily as domestic caregivers in the post-war era. 
While most women worked after finishing high school or university, they were expected 
to retire after marriage, or at least after their first pregnancy (which was often only a few 
years into adulthood). Women were then expected to serve primarily as caregivers, taking 
on nearly 100 percent of the burden of social reproduction, including through 
childbearing and childrearing, cooking, cleaning, shopping, and in cases where there were 
elderly or disabled relatives to care for, care work as well.36  
																																																								36	In addition, women often had control over household financial decision-making (Sugimoto 2014) and 
were often responsible for making small-scale investments of household savings in the stock market (Kerbo 
and McKinstry 1995), a tendency that further buoyed Japan's rapid economic growth in the post-war period 
and points to the early financialization of social reproduction. 
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Moreover, Miura (2012) shows how women filled a secondary, flexibilized labour 
market on the side of the core, protected labour market where their husbands worked. 
During times of economic downturn, these jobs were generally the first to be cut. While a 
small minority of women worked in the secure, career-track sectors of the economy, they 
faced tremendous structural barriers to employment in this field: given both sexist 
attitudes about women's role in society and the reality of the significant amount of in-
house training required to develop career-track workers, firms usually avoided hiring 
women to career-track positions that they assumed would retire from within a few years 
anyway. Moreover, labour laws designed to protect women in particular from harsh 
overtime work deemed "too strenuous" for women informally served as a disincentive to 
hire female workers (Miura 2012). Finally, income tax incentives were set up that 
ensured that families where only one income earner made more than 1,030,000 yen 
received a special tax deduction, thus seriously penalizing households with two full-time 
working parents while incentivizing women to work part-time only.37 
In addition to this rigid gendered division of labour, another element of Japan's 
post-war regime of social reproduction was the extended family household and the 
persistence of extended family networks for caring activities. Unlike in European 
countries where nuclear families increasingly became the dominant family model after 
the war, the extended family, with three generations living under one roof, persisted in 
Japan for the first few decades of the post-war era (Tanaka 2010). This had several 																																																								
37 Under the law, households with two incomes over 1.03 million yen ($10,000) receive a 380,000 yen tax 
deduction for each income, while those with only one income allow the two 380,000 yen deductions to both 
be applied to the sole breadwinner income. However, when the secondary earner is working for less than 
1.03 million yen, in addition to the double deduction (760,000 yen total) applied to the main income, an 
additional deduction of 380,000 yen is applied to the sub-1.03 million yen income, a tax policy that 
incentivizes part time work only for secondary incomes known as the "triple dip" (Sudo 2014). 
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important implications. First, it meant that rather than the state assuming the burden for 
eldercare, this was usually taken care of by families (and usually by women). Second, it 
meant that less emphasis was needed on old age security programs, since cohabitation 
with adult children reduced the costs of supporting seniors. Third, it meant that unlike in 
countries with public supports for seniors, where the costs of not having children are 
socialized, those costs were individualized, and having one's own children continued to 
be an important measure for ensuring one's security in old age. As such, the birth rate 
remained relatively high during this era – at least until the 1970s – and the Japanese 
labour force remained relatively young by international standards. 
Overall, although it was premised on a rigid (and heteronormative) gendered 
division of labour that highly constrained the scope of autonomy and freedom for women 
(as well as men), the post-war Japanese regime of social reproduction – including the 
gender dual system, welfare through work, and extended family households – served as a 
structural precondition for the highly stable patterns of social reproduction that occurred 
during the 1950s and 1960s, while also providing a high degree of institutional 
complementarity with the lifetime employment model and thus indirectly buttressing 
Japan's highly stable, long-termist and coordinated model of capitalism overall.  
 
Demography and welfare: Young society, small welfare state 
The ninth condition of postwar hegemonic order was the favorable demographic 
situation. In particular, this included a relatively young workforce as well as a relatively 
small proportion of elderly people. These two factors contributed significantly to stable 
social reproduction and profitable capital accumulation. First, the structure of the lifetime 
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employment system and its emphasis on progressive wage increases meant that while 
older workers tended to be paid wages that exceeded their productive output, young 
workers' wages tended to undervalue their labour. Thus while a young workforce may 
generally be beneficial to capital accumulation, this was especially true in post-war 
Japan, and thus helped to further improve Japanese capital's competitiveness.  
Second, the proportion of elderly people was significantly lower than in other 
industrial countries, comprising roughly five percent of the population in the 1950s and 
1960s and still only seven percent by 1970.38 This relatively small population of seniors, 
coupled with the persistence of extended family households, meant that welfare costs 
remained significantly lower than in other countries. Indeed, while Japan was one of the 
first countries to establish universal pensions and health insurance in 1958, the actual 
amount of compensation paid to seniors was small amounting to little more than pocket 
money to give to their grandchildren (Estevez-Abe 2008). 
This lack of a fiscal drain on the state from welfare spending afforded the 
Japanese state more revenue to spend elsewhere, particularly on public works spending as 
well as industrial subsidies, while keeping the tax burden low. The low degree of demand 
for welfare, driven by a young population and the persistence of extended family 
households (as well as the availability of women's unpaid domestic labour, discussed 
above) thus provided an important condition of possibility for class compromise. Without 
being tasked with the burden of funding universal welfare provisions (through taxes, both 
direct and indirect), firms had the means to maintain and strengthen corporate welfare 
provisioning, further entrenching company loyalty from their workers. 																																																								
38 By comparison, the percentage of people age 65 and older in 1970 for the G7 as a whole was 10.3, while 
the number for the EU 28 was 11.5 (OECD 2019). 
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While Japan went through a period of rapid urbanization in the post-war period, 
this change – unlike in many developing countries today – led neither to the hollowing 
out of the countryside nor to the development of urban slums. Instead, due to the high 
demand on the part of private capital for young workers who could be paid low wages in 
exchange for long-term employment security combined with state-led infrastructure 
spending to maintain high employment in the countryside, Japan was able to evade the 
problem of significant urban-rural uneven development even under conditions of rapid 
urbanization and industrialization (Murakami 1984). While this had much to do with 
other factors of Japanese labour management and the role of the Construction State, 
ultimately it was these favorable demographic conditions that made this dynamic 
possible. 
 Nonetheless, far from being an era of stasis and stability, the 1950s and 1960s was 
one of unprecedented social change. Japan's population grew very rapidly in this period, 
from 84 million in 1950 to 105 million by 1970, a 25 percent jump (Statistics Japan n.d.). 
The population was relatively young, certainly by today's standards: in 1950, 35 percent 
of people were under 14, 60 percent were between 15 and 64 and only 5 percent were 
over 65. By 1970, the population was still young, though a higher percentage of people 
were of working age: 24 percent were under 14, 69 percent were 15 to 65 and 7 percent 
were over 65 (Statistics Japan n.d.). During the post-war period Japan continued a 
process of rapid urbanization and industrialization that had been going on since the Meiji 
Restoration.39 While 53 percent of people lived in cities in 1950, by 1970 it was 72 
																																																								
39 Incidentally, Japan was arguably the most urbanized pre-industrial society in the world; pre-industrial 
Edo (Tokyo) was the biggest city in the world in the 18th century, with over a million residents (and over 	
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percent (Ritchie and Roser 2018). This was particularly punctuated immediately after the 
war, where the fertility rate jumped above 4.0 for the last few years of the 1940s, before 
falling to just over 2.0 by the mid-1950s and remaining at that level for the rest of this 
period (Tanaka 2010; Statistics Japan n.d.). While urbanization played a transformative 
role for the Japanese economy, it played an equally significant role in relation to family 
life, culture and reproduction. While Japan's rapid urbanization in the post-war era was 
perhaps more successful than that of any other country, neither creating an underclass of 
slum-dwellers on the edge of cities nor leaving in its wake a backward and decaying rural 
society, it nonetheless had major social consequences. Perhaps the most significant of 
these was the decline of the extended family. In 1955, approximately 35 percent of 
Japanese lived in extended families; by 1975, the number was only 22 percent (partly 
because elderly family members often stayed behind in rural towns and villages) (CAO 
2006). 
These social changes, including the slow aging of the population, the rapid 
urbanization and the transition from the extended family to the nuclear family as the 
dominant household form all brought with them important consequences for Japan's 
regime of social reproduction, as the next chapter will show. 
 
Nation and ideology: The pacifist nationalism of the post-war 
The tenth condition of Japan's post-war hegemonic order was what I call pacifist 
nationalism, or the sort of nationalism that emerged after world war two in opposition to 
the militaristic, quasi-fascistic nationalism that had pervaded the pre-war era. This new 																																																																																																																																																																					
90% rates of literacy), while Osaka and Kyoto were both home to more than 100,000 people. Castle towns 
like Wakayama, Hiroshima, Nagoya, Kanazawa and Okayama were each home to 10,000s of people.	
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nationalism was different from the old nationalism in important ways. For one, it was 
pacifist rather than militarist, seeking to position Japan and the Japanese people as peace 
seeking, driven by goals of demilitarization and denuclearization and to peaceful and 
amicable relations between sovereign and equal countries. Moreover, it was no longer 
characterized by a valorization of social stratification. While pre-war nationalism had 
held the emperor as God-like top of the social order and Father of the Japanese ethno-
nation, whilst also providing legitimation for a nobility class that occupied a position 
between the emperor and the ordinary people, the post-war nationalism spoke to an 
egalitarian social structure; while the emperor was now seen as merely human and 
nothing more than a symbol of the nation and the nobility class was legally erased.  
In this context of social transformation, the liquidation of the nobility class and 
the end of emperor worship, how were new identities based on class, race and nation 
narrated within socializing practices and what were the effects of this for entrenching the 
commonsensical nature of the post-war order? In this context, three powerful ideological 
tropes, each with long lineages in Japanese history characterized Japanese social order: 
mura (village), ie (household), and tan'itsu minzoku (ethnic homogeneity) are of note (see 
also Murakami 1984; 1996). The trope of the mura claims that all Japanese people today 
(regardless of class) are the descendants of the peasant class, who worked side-by-side in 
small village communities, self-sufficient yet internally co-dependent, and characterized 
by largely horizontal relations (besides age- and gender-based hierarchies). The effect of 
this is to posit that the old class society of the Edo period (1603-1868) has given way, and 
that with the erasure of the samurai class with the Meiji Restoration (1868) and nobility 
in the post-war, modern Japan was no longer a class society. This ideology thus seeks to 
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frame the Japanese mura, or nation, as an eternal construct (with the descendants of 
peasants going back to time immemorial) yet also specific to the contemporary world in 
its contrast with the previous feudal era of social hierarchy. 
 Moreover, the ideology of the mura was enlivened through Japan's wartime defeat 
and the impact that it had on post-war class society. As Kerbo and McInstry (1995) argue, 
"in Japan, the suffering shared by elites, future elites, and the masses was a leveling 
experience which had profound effects on attitudes for many years" (13). Before the 
Second World War, four families in Japan controlled 25 percent of corporate assets and 
ten families controlled 75 percent (Kerbo and McInstry 1995). The income gap between 
corporate elites and workers was one hundred to one. But that all changed with the 
wartime defeat, and served as a major basis for Japan's post-war emphasis on equality. 
However, while the erasure of class difference ideologically and its replacement 
with national homogeneity was clearly a major part of the postwar hegemonic project, 
this was not universally successful. Labour unions remained important forces, and the 
militancy of the student movement in the 1960s can attest to the fact that there was 
staunch resistance to this attempt to naturalize some hierarchies while erasing others. 
Nonetheless, the ethos of enterprise unionism, and of belonging to a (hierarchically 
ordered) company before belonging to the working class came to be entrenched. Part of 
this was the way the notion of ie (household or kinship group) existed to reconstruct 
hierarchies as a natural part of Japanese social order: as an almost innate cultural 
characteristic of the Japanese ethno-nation (Murakami 1984, 1996). Unlike mura, ie 
posits the samurai hierarchical social order as the foundation of Japanese social order. 
Under this system, people are linked hierarchically yet each hold the opportunity to 
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ascend hierarchies over time through dedication. Murakami argues that this hierarchical 
structure serves as the basis for the Japanese corporation, and relations within the firm.  
 Clearly these two ideological constructs, mura and ie, are powerful regulatory 
ideals for Japanese national identity, providing on one hand a transhistorical explanation 
for the (mythical) notion of Japanese social equality and homogeneity (mura) yet at the 
same time justifying certain social hierarchies (including the family and the workplace) 
as essentially Japanese. Needless to say, both narratives are highly potent ways of 
naturalizing and justifying capitalist social relations. On one hand, class differences are 
erased through the mura discourse; on the other hand, they are justified, even celebrated, 
through the ie discourse. While it would be wrong to make a culturally determinist 
argument that this cultural nationalism and an uncritical ideological commitment to 
traditional social structures served as the basis for Japanese ruling relations in post-war 
Japan, it is nonetheless clear that they served an important role in socialization at all life 
stages and provided part of the normative justification for hegemonic social relations. 
While this appeal to the essential nature of indigenous social structures and their 
basis as the mediators of social relations was one effect of post-war nationalism, a further 
element was the degree to which it required the reproduction of a myth of ethnic 
homogeneity. Japan almost immediately lost touch with its former colonies after World 
War II and was fully exempt from having to deal with the post-colonial fallout. While 
this clean break from the colonial half-century (1895-1945) allowed Japan to return to a 
myth of national homogeneity and isolation (the "island country" trope) that served as a 
major basis for claims to its uniqueness and separation from the rest of the world 
(something that made it difficult for Japanese people to identify with people of other 
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countries, including those in similar class positions to themselves), it also prevented 
Japanese people from being able to adequately accept their role as an imperial aggressor 
in the first half of the twentieth century, and played into efforts by both parties to portray 
the Japanese as only victims of the war (Dian 2015). 
Overall, the post-war era thus saw the development of a new kind of nationalism 
that rejected the militarism, authoritarianism, feudal hierarchies and emperor worship, 
replacing them with commitments to pacifism, grassroots democracy (mura), corporate 
hierarchies (ie), and egalitarianism based on shared ethnic community. This new 
nationalism served as the basis for a new collective ethos that played a major role 
culturally in anchoring Japan's post-war rebuilding under conditions of domestic stability, 
while nourishing Japanese democracy and ensuring that capitalist development proceeded 
in an egalitarian fashion (unlike in the pre-war era). Nonetheless, this pacifist nationalism 
was rooted in myths, not only about Japan's ethnic homogeneity (that denied the 
existence of internal Others) also about Japanese people's roles in the Pacific War, 
erasing from memory the complicity of society as a whole in Japan's wartime aggression 
and instead presenting the Japanese people as mere victims of the war, while excluding 
from both historical memory and from future society the presence of immigrants.  
 
Environment and national resources: Cheap oil (and food) 
 The eleventh and final condition of post-war hegemonic order was the availability 
of cheap oil and other natural resources. Access to oil had been a major challenge for 
Japan in the pre-war era. Indeed, it is the lack of access to oil in the wake of American 
and European sanctions for Japan's invasion of China in 1937 that is often cited as the 
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ultimate reason for Japan's entry into World War II with the US: prior to Pearl Harbor, 
Japan's oil supply was reaching critically low levels, and war with the US (as well as the 
UK and the Netherlands), who held access to oil in the Middle East and Indonesia, was 
seen as the only way of getting that oil by certain elements of the military. 
Unsurprisingly then, given Japan's complete lack of oil and gas and relative lack 
of other mineral resources (including coal), stable and cheap access to these resources 
was fundamentally necessary for Japanese industrialization. The immediate post-war era 
witnessed a flood of cheap oil onto the market. This easy access to natural resources was 
enabled by two things: First, technological breakthroughs in oil drilling and other 
extractive technologies reduced costs and increased the ease with which vital natural 
resources – and oil in particular – could be produced. Second, post-war American 
hegemony at the level of the world system, and the security that this brought to the global 
trading system, enabled a high degree of stability and openness in access to these crucial 
resources. As we will see in the next chapter, challenges to world order in the 1970s 
disrupted these conditions of stability, upsetting the ease of access to natural resources 
that Japan enjoyed until then, beginning with the first oil crisis in 1973. 
 
Part 3: The post-war Japanese historic bloc 
 Through all of these favorable conditions, Japan in the post-war era saw the 
development of a historic bloc, which was led by the triumvirate of the LDP, 
bureaucracy, and large corporations, what has been called seikangyō (politics, 
bureaucracy and industry) in Japanese (Ikeda 2011). While the exact degree of influence 
of each of the three constituents of this power bloc is the subject to significant debate, 
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with Weberian thinkers such as Johnson (1982) privileging the role of the bureaucracy; 
policy-oriented thinkers such as Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) locating the LDP at the 
centre of analysis, and Marxists such as Itoh (1990, 1992, 2000) giving more influence to 
the capitalist class, such debates are beside the point. What is significant is that each of 
the three forces played its own role in the maintenance of hegemonic ruling relations, 
through a division of labour. 
 The LDP was predominantly driven by its needs of maintaining political 
legitimacy, both at the aggregate level (through general policy determined by the 
Cabinet) and at the micro-level of individual lawmakers, who were structurally required 
to seek maximal degrees of public funds for their districts as means of ensuring electoral 
survival under conditions of intraparty (as well as interparty) competition. Moreover, the 
electoral system of mixed member districts with intraparty competition meant that the 
LDP simultaneously enjoyed conditions of virtual guarantees of continued party rule with 
structural pressures for intense mobilization on the part of individual candidates, forcing 
them to stay motivated to appeal to constituents. 
 The bureaucracy, on the other hand, was driven by economic and social questions. 
While the more dominant economic ministries – MITI and the Ministry of Finance in 
particular – fashioned macro-economic and industrial policy aimed at generating and 
maintaining rapid economic growth, other ministries such as Transport, Postal and 
Construction were more driven by the need for infrastructure and development in 
peripheral regions, and still others, such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the 
Ministry of Education were concerned with the development of Japan's social 
reproductive needs: health, education and welfare. The more long-term and general aims 
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of the bureaucracy – and the economic ministries in particular – existed in dynamic 
tension with the more particularistic and short-term interests of individual LDP 
lawmakers. 
  Finally, the third member of the power bloc, Japanese corporations, played an 
important role in cooperating with the LDP and bureaucracy. These firms had a largely 
cooperative relationship with the bureaucracy, often accepting bureaucratic guidance and 
oversight at the cost of firm autonomy. In other ways, they participated in major policy 
deliberations through shingikai where they sought to achieve consensus in negotiations 
that included other stakeholders, including representatives from organized labour and the 
various petit bourgeois organizations. Overall, through both their structural and 
instrumental power, Japanese capital played a significant role in shaping the trajectory of 
post-war Japanese development, ensuring rapid growth and robust capital accumulation 
until the 1980s. At the same time, through multilateral negotiations that included the 
Japanese Business Federation as well as bilateral relations between firms and their 
workers or between lead firms and their subordinate firms, Japanese capital rarely sought 
to unilaterally dictate the direction of decisions, instead seeking dialogue and consensus 
in the interests of overarching consensus and long-term stability. 
However, while this historic bloc clearly enjoyed coordinated leadership on the 
part of this three-pronged power bloc, it also incorporated, and generally represented the 
interests of a wide range of social and class forces. These forces included most notably 
the petit bourgeoisie, who enjoyed a plethora of protections and supports maintained 
through Japan's political system in return for their active role in supporting the LDP. 
Partly due to their exorbitant electoral influence – which the LDP maintained by design – 
		 152	
and partly due to the high degree of political organization and social visibility of their 
leading organizations, petit bourgeoisie wielded a substantial degree of influence. 
 A second group that was also incorporated into the historic bloc, though on less 
favorable terms, was the privileged workforce of major corporations, who enjoyed strong 
benefits of the lifetime employment model. However, as Estevez-Abe (2008) has shown, 
the benefits these workers enjoyed were, unlike in social democratic countries of Europe, 
mediated through employer firms rather than provided directly to workers. These workers 
were thus incorporated into the historic bloc as appendages of firms rather than as agents 
wielding effective power in their own right. Though they worked for the state rather than 
private capital, in general terms Japan's (comparatively small) public sector workforce 
can also be included in this category. 
 A third group of the historic bloc, further subordinated, was a group of other 
workers, often in blue-collar sectors of the economy, employed by relatively inefficient 
and uncompetitive small and medium enterprises, primarily in construction but also in a 
range of manufacturing and trade industries indirectly related to construction. These 
workers enjoyed the benefits of Japan's infrastructure-driven model of public 
provisioning, through state-funded employment maintenance systems. However, as with 
the white collar workers discussed above, this was also indirect, as the SMEs who 
employed these workers, rather than the workers themselves, were the recipients of 
public works spending. 
 A fourth and final group that was incorporated into the post-war historic bloc was 
women, or more specifically, women who enjoyed the financial security of a 
breadwinning husband and either worked as housewives or took flexible part time jobs 
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(in addition to their near total share of domestic labour) to supplement their husbands' 
incomes. Though Japan's post-war constitution, imposed under conditions of occupation, 
formally granted women equal rights to men and instituted universal suffrage, post-war 
Japanese society remained strongly patriarchal and characterized by a rigid gendered 
division of labour. Women's freedom to pursue careers of their choosing outside of the 
home was thus severely limited, while their domestic obligations were significant and 
highly restrictive. Nonetheless, within the context of a dominant gender ideology rooted 
in the notion of ryōsai kenbo (good wife, wise mother), and the popular resonance of the 
ideological justification for the gendered division of labour in Japanese society, women 
enjoyed certain benefits – and even a degree of empowerment – within the post-war 
historic bloc.  
As with the previous three subordinate groups, these benefits were largely 
indirectly attained through the economic security granted to men through the lifetime 
employment system. Women's economic security was thus largely contingent on 
marriage, and conditions for those who did not marry were often grim (Hashimoto 2001). 
Nonetheless, given the ideological normativity enjoyed by marriage and the equation of a 
woman's role with wifehood and motherhood, it is easy to see how such conditions could 
be seen as liberating rather than restrictive. Freed from having to work long hours as their 
husbands, many women enjoyed autonomy as the managers of their households, closely 
overseeing their children's development and exerting control over the direction of 
household spending (even controlling how much kozukai, or allowance, their husbands 
get after necessary household expenditures are deducted), while playing an active role in 
community organizations, including their children's schools' parent-teacher organizations. 
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However, along with these various social forces that were integrated to varying 
degrees into the post-war historic bloc, it is also important to recognize the groups who 
were excluded from any form of social or political power. These marginalized groups 
included ethnic and cultural minorities, including ethnic Koreans, Ainu, and burakumin, 
as well as insecure workers, and many women who lacked the financial support of a male 
breadwinner, including unmarried women, divorcees, and single mothers. As Osawa 
(2008) has shown, many of these groups experienced high rates of poverty, and received 
virtually no supports from the state. All of these groups lacked means for effective 
political organization and existed on the fringes of Japanese society, largely voiceless. 
Their exclusion from the post-war historic bloc thus did little to upset the high degree of 
political legitimacy it enjoyed from the various groups who were incorporated into it. 
 
Conclusion  
Overall, we can see that the post-war period was clearly one of relative 
hegemonic order that effectively carried out requirements of accumulation, reproduction 
and legitimation, with robust economic growth, low unemployment, strong growth in 
wages, high levels of inequality, steady and stable population growth, progressively 
improving outcomes in education and public health, high levels of popular participation 
in politics and strong and enduring support for the LDP in particular.  
This hegemonic order was formed and maintained by eleven conditions that 
highlight the significance of world order, forms of state, domestic social forces and social 
reproduction. Hegemonic order was also rooted in the post-war global political economy 
and geopolitical order, constitutional and political reforms, a pacifist nationalist ideology 
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and an historic bloc that was led by a ruling elite of the bureaucracy, the LDP and leading 
firms but that also incorporated various social groups, including protected white-collar 
workers, blue-collar workers, farmers, small business owners, and middle class 
housewives, drawing on the support of each of these groups through a range of policies 
and institutions. While this approach to maintaining political order succeeded for several 
decades, in the long run, structural conditions (e.g. contradictions at level of world order 
and demographics) and the challenge of maintaining this historic bloc undermined 
hegemonic order, as following chapters will show. 
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Chapter Five: Contradictions and transitions of the late Showa era 
This chapter explores the period from the early 1970s until the late 1980s, a time 
that began and ended with crisis and transition. The beginning of the period saw several 
significant changes in world order, most notably including the partial breakdown of the 
old Bretton Woods System, the end of the Dollar-Gold Standard and the First Oil Crisis, 
conditions that shook the Japanese economy and pointed to renewed uncertainty. The end 
of the period saw the rise of the bubble economy and ultimately the beginning of a long 
period of economic stagnation that persists to this day, as well as the 1989 death of the 
Shōwa Emperor, who had reigned since 1926 and became an object of criticism both 
within and outside of Japan after World War II for his role in Japanese military 
aggression and imperialism. 
This chapter argues that beginning in the 1970s, Japan's post-war hegemonic 
order began to slowly encounter changes to the underlying conditions that supported it. 
These changes gradually accumulated, and ultimately led to contradictions both between 
the roles actually performed by Japan's social, political and economic institutions versus 
the roles they were supposed to perform as well as among institutions that had previously 
functioned complementarily and which increasingly functioned in contradictory ways. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. Section one outlines the changes to conditions of 
hegemonic order and considers three types of change that are significant in this period. 
First, structural changes include not only changes to the structural conditions of global 
political economy but also changing demographic conditions. Second, political changes 
refer to significant policy changes, either in response to changing structural conditions or 
as a backlash against politically contested conditions of Japan's original post-war order. 
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Third, what I call institutional changes but also referred to as path-dependencies 
or institutional drift, represent a slow shift in the function or nature of an institution to the 
point that it no longer performs its original role and may go from a complementary to a 
contradictory relationship with other institutions and with the hegemonic order as a whole. 
In section two, the chapter then outlines the overall implications of these transformations 
for Japan's hegemonic order, for its ability to fulfill requirements of political legitimation, 
capital accumulation and social reproduction, and for the relations of force within Japan's 
historic bloc. 
 
Section 1: Transformations of the late Showa era 
 While the period in the 1950s and 1960s saw the development of a cohesive 
hegemonic order, the period beginning in the 1970s saw a host of changes, both abrupt 
and gradual, and within not only Japan's political and economic institutions but also with 
regard to structural demographic conditions and dynamics at the level of world order. 
This section considers three types of change during this period. After first considering six 
key structural changes to the conditions of Japanese political order that were manifest in 
the 1970s and 1980s, it then turns to seven core political changes. Finally, it examines six 
major institutional changes. The following section will consider the implications of these 
changes for Japan's hegemonic order. 
 
Structural changes to world order 
 Three major changes to the structural conditions of world order characterize the 
period of the 1970s and 1980s. These include the restructuring of the world economy 
		 158	
under economic globalization beginning with the end of the Dollar-Gold Standard in 
1971; the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979; and the growing frictions between Japan and 
the US that culminated in the Plaza Accord of 1985. It is important to note that each of 
the three structural changes had their origins in key political decisions, and thus might not 
be thought of as structural. Yet in each case, the decisions made had impacts on the 
structural conditions of world order, while further impacting Japanese political economy 
indirectly. In other words, from the perspective of the Japanese hegemonic order, these 
changes occurred largely outside the scope of the Japanese state's agency. 
 
The Nixon shocks 
Beginning in the 1970s, the fundamental ordering framework of global political 
economy underwent a transformation that ultimately came to be known as economic 
globalization. This transformation was partially triggered by the end of the Dollar-Gold 
Standard, and later further advanced through technological innovation as well as a host of 
legal political transformations both within individual states and to the core institutions of 
global trade and commerce (the three Bretton Woods Institutions of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), 
and resulted in an increase in not only global trade but more importantly, global financial 
flows and foreign direct investment as well as the rise of transnational corporations and 
increasingly deterritorialized production networks. In other words, it meant an end to the 
Keynesian-Fordist trading regime that had bolstered Japanese export-oriented 
developmentalism since the 1950s. 
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In Japan, this broader transformation was punctuated by two tumultuous events of 
the summer of 1971 that are referred to as the "Nixon shocks." First, in July 1971, 
American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai for 
the first time, and President Nixon subsequently announced he would be visiting China 
himself (Nakajima 2011). The Japanese government was unaware of, and shocked by this 
sudden development, which also prompted Prime Minister Satoh to visit China himself 
(Nakajima 2011). Overall, this first "Nixon shock" had critical geopolitical implications, 
as it marked the death knell of the Sino-Soviet alliance, while also marking the beginning 
of the integration of China into the capitalist world economy.  
Second, in August 1971, Nixon unpegged the dollar from gold in a move to revive 
sagging economic fortunes and the growing trade deficit that the US had developed with 
Japan and Europe in particular. According to Hook (2005), "Nixon’s abandonment of the 
gold standard and the move to a floating exchange rate system led to a rapid rise in the 
value of the yen" (41). While the yen had been pegged to the dollar at a rate of 360:1 
since 1949, it was revalued up to 308:1 in 1971 after a meeting of ten finance ministers 
from major economies (Nakajima 2011). Its value grew further, up to 272:1 in 1973 and 
210:1 in 1978 (Hook 2005). While the strong yen did not lead to an end to the American 
trade deficit, it did have a negative effect on Japanese exports in the 1970s. Moreover, it 
provided one of the first stimuli for the offshoring of Japanese industrial production, as 
we will explore below.40  
																																																								
40 Nixon's attempts to play hard-ball with Japan over its trade policy grew even more forceful in 1973, 
when he placed an embargo on American soybean exports to Japan, which accounted for 92 percent of 
Japan's soybean consumption and thus threatened Japan with the near total loss of one of its most important 
sources of protein (though the export embargo was overturned only a week later) (Du Bois 2019; New 
York Times 1973). 
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Third, in the aftermath of the decision to abandon fixed exchange rates, conditions 
emerged that facilitated the development of financial capitalism, particularly in the US. 
These were extended in the 1980s as many countries removed another hallmark of the 
Bretton Woods System, capital controls, further enabling the free flow of capital across 
borders (Germann 2014). In the case of Japan, this ultimately led to the financialization 
of the Japanese economy beginning in the mid-1980s in the wake of neoliberal financial 
deregulation that took place under Nakasone and prompted the rise of stock market and 
real estate asset boom known as the bubble economy (Lechevalier 2014).41 
 
The oil shocks 
 Along with these changes to the economic structures of world order, the two oil 
crises of the 1970s proved a major shock to the Japanese economy. In the 1970s oil 
accounted for nearly half of the value of all imports (Dore 1986). In 1973, decisions by 
OPEC to limit the supply of oil on the world market led to a sudden spike in oil prices in 
the Middle East, which provided 88 percent of Japan's oil (Wakatsuki 2011). While this 
caused the first post-war recession in Japan, it also led to a growing political awareness of 
the power of oil-rich countries in the Middle East especially and a recognition of the 
vulnerability of the Japanese economy to energy and natural resource shortages and price 
fluctuations. In other words, it meant an end to cheap oil, and the lack of concern over 
energy consumption and efficiency that had gone with it. Politically, the Oil Crisis forced 
Japan to forge a more nuanced foreign policy line in the Middle East, taking a more 
neutral stance in the Israel-Palestine dispute than the US (Wakatsuki 2011). Then, in 																																																								
41 It also led to the development of high rates of Japanese purchases of American treasury bills, as the 
Reagan administration raised interest rates. 
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1979, the second oil shock occurred. This time, Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (1978-
80) took a more hardline position in relation to the Middle East, siding with the US. This 
ultimately paid off, as Carter backed Ōhira's proposal for oil import quotas, rather than 
that of France, which would have required Japan to reduce its imports by 75 percent in 
relation to estimates by 1985 (Wakatsuki 2011). 
 The first oil shock led to decline in GDP in 1974 for the first time in the post-war 
era. It (along with the shift to floating exchange rates) also brought Japan back into a 
trade deficit of 373 billion yen in 1973 and 1.9 trillion in 1974, which continued until 
1981 (MOF n.d.). While Japan's economy as a whole recovered faster from the first oil 
shock than those of the US and UK, this marked the end of the high growth era and the 
start of a new era of moderate but stable GDP growth (Nakakita 2017). Moreover, 
recovery from the shock varied by industry, and some industries, such as shipbuilding 
and textiles in particular, began to decline as a result of the shock (Beggren 1995), while 
steel, petrochemicals and aluminum also faced competitive disadvantages (Katz 1998). In 
addition, the recession caused by the shock prompted an increase in public spending, 
particularly public works, in order to revive flagging industries, including in construction 
(Nakakita 2017). The oil shock also served as a point of transition for the orientation of 
MITI, which moved away from its role in facilitating Japanese heavy industries and 
began to shift focus towards the knowledge industry, including semiconductors and 
computers (Beggren 1995). As a result, by the early 1980s, Japan was the largest 
producer in the world of semiconductors. In addition to prompting the development of 
high tech sectors, Japan's economy also successfully adapted to the increased price of oil: 
by 1989, the volume of oil consumed per unit of GNP had fallen by more than half, while 
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the value of oil consumed per GNP had also declined (partly due to the adoption of more 
efficient technologies by businesses (Kameyama 2017)). In contrast, in the US the 
volume of oil consumed per GNP only fell slightly and the value of oil consumed per 
GNP increased (Hutchison 1993). Thus, while Japan effectively weathered the storm 
caused by the oil shocks, they nonetheless had profound implications for Japanese 
capitalism.  
 
American trade frictions and the Plaza Accord 
 Third, beginning with trade tensions over Japanese exports of synthetic fibers to 
the United States that emerged in the early 1970s, an increasingly complicated trading 
relationship with the United States developed, with growing animosity directed to Japan 
on the part of the United States over protectionism and the substantial trade surplus that 
Japan enjoyed. In the late 1970s, pressures continued to grow, with American demands 
that Japan increase imports of lumber, beef and oranges, among other things (Wakatsuki 
2011). These tensions reached a point of climax with the signing of the Plaza Accord in 
1985 that forced Japan to revalue the yen and accept voluntary export restraints over a 
range of products in an effort to rebalance trade between the two countries. In other 
words, it meant an end to the highly favorable trading conditions that had characterized 
the Japanese-US relationship since the 1950s, and served as the counterweight to Japan's 
role as a compliant but passive geopolitical ally of the US and host of major US military 
bases under the Anpo.  
 What course of events characterized the development of the Plaza Accord, and 
what were its consequences for Japanese-American relations and for Japanese political 
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economy more generally? According to Lucarelli (2015), "Japan’s current economic 
malaise has its roots in the chain of events that led to the expansionary monetary policies 
enacted after the September 1985 Plaza Accords" (312). The Plaza Accord was pursued 
by the US as a solution to contradictions that had emerged out of Reagan's monetary 
policy. In the aftermath of the Second Oil Shock (1979), the US Federal Reserve under 
Paul Volcker instituted major interest rate hikes in order to curb inflation and restore 
conditions for profitable accumulation domestically. This led to a high US dollar, which 
consequently led the American trade deficit to grow even bigger. While it was already 27 
billion in the late 1970s, by 1984 it had reached 148 billion dollars. This, coupled with 
other Reagan-era policies such as massive tax cuts for the wealthy and substantial 
increases in defense spending also led to the ballooning of the US deficit, from just 4 
billion during 1978-80 to 128 billion by 1985.  
 Then, in the context of a pronounced global economic downturn at the start of the 
1980s, the US government encouraged Japan and other countries to invest in stimulus 
policies designed to boost domestic consumption, thus boosting the yen and reducing the 
trade deficit, policies that were reiterated by the Japanese government's Maekawa Report. 
However, while the Japanese government was initially leery of the inflationary effects 
such moves might have, Central Bankers from the G5 countries instead intervened and 
coordinated a series of measures that led to the depreciation of the dollar compared to the 
yen, falling from 260 to 175 yen from 1985 to 1986. Ultimately in the face of mounting 
US pressure, the Bank of Japan engaged in a series of interest rate hikes designed to 
increase the value of the yen. As a result the yen's value soared, all the way to a high of 
80 yen per dollar by 1995. Along with other factors, such as the early 1980s' financial 
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deregulation and the increase in surplus cash held by banks as a result of the decreased 
need for main-bank financing by their affiliate industrial firms (Lucarelli 2015), the 
soaring yen led to a surge in speculative investment in the stock market and real estate, 
both from abroad and domestically, in what became known as the bubble economy 
(Lechevalier 2014). 
 However, paradoxically, the main aim of the policy was not achieved: the US 
trade deficit did not go away despite the high yen. While Lechevalier (2014) argues that 
this was evidence that it was not an artificially weak yen that was responsible for the 
trade imbalance, this is not the whole picture. As Lucarelli (2015) shows, many Japanese 
firms made up for the higher costs of their exports to the United States by moving 
production to other parts of Asia, accelerating the transnationalization of Japanese capital, 
a dynamic that would ultimately become a hallmark of the transformation of Japanese 
capitalism in the Heisei era. In response to the high yen, the Bank of Japan made efforts 
to rein in interest rates, but this only served to increase the flow of speculative financial 
capital, exacerbating the economic bubble and the relentless asset price spiral that saw the 
Nikkei Tokyo stock exchange treble its value in only four years, from 1986 to December 
29th, 1989, when it peaked at just under 39,000 points, at the same time as the land value 
of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo exceeded that of the whole of the state of California 
Haeber 2007).  
 While the effects of the bubble economy will be part of the focus of the next 
chapter, overall, we can see how these structural changes in the conditions of world order 
and of Japan's economic relationship with the United States had major implications for 
the nature of Japan's hegemonic order. The rise of financialization, globalization, 
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neoliberal monetary policy and the transnationalization of production, all phenomena that 
are highlighted by the events discussed above, were developments in which the Japanese 
state was an active player. Nonetheless, they led to changing structural conditions in 
global political economy that were not easily reversible but that had major implications 
for domestic political economy and ruling relations alike, ultimately undermining the 
stable political economic order that had hitherto developed.  
 
Structural demographic changes 
 In addition to these three structural changes to conditions of world order, three 
further changes characterized this era, in relation to demographic conditions. These 
include 1) the onset of population aging; 2) the decline of extended family households 
and the growth of nuclear family households; and 3) the slow increase of women in the 
workforce. 
 
The beginning of an aging society 
First, in the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the Japanese population 
transitioned from being markedly young in comparison to Western European and North 
American countries to being the oldest of major OECD countries. The population of 
young people fell both proportionately and, beginning in 1980, in absolute terms as well. 
While the proportion of elderly people (65+) had remained between 5 and 6 percent of 
the total population from the 1930s through the 1960s, reaching 7 percent in 1970 
(Tanaka 2010), it subsequently started to grow rapidly, reaching 12 percent already by 
1990. The median age grew very rapidly, and the proportion of the population of working 
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age peaked by 1990. Given that seniors' welfare costs are invariably higher than those of 
children, this meant a growing budget for social expenditures. 
Part of the reason for this population aging was the declining fertility rate, which 
had fallen from just above 2.0 from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s to between 1.8 
and 1.6 from the late 1970s to 1989. Despite this change, the number of babies born to 
married couples stayed constant from the 1970s to the 1990s, as did the number of 
desired children, at 2.2 and 2.6 respectively (MHLW 1996). The change, therefore, 
occurred in the proportion of women who married, as increasing numbers of women 
opted to forego marriage (and, in the case of Japan, where the legal and social barriers to 
having children outside of marriage have remained significant, therefore childbirth as 
well). 
 
The decline of extended families 
 Second, this period saw a decline in extended family households and a rise in not 
only nuclear family households but also non-extended, non-nuclear family households, 
including single person households. While the proportion of extended family households 
fell from 36 percent in 1955 to 30 percent in 1965 to 23 percent in 1970 to just 17 percent 
in 1990, the proportion of nuclear family households (parents and their children) stayed 
roughly the same during this period, at around 60 percent of all households (CAO 2006). 
Conversely, the proportion of single person households grew from 3 percent in 1955 to 
20 percent in 1975 and to 23 percent by 1990 (CAO 2006). This meant a steady decline 
in the number of households where seniors lived with their children – practically a fall of 
50 percent – from the mid-1960s to 1990, while the proportion of seniors doubled over 
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the same period, and the population of seniors grew from roughly 6 million to 15 million. 
In other words, even though the total number of seniors more than doubled – implying 
that the maximum number of extended family households possible increased substantially 
– the actual number of extended family households shrank. Thus, while 79% of seniors 
lived with their children in 1968, by 1995 it was just 54%, and while approximately 1.7 
million seniors lived apart from their children in 1970, by 1995 this number had 
quintupled to 8.4 million, due to the increase in the sheer number of elderly people, the 
continued movement of young people to cities, and the more general cultural trend of 
nuclear familialization (Kaneshiro 1998). With so many more seniors and so few 
extended family households this inevitably shifted the burden of care onto the state, while 
also necessitating a greater outlay on pensions. 
 
Rise of women in the workforce 
 The third structural demographic change from this period, albeit a slow-moving 
one, was the gradual increase in women working outside of the home. Women grew from 
33 percent of the total workforce in 1970 to 39 percent by 1994 (MHLW 1996). 
Moreover, the type of work women engaged in changed significantly: while two thirds of 
working women in 1955 and a majority of working women in 1965 were employed by a 
family business or self-employed – therefore representing the old petit bourgeoisie – by 
1995 78 percent of working women were employed by a company as wage laborers and 
only a fifth worked as petit bourgeoisie (GEB 2016). Among women who were married 
to salaried employee husbands, the proportion that worked grew from 25 percent in 1955 
to 38 percent in 1970 to 53 percent in 1990, while the proportion who worked as 
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employees (not as petit bourgeoisie) grew from 10 percent in 1955 to 25 percent in 1970 
to 44 percent by 1990 (Kaneshiro 1998). Overall, the growing proportion of women in 
the workforce, and the changing social role of women in general, was another structural 
change that posed challenges for the male breadwinner, female housewife model. 
 During this period, attitudes about women's role outside of the home also 
changed: while 58 percent of men and 39 percent of women in 1972 thought that women 
should either never work or retire after marriage or their first child, 31 percent of men and 
52 percent of women thought that they should keep working, either with or without a 
break from work while their children are young. In contrast, by 1995, only 29 percent of 
men and 22 percent of women thought women should never work or retire young while 
64 percent of men and 73 percent of women thought women ought to keep working. In 
other words, between 1972 and 1995, support for working mothers (including those who 
return to work after a break during pre-school years) went from a minority opinion to that 
of nearly 70 percent of Japanese (MHLW 1996).42 
 Overall, we can see how beginning in the 1970s, Japanese society was 
characterized by significant demographic changes, including population aging, changing 
household patterns, and a rise of women in the workforce. While the full effects of these 
changes would not be felt and understood for decades to come, beginning in the early 
1970s a number of forward-thinking bureaucrats and politicians began to consider their 
implications for Japanese society. The policy changes that were pursued, both 
																																																								
42 The reasons for this shift are not fully clear, but the growing rates of post-secondary educational 
attainment for women as well as the growing economic push towards dual-income earning households are 
likely among the reasons for this attitudinal shift. 
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successfully and unsuccessfully, in the wake of these demographic changes will be part 
of the focus of the next section. 
 
Political changes 
 In addition to the above structural global political economy and demographic 
changes, a number of political changes, or new policy directions taken partly in response 
to the structural changes, were pursued in the 1970s and 1980s. These include both 
economic and social policies, aimed at addressing the challenges caused by economic 
globalization and population aging in particular. This section will examine seven of these 
changes in detail.  
The 1972 election of Tanaka Kakuei as LDP leader represented in many ways a 
sea change in Japanese politics. Tanaka was young and from a humble background, 
having only received an elementary education and connected very effectively with 
people, both in his district and at the national level (Wakatsuki 2011). During his two-
year tenure as Prime Minister, Tanaka pursued two notable policies: public works 
spending to counter uneven development in the countryside and welfare expansion. 
Although Japan's post-war welfare state was often noted as being small by international 
standards,43 Japan was actually one of the first countries to institute both universal health 
insurance and social insurance in 1961, through a patchwork system that includes 
separate programs for private sector salaried workers, for public employees, and for those 
not covered by the other two programs, thus reflecting the conservative corporatist 																																																								
43 For example, in 1960, Japan spent only 4.9 percent of national income on social expenditures (in 
particular, healthcare, pensions and unemployment insurance), while West Germany spent 18.5 percent 
(Miyamoto 2008). 
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variety of welfare provision more than the universalist vision of social democratic 
countries (Estevez-Abe 2008; see also Esping-Andersen 1990). In the 1958 election, the 
first contested between the unified JSP and LDP, both parties ran on the expansion of 
health insurance and social insurance, and unlike in Europe, there was not a partisan 
ideological split over the issue of social welfare: instead the LDP saw it as part of a sort 
of developmentalist nationalism, where reducing inequality was part of its overall 
economic growth strategy (Miyamoto 2008).  
Moreover, the groups at the greatest risk of being left out of rapid growth, farmers 
and small businesses, were the LDP's core electoral bases, and welfare expansion was 
identified as much with the interests of the petit bourgeois as those of the working class. 
Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s, welfare spending remained small, as the government 
focused on economic growth and the pursuit of full (male) employment through public 
works spending. However, beginning in the 1970s period of global turbulence brought on 
by the First Oil Shock and the end of the Bretton Woods System, the government of 
Tanaka Kakuei turned to welfare expansion as well as policies to dramatically reduce 
uneven regional economic development, due to both changing structural demographic 
and global economic pressures.  
Between 1973, known as the "year of welfare," and 1974, the LDP government 
passed legislation that expanded welfare and included massive income tax cuts for the 
working and middle classes coupled with spending increases in welfare of over 75 
percent in total (LDP n.d.b). Much of this money was directed towards pensions, which 
more than doubled over the course of two years, while pensions were further indexed to 
the rate of inflation (LDP n.d.b). The LDP under Tanaka was forced to respond not only 
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to growing electoral and demographic strength of the left and centre-left opposition 
parties, particularly in urban areas and including at the local level (Miyamoto 2008) but 
also to the increasing strains the economy was bearing due to rapid economic growth and 
demographic change. Indeed, while Japan was increasingly urban, it was also 
increasingly middle aged. Population aging led to a ballooning of the welfare state: 
according to Estevez-Abe (2008), given the provisioning of free healthcare for seniors 
that had existed since the 1960s, the cost of seniors' health care grew from 400 billion in 
1973 to 800 billion in 1975 to 1.8 trillion in 1979.  
However, while the Tanaka government introduced stronger welfare provisions, it 
did not create corresponding means of paying for these new programs, instead opting to 
lower taxes even further while incurring the first deficit budget in 1974 (Sadoh 2012). 
This was compounded by the fact that the financing estimates for Tanaka's plan for 
significant public works spending aimed at countering underdevelopment and 
depopulation in the countryside – his famous "Plan to Remodel the Japanese 
Archipelago" that had been his signature policy at the 1972 LDP convention – were based 
on the assumption that the 1970s would see a continuation of the double-digit GDP 
growth that characterized the 1960s (Wakatsuki 2011). Even after Tanaka left office in 
1974, public works spending continued to grow: for example, the 1978 budget called for 
a 20 percent spending increase over 1977, mostly from public works (Wakatsuki 2011). 
Thus, while the early 1970s brought recognition of not only the negative 
externalities of Japan's breakneck development (including both environmental problems 
and rural underdevelopment) as well as the effects of population aging and urbanization 
(and thus the need for stronger welfare programs), this proved to be a double-edged 
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sword, upsetting the balance behind the low-spending, low-tax regime that had 
characterized Japan's welfare-through-work regime, where the costs of social 
reproduction were largely borne by corporations and households rather than the state. 
Indeed, by 1979, public debt had already grown to 40 percent of GDP (Wakatsuki 2011). 
In the wake of the budgetary deficit that resulted from these policy changes, the LDP 
pursued fiscal retrenchment, beginning in 1979.  
At first, under Ōhira Masayoshi the government sought to follow the model 
established in other Western countries of expanding general taxation and proposed the 
first ever consumption tax, which he intended to run on in the 1979 election. Yet Ōhira 
faced backlash from the public and within the LDP, and withdrew the tax proposal during 
the 1979 election, which resulted in a poor showing for the LDP. More than anything it 
was the petit bourgeoisie – small businesses and farmers – who opposed the tax hikes, 
even though these groups had been among the biggest beneficiaries of the LDP's free 
spending ways in the 1970s (Wakatsuki 2011). In the context of this backlash against the 
consumption tax (both within and outside of the party), the LDP under Suzuki Zenkō, 
who succeeded Ōhira after his sudden death ahead of the 1980 election, pursued a policy 
of "fiscal reconstruction without tax increases" (zōzei naki zaisei saiken). Though this 
promise was politically successful in the immediate term, it proved to be a watershed in 
Japanese political economy, and the beginning of what Lechevalier (2012) has called 
Japan's neoliberal transformation. 
In the aftermath, the program for fiscal reconstruction in the early 1980s was 
developed under the Second Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform 
shingikai, or deliberation council, known as Rinchō II, from 1981 to 1983 (Jun & Muto 
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1998; Masujima 2005). Rinchō II called for spending cuts, deregulation, and privatization 
among other measures. At the behest of Nakasone Yasuhiro, chair of the Economic 
Planning Agency, Rinchō II was chaired by Dokō Toshio, president of Keidanren and 
former CEO of Toyota. It saw the privatization of Japan Salt and Tobacco, Japan 
National Rail, Japan Telegraph and Telephone and Japan Airlines. Overall, Rinchō II had 
three aims: 1) administrative reform and reduction of the size of government; 2) 
rationalization and simplification of the administrative system; 3) privatization of state-
owned-enterprises (Wakatsuki 2011). Along with these policies of administrative reform, 
deregulation and privatization, in its pursuit of fiscal reconstruction the Suzuki 
government adopted policies of welfare spending cuts, including reductions to public 
pensions and child allowances; the introduction of co-payment in seniors' health care; 
increases to the copayment burden for national health insurance; increases to university 
tuition; and reductions to private school subsidies (Wakatsuki 2011). All of these 
measures together meant that the 1981 budget was kept at the same level as in 1980. 
In addition to Rinchō II, the 1986 report of the Maekawa Comission, another 
panel organized under Prime Minister Nakasone (who succeeded Suzuki in 1982) on 
economic issues, this time on the issue of trade tensions, also led to a range of neoliberal 
recommendations. The Maekawa report called for economic reforms and harmonization 
with international society in order to promote trade, calling for reforms to elements of the 
distribution system that stifled growth in domestic demand. Yet with regard to public 
works spending meant to support employment in the regions, it called for proactive 
spending to encourage domestic demand growth, much as under the traditional 
construction state regime (Miyamoto 2008). However, while the Maekawa report's call 
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for investments to promote domestic demand over the continuation of Japan's export-
based growth model thus differed in important ways from the neoliberal orthodoxy of 
Rinchō II, Nakasone nonetheless used it (and its emphasis on trade liberalization in 
particular) as a basis to push a neoliberal agenda (Miyamoto 2008). 
Along with policies of retrenchment, privatization, and liberalization, Rinchō II 
also led to the first major policy of labour market deregulation – and thus the first shift 
away from the lifetime employment system – with the extension of Japan's dualized 
labour market regime under the 1985 Worker Dispatch Law. The Worker Dispatch Law 
was the first major piece of legislation relating to labour market deregulation and was 
among the policy recommendations of Rinchō II. While labour market deregulation was 
touted as a measure to ensure Japanese competitiveness in a globalizing world economy, 
there were tremendous barriers to the removal of protections for workers included in the 
lifetime employment system. Instead, Japanese labour market reform targeted fringe 
sectors of the economy, or irregular work outside of the category of seishain (regular 
worker), creating a new category of haken (dispatch worker). Under the law, dispatch 
workers are not employed by the actual firm where they work, but rather by temp 
agencies that indirectly mediate between the worker and the workplace, often on a 
temporary, flexible and ad hoc basis. Because they do not technically work for the host 
company, they do not enjoy any of the legal protections and benefits guaranteed to 
workers of the host company, while employment in the temp agency itself provides no 
guarantee of stable access to work and is at the discretion of the company.  
The haken system thus created a new category of flexibilized worker that firms in 
applicable industries could draw on in times of need and easily discard whenever their 
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labour was no longer needed. Under the 1985 Worker Dispatch Law, the number of job 
categories where temp agencies could operate was limited to 13 "white listed" job 
categories, including 1) software development, 2) operation of business equipment, 3) 
interpretation, translation and stenography; 4) secretarial work; 5) filing; 6) market 
research; 7) financial processing; 8) business document preparation; 9) demonstration of 
machinery; 10) tour conducting work; 11) reception and guide services and parking 
management; 12) building cleaning work; and 13) operation, checking and maintenance 
of building equipment. In 1986 it was expanded to include 14) machinery design; 15) 
operation of broadcasting equipment; and 16) production of broadcast programs 
(Hamaguchi 2015).  
Clearly, many of these job categories are highly specialized, and thus do not 
appear to apply to low-skilled workers, those normally at greatest risk of seeing an 
increase in precariousness under labour market deregulation policies. Indeed, due to 
pressure from workers protected by the lifetime employment system, the law was 
formulated in such a way as to only include job categories usually seen as outside the 
scope of lifetime employment positions so as to ensure protected workers that they would 
not have to compete with dispatch workers (Hamaguchi 2015). However, in practice, 
some of these job categories, such as "filing" and "operation of business equipment" were 
interpreted so broadly as to cover a significant proportion of tasks required in office work. 
As Hamaguchi (2015) has argued, this also had a disproportionate effect on women, who 
were still largely expected to retire in their late 20s or early 30s and were seen as easily 
replaceable by haken workers, compared to men, whose protected status as sararīman 
was much more difficult for companies to challenge politically.  
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Thus, while the Worker Dispatch Law saw the first major extension of what came 
to be Japan's dualized labour market, divided between protected, mostly male, lifetime 
employment workers on one hand and precarious, mostly female, workers on the other 
(see also Thelen 2012), in other ways the entrenched institutional power of enterprise 
unionism and the lifetime employment system was largely retained, despite the growing 
costs of lifetime employment due to the rapid aging of the workforce.  
Along with these various neoliberal economic policies as outlined by Rinchō II, 
the Nakasone administration also sought to bring a renewed nationalist militarism to 
Japan. This included his commitment to the Anpo, referring to Japan as the US's 
"unsinkable aircraft carrier" in an era of renewed Cold War tensions under Reagan, while 
also breaking the unofficial limit on military spending at one percent of GDP, a symbolic 
act that must be understood as a reflection of the staunch nationalism and militarism of 
Nakasone, who was the only post-war Prime Minister to fight in the Second World War. 
Moreover, in 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, Nakasone made 
an official state visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which provoked widespread condemnation 
from China (Wakatsuki 2011). While the Yasukuni Shrine had been relatively 
uncontroversial until the late 1970s, and visited by various leaders, including Miki Takeo, 
the 1978 decision by the new shrine chief to enshrine a number of war criminals 
immediately transformed the shrine into a highly political and controversial site, even 
leading the emperor to announce that he would never again visit (Mochizuki and Porter 
2013). In this context, Nakasone's official visit marked a strong departure from the past, 
and one of the first examples of right wing LDP leaders attempting to normalize 
revisionist accounts of wartime history. 
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Along with these conservative and neoliberal policies, however, from other 
quarters – particularly the Ministry of Health and Welfare – there was a push in the 1980s 
to further the project of welfare expansion and modernization that had begun under 
Tanaka and to prepare Japan adequately for the demographic changes ahead (Estevez-
Abe 2008). However, these proposals were ultimately shelved due to opposition within 
the increasingly neoliberal Ministry of Finance, thus postponing a solution to the 
emerging demographic crisis facing Japan (Osawa 2008). 
Finally, in 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru, who succeeded Nakasone and 
brought the clientelist approach to politics back to the kantei, was able to successfully 
institute the consumption tax that Ōhira had failed to introduce back in 1979. In the 
decade since the LDP had first backtracked on the consumption tax, the deficit had grown 
significantly, and the strategy of fiscal consolidation without tax increases had failed. 
While this proved to be an important measure in bringing fiscal balance back to the 
Japanese state (and occurred on the eve of Japan's stock market crash), it proved to be 
electorally and politically costly, as the next chapter will show. Overall, we can see how 
various policy changes of the 1970s and 1980s attempted to rectify many of the 
challenges and contradictions facing Japanese society, including those that were 
occurring due to globalization and demographic transitions. While some of these were 
successful in responding to immediate challenges, such as the need for greater welfare 
provisions for seniors and the need to adjust to the competitive market pressures of 
globalization in order for Japanese firms to remain profitable through deregulation 
policies, these solutions themselves created new contradictions, such as the budgetary 
deficit and growing social problems caused by labour market deregulation. 
		 178	
 
Institutional changes 
 In addition to these structural and political changes, the period from the 1970s to 
the early 1990s was characterized by a range of institutional changes, manifest in both the 
structure and order of the Japanese state and the nature of relations within the Japanese 
economy, including not only relations between firms and the state but also relations 
among firms, between capital and labour, and between the state and petit bourgeois 
producers, including farmers. The changes implied here were usually slow moving and 
occurred according to institutional path dependencies rather than as the result of 
immediate and deliberate policy prerogatives. In this sense, they fit more with Gramsci's 
notion of organic change rather that conjunctural change, the latter a dynamic more 
closely characterized by the political changes discussed above. 
 
The heyday of the kōenkai 
 First among the political institutional changes were the growing cost of elections, 
the increased power of the kōenkai and how these were linked with corruption and 
growing criticism of the overall electoral system. For example, in the 1974 Upper House 
election, Prime Minister Tanaka travelled 40,000 kilometres by helicopter to every 
prefecture making campaign speeches, nominating business people and celebrities as 
candidates and all the while generating enormous fundraising, in what came to be known 
as the "rule of money election" (kinken senkyo) (Wakatsuki 2011). In the aftermath, news 
of corrupt campaign activities by Tanaka's kōenkai, the Etsuzankai, forced him to resign 
with an approval rating of just 12 percent (Wakatsuki 2011). While the party chose Miki 
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Takeo as a clean option to succeed Tanaka, this did little to alter the growing role of 
kōenkai as massive get-out-the-vote machines, the enormous amount of money required 
to finance kōenkai, and the staggering levels of corruption required to maintain sources of 
financing. While Miki introduced legislation targeted at curtailing corruption by reducing 
the influence of money in elections, his efforts were rejected by more powerful and 
entrenched interests within the party (Wakatsuki 2011). The depth of LDP corruption was 
soon further revealed: in 1976, the Lockheed corruption scandal broke,44 implicating 
Tanaka Kakuei, among others, and tarnishing the image of the LDP further. 
In addition, this era also saw massive increases in the costs of elections, driven by 
the increasing power of factions and the growing effectiveness of kōenkai as fundraising 
machines. According to Shinoda (2013), while the total cost of political financing in 1976 
was 110 billion yen, by 1988 it had nearly tripled to 307 billion yen. However, this does 
not include a significant amount of non-reported expenses (including bribes): indeed, 
some suspect the total cost could have been three times as high.  
What enabled the rise of kōenkai? Part of it was loopholes in campaign financing 
laws: while political parties were required to report all donations above 10,000 yen, 
political organizations such as kōenkai only had to report sums over one million yen; 
while individual politicians could only receive 150,000 yen a year, there was no limit on 
the amount received by political organizations (Shinoda 2013). In this context, kōenkai 
expanded rapidly: while Tanaka Kakuei's Etsuzankai had only 80 members when it was 
																																																								44	The Lockheed scandal occurred in October 1972, when Prime Minister Tanaka, along with officials 
from All Nippon Airlines (ANA) received bribes from American aerospace manufacturer Lockheed to give 
Lockheed a contract to manufacture ANA airplanes. The scandal broke in 1976 after an American 
congressional hearing, and Tanaka was later arrested for accepting bribes from Lockheed. Then Defense 
Minster Nakasone was also implicated, though never arrested (Tokumoto 2016; Chapman 1978). 
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launched in the 1950s, it had nearly 100,000 members by the early 1970s (Krauss and 
Pekkanen 2010). Tanaka's kōenkai famously once spent 1.4 million dollars on onsen (hot 
springs) visits for 11,000 people. Moreover, during this time the number of people 
belonging to kōenkai also grew markedly: while only 8 percent of LDP supporters 
belonged to kōenkai in 1967, by 1979 the number was 25%, and by 1993 it was 31 
percent (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). 
 
The rise of factions and the PARC 
 The third major institutional political change of this period was the rise of factions 
within the LDP as major power brokers and the implications this had for internal party 
democracy and accountability, as well as the growing influence of the PARC and zoku 
lawmakers. According to Shinoda (2013), the PARC took on importance after the 1970s' 
oil shock, as the government no longer faced a fiscal situation of ever-growing budgets, 
where the question was simply where to allot the new revenue on top of existing 
spending, and now faced much more difficult questions, such as which programs – and 
which social and class interests – to advance, and which to postpone or even cut. 
Parallel to the rise of kōenkai was the growing power of factions. According to 
Krauss and Pekkanen (2010), beginning with Kakuei Tanaka, factions also began to help 
Diet members perform constituency services. Tanaka referred once to his faction as a 
'general hospital'" (115). Factions' role increased with the turn to a membership vote in 
leadership elections, because faction members (and their kōenkai voters) became the 
surest way for would-be LDP Presidents to get votes. This strongly benefited Ōhira in the 
1978 election: "the mobilization of kōenkai members in the 1978 party presidential 
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primary was the culmination of the institutionalizing of the extension of the factions into 
the electoral districts" (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010: 117). Moreover, this period saw a 
growing tendency for intraparty competition within mixed member districts to occur 
along factional lies: while in 1958 over 40 percent of districts had multiple candidates 
from the same faction, by 1980 just 10 percent did, and by 1993 just five percent did 
(Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). Moreover, the relative importance of factions over the 
party's central organization for fundraising grew markedly: while political parties raised 
43 billion yen in 1976, only 26 billion was raised and spent by factions. In contrast, by 
1988, 88 billion was raised by factions, more than what was raised by parties (Shinoda 
2013). 
 
Growing bureaucratic influence: Zoku and amakudari 
In addition to the growing roles of factions, kōenkai and the PARC, this period 
also witnessed the hardening of relations between the bureaucracy and elected officials, 
in particular the so-called zoku lawmakers of the LDP, and the LDP's PARC, but also 
including officials from other parties as well. Main faction leaders, and Tanaka Kakuei in 
particular, actively sought to cultivate zoku lawmakers from among their factions so as to 
maximize their own faction's ability to control the direction of discretionary spending for 
their benefit, and thus the faction's overall power (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). Indeed, 
by the 1980s, Japanese bureaucrats located zoku lawmakers as the most influential forces 
on their decision-making, ahead of the cabinet and other interest groups (Krauss and 
Pekkanen 2010). This dynamic of a close relationship between zoku lawmakers and 
bureaucrats functioning with a high degree of autonomy from the Cabinet and Prime 
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Minister not only served as the basis for the increase in public works spending during the 
1970s; it also undermined the development of a strong executive (Estevez-Abe 2008).  
In addition to the growing importance of this relationship between bureaucrats 
and LDP lawmakers, a collusive relationship between the bureaucracy and major 
corporations developed through the amakudari system, which became institutionalized in 
the 1970s (Mizoguchi and Nguyen 2012). Indeed, the number of amakudari appointments 
to private companies doubled between 1967 and 1981 and peaked in 1985, while the 
number of semi-public tokushu hōjin corporations such as the Japan Foundation and the 
Society for Prevention of Pollution – institutions often set up by ministries in order 
provide venues for amakudari appointments easily within ministry control – grew from 
38 in 1967 to 81 in 1981 (Blumenthal 1985; Krauss and Pekkanen 2010; Usui and 
Colignon 1995). Amakudari appointments during this period were dominated by 
bureaucrats from the Ministries of Finance, Construction, Agriculture, Transport, and 
MITI, reflecting the economic policy areas where bureaucrats held the greatest influence 
overall, while the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications increased its amakudari 
appointments from just two in 1965 to 29 in 1985, reflecting the power of that Ministry to 
direct pork barrel spending through its control of the postal savings system (Usui and 
Colignon 1995). In various ways, then, the 1970s saw an extension of bureaucratic 
influence through amakudari appointments as well as an entrenchment of collusive 
relations not only between bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers but also between bureaucrats 
and private corporations. 
 
Institutional changes and continuities in Japanese business relations 
		 183	
 Two major changes affected Japanese capitalism, and relationships between 
Japanese firms, during the 1970s and 1980s. While many elements of the keiretsu system, 
subcontracting, and the role of the developmental state in promoting strategic economic 
sectors remained the same as before, two key changes occurred that ultimately had major 
ramifications in the 1990s and 2000s: 1) the globalization of production and investment 
and 2) changing financial conditions, including the rise of financial capitalism and the 
fragmentation of financing relations. 
The globalization of Japanese capitalism began in the 1970s. According to 
Komiya and Wakasugi (1991), Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) until the 1970s 
had been concentrated mainly in mining and had amounted to less than a billion dollars. 
Following a change in policy by the Japan Import-Export Bank in 1969 to lower interest 
rates, Japanese capital shifted outward FDI into manufacturing, and total outward FDI 
surged from 1 billion dollars in 1970 to 53 billion in 1988, particularly in the US, which 
increased its share of Japanese outward FDI from 10 percent in 1970 to 46 percent in 
1990 (Hook and Gilson 2011). While the liberalization of FDI regulations was one factor 
behind this (Cowling and Tomlinson 2011), equally important was the increasing costs of 
domestic production, as well as the emerging trade tensions with the US. However, 
according to Schoppa (2008), there was a difficulty in determining whether outward FDI 
was a sign of an internal hollowing out or merely a normal expansion of Japan's export 
strategy, and thus the outward flow of FDI was not initially seen as a sign of domestic 
regulatory problems.  
The 1970s and 1980s thus saw the rise of leading Japanese firms as transnational 
corporations. Beginning with the apparel and aluminum sectors, Japanese firms moved 
		 184	
production overseas in order to reduce labour costs (Schoppa 2008). Thus, rather than 
pushing for deregulation domestically, firms sought already deregulated markets for 
overseas production building plants in right-to-work US states, including Kentucky and 
Tennessee, as well as developing Southeast Asian countries, where they did not treat 
workers with the same protections as their core workforces in Japan. Increasingly, then, 
these firms came to be bifurcated between a relatively uncompetitive and protected 
domestic workforce and a super-competitive workforce in Asia or the Southern US 
(Schoppa 2008). The transnationalization of Japanese capital soon spread to other 
industries: beginning in the 1970s, in response to American pressure, both politically and 
structurally from increased tariffs and export restrictions, Japanese electronics firms 
Matsushita, Sony and Sharp all built factories in the US. Then, beginning in the late 
1970s, auto firms, including Mitsubishi, Honda, Nissan and Toyota followed suit. 
Moreover, the subsidiary firms that were set up abroad did not simply mimic their 
domestic Japanese counterparts; they took on their own independent business identities in 
response to the competitive pressures of their new markets, no longer "Japanese" in any 
meaningful sense (Hook and Gilson 2011). 
 In addition to the globalization of capital through the offshoring of production, 
changing patterns of financing also developed in this period. Several tendencies 
characterized Japanese corporations' financing relations and activity in the 1970s and 
1980s. First, on average turnover fell markedly compared to the preceding period 
(Lucarelli 2015). Second, firms increasingly sought to globalize and establish offshore 
production. However, in general the key keiretsu relationships, including domestic 
ownership and main bank functions, were largely retained until the late 1980s. Beginning 
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in the 1980s, then, financial deregulation led to the asset boom, combined with a shift 
away from main bank financing. Globalization and neoliberal reforms also had a major 
impact on keiretsu, dissolving the previous bonds that had tied them together. According 
to Lucarelli (2015), "by the late 1980s, most of the large keiretsu began to generate 
internal funds for investment and curtailed their traditional reliance on the [Bank of 
Japan] and the big banks" (314). While leading keiretsu had previously obtained roughly 
40 percent of their loans from major banks, in the context of financial deregulation in the 
1980s, this number was down to just six percent by the late 1980s. In this context, major 
banks could no longer secure investment fixes through the secure relationships with 
affiliated firms, and instead pursued reckless speculative activity in the stock market and 
real estate, injecting as many as 220 billion dollars of loans into the real estate sector in 
the late 1980s (Lucarelli 2015). 
 In other ways, Japanese capitalism of this era was marked by continuities. State 
support for unprofitable industries and corporate preference for market share over profit 
continued (Katz 1998). The same can be said for MITI financing, although it moved into 
new sectors, particularly information technology (Okimoto 1989). In this way, the 
hegemonic, consensus-based model of Japanese capitalism continued through the 1980s, 
as Japanese firms adapted to new structural conditions of economic globalization and 
financialization, while in depressed industrial sectors, MITI-led recession cartels that 
provided financing, market coordination and protections, ensured the effects of industrial 
hollowing out were muted (Katz 1998).  
 Overall, these changes to the dynamics of Japanese capitalism suggest that 
globalization, financial deregulation, and increased pressure, both from the US and from 
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export competitors led to a transformation of the financial relationship among firms 
within keiretsu and the transnationalization of production through offshoring. While 
MITI continued to play a major role in coordination and in softening the effects of market 
forces for Japanese firms, the 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of an era of 
significant adjustment that challenged the stable relationship between Japanese capital, 
workers, and the state. 
 
Lifetime employment and the dual system 
 The second major institutional economic change of this era was in the changing 
conditions of Japan's post-war system of labour management and organization. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this system was characterized by commitments from 
firms to lifetime employment and seniority-based wages in exchange for workers' total 
commitment to firms, including through norms that limited labour movement organizing 
to the firm level through enterprise unions. This system served as a basis for Japan's low 
levels of labour unrest since the 1960s, its high levels of productivity growth, as well as 
the willingness by many workers to work long hours and accept job transfers. While this 
system remained more or less intact during the period of the 1970s and 1980s, a number 
of important changes, including not only the structural and political changes discussed 
above but also institutional changes, placed pressure on this system that ultimately 
undermined its ability to contribute to capital accumulation in the 1990s. 
 While the turn towards neoliberal deregulation and austerity in the 1980s saw 
attacks on Japanese unions and welfare programs, the corporate welfare provisions and 
labour security associated with lifetime employment received little overt criticism, either 
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from policy makers or from corporations (Anchordoguy 2009; Schoppa 2006). Indeed, by 
the late 1980s, the lifetime employment system appeared no less intact than it had been 
two decades earlier. Nonetheless, beneath the surface a number of changes were 
emerging that ultimately served to undermine lifetime employment both politically and 
economically, beginning in the 1990s. 
 First, as discussed above, the aging of Japan's workforce, combined with wage 
growth that outpaced profits due to the declining number of rural migrants to major urban 
centres led to a growing wage bill for firms (Itoh 2000). This was especially pronounced 
given how the seniority wage system tended to underpay young workers while 
overpaying older workers. Second, and partially in response to this, dynamics of 
globalization and liberalization of foreign direct investment laws led a number of leading 
Japanese firms to begin outsourcing production in the 1970s in order to remain 
competitive in export markets.  
Third, and also in response to growing pressures on profitability, manufacturing 
firms, and Toyota in particular, drove innovation in labour management techniques 
through the creation of Just in Time production, or Toyotism. This production technique, 
which relied on highly flexibilized and rationalized practices and the constant drive for 
further improvements at the micro-level of production (a principle known as kaizen) 
corresponded well with the structural transition towards flexible and fragmented 
production in the global economy, and enabled Japanese firms to benefit from the early 
stage of neoliberal globalization, helping to make Japanese auto makers in particular 
competitive on world markets and spur the boom in auto exports beginning in the late 
1970s (Chalmers 1995; Lechevalier 2014; Flath 1998). Though Japanese workers and 
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capital alike were active participants in the development of Toyotism (Sakoh 1990), the 
development of Toyotism, and the shift to Just in Time production more generally, led to 
a shift away from the stable and long-term orientation of Fordist production, which 
corresponded more closely with the requirements of the lifetime employment system. 
Thus, while Toyotism is not a direct cause of the rise of precarious work, and certainly 
benefited the workforces of the firms who adopted it successfully in the immediate term, 
the long-term effects of its popularization may have undermined the basis for the lifetime 
employment system. 
 Fourth, a number of measures taken by the government in the 1980s had the effect 
of transforming Japanese labour organization away from the prevailing post-war model. 
These include the 1985 Worker Dispatch Law, discussed above, which served as a 
harbinger for the rise of precarious employment, and the 1985 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law. While the Equal Employment Opportunity Law banned gender 
discrimination in the workforce, it did nothing to protect workers from harsh conditions 
of overwork, thereby further extending the norm of harsh working conditions and long 
hours to all full-time, career-track workers, women and men alike. Additional 
neoliberalizing measures of this era included the efforts under Nakasone to destroy 
militant public sector unions through the privatization of Japanese National Railways, a 
move aimed as much at reducing the state's debt burden and promoting capital 
accumulation as at crushing the power of public sector unions hostile to the government, 
and thereby hurting the left-wing parties (JSP and JCP) affiliated with the unions 
(Tiberghien 2014). Importantly, this defeat severely weakened the JSP-affiliated Sōhyō 
union, which merged with other unions in 1987 to form Rengō, a trade federation that, 
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despite representing a much larger proportion of the labour movement than Sōhyō, has 
proven to be much more timid and submissive in the face of anti-worker policies since 
the 1990s (Tiberghien 2014). 
 Overall, then, we can see how although the period of the 1970s and 1980s did not 
bring an overt challenge to Japan's post-war employment regime centered on lifetime 
employment, the seniority wage system and enterprise unionism (at least for the core 
male workforce), it was nonetheless characterized by a number of changes – structural, 
political and institutional – that collectively undermined the basis for Japan's labour 
regime and the complementary relationship it held with Japanese post-war capitalism. 
 
Clientelism and the construction state 
 The third process of institutional change in the Japanese economy is the 
continuation and deepening of clientelist pork-barrel infrastructure spending. Indeed, the 
period of the 1970s saw the largest increase in the scope of the so-called Construction 
State, a development encouraged by: 1) the kōenkai of local politicians, particularly those 
of the Tanaka faction; 2) the increasing institutional power of zoku lawmakers, 
particularly in the Postal, Construction, and Transport policy areas; 3) major elements of 
the bureaucracy, particularly the Postal Ministry, the Construction Ministry and the 
Transport Ministry, who worked with zoku lawmakers and the PARC to have their 
institutional interests advanced; and 4) the LDP's PARC, which in many ways served as 
the institutional conduit for zoku politicians' networking and engagement with 
bureaucrats (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). 
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According to Miyamoto (2008), in the 1970s, rather than focusing on economic 
transition (away from outdated industries), LDP governments focused on propping up 
businesses in the regions. Following the parameters of Tanaka's Plan to Remodel the 
Japanese Archipelago, in the 1970s, the support system for SME's was expanded. This 
included measures in 1973 to create a new small business financing system that could 
provide stronger financing for SMEs in exchange for further integrating them into the 
LDP's electoral coalition (Miyamoto 2008). This program expanded rapidly: while the 
1973 financing budget was 30 billion yen, by 1975 it had grown to 240 billion yen. Other 
financing programs also grew, and overall the financing for SMEs tripled between 1970 
and 1975 (Miyamoto 2008). In other ways, protectionist legislation was strengthened: in 
1973 the LDP strongly opposed a bill that would have allowed department stores to build 
supermarket expansions through a simple notification to government (rather than 
requiring an application for permission). This further led to the Large-Scale Retail Store 
Law that granted governments the authority to block large retailers from establishing 
businesses, thereby protecting SMEs from competition with more profitable large firms. 
In 1979, the scale of a "large retailer" was further expanded by including stores of 500 to 
15000 square meters in area (rather than only those above 1500), while regulations were 
further strengthened in 1982 (Miyamoto 2008). These protectionist measures had the 
effect of strongly buttressing employment at SMEs: between 1972 and 1981, the number 
of people who worked for a large company increased by 120,000, while the number of 
people hired by a nonagricultural SME grew by 6.8 million (Miyamoto 2008). 
Thus, the 1970s and early 1980s saw the continuation of Japan's highly clientelist 
politics that distributed significant political goods to key electoral groups, particularly the 
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farmers and small business owners of the petit bourgeoisie in exchange for electoral 
support, despite countervailing forces, including the steadily declining number of farmers, 
increasing political and structural pressure due to the ballooning budgetary deficit, the 
changing dynamics of economic globalization and the pressure from the US and its 
corporations. According to Katz (1998: 83), "by the 1980s, more than 75 percent of all 
farm income came from subsidies and price support programs." In general, the period of 
the 1970s saw an increase in public works spending from 2 trillion to more than 7 trillion 
yen. Moreover, total public fixed capital investment grew from 6 to 24 trillion and rice 
subsidies grew from 137 percent above production value in 1970 to 287 percent above 
production value by 1985, while rigid barriers to imports were strengthened (Honma and 
Hayami 1988; MLIT 2010). Furthermore, while the number of people employed in 
agriculture full time fell precipitously, the state indirectly provided new employment 
opportunities for these now part-time farmers through construction jobs, which 
outnumbered agricultural jobs by the 1970s (Nakakita 2017).  
However, if there was any reminding of just how important these groups were to 
the LDP's political fortunes, the 1989 Upper House election, where the LDP – responding 
to American pressure – ran on a platform of agricultural trade liberalization – was proof 
(Stockwin 2006). While the 1989 election saw the LDP lose half its seats and control of 
the Upper House to the JSP, this was primarily driven by rural communities abandoning 
the LDP en masse, as the LDP's control of Japan's 26 least populous (mostly rural) 
prefectures (all single-member) fell from 24 to only two out of 26, while the JSP and its 
labour union affiliate organization increased their share of rural seats from one to 23. 
Overall, then, we can see how strong the political impetus remained for the LDP to shore 
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up support from stable voting blocs of farmers and small business owners, groups that 
remained core LDP clientele through the 1980s despite their declining proportion of the 
electorate. While the extension of this support, both through pork barrel spending that 
secured employment and infrastructure improvement in rural areas, and through 
protections, price guarantees and other subsidies that insulated the petit bourgeois from 
market pressures, these policies ultimately created pressures on Japan's regime of capital 
accumulation, as the next chapter will show. 
 
Part 2: Implications of these changes for the hegemonic order 
 Thus, we can see how the period of the 1970s and 1980s brought a number of 
changes to the conditions of hegemonic order in Japan, including slow-moving and 
organic structural economic and demographic changes; conjunctural political changes; 
and organic and path-dependent changes to political and economic institutional 
configurations. However, we must consider what the implications of these changes were 
for Japanese hegemonic order, including for the ability of the ruling regime to fulfill the 
three key requirements of capital accumulation, political legitimation and social 
reproduction. The next section will consider this question in detail. 
 
Economic implications 
 What implications did the above collection of structural, institutional and policy 
changes have for the Japanese ruling regime's ability to meet requirements for capital 
accumulation? Overall, three major implications can be observed. First, neoliberalization 
and globalization may have contributed to an economic boom and bubble that enabled the 
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Japanese economy to continue to grow at a relatively robust pace through to the end of 
the 1980s, but alterations to the structure of Japan's economy placed it in a precarious 
position, as the ensuing crisis has shown. As Lechevalier (2014) has argued, Japan was in 
many respects an early winner of globalization, and its robust economic growth in the 
1970s and 1980s, combined with the transformation of many Japanese firms in the 
automobile, electronics, and semiconductor industries from followers to leaders, and 
growing Western interest in Japanese management practices are demonstrative of this. At 
the same time, the aggressive ways in which the Japanese state and firms helped drive 
neoliberal globalization in the 1980s ultimately proved to be a double-edged sword, as 
the bubble economy and subsequent banking crisis of the early Heisei era proved. In 
other words, the resolution to the short-term economic crisis of the mid-1970s – the 
unraveling of the embedded liberal system and the oil shocks – may have restored 
conditions for capital accumulation in the short term, but it brought about its own set of 
contradictions that became apparent by the late 1980s. 
Second, the economic system continued to distribute benefits to all groups 
concerned, and continued to do so against the logic of market efficiency, as ample funds 
were continuously recycled to inefficient small businesses and farmers, and significant 
corporate welfare packages and generous pay (irrespective of productivity) were 
distributed to aging protected workers. Firms financed these practices by earning super-
profits from exports or by selling goods at high prices domestically, and, beginning in the 
1980s, even by moving export-oriented production itself overseas. Yet this led, as the 
next chapter will show, to a growing disconnect between the conditions required for 
profitable accumulation for increasingly footloose Japanese firms on one hand, and those 
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conductive to the overall growth and health of the Japanese economy domestically on the 
other.  
Third, the power of capital, including what Gill and Law (1989) have termed both 
the structural and instrumental power of capital, as well as the political (instrumental) 
power of the petit bourgeoisie, negated the possibility of restoring fiscal balance through 
tax increases or, in the case of the petit bourgeoisie, through cuts to infrastructure 
spending. Thus, with GDP growth falling to modest levels, deficit spending was the only 
way to meet budgetary demands without cutting programs. While Japan came through the 
period of economic restructuring in the 1970s and early 1980s – what in other countries 
came to be known as the era of stagflation – stronger than many other countries, with 
Japanese GDP growing faster than other major economies, and major Japanese firms 
increasing their global competitiveness in a range of industries, this was partially 
conditioned by a turn to the disequilibrium of a structural deficit. 
 
Political implications 
 In addition to the above economic implications of these changes to the conditions 
of hegemonic order, three key political implications are also manifest. First, due to the 
path dependencies inherent in Japan's multi-member electoral system, as well as 
increasingly entrenched policy-making institutions within the LDP and networks between 
bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers, the period beginning in the 1980s saw growing 
corruption and scandals as well as dissatisfaction with the electoral system and the 
clientelist politics that it entailed. While the voices of opposition to these dynamics – 
strong in the 1970s – were partially muted during the LDP's 1980s revival, these 
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dynamics ultimately led to a major push for political reform, including not only electoral 
reform but also administrative reform as well in the 1990s, as the next chapter will show. 
Second, while this period saw a virtual stasis in the seat count for all of the major 
parties, this apparent electoral stability (itself engineered by the electoral system that 
made it illogical for small parties to run enough candidates to have a chance at winning 
elections, given the vote-splitting that such a bold move would likely entail) masked a 
growing ambivalence among the public over the LDP. Indeed, the LDP's inability to 
introduce a consumption tax in 1979, and the degree to which the party was punished for 
finally doing so in 1989 with the 1989 Upper House election loss to the JSP, demonstrate 
that public consent to the conditions of LDP rule was weaker than it appeared on the 
surface. This growing public ambivalence over the legitimacy of LDP rule reached a 
boiling point in the 1990s and 2000s, but it was already beginning to emerge in the 1970s, 
as the LDP retained a narrow majority only through a careful and unsustainable balancing 
act of social and economic policies designed to please everyone coupled with its ability to 
outspend other parties at election time – both legally and illegally – through their well-
organized kōenkai and privileged access to corporate donors. 
Finally, we must consider the implications of attempts to revive Japanese 
nationalism through remilitarization and the forging of closer ties with the US under 
Nakasone's neoconservative program. Though this, along with Rinchō II was part of a 
bold and partially successful move to restore conditions for LDP hegemony on more 
hardline conservative and nationalist terms, it was ultimately short lived, as the party 
moved back towards the communitarian model under Prime Minister Takeshita after 
1987. The LDP's electoral defeat in 1989 showed that ultimately Nakasone's nationalist 
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drive was unsuccessful in restoring political hegemony in neo-conservative terms, 
foreshadowing an increasingly ideologically rudderless and anchorless LDP in the 1990s. 
 
Social implications 
 Finally, three key implications for conditions of social reproduction emerged from 
all of these changes in the 1970s and 1980s. First, the delay of improved revenue 
generation and the failure to develop welfare institutions capable of meeting the social 
and demographic challenges of the coming generation due to the government's aversion 
to taxation and commitment to clientelist infrastructure spending brought increasingly 
tough fiscal conditions even before economic crisis emerged in the 1990s. While the 
1970s saw this revenue shortfall problem met through increased deficit spending, in part 
riding the global wave of neoliberalism the 1980s saw the emergence of a commitment to 
fiscal consolidation through spending retrenchment alone, which negated much of the 
gains in welfare provisioning that had been made in the 1970s and weakened Japan's 
capacity to deal with the growing challenges of demographic transformation. 
Therefore, and second, in the context of labor market deregulation, the rapidly 
growing elderly population, the decline of extended family households and woefully 
insufficient welfare institutions, Japan's welfare regime was poised to suffer challenges in 
its ability to sustain social reproduction. While the negative effects of this growing 
disconnect between the institutions – both formal and informal – that existed to deal with 
social reproduction on one hand, and the changing realities of society on the other, did 
not become apparent until the 1990s, we can say, in hindsight, that the Japanese state 
missed a chance to adequately recalibrate its regime of social reproduction in anticipation 
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of the changes that were already occurring – population aging, household diversification 
and fragmentation, women's participation in the workforce, and the falling birth rate – 
before it was too late.  
Finally, while the drop in GDP growth from the high levels of the 1950s and 
1960s (around 10 percent) to the moderate levels of the 1970s and 1980s (around 5 
percent) should not in itself be seen as a negative, or a sign of declining hegemony 
(especially since high growth becomes more difficult the further industrialization 
progresses), Japan's fiscal policy since the 1960s had left little room to adapt to a slower-
growth economy without either instituting major spending cuts or deficit budgets. As 
Park and Ide (2014) have shown, Japan's state has long displayed a weak extractive 
capacity, partly because LDP governments – as well as the left opposition parties – 
consistently campaigned on tax cuts. Thus, while European and North American 
governments enjoyed a steady rise in tax revenues even without raising taxes as wage 
growth lifted people into higher tax brackets, Japanese policy negated this natural 
increase in public revenue, leaving zero room for error when the period of rapid growth 
ended and the welfare needs of society suddenly expanded (Park and Ide 2014). In this 
way, we must recognize that the basis for social reproduction in Japan, including the 
fiscal basis for its regime of social reproduction and welfare, was fundamentally 
unsustainable from the beginning. 
  
Conclusion: Structural transformation, institutional impasse 
Overall, the 1970s and 1980s was a period characterized by a high degree of 
superficial continuity with the previous era contrasted with a number of significant 
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changes below the surface that ultimately came to have far reaching implications for 
Japanese political economy and hegemonic order. First, beginning with the 1971 "Nixon 
Shocks" of the United States' adoption of floating exchange rates and the subsequent 
transformation of the Bretton Woods System and continuing with the oil shocks and the 
later rise of neoliberal globalization, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a number of 
significant changes to the structural conditions of global political economy. These 
ultimately led to the unraveling of the system of embedded liberalism that had aided 
Japan's rapid economic development in the early post-war period. Second, a number of 
key structural demographic changes to Japanese society – in particular the steady aging of 
society and the decline of extended family households, as well as the steady increase of 
women in the workforce – brought about new contradictions between core elements of 
Japan's regime of social reproduction, such as the extended family household and the 
minimalist welfare state, and the needs of a changing society. 
In addition to these structural changes, a number of key policy changes also 
characterized the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in response to these structural changes. In 
response to the changing demographics, the LDP under Tanaka tried to expand Japan's 
welfare state, and public provisions for seniors in particular, through a major enlargement 
of pensions and other social programs. Then, in response to the growing budgetary deficit, 
as well as prevailing global norms of economic deregulation, the 1980s saw a shift 
towards spending cuts, financial and labour market deregulation and privatization, moves 
which ultimately contributed to the bubble economy and banking crisis of the 1990s. 
While the LDP and bureaucracy pursued these policy directions, institutionally 
this period saw the entrenchment of a number of elements of the electoral and political 
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system, including the high degree of collusion between bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers, 
the growing influence of the PARC, factions and kōenkai, and the growing costs of 
Japan's clientelistic political system, where huge sums of money used to fund election 
campaigns would be cycled back through equally huge distributions of pork-barrel 
spending. While this system only strengthened the structural and institutional advantages 
of the LDP (as the party of both large corporations and small businesses), it also served as 
a breeding ground for corruption, undermining the system's political legitimacy. 
Finally, a number of key institutional changes to Japanese political economy also 
had significant impacts on the conditions of hegemonic order. The pressures of global 
competition, foreign trade pressures and the liberalization of investment beginning in the 
1970s enabled the transnationalization of Japanese capital, beginning with the auto and 
electronics sectors, while financial deregulation led to a shift away from the main bank 
system of financing for firms beginning in the 1980s. With regard to workers, while the 
1970s brought about the entrenchment of the enterprise union system and a robust growth 
in real wages (which outpaced GDP growth), the 1980s saw growing labour market 
deregulation and the beginning of a slow decline in labour activism, partly driven by the 
union-busting privatization of JNR under Nakasone. 
 Thus, while the structural demographic and political economic changes created 
new contradictions to the postwar hegemonic order, the above institutional and policy 
changes pursued were largely able to adjust to the new conditions for the time being. The 
period of the 1970s and 1980s thus saw Japan's ruling hegemonic order emerge from the 
early 1970s' global crisis in an even stronger position than before the crisis: Economic 
growth continued to be robust after the first post-war recession in 1973; the LDP restored 
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its electoral dominance in the late 1970s after coming close to losing its majority in 1974; 
and the expansion of pensions and seniors' medical care appeared to help Japan's regime 
of social reproduction adjust to changing social and demographic conditions. Nonetheless, 
while these measures provided temporary solutions to immediate challenges, many of 
these policy changes themselves brought about new contradictions that ultimately served 
to undermine the conditions for stable hegemonic order, as the next chapter will show. 
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Chapter Six: The organic crisis of the Heisei era 
This chapter deals with the period beginning in 1990 in the aftermath of the 
NIKKEI stock market crash until the 2012 return to power of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. 
During this era Japan went through a period of deep crisis and transformation that 
continues to the present. Economically, the crash of the stock market exposed deeper 
contradictions within the finance system, as trillions of dollars worth of non-performing 
loans were exposed, causing the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and other financial 
institutions to become insolvent, something unheard of in the post-war context of 
unprecedented financial stability under the keiretsu system. Politically, mounting 
corruption scandals, including the Recruit scandal that involved Prime Minister Takeshita 
Noboru and the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal that involved Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi 
led to further public distrust and disgust with the LDP that pushed the LDP into 
opposition in 1993 for the first time in nearly forty years. While the coalition that 
replaced the LDP was unstable and the LDP's time in opposition was brief (only eleven 
months), this short period saw the reform of the electoral system in the Lower House, 
ending the multi-member district system that had served as a basis for the LDP's intra-
party factional competition as well as its clientelist electioneering strategies. Socially, this 
era saw the emergence in earnest of a demographic crisis, as the birth rate fell to record 
low levels and the proportion of elderly people grew rapidly. This prompted a rapid 
expansion of the welfare system, with escalating public costs that could only be paid for 
through borrowing, leading the Japanese national debt to rapidly escalate with a structural 
deficit that even consumption and income tax increases could do little to abate.  
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These three elements of the Heisei Era crisis all have their origins, as we have 
seen, in the previous two eras of the Japanese post-war order. The failure to adequately 
address the changing social and demographic context – in other words, the structural 
conditions of social reproduction – led to a crisis of social reproduction. The failure to 
reform a political system – which had served as the basis for the LDP and bureaucracy's 
ideological hegemony and thus for political stability – that was increasingly corrupt led to 
further popular dissatisfaction with the system and ultimately to the LDP's electoral 
defeat. Moreover, the consequences of Japan's largely neoliberal response to changing 
conditions in the global and domestic economy led to a quarter century of economic 
stagnation whereby the state has only been able to keep the economy treading water, and 
at the cost of a structural budget deficit of almost 8 percent of GDP. All of these 
problems were partially the result of decisions, discussed in the previous chapter, to 
privilege the short-term maintenance of political order over the restoration of conditions 
for its long-term sustainability. The question for this chapter is how we should understand 
these transformations and crisis conditions of the Heisei Period in the context of the 
Shōwa Period of relatively stable hegemony: how the conditions of that hegemonic order 
begat these crisis conditions, and what the crisis conditions, the policy responses to them 
and the failure to adequately resolve them, have meant for Japan's post-war political order 
under the LDP-bureaucracy-keiretsu led historic bloc? 
In its analysis of Japan's organic crisis, this chapter starts by providing a historical 
overview of key events of the Heisei Period from the vantage point of Japanese political 
economy and hegemonic order, considering in particular key political, economic, social 
and foreign policies and reforms of the period, in the context of the changing structural, 
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institutional and political conditions under which they take place (and in particular those 
discussed in Chapter Five). Next, taking these developments of the Heisei Era as its point 
of departure, it seeks to analyze the implications of these dynamics from the vantage 
point of the conditions for Japanese hegemonic order outlined in Chapter Four by asking 
in what ways these conditions were manifest differently in the 1990s and 2000s and what 
consequences this holds for Japan's hegemonic order. Finally, after finding that in many 
cases, conditions once favorable to hegemonic order had now become the basis for 
contradictions in the structure of Japanese hegemonic order, it characterizes Japan's 
Heisei Era as a period of organic crisis. It seeks to theorize Japan's organic crisis, 
focusing on its implications for key hegemonic requirements of political legitimation, 
social reproduction and capital accumulation. Taking organic crisis as the moment at 
which "the old is dying but the new cannot be born" (Gramsci 1992: 276), it explores 
how the organic crisis since the 1990s has brought about various efforts to reconstruct 
Japan's ruling historic bloc, with Ozawa Ichirō, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Koizumi Jun'chirō 
and the DPJ each in their own way attempting to do so, though in each case, 
unsuccessfully. This chapter ends where the next chapter begins, with the return to power 
of Abe Shinzō in 2012. 
 
Historical background to the crisis 
1989-1993: The two electoral shocks 
 On January 7th, 1989, the Shōwa emperor Hirohito died and was succeeded by his 
son, the Heisei emperor Akihito. Akihito's enthronement ceremony the following year – 
the first since the 1920s – was watched by a television audience of 30 percent of the 
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public (Sadoh 2012). 45 Yet just as the Heisei era was beginning, a new period of crisis 
and instability was emerging. Very quickly, the signs of strain, political, economic, and 
social, began to rear their heads. In February 1989, facing public backlash over both the 
Recruit-Cosmos scandal46 that had directly implicated him and the unpopular 
consumption tax, with an approval rating of just 4.4 percent, Prime Minister Takeshita 
resigned (Sadoh 2012). Rather than holding a leadership election, Takeshita handpicked 
his successor as Uno Sōsuke, an experienced yet relatively unknown figure chosen for his 
distance from the Recruit scandal. Yet shortly before the election, Uno himself was hit by 
a sex scandal. With public trust in the LDP at an all-time low, the party suffered a major 
defeat in the Upper House election to the JSP led by its dynamic (and first female) leader 
Doi Takako, losing its double majority and thus unfettered political control. 
In the aftermath of the LDP's electoral defeat in 1989, the party chose yet another 
new leader in August, Kaifu Toshiki of the Miki faction. Like Miki, Kaifu had a clean 
image desperately needed by the LDP at the time. While Kaifu helped restore some 
public trust and weather the storm oh the scandals, in the summer of 1990, Kaifu was 
caught off guard by the start of the Gulf War. While backing American sanctions against 
Iraq, Kaifu hesitated over demands from Bush to send troops to the conflict. For the first 
time, powerful voices within the LDP called for direct involvement of the Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF). However, these calls were rejected by the bureaucracy and by Kaifu 
																																																								45	This number should not be seen as particularly high: by comparison, the 1987 and 1988 seasons of the 
popular Taiga Dramas that run every week on Sundays each had average viewership of nearly 40 percent, 
while nearly two thirds of Japanese watched the 2002 FIFA World Cup match between Japan and Russia 
(Biglobe 2019; Matome Naver 2013). 
46 Under the Recruit-Cosmos scandal, numerous lawmakers (from various parties) were implicated or found 
guilty in a scheme of being offered shares (and accepting) by Cosmos (owned by Recruit) before the 
company went public (and share value increased) (Shiratori 1995).	
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himself, as well as by the opposition (Sadoh 2012). In the end Japan spent 13 billion 
dollars on the Gulf War but had little to show for it in terms of international recognition. 
Japan's foreign policy was characterized by American critics as "pacifism in one country", 
refusing to sacrifice blood and sweat, while trying to solve everything with money alone 
(Sadoh 2012).  
Along with this political turbulence, the end of 1989 had brought economic 
turbulence in the context of the bubble economy that had bloated asset values to the point 
of the land value of the Imperial Palace in central Tokyo exceeding that of the entire state 
of California by 1989. Yet on December 29th, when the Nikkei stock market peaked at 
just under 40,000 points, it then began to fall the next day, a moment that served as a 
harbinger for the economic crisis to come (Komine 2018). While the Kaifu government 
took measures to abate the stock market plunge, which had fallen below 30,000 by March 
1990, these proved ineffective, and the stock market fell below 20,000 yen by October 
1990 (Sadoh 2012). The stock market crash was followed by a real estate market crash, 
partially engineered by the government, which tried to deflate the speculative bubble by 
instituting control measures over real estate loans for banks (Komine 2018), as well as 
through hikes in interest rates to over 8 percent in 1990 (Lucarelli 2015). While this had 
the effect of controlling the real estate boom that was making housing unaffordable for 
many people, the sudden decline in asset values led to a credit crunch among major 
financial institutions, as their debts were no longer asset-leveraged. This led GDP growth 
to fall to 0.8 percent in 1991 and -0.5 percent in 1992 (Berggren 1995). By the early 
1990s, Japan's economy had fallen into a state of debt deflation (Komine 2018). 
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In addition to the economic challenges posed by the sinking stock market and the 
foreign policy challenges of the Gulf War fiasco, growing public anger over LDP 
corruption – highlighted by the 1989 electoral defeat – emboldened the voices of electoral 
reform, both inside and outside of the party. As with foreign policy and (neoliberal) 
economic reform, one of the leading voices for electoral reform was LDP party general 
secretary and rising star Ozawa Ichirō. While unions and business groups had been 
calling for electoral reform since the late 1980s, the LDP itself had formed a Political 
Reform Committee that advocated a switch to a full first-past-the-post electoral system, 
alongside other measures, such as campaign financing reform (Sadoh 2012). Yet this sort 
of change threatened the power of kōenkai, and thus received little outright support from 
lawmakers. 
These debates over electoral reform – which Kaifu supported – divided the party, 
and ultimately weakened his support within the party. He resigned in October 1991 and 
was replaced with veteran lawmaker Miyazawa Kiichi. While Miyazawa was credited 
with improving Japan's image abroad by sending SDF troops to participate in 
minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf and in peacekeeping operations in 
Cambodia in 1992, and because of his prominent leadership role in the high-level 
Trilateral Commission, in other ways, Miyazawa faced domestic political adversity. First, 
in 1992, news of yet another scandal, the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal, broke, and implicated 
LDP general secretary Kanemaru Shin, who was found to have taken a 500 million yen 
(3.6 million US dollars) bribe to save Sagawa from bankruptcy caused by the bubble 
crash (Sadoh 2012). Second, there were growing divisions and debate both within the 
LDP and among parties over electoral reform in early 1993: while the LDP was split 
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between those pushing for a first-past-the-post system and those opposed to reform 
altogether, much of the opposition favored a proportional representative electoral system. 
Within this context, Ozawa, the boldest advocate for reform among the LDP, called for a 
compromise system that combined first-past-the-post with proportional representation. 
Miyazawa, meanwhile, promised on national TV pass electoral reform legislation before 
the summer election (Sadoh 2012). 
At a caucus meeting on June 15th, however, it was determined that this promise 
could not be kept. When the opposition tabled a motion of non-confidence on June 17th, 
the pro-reform Ozawa led his faction to vote in favor of the motion, which passed. Within 
a week, 54 LDP members had mutinied from the party, with 43 following Ozawa as he 
formed the conservative but reformist Japan Renewal Party (JRP) and 10 others forming 
another, slightly more left-leaning party, Sakigake. Despite this upheaval, the result of the 
election that followed saw both the LDP and JRP maintain their seats. Indeed, it was the 
JSP that saw a major decline, going from 134 to 70 seats, while the newly formed centrist 
and reformist Japan New Party (JNP), led by Hosokawa Morihiro, won 35 seats. The 
result thus saw the LDP slightly improve its post-defection seat count from 222 to 223 
seats, though still fall short of a majority. However, rather than resulting in an LDP-led 
minority or coalition government, the government formation that followed saw Ozawa 
orchestrate an heretofore unthinkable seven-party coalition that included the JSP (70 
seats), his own JRP (55 seats), Kōmeitō (51 seats), JNP (35 seats), DSP (15 seats), 
Sakigake (13 seats) and the Socialist Democratic Federation (4 seats). In the end, it was 
Ozawa's shrewd decision to offer Hosokawa the position of Prime Minister that led the 
JNP to join the seven-party coalition rather than form a coalition with the LDP (Sadoh 
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2012). This unforeseen set of events led to the most significant upheaval of Japanese 
post-war political history and brought an end to the LDP's uninterrupted 38-year reign of 
office. 
 
1993-1996: Coalition governments, political reform 
 While the coalition cabinet was sworn in with a 70 percent approval rating, 
hinting at a fresh start for Japanese democracy after more than a decade of LDP 
corruption, the honeymoon did not last long, as interparty infighting and scandals led the 
coalition government to fall apart after less than a year. Nonetheless, the brief spell of 
coalition government brought one major policy achievement: political reform, including 
electoral and campaign finance reform, in a compromise bill that stipulated an electoral 
system that combined first-past-the-post with proportional representation and won 
support from the LDP, which was needed to secure passage in the Upper House. 
However, while reform had been what brought the seven party coalition together, its 
achievement marked the beginning of the coalition's unraveling. In February, Hosokawa 
held a press conference at 1 AM saying he wanted to change the consumption tax to a 
social welfare tax and raise it from 3 to 7 percent. Uninformed of this, the JSP and 
Sakigake were irate and while Hosokawa quickly backtracked one day later, it severely 
damaged him (Sadoh 2012). With allegations of Hosokawa's implication in the Sagawa 
Kyūbin scandal emerging shortly thereafter, he was forced to resign in April. 
While Ozawa next tried to orchestrate a new coalition, with the JRP's Hata 
Tsutomu as Prime Minister, the JSP refused to join, frustrated with Ozawa for not giving 
the JSP a strong voice in the coalition despite their leading seat total. The Hata-led 
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coalition thus took over the reins with just 33 percent of seats in the Diet, and lasted all of 
nine weeks. After the LDP tabled a motion of non-confidence, the cabinet was forced to 
resign. This time, however, the LDP offered JSP leader Murayama Tomiichi the position 
of Prime Minister in a new, LDP-JSP-Sakigake coalition government. However, the JSP 
faced a major problem regarding fundamental policy differences with the LDP, 
particularly over defense. As an opposition party, the JSP had never renounced its 
opposition to the Anpo nor its claim that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) was 
unconstitutional. Suddenly, the realities of government forced it to confront this question. 
Perhaps predictably, the SDP bowed to pressure to accept the existence of the SDF and 
the Anpo, along with Japan's national anthem, kimigayo and flag, hinomaru (Sadoh 2012). 
Ultimately this cooptation proved costly for the JSP: seen by the general public as having 
abandoned their principles for power, they fell even further in the 1996 election, and 
gradually declined into virtual non-existence over the next two decades.47 
While the Murayama-led coalition government was successful in developing a 
number of social programs, its 18 months in power were widely seen as ineffective. On 
one hand, Murayama faced bad luck: 1995 brought two major challenges, first with the 
Hanshin Earthquake in January near Kobe, then with the Tokyo sarin gas attack in 
March.48 On the other hand, Murayama was criticized for indecisiveness and an absence 
of leadership in both cases, criticism that he himself accepted (Sadoh 2012). These 																																																								
47 However, despite generally renouncing the SDP's critical stances on major foreign policy issues, there 
was one major exception to this under Murayama's tenure: the 1995 Apology on the 50th anniversary of the 
war's end, where Murayama apologized to Japan's Asian neighbours for Japan's wartime actions, 
recognizing the state's complicity in the comfort women issue, and identifying the war as an "imperialist 
war of aggression" (Sadoh 2012).  
48 The Tokyo Sarin gas attacks were a terrorist plot that killed 13 Tokyo subway passengers using sarin gas 
during the morning commute on March 20, 1995, carried out by new-age religious cult Aum Shinrikyō. 
The Hanshin earthquake occurred near Kobe in the early morning of January 17th, 1995, killing over 6,400 
people. 
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problems only further hurt the JSP, which lost half its seats in the 1995 Upper House 
election. Murayama resigned in January 1996, and was replaced as Prime Minister with 
the LDP's new leader, Hashimoto Ryūtarō. 
 
1996-2001: LDP's return to power, administrative and financial reform 
Thus, in January 1996, the LDP returned to the kantei (Prime Minister's Office), 
just 30 months after vacating it. While it remained in coalition with the JSP and Sakigake, 
after winning the June 1996 Lower House election – the first under the new system – the 
LDP could still more or less govern on its own. The LDP did well in the 1996 election, 
winning a majority of seats despite experiencing a decline in its popular vote, largely due 
to vote-splitting between the newly-formed New Frontier Party (NFP) (a merger of the 
JRP, JNP, DSP and Kōmeitō) and the Democratic Party, a new party formed at the start 
of the year by Sakigake and JSP members unhappy over the coalition with the LDP. The 
new electoral system thus quickly proved to be more punitive to small parties – and 
rewarding of large parties – than the old system, paradoxically enabling the LDP to 
regain majority control of the Diet with a vote total that would have proven insufficient to 
maintain power under the old system. 
After the 1996 election, Hashimoto unveiled a program for reform, focusing on 
six areas: education, finance, administration, fiscal policy, social security and structural 
economic policy. Hashimoto's reform agenda was driven by the aging crisis in Japan, as 
well as by the growing weight of arguments for neoliberal structural reform, including 
from opposition forces such as Ozawa Ichirō (Sadoh 2012). In order to adjust Japan's 
political economic system to the needs of an aging society and rein in the mounting 
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public debt, Hashimoto, who had worked as the LDP's representative at the Rinchō II and 
overseen the privatization of JR as Transport Minister, felt that Japan must move away 
from clientelist infrastructure spending and instead pursue economic deregulation, 
welfare reform and greater investment in science and technology (Sadoh 2012). 
In 1997 Hashimoto deemed that the after-effects of the bubble had abated, and 
decided to introduce his reforms. Part of Hashimoto's plan was to cut public works 
spending by seven percent while raising the sales tax from three to five per cent in order 
to cut the deficit to within three percent of GDP by 2003 (Sadoh 2012). However, the tax 
hike led to the first decline in consumer spending in postwar history. In addition, 
Hashimoto's administrative reform involved shrinking the number of government 
ministries from 21 to 12, while bolstering the power of the PM in order to increase 
executive authority and responsibility in Japan's political system. While this 
administrative reform received a backlash from entrenched interests in the Postal, 
Construction and MITI ministries principally from both bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers, 
it was seen by many as a necessary step in reducing corruption and increasing 
accountability in Japan's political system. 
However, in the fall of 1997, economic crisis struck yet again, this time in the 
form of the Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis brought a market downturn, including the 
bankruptcies of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Shōken, pushing the Japanese 
economy back into recession (Sadoh 2012). In response, Hashimoto introduced a 
financial liberalization policy designed to ensure that the yen would not decline as a 
		 212	
major currency in world markets.49 Yet the Asian Financial Crisis proved that the 
Japanese financial sector was still vulnerable. The Treasury had discovered that the bad 
debt of the financial industry was worth not 30 trillion but 70 trillion yen (Sadoh 2012). 
News that the GDP had fallen 0.7 percent came before the 1998 Upper House election, 
where the LDP lost 22 seats, forcing Hashimoto to resign. 
Though Hashimoto only served for two years, he has since come to be seen as an 
important figure in Japanese politics (Estevez-Abe 2008), primarily for the measures of 
administrative reform that he instituted, including streamlining the number of ministries 
and introducing measures to strengthen the role of the Prime Minister (in relation to both 
the party and the bureaucracy), including by giving Prime Ministers the power to directly 
appointment the three top positions of each ministry (Sadoh 2012). These changes took 
effect beginning in 2001 and were responsible for the new leadership style and increased 
authority enjoyed by future leaders. In other ways, Hashimoto (and his successor Obuchi) 
made serious efforts to roll back Japan's clientelist state and pork-barrel spending in the 
wake of growing budget deficits and economic stagnation: in 1998 Hashimoto repealed 
the Large Scale Retail Store Law of 1974, while Obuchi ended wage subsidies for 
declining industries (Estevez-Abe 2008).  
While the years that followed (1998-2001) under Obuchi, and his successor, the 
gaffe prone and unpopular Mori, saw a continuation of the policies introduced under 
Hashimoto, one major accomplishment for the LDP in this time was the 1999 negotiation 
of a coalition agreement with Kōmeitō, who had left the NFP and re-founded itself as an 
independent party in 1998. While Kōmeitō had long been an opponent of the LDP and 																																																								
49 Over two occasions in 1998 the Hashimoto government and its successor Obuchi government injected a 
combined 40 trillion yen of stimulus into the financial sector (Katada 2013). 
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little cross-party dialogue had existed, in 1999 the LDP's Chief Party Secretary Nonaka 
Hiromu made a shrewd observation that a coalition with Kōmeitō could help ensure 
political stability and keep the LDP in power (Sadoh 2012). For their part, Kōmeitō was 
intrigued by the possibility of controlling cabinet positions and gaining policy 
concessions from the LDP, and thus the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition was born, and has 
remained to this day. 
 While the 1990s saw a focus on electoral reform, economic crisis management 
and neoliberal deregulation, these years also saw the development of a at least four major 
social policies. First, in the aftermath of the 1989 Upper House election defeat to the JSP, 
the LDP introduced the Gold Plan, which greatly expanded public elder care (Estevez-
Abe 2008). Second, in 1991, JSP lawmakers who controlled the Upper House pushed the 
government to pass a Childcare Leave Act that mandated a year of unpaid leave for new 
mothers, a compromise policy that emerged out of shingikai negotiations between 
business and labour groups (Estevez-Abe 2008). Third, following the end of LDP rule 
and the rise of the proto-DPJ coalition in 1993, the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
crafted a wide-ranging pro-natal policy called the Angel Plan, which called for expanded 
public daycare, expanded child benefit payments, extended daycare flexibility, and the 
introduction of lump-sum baby bonuses.50 Fourth, in 1999 the Child Care and Family 
Care Leave Law was created, which added to existing unpaid childcare leave protections 
similar measures for those who need to care for sick (non-infant) family members 
(Estevez-Abe 2008; MHLW 2010). Thus, despite the enduring economic stagnation and 																																																								
50 According to Osawa (2013), the Angel Plan of 1994 predicted that 70 percent of childbearing age 
women would be working by the 21st century and advised provided daycare services that could cover the 
working hours for children from babies to age 6, located at workplaces or on the way to work places. 
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political upheaval caused by electoral and administrative reform, the period of the 1990s 
saw a significant expansion of social programs designed to target the two elements of 
Japan's emergent demographic crisis: population aging and the low birth rate. 
 
2001-2006: Rise of Koizumi, postal privatization 
In 2001, Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a third-generation lawmaker who was not from any 
faction but was known as a maverick and reformer, faced off against Hashimoto to 
succeeded Mori as LDP leader. Koizumi had little support from within the party but 
appealed to the wider party membership and public at large, framing himself as someone 
who could get rid of the old-style, clientelist and collusive LDP politics from within 
through a far-reaching agenda of liberalization. This, along with his cool and suave image, 
made him popular with the masses (Sadoh 2012). Koizumi ran for the LDP presidency as 
if he was running for president of Japan, making speeches all over the country. Supported 
by Tanaka Makiko (daughter of Tanaka Kakuei), he appealed strongly to women. 
Electoral rule changes that tripled the votes of prefectures enabled Koizumi to target 
party membership rather than try to cultivate factional support. The strategy paid off: he 
won 123 to 15 over Hashimoto on regional ballots. This then impacted the voting of LDP 
lawmakers, who elected Koizumi 175 to 140 (Sadoh 2012). 
Koizumi, who began his term with a 92 percent approval rating, paid little 
attention to factions when selecting his cabinet, choosing five women as well as a non-
politician, Takenaka Heizō. Koizumi was bullish in advancing his neoliberal agenda to 
cope with globalization, while also advancing a more militarist foreign policy: in August 
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2001 he visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, angering China and Korea.51 Then, 
after 9/11, Koizumi announced support for the US in the War on Terror, angering 
pacifists by sending SDF troops into non-combat duty in Afghanistan, their first non-
PKO mission. Economically, Koizumi announced a Basic Plan for Economic and 
Financial Activities' Management and Reform that included privatization and regulatory 
reform, fiscal retrenchment, social insurance reform and stronger intellectual property 
rights, seeking to resolve the bad debt problem of the banking sector within three years 
and proposing to bring the national debt down to 30 trillion yen (Sadoh 2012). 
While Koizumi and his economic policy minister Takenaka Heizō received praise 
for successfully addressing the bad debt problem at the beginning of his tenure, most of 
Koizumi's time was dominated by his pursuit of postal privatization.52 Koizumi had been 
obsessed with postal privatization since he first worked as an undersecretary for the 
Treasury during the Ōhira administration. In that role Koizumi noticed the immense 
amount of capital held the Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance public entitites that 
was being used as to finance spending in very inefficient ways, arguing that their 
privatization was necessary to get rid of inefficient, pork-barrel spending that ran counter 
to the neoliberal economic system that Koizumi thought Japan needed. Koizumi also 
supported postal privatization for personal reasons, seeing it as the fiscal basis for the 
																																																								
51 The Yasukuni Shrine is a war memorial shrine in Tokyo that houses the spirits of all Japanese people, 
including both soldiers and civilians, who have died in wars since the Meiji Restoration. It is controversial 
because it has, since the 1970s, housed the spirits of convicted Class-A war criminals. As such, visits by 
public figures are seen across East Asia as efforts to downplay or even celebrate Japan's role in the Pacific 
war, despite the enormous brutality unleashed upon other Asian peoples during and before the war. 
52 Koizumi also privatized the Public Highway Corporation in 2004, a policy that drew much criticism for 
his lack of leadership as well as the backlash it caused among both zoku lawmakers from the MLIT and 
rural voters (Sadoh 2012). 
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clientelist politics that had underscored the power of Tanaka Kakuei, whom Koizumi 
deeply resented (Sadoh 2012). 
Despite initial public enthusiasm, support for Koizumi waned in 2004, resulting in 
a defeat in the Upper House election to the DPJ, while opposition within the LDP to 
postal privatization left his signature reform measure in jeopardy. In response, Koizumi 
tightened his resolve in the drive for postal privatization. In 2005, Koizumi was able to 
force postal privatization despite lacking an Upper House majority by dissolving the 
Lower House and winning a landslide election in what became known as the postal 
election, where Koizumi famously delisted anti-privatization "rebels" from the party 
nomination and ran "assassin" candidates against them. The landslide win gave Koizumi 
the political capital he needed to get the Upper House to agree to the bill. Overall, 
Koizumi was brilliant in the way he used appeals to the public and public opinion as a 
basis for his power. Part of this was because Koizumi lacked his own faction within the 
party. More importantly, though, was the way he used the emerging forms of popular 
media to his advantage: in the 1990s and 2000s TV was becoming a more important 
medium than newspapers, and Koizumi exploited TV media very effectively. In an era of 
image politics, Koizumi was the master of the sound bite (Sadoh 2012). 
 
2006-2009: LDP impasse 
 Koizumi was barred from running for a third term in 2006 and was instead 
succeeded by Abe Shinzō, a young conservative who had served as Koizumi's Chief 
Cabinet Secretary. Though he would later make a spectacular political comeback, Abe's 
first year in office was one of failure. First, he was accused of cronyism by forming a 
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"cabinet of friends," many of which became engulfed in scandals. Abe himself faced a 
major scandal involving the loss of personal data relating to the pensions of 50 million 
people (Sakoh 2012). Second, his obsession with right wing causes, including the 
introduction of a "patriotic" moral curriculum in schools and remilitarization through 
constitutional revision suggested that he was out of touch with the needs of the majority 
of Japanese, who were increasingly concerned with continued economic stagnation and 
rising inequality. Abe's popularity fell over the course of his term, and in the fall of 2007, 
he resigned after losing the Upper House election to the DPJ. 
 Fukuda Yasuo, son of former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, and a senior figure 
within the conservative faction that his father once led, succeeded Abe. While Fukuda 
brought a more measured approach to Japanese politics, he was hampered institutionally 
by lacking a majority in the Upper House, and thus had trouble passing legislation. With 
slumping approval ratings, Fukuda was pushed out by the LDP, who feared that he was 
not the right "face" to contest the upcoming 2009 election against an insurgent DPJ 
(Sadoh 2012). Fukuda's term thus lasted just one year and he was replaced in September 
2008 with Asō Tarō. While Asō hoped to call an early election, he was very quickly 
forced to deal with the Global Financial Crisis, as American investment bank Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy just a week before Asō's inauguration.  
As with the Asian Financial Crisis ten years earlier, the subprime mortgage and 
financial crisis in the US quickly spread to Japan: in 2008 Japanese GDP contracted by 
6.3 percent, while the Nikkei fell below 7000 points – the lowest since the early 1980s – 
and unemployment also grew from 3.8 to 5 percent (Katada 2013). In the context of the 
crisis, the Fukuda and Asō governments took measures to stimulate the economy, cutting 
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interest rates and introducing four financial stimulus packages in August, October and 
December of 2008 and April 2009 totaling 91 trillion yen, while the April 2009 stimulus 
also included an additional 42 trillion yen aimed at boosting consumer spending, making 
it the largest stimulus package in history (Katada 2013). However, and despite these 
measures, with the sharpened crisis conditions of the 2008-09 recession adding to the 
long run of LDP scandals as well as image problems facing Asō (Sadoh 2012), the LDP 
began to prepare for electoral defeat in 2009. 
 
2009-2012: Rise of the DPJ 
In August 2009, the DPJ led by Hatoyama Yukio won a landslide election, 
winning 308 seats to the LDP's 119. The DPJ had been formed in 1996 by a group of 
Sakigake and JSP lawmakers unhappy with the coalition with the LDP, expanding in 
1998 when a large number of NFP lawmakers – many originally from the DSP and JNP – 
joined. The party expanded further when Ozawa Ichirō joined the party along with most 
of his Liberal Party lawmakers in 2003. Overall, the DPJ might be seen as a catchall party 
to the left of the LDP with both social democratic (former JSP) and neoliberal (former 
NFP) factions that had its lineages in the 1993 coalition government. The DPJ's electoral 
breakthrough – 13 years after the party's founding – occurred due to a number of reasons, 
including both the public's frustration with the post-Koizumi LDP's poor leadership, 
growing concern over issues such as inequality (which the DPJ campaigned on) and an 
appeal to rural voters through promises of clientelist supports (Sasada 2015).  
Upon assuming office, the DPJ was steadfast in the pursuit of a reformist agenda. 
On foreign policy, Hatoyama led Japan to sign the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, calling for 
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25 percent cuts to CO2 emissions by 2020, while also signaling a major foreign policy 
pivot away from the US and towards Asia through a political summit with Chinese leader 
Hu Jintao. At the summit he called into question the long-term status of the US-Japan 
security alliance, a move that drew immense criticism from both the LDP opposition and 
the US. In other ways, Hatoyama failed to fulfill foreign policy promises, and his 
inability to reach an agreement with the US over the relocation of the Pentagon's Futenma 
base in Okinawa brought about his resignation in 2010. 
 With regard to domestic politics, Hatoyama pursued a further strengthening of 
the administrative reforms that began under Hashimoto, further strengthening Cabinet 
control over the selection of top bureaucrats. Additionally, Hatoyama got rid of the 
weekly deputy ministers' meeting, where top bureaucrats from each ministry gathered in 
advance of cabinet meetings to determine the agenda of those meetings (Shinoda 2013). 
These meetings had existed for decades as a leading example of the bureaucratic "tail" 
wagging the "dog" of the cabinet by setting the agenda of discussion, which meant that 
cabinet meetings were often little more than a rubber stamp for previously agreed-upon 
bureaucratic prerogatives. By getting rid of these meetings, Hatoyama had challenged the 
power-knowledge-institutional complex of the bureaucracy. A hostile relationship with 
the bureaucracy, which the DPJ blamed for many of Japan's problems, characterized 
much of the DPJ tenure (see also Kamikawa 2016). 
Partially due to their lack of experience in governing and partly due to the 
hostility incurred from the bureaucracy and media, the DPJ's term was dogged by major 
campaign financing scandals implicating prominent cabinet ministers. While Hatoyama's 
resignation and replacement with Kan Naoto brought an uptick in approval ratings, these 
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problems continued to linger. Indeed, Kan's immediate task of maintaining DPJ control of 
the Upper House after the 2010 election proved to be too much to ask, as a campaign run 
on sales tax increases – a proposal for which Kan could never find a consistent 
explanation to justify – not only led to the end of DPJ control of both chambers but also 
forced Kan to whether a leadership challenge from Ozawa, hurting party unity. 
Along with this electoral setback, the DPJ faced renewed foreign policy 
challenges. While Kan had worked hard to restore bonds with the United States, an 
incursion into Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese fishing boat led to a major 
diplomatic row with China, erasing the good will that Hatoyama had established just one 
year earlier. Mismanagement of the issue as well as public perceptions of Japanese 
weakness in the face of Chinese aggression seriously hurt Kan (Sadoh 2012). 
All these challenges paled in comparison to that posed by the triple disaster of 
March 11th 2011: a Magnitude 9 earthquake off the coast of Miyagi prefecture and a 
tsunami that killed nearly twenty thousand people and led to a nuclear meltdown at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Together these amounted to the costliest disaster 
in human history. Though a disaster of this scope would stretch the limits of any 
government, the DPJ proved particularly ineffective in dealing with it. It was widely 
perceived that Kan interfered too much with the emergency response and in ways that 
were not helpful and misemployed resources (Sadoh 2012). Part of this was because of 
the degree of mistrust that had developed between the bureaucracy and the DPJ cabinet. 
As a result, the flow of information between the government, bureaucracy and business 
was interrupted, often leaving Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio with nothing to 
report, and further presenting an image of incompetence to the public (Sadoh 2012). 
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After five months of trying to resolve the nuclear emergency, Kan finally resigned 
in August 2011, replaced by Noda Yoshihiko. In a bid to switch tracks in the face of 
ailing polling numbers, Noda tried to advance a more neoliberal agenda, pushing trade 
liberalization through the Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as fiscal reconstruction 
through sales tax increases, though neither measure could reverse the trends of crumbling 
party support and party unity. Thus, in the December 2012 election, the DPJ suffered an 
emphatic defeat, seeing its share of the vote fall from 42 to 15 percent and losing 20 
million votes as the LDP was revived under one-time political failure Abe Shinzō. 
 Ultimately, the DPJ's three years in power were nothing short of disastrous 
politically and damaged the image of the party so seriously that it has failed to win more 
than 21 percent of the vote in any of the five elections since 2012,53 in stark contrast the 
42 percent it received in 2009. Nonetheless, the DPJ – particularly in its first nine months 
of double legislative control under Hatoyama – passed a number of important economic 
and social policies designed to target both Japan's terminally slow growth and its growing 
social and demographic crisis of rising inequality and population aging. These included 
an expansion of the child allowance and the elimination of high school fees as well as 
anti-poverty welfare programs, subsidies for farmers, increases to the minimum wage and 
other protections for workers (Osawa 2013). However, while the DPJ had initially 
claimed that such programs would be financed by the elimination of wasteful LDP 
spending, this ultimately proved naïve, and it was only through the increase of the deeply 
																																																								
53 The DPJ received 15 percent in the 2012 Lower House (LH) election; 13 percent in the 2013 Upper 
House (UH) election; 18 percent in the 2014 LH election; 21 percent in the 2016 UH election (after 
merging with the Restoration Party); and 20 percent in the 2017 LH election (as the Constitutional 
Democratic Party). 
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unpopular consumption tax that their social policies could be rendered affordable, a move 
that in the process ended the party's chances of re-election. 
 
Conditions of the crisis 
 What accounts for the dynamics of political instability and upheaval, combined 
with economic stagnation and stasis, outlined in the previous section? Following 
Gramsci, I want to conceptualize the period beginning in the early 1990s as one of 
organic crisis. This crisis is wide-ranging, and thus relates to social, economic and 
political conditions. In what follows, I consider eleven different elements in the crisis, 
each corresponding to one of the eleven conditions of hegemonic rule developed in 
Chapter Four. While all of these conditions helped buttress the hegemonic order in the 
early post-war period, due in part to the structural, institutional and political changes 
discussed in Chapter Five, things had dramatically changed by the 1990s.  
 
1. Geopolitics: Security Alliance in a post-Cold War world 
 Changing geopolitical conditions beginning in the 1990s brought new challenges 
for Japan's domestic hegemonic order. While it would be wrong to suggest that these 
changing conditions are directly at fault for Japan's prolonged crisis, in various ways they 
have disrupted the stable basis for Japanese domestic hegemony. 
First, the end of the Cold War brought new challenges as Japan's relationship with 
the US was increasingly called into question, with some American leaders seeing Japan's 
economic threat as the biggest challenge to US hegemony in the 1990s. Yet Japan lacked 
the political leadership to chart a different course than that of the alliance with the US. 
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Japan was therefore criticized for being a political and foreign policy lightweight, not 
contributing with blood and steel to the Gulf War. This led to efforts to re-forge Japan's 
foreign policy identity under Kaifu and public concern over Japan's global role and 
image, while increasingly powerful voices, such as that of Ozawa Ichirō, called for Japan 
to reformulate its role in world politics as a "normal country" – in other words, a country 
with a normal military that engages in its "fair share" of international policing.  
 Second, the period of the 1990s and 2000s saw the rise of new threats beyond the 
purview of the nation state, particularly that of terrorism, and including both international 
terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and domestic terrorists such as Aum Shinrikyō, which 
challenged the sense of domestic security that had previously existed in Japan. Indeed, 
the loss of civilian life at the hands of terrorist groups, both in the US – the supposed 
protector of Japan – and in Japan itself, were politically and existentially destabilizing. 
Moreover, despite the end of the Cold War East-West antagonism, new threats emerged 
in the 1990s from Japan's neighbours in China and especially North Korea, including 
with the launch of North Korean missiles over the Sea of Japan in 1993, the development 
of its nuclear program a decade later, as well as with the 2003 revelations of North 
Korean abductions of Japanese nationals from the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Third, the rise of China was another factor generating ambivalence over the future 
direction of Japanese regional foreign policy and overall increasing doubts over what 
Japan's role in the world ought to be. This ambivalence about the role of China in 
regional geopolitics and the prospects for a more peaceful and amicable Sino-Japanese 
relationship is reflected in the perception among some Japanese politicians, including 
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Abe Shinzō, that China has two faces: a friendly face with regard to mutually beneficial 
trade, and a more ominous face in relation to security policy. 
Overall, these three foreign policy challenges all had destabilizing effects on the 
fabric of Japanese post-war security policy and raised new concerns over the validity of 
the post-war regime rooted in Anpo and the Pacifist Constitution, challenging the old 
order in ways that have brought about difficult political challenges for LDP and DPJ 
governments alike. 
 
2. Global political economy: Japan in a global neoliberal era 
As noted, the period of the 1990s and 2000s was characterized by consistent 
economic crises. Three dynamics in the global political economy were transformed into 
underlying elements of these crises.  
First, Japan's project of neoliberal deregulation in the 1980s was a key source of 
the problems that Japanese financial institutions faced until the early 2000s, including the 
bubble economy of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the non-performing loan problem 
that led to costly bank bailouts and failures and was only resolved in the early 2000s 
(Lechevalier 2014). As the previous chapter showed, the neoliberalization of Japan's 
economy in the 1980s was primarily characterized by the privatization and financial 
deregulation that emerged out of Rinchō II and was as much a product of indigenous 
neoliberal organic intellectuals as a result of pressure from forces within the American 
government and capital who wanted easier access to Japanese capital (Tiberghien 2014). 
Though far from systematic or complete, it served as a principal driver for both the 
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speculative boom of the late 1980s bubble economy and the transformation in corporate 
relations that followed in response to the stock market crash.  
By the late 1990s, the system of coordination and support between banks, firms 
and the state had broken down, as the main bank system of corporate financing had been 
replaced by shareholder supremacism, and the state was no longer willing to bail out 
ailing banks (Takahashi and Mizuno 2013). The speculative bubble and ensuing bust led 
to a breakdown of trust relations among public and private actors alike (Komine 2018). 
Indeed, this loss of trust is one reason it took more than a decade for the bad debt problem 
to finally be resolved under Koizumi in 2002. As Boyer (2014) has argued, this lack of 
trust not only delayed the end of the banking crisis; it also led to a vicious cycle of market 
pessimism, which in turn led to a structural dynamic of debt deflation. This caused real 
wages and commodity prices to fall in the late 1990s, while unemployment passed five 
percent for the first time in the post-war in 2002 (Komine 2018). The bursting of the 
speculative bubble also brought about a fiscal crisis, as revenues fell and stimulus 
packages necessitated more spending. While Japan's budget had been in surplus as late as 
1992, by 1997 it had the largest deficit among industrialized countries (Komine 2018). 
In addition to the emergence of financialization and the rise of shareholder 
supremacy – both effects of Japanese capital's partial embrace of globally ascendant 
neoliberal principles – a second factor behind the enduring economic crisis was the high 
degree of integration into world markets, and the negative effects of that dependency. 
Japan's bubble economy was itself an early cause of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8, 
and in turn the effects Asian Financial Crisis itself came full circle to Japan, as a credit 
crunch brought the economy back into recession in 1998. The 2008 Global Financial 
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Crisis was even more serious, prompting the biggest single year contraction of GDP in 
postwar history and leading to 790,000 job losses and the highest unemployment rate of 
the postwar era despite having its US origins (Shibata 2017). Indeed, according to Katada 
(2013) the historic contraction in GDP experienced as a result of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis had little to do with the activities of Japanese banks, which did not 
engage in the speculative activities of American firms such as Lehman Brothers or 
Merrill Lynch. Instead, it was caused by a sudden and sharp withdrawal of foreign 
investment from the Japanese stock market. Foreign ownership of stock had grown 
dramatically since the 1990s, totaling 28 percent of stock and 65 percent of the volume of 
traded stock in 2007.  
A third factor behind Japan's lost two decades is the rise of China since the 1990s. 
While Japan had four times as much trade with the US compared to China until the 1990s, 
by 2005 trade with China passed the US (Lechevalier 2014). This gave Japanese capital 
an abundant supply of cheap labour close by that helped ensure conditions for 
profitability for Japanese firms, particularly in manufacturing industries. However it led 
to an outflow of Japanese capital to China, undermining domestic growth and playing a 
role in entrenching conditions of domestic deflation (Jayasuriya 2018).  
Overall, the integration of Japan into the global framework of disciplinary 
neoliberalism destroyed the social fabric of Japanese-style capitalism while deepening 
contradictions between conditions conducive to capital accumulation (i.e., neoliberal 
deregulation) and those conducive to stable social reproduction (i.e., social welfare 
provisioning and employment maintenance).  
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3. The electoral and party system: Crisis, reform, and the end of LDP rule 
 In what way did conditions relating to Japan's electoral and party system 
contribute to the crisis? As noted above, Japan's post-war electoral system had a 
significant impact on post-war political order, helping to maintain conditions for stable 
LDP-led one party rule. LDP hegemony was beset by a number of high profile scandals, 
beginning in the 1970s and extending into the 1980s and 1990s, laying bare the dark side 
of Japan's political system.  
The beginning of the 1990s thus saw a mounting political crisis, with high levels 
of public distrust with politicians and bureaucrats alike, and calls for reform. The political 
crisis of the 1990s was famously characterized by the 1992 arrest of Kanemaru Shin, the 
party's deputy president and former chief secretary and one of the most powerful figures 
in the LDP, in relation to the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal.54 However, the fallout of the crisis 
was significant: within months the LDP was out of power, and a broad coalition 
government that included socialists, Kōmeitō, and LDP rebels stayed together just long 
enough to pass far-reaching electoral and campaign finance reform. To be sure, the 
electoral reform had far-reaching implications on Japan's political system. Since reform, 
there have been no major corruption scandals to parallel the Lockheed, Sagawa and 
Recruit scandals.  
At the same time, reform has brought with it new challenges for Japan's 
hegemonic order, while failing to resolve old ones. As Krauss and Pekkanen (2010) have 
shown, it did not have the expected effects of removing the influence of factions and 
kōenkai. With the exception of Koizumi, the LDP leadership continued to be determined 																																																								54	When police later raided his home, they found gold bars weighing hundreds of pounds as well as cash 
and bearer bonds worth fifty million US dollars (Pollack 1996).	
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based on factional politics. Nor did it have any impact on the formation of political 
dynasties: while only 17 percent of lawmakers had inherited their districts from family 
members in 1958, by 2003 this number was 40 percent, and especially pronounced in 
rural districts (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). Indeed, while their membership has declined 
somewhat, little changed in the function of kōenkai compared to before the electoral 
reform, nor in their basic activities (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). 
 Second, and linked with the continued relevance of kōenkai, electoral reform only 
went so far in creating party-centered politics. Candidates continued to be important, and 
neither the LDP nor the newly formed DPJ were characterized by ideological coherence. 
While the LDP used its lack of ideological coherence as a means of being all things to all 
people, for the DPJ a lack of ideological coherence simply led to party infighting and a 
scattergun approach to policymaking. 
 Part of the cause for this, as noted, was an ironic consequence of the new model 
for electoral reform that was chosen – a compromise position between the MMP system 
favored by the small progressive parties and the First Past the Post (FPTP) system 
favored by the LDP. Yet while either MMP or FPTP would have posed challenges to the 
LDP – MMP by giving small parties a number of seats proportionate to their vote share 
and FPTP by forcing all opposition parties to unite behind the DPJ – the mixed system 
that was chosen gave small parties just enough incentive to avoid joining the DPJ (since 
they could still win seats through the PR element of the system) while still heavily 
favoring the LDP overall (through the FPTP element that contained most of the seats). 
 Moreover, the electoral reform did not extend to the House of Councilors, nor to 
the 47 prefectural assemblies, all of which retained the old multi-member system. This 
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system allows the LDP to win nearly all of the single-member, winner-take-all races in 
small prefectures while still winning a handful of seats in the multi-member urban 
prefectures where the second or third-place LDP candidates are still able to win seats 
despite finishing behind the DPJ.55 Thus despite electoral reform of the Lower House, the 
largely unreformed Upper House and (regional governments) continue to heavily favor 
the LDP while encouraging the old-style clientelist politics that electoral reform was 
supposed to replace. Moreover, even the Lower House reform did not brought with it a 
thoroughgoing transformation of Japanese democracy as many had hoped. 
A final consequence of the events of the 1990s was the elimination of Japan's two 
nominally socialist parties, the JSP and DSP. While the DSP was officially merged into 
the New Frontier Party that eventually joined the DPJ, the JSP suffered a gradual but in 
the end near-total decline, partly due to its disastrous two years in government, where it 
was seen to have simultaneously abandoned long-time supporters by selling out to the 
LDP on security issues while poorly managing other issues and thus convincing moderate 
voters that it was incapable of governing. While the DSP and JSP had never previously 
been in government, their presence as active opposition parties on the left and centre-left 
played an important role in situating political debates in Japan and pulling the LDP to the 
																																																								
55 For example, the 2010 Upper House election brought a major electoral defeat to the DPJ and ended their 
majority in both houses, effectively creating legislative gridlock only 10 months into their term. Yet while 
the DPJ actually won 39 percent of the vote to the LDP's 33 percent in the MMD portion of the electoral 
system, it only won 28 seats to the LDP's 39, due to the extreme imbalance of the system in favor of small, 
rural prefectures. Osaka and Kanazawa, each with a population of 9 million, elected only 3 councilors each. 
While the DPJ placed first in both prefectures, the sole candidates of second and third-placed parties 
(including the LDP in both cases) did better than the DPJ's second candidate, leading the DPJ to only win 
one seat in each prefecture. In contrast, Tokushima, Tottori, Shimane and Fukui, each with 800,000 people 
or less, each elected LDP candidates with a similar share of the vote. Overall in eight large prefectures 
amounting to nearly half of the Japanese population the DPJ beat the LDP 38 percent to 23 yet only won 10 
seats to the LDP's 8, while 24 small prefectures amounting to less than a quarter of Japan's population voted 
49 percent for the LDP to 40 for the DPJ and saw 18 LDP members elected to the DPJ's 6.	
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centre. Without these two parties, opposition to the LDP since the 1990s has taken the 
form of the ideologically incoherent DPJ on one hand and the JCP – largely ignored as 
far-left radicals – on the other. Overall we can see how the early 1990s witnessed a 
political crisis that prompted widespread reform. The reforms were successful in solving 
some elements of the crisis but not others, while new problems emerged instead. 
 
4. The state form: Institutional decay and administrative reform 
 In the early 1990s, it was widely acknowledged that Japan's system of bureaucrat-
led rule was no longer a driver of Japanese political and economic success but rather a 
hindrance and cause of the wider political and economic problems that were emerging. 
As a result, the revamped LDP government pursued an agenda of administrative reform 
in the 1990s under Hashimoto. 
 However, while these reforms were somewhat successful in empowering cabinet-
based leadership (as demonstrated by Koizumi's five year term), the return of a series of 
weak leaders, both under the LDP (Abe, Fukuda, Asō) and more importantly under the 
DPJ, is evidence that this administrative reform was not wholly effective. 
 Indeed, under Hatoyama, the DPJ argued that administrative reforms had not been 
successful in overcoming the collusive relationship between bureaucrats and the LDP and 
sought to end once and for all unaccountable bureaucratic-led politics. However, this 
proved impossible. The bureaucracy resisted the DPJ's attempts at reform, while the DPJ 
was already highly disadvantaged by its lack of party unity and experience in 
government. After the failure of Hatoyama's attempts to curtail bureaucratic power by 
allowing cabinet ministers to appoint the top three ranking staff of their departments, 
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Prime Ministers Kan, and especially Noda returned to the old system of cabinet deference 
to bureaucrats, while Noda even brought back the vice ministers meetings (Shinoda 
2013). While this return to "bureaucratic rule" may have been politically expedient, the 
underlying problems of democratic accountability in a system where bureaucrats who are 
neither elected nor directly appointed by elected officials have the authority to craft 
policy in ways that conflict with the aspirations of the elected government were only 
exacerbated. 
 The other problem with the bureaucracy-led system was the way it encouraged 
clientelism. Although this system was successful both politically and economically 
during an era of ever-growing budgets, various structural and institutional changes in the 
1970s and 1980s meant that by the 1990s it was extremely costly and wasteful.  
 In this context Koizumi emerged looking to get rid of these clientelistic networks 
and wasteful spending through his postal privatization drive. However, it was not entirely 
successful: public works spending went back up after Koizumi left office (CAO 2015). 
Moreover, Koizumi's neoliberalism, including its rejection of public infrastructure 
spending, led to major social problems, including heightened poverty and inequality, 
which in turn necessitated further government spending, including through a return to 
pork-barrel infrastructure spending, after the 2008 financial crisis and 2011 earthquake. 
 
5. Production and capital: The Americanization of Japanese capitalism? 
 In what ways have changes to the underlying conditions of Japanese capitalism 
and Japanese business networks underscored Japan's organic crisis since the 1990s? 
Three changes to the sociology of Japanese business played a role in the crisis. First, as 
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Lechevalier (2014) has argued, changes to corporate financing and the withering of 
keiretsu relations led to a growing lack of complementarity between Japan's economic 
institutions. For example, while the labour management and financing patterns had both 
previously prioritized long-term stability over short-term profits, neoliberalism brought 
about a liberalization of financing arrangements even though in other ways corporate 
reforms did not take place to the same degree. In this way, a business culture that 
prioritized stability and long-term growth has been replaced with an incoherent model 
that combines short term, quarterly profit-oriented financing and shareholder-centrism 
with residual elements of the old system that still prioritize stability and consensus-based 
decision-making. In this context, barring further neoliberal deregulation, Japanese firms 
are unable to provide the short-term rewards for innovation of American-style firms, nor 
the long-term, cumulative gains of the old, stable domestic model. 
Second, we must consider the growing neoliberal orientation of major 
corporations and business networks, which in many ways meant a decline in their support 
for the inclusion of other key forces (SMEs, workers) within the historic bloc. Both the 
growing neoliberal orientation of Keidanren and the shift to a more American style model 
of corporate management oriented around lucrative executive pay with generous stock 
options are indicative of this trend, while Nissan under the leadership of CEO Carlos 
Gohsn, which fired over 20,000 workers while paying Mr. Gohsn ten million dollars a 
year, is perhaps the best example of this (Anchordoguy 2005; Bloomberg 2014). While 
the president of Toyota, Toyoda Shōichirō made only 690,000 dollars without stock 
options in 1991, by 2013 his son, Akio, who succeeded him as president, was earning 1.8 
million dollars with 7.5 million dollars in stock options (Bloomberg 2014). Though still 
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significantly less than in the US, overall executive pay has increased from 378,000 
dollars in 1991 – with no stock options, which were banned until 2006 – to more than one 
million dollars in 2014 (Kerbo and McKinstry 1995; Nikkei 2015). Under the 2006 
Companies Act, firms are now allowed to freely issue stocks to any party, a legal change 
that prompted a rise in stock options to CEOs based on the American model (Hasegawa, 
Kim and Yasuda 2017). Along with this shift towards an American style, "greed is good" 
orientation towards executive pay that was strongly encouraged under Koizumi, the 
consensus-based hegemonic orientation of major firms and business organizations 
declined, as these groups no longer called for policies in the broad interests of society 
(including workers), instead focused narrowly on their own immediate interests of capital 
accumulation and neoliberal deregulation (Jayasuriya 2018). In the context of this 
Americanization of Japanese business culture, the shared cultural ethos that united the 
interests of large firms, the bureaucracy, and the privileged core workforce began to 
fragment. 
Third, we have seen a general decline in the close ties that bound members of 
keiretsu through main bank financing, as well as the practice of sub-contracting, wherein 
small firms enjoyed high degrees of security through stable, long-term relations with the 
large firms that they engaged in business with, as well as a decline in industrial policy 
and other means of economic coordination between firms and the state through MITI 
(Lechevalier 2014). While long-term subcontracting arrangements fell precipitously in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, replaced with more fluid and short-term market-based 
transactions, MITI's influence has declined markedly in the face of neoliberal opposition 
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to industrial policy.56 Keiretsu linkages, meanwhile, have weakened due to the declining 
centrifugal power of the main bank system, which has been replaced by stock market-
based financing, while reciprocal and main bank shareholding – the stable "institutional 
investors" that enabled firms for decades to make long-term decisions without worrying 
about a sudden drop in their share price – has declined from nearly half to less than a 
quarter of all shares, and has largely been replaced with foreign shareholders (Lechevalier 
2014). 
Overall, we can see how the period of the 1990s and 2000s saw a reordering of 
Japanese economic relations, both among fractions of capital and between capital and the 
state.57 These reforms were only partially successful, as certain elements of the old, 
highly integrated, long-termist and consensus-based system, remained. Moreover, these 
reforms did little to restore conditions for profitable accumulation, while creating new 
problems, in particular inequality and the decline of political consensus between core 
elements of the historic bloc that had hitherto been maintained. 
 
6. Production and labour: Deregulation and the rise of the working poor 
 The Heisei era also saw a transformation in the fortunes of the working class. In 
particular, two major changes are of note. The first change is the growing dualization of 																																																								
56 MITI was renamed as METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) in 2001 under the Hashimoto 
administrative reforms. 
57 In addition to all of these dynamics that collectively amount to a neoliberal shift in the orientation of 
Japanese business networks, another important dynamic that characterized keiretsu relations in the 1990s 
and 2000s was the concentration of keiretsu due to a number of bank mergers. While six main keiretsu 
(Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyō (Fuji-Yasuda), Sanwa, and Daiichi-Kangyō) existed until 2000, since 
the 1997 reform of the Anti-Monopoly Act series of bank mergers between 2000 and 2006 has produced 
only three: Mitsubishi UFJ (formed by the merger of the Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi, Tokai and Sanwa 
banks); Sumitomo-Mitsui (formed by Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Taiyō-Kobe banks); and Mizuho (formed by 
Industrial Bank of Japan, Fuji and Daiichi Kangyo banks) (Grbic 2007). 
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the workforce. Here, dualization refers to the maintenance of the lifetime employment 
system for a gradually shrinking cohort of protected workers while allowing a parallel 
labour pool of unprotected haken, part time and contract workers (see also Thelen 2012). 
According to Jayasuriya (2018), "the dualistic labour market is reflected in the slow 
erosion of the institutions of lifetime employment. …the share of non-regular workers 
which was below 20% in the early 1990s reached 35% by the early 2010s" (597). Faced 
with shrinking profits due to the growing labour costs of an aging workforce, many firms 
tried to restore profitability by reducing the size of their core, protected workforce, 
mainly through attrition and early retirement and only rarely through layoffs (Boyer 
2014). Instead they focused on expanding the scope of their non-protected (mostly 
female) workforce hired under part time or haken categories, without the benefits, 
protections or higher pay of the protected core (see also Noda and Hirano 2013).  
The second change is the absolute expansion of flexibilized labour, especially in 
the service sector, and the corresponding decline of the petit bourgeoisie. While this had 
been going on for decades, the 1990s saw a major expansion of it, as fast food chains, fast 
fashion retail outlets and convenience stores became ubiquitous, particularly after the 
repeal of the Large Scale Retailers Law in 2000.58 This second change reflects a 
transformation at the macroeconomic level characterized by two dynamics: 1) the decline 
in employment in manufacturing, which was less pronounced in Japan than in the US and 
UK but still significant, falling from 24 percent to only 16 percent of total employment 
between 1992 and 2014 (JIL 2016), and the growth of service-sector jobs; and 2) the 																																																								
58 For example, looking at Japan's two largest convenience store chains, Lawson opened its first store in 
1975, opened its 100th store by 1977 its 1000th store by 1982 and number 10,000 by 2011; Seven Eleven's 
first store opened in 1974; its 100th store in 1976; its 1000th store in 1980 and its 10,000th store in 2003 
(HighCharts 2019). 
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declining proportion of employment in traditional petit bourgeois job categories, whether 
self-employment, family businesses or small businesses, and their replacement with big 
box retailers and chains since the 1970s.59	
Job category Definition 
Regular (seishain) Full time, directly employed, permanent workers with job security and benefits 
Part time (pāto) Technically part time, though often working 35 hours per week; can be either 
temporary or permanent but often without job security or benefits 
Dispatch (haken) Workers employed by dispatch agencies who are given limited term postings at 
workplaces without becoming employees of those workplaces; can be full or part 
time 
Arubaito Part time, casual work without job security or benefits, often associated with 
students; not an official category (officially considered "part time") 
Contract (keiyaku) Limited term employees, usually full time and directly employed (very short term 
workers are called "temporary workers," while longer term contract workers are 
called "contract workers") 
Table 1: Types of labour categories in Japan (definitions drawn from Asao 2011). 
What were the underlying causes of these changing conditions? First, labour market 
deregulation may have kept unemployment relatively low, but it led to a massive increase 
in poverty (including child poverty and working poverty) and inequality, while disrupting 
the old lifetime employment system (Osawa 2013). Second, population aging, which sped 
up markedly in the 1990s as the baby boom cohort started to reach middle age, led to 
increasing fiscal strains on firms due to seniority-based pay provisions. In other words, 
the system that had once been an advantage to Japanese firms when its workforce was 
young had slowly turned into a drain on profits.  
Third, Japan's enterprise unions were unable to resist the deterioration of working 
conditions, including wage stagnation and deflation, the decline in lifetime employment 
protections, and more importantly the dualization of the workforce (see also Noda and 
Hirano 2013). Part of this was due to the long-term strategy of the Japanese labour 																																																								
59 For example, the percentage of workers in the categories "self-employed" or "family business" fell from 
33 percent of women and 21 percent of men in 1985 to 15 percent of both women and men in 2005 and 10 
percent of women and 12 percent of men in 2014 (GEB 2016). 
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movement of prioritizing job security over remuneration. During a period of economic 
downturn, then, it made sense to forego the annual shuntō coordinated wage negotiations, 
sacrificing deterioration in working conditions or reduced pay in order to minimize 
layoffs. While unemployment more than doubled to more than five percent during this 
period, it remained below the level of most OECD countries. At the same time, unions 
possessed institutional weakness due to their decline since the 1970s, where union density 
fell from 35 percent in 1975 (largely unchanged since the 1950s) to less than 20 percent 
by the 2000s (Noda and Hirano 2013): even during a period of robust economic growth, 
labor unions could do little to rebuff the neoliberal onslaught, characterized by 
Nakasone's privatization drive and the breaking of the JNR union. While the 1988 
formation of Rengō united three of the main trade federations, its formation was driven 
by the decline of the more assertive JSP-affiliated Sōhyō trade federation, and Rengō thus 
served to function as a weak and passive federation, despite its broad representation 
(Tiberghien 2014).60 As a result, even during the recovery, when GDP grew continuously 
from February 2002 to February 2008 (and corporate executive compensation grew 
significantly), wages remained stagnant (Osawa 2013). 
Another way in which Japanese labour organizations did little to challenge the 
growth of working class insecurity and inequality during this period was the insular 
nature of enterprise unions, which usually only included the protected core (and male) 
workforce. As these unions were usually deeply integrated into the ethos of management, 
and identified more with the interests of the firm than with the labour movement in 																																																								
60 This weakening has also been exacerbated by the rise of service sector jobs, which are only very rarely 
unionized. While Rengō has since 1997 focused more on promoting unionization and workers' rights for 
service sector and irregular workers, unionization rates remain at around 2-3 percent (Royle and Urano 
2012). 
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general, workers felt little solidarity even with the non-regular workers in their own 
company – let alone the growing numbers of precarious workers in other firms and 
sectors –if the precarious and flexible status of those workers could boost corporate 
profitability without undermining the own job security of the core workers themselves 
(see also Shibata 2017). Deregulation and dualization of the workforce was thus 
effectively executed as a strategy of divide and rule, co-opting the well-organized but 
conservative core unionized workforce while marginalizing the rest. As a result, since the 
1990s there has been an increase in wage inequality both within and across sectors, 
including among unionized workers (Lechevalier 2014). 
 
7. Production and the petit bourgeoisie: End of the pork-barrel system? 
 As for the petit bourgeoisie, long an integral piece of the LDP's electoral 
coalition, how did the crisis of the Heisei manifest itself in relation to its role within 
Japan's historic bloc? While the government had previously used pork barrel spending, 
protections for SMEs and supports for blue-collar workers (most of whom were 
employed in small businesses) in rural areas to combat uneven development and to shore 
up petit bourgeois electoral support, this regime encountered problems in the 1980s due 
to its high costs. While public infrastructure spending as a percentage of GDP already 
stood at 4.8 percent – more than double the US, UK and Germany – in 1989, by 1995 it 
had grown to 6.4 percent, despite declining public revenues (CAO 2015). Then, while 
neoliberal reforms under Hashimoto and Koizumi successfully cut it to 3 percent of GDP 
by 2007, after Koizumi left office it rose again, up to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2009 (CAO 
2015). These decades thus saw a shift back and forth between neoliberal austerity aimed 
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at fiscal consolidation and returns to pork barrel spending aimed at fighting the negative 
economic and political consequences of that austerity. 
 In addition to reductions in public works spending, which served as the financial 
basis for a wide range of construction-related small businesses, especially in the 
countryside, as well as an anchor for rural employment, especially of blue-collar males, 
and as a secondary income source for farmers, the LDP of the late 1990s and early 2000s 
also displayed a willingness to abandon protections for small businesses. In 2000, under 
pressure from the US government and large-scale American retail firms, the LDP pushed 
through a repeal of the Large Scale Retail Store Law (Shimotsu 2014), replacing it with 
significantly weakened piece of legislation that greatly opened the scope of big-box store 
development in Japan. This move only sped up the decline of small businesses in retail. 
 Then, with Koizumi's postal privatization, things reached a watershed and one of 
the key means for pork barrel spending was substantially reformed with the privatization 
and breakup of the postal savings system (Estevez-Abe 2008; Sadoh 2012). Koizumi also 
pushed for agricultural liberalization and other neoliberal policies, in addition to 
defunding the construction state. However, while popular at the time, and successful in 
combating the deficit, these policies lead to greater insecurity in the countryside. As a 
result, rural voters began to feel abandoned by the LDP, and instead voted for the DPJ in 
the 2007 and 2009 elections, as the DPJ made a major pivot to favor agricultural 
subsidies, something that had gone against its hitherto neoliberal position (Sadoh 2012). 
In other ways, the hollowing out of Japanese agriculture, with severe labour 
shortages and the average age of a farmer over 65 is a growing problem for Japan's future 
food security, despite agricultural subsidies that are unaffordable and that contradict the 
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trade deals that both the LDP and DPJ have supported (including the TPP, which was 
first discussed at the end of the DPJ's term in office). Moreover, as we have seen, in other 
ways the petit bourgeoisie has declined in numbers steadily since the Second World War, 
and has been replaced by precarious service sector workers. Many of the voters that 
remain are elderly farmers and shopkeepers that rely on protections and supports to 
remain economically viable against increasingly transnationalized and concentrated 
competition. 
 Overall, we can thus see a contradiction with the programs aimed at supporting 
the petit bourgeoisie, which remained an important element of the LDP's electoral 
coalition, and policies pursued, beginning in the late 1990s, to restore conditions for 
profitable accumulation, particularly through reduced agricultural subsidies, commercial 
deregulation and cuts to public works spending, which have both politically and 
economically undermined small businesses and farmers. In the context of drastically 
suppressed tax revenues, the wild spending of the FILP (Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program)-funded public works programs led to a massive deficit by the mid-1990s, which 
prompted spending cuts and deregulation. However, efforts since then to rein in the debt 
by defunding pork-barrel spending led to a political backlash against the LDP, which 
forced the party to backtrack under Koizumi's successors. Moreover, the DPJ, 
understanding the implications of this, made a successful play for petit bourgeois votes, 
promising greater financial supports and protections to farmers just as they tried to cut 
wasteful spending (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). However, once in power, the DPJ was 
unable to find sufficient revenue to fund many of its promises and quickly lost the 
support of the petit bourgeoisie. Thus while the LDP was mostly effective in scaling back 
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the scope of protection and spending to prop up inefficient small businesses (and, to a 
lesser extent, farmers), it paid a heavy political cost for abandoning these core 
constituencies with the end of LDP electoral hegemony in 2009. 
 
8. Gender and the family: The end of the male breadwinner model and shoshika 
 What about gender and the family and its relation to social reproduction? The 
post-war era saw the development and entrenchment of the gender-dual system and a 
rigid gendered division of labour characterized by male breadwinners and female 
housewives, a model that was highly patriarchal and placed rigid social boundaries 
around male and female roles, not only depriving women of the option of pursuing a 
meaningful career but also obligating the majority of men to work long, hard hours with 
only limited opportunities to participate in family life. Nonetheless, this model was 
successful in providing conditions for a stable basis for social reproduction: rates of 
marriage were high, and the fertility rate remained relatively high until the 1980s. The 
proportion of households where one parent (almost always the husband) earned enough 
money to support the family on his own was also high. 
Since the 1990s, many of these things have changed. First, the proportion of jobs 
falling into the category of lifetime employment has declined, while the proportion of 
precarious jobs, including part time, haken, contract, and other flexible arrangements has 
grown rapidly. Importantly, the majority of people working in this field are women, and 
indeed a majority of women work in precarious jobs (see also Miura 2012). 
Second, due to growing insecurity, poverty and inequality, as well as changing 
norms about gender, marriage and the family, the fertility rate fell rapidly to a low of 1.26 
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in 2010, far below the replacement rate of 2.1. As increasing numbers of women have 
sought to pursue careers outside of the home, they have been forced to choose between a 
career and family, and many have chosen the former (Schoppa 2006). At the same time, 
growing inequality and poverty, which have largely resulted from neoliberal reforms 
coupled with two decades of stagnation, have meant that increasing numbers of people 
feel that they cannot afford to get married and have children. This is further reflected in 
the decline of nuclear families and the rise of single person households. Moreover, this 
dynamic can be seen in a range of other social problems, including the rise of hikikomori, 
so-called parasite singles, freeters and NEET, and elderly people who die alone.61 
The decline of this system in the 1990s is one key reason why the crisis has been 
so prolonged. Moreover, it is the reason why what began as an economic crisis has 
gradually mutated into a wider social and demographic crisis. Both the economic crisis 
itself and attempts to rectifying it (particularly through neoliberal deregulation) upset the 
basis for stable social reproduction in Japan.  
 
9. Demography and welfare: The rise of the 'pension state' 
 While Japan's young population was a major condition of the post-war period of 
rapid economic growth, the Heisei era saw the rapid aging of Japanese society. Indeed, 
over the course of thirty years, Japan went from being the youngest industrialized country 
to the oldest. The 1990s saw Japan's ruling regime scramble to fill in the gaps of a porous 
																																																								
61 "Parasite singles" refers to young adults in their 20s and 30s, generally from middle class backgrounds, 
who live with the parents and off of their parents' incomes (or pensions). "NEET" stands for "not in 
employment, education or training" and tends to refer to young people who are neither in school nor 
working (nor actively looking for work). "Freeters" refers to young people who shift between low-wage, 
casual jobs (such as at fast food restaurants) without looking for a permanent job or career.  
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and insufficient welfare regime, with a number of major programs constructed or 
expanded, particularly regarding pensions, subsidized eldercare provisioning and paid 
eldercare leave for family members (see Estevez-Abe 2008). However, these led to major 
increases in welfare costs, which more than doubled between 1990 and 2010 even while 
revenue stagnated (CAO 2016). Indeed, by the beginning of the 2010s, Japan's welfare 
costs were in line with other industrialized countries, even though its tax base was 
substantially smaller, leading to a massive budget deficit and growing government debts. 
 Moreover, the Heisei era saw a rapid hollowing out of the countryside. While the 
effects of this have been most strongly felt in villages and towns that have seen extreme 
population decline, in the coming decades whole prefectures are expected to witness 
rapid population decline. While overall government estimates project the population to 
fall from a high of 128 million in 2010 to 107 million by 2040, the degree of this decline 
varies widely by place: while Tokyo is expected to maintain 94 percent of its 2010 
population, rural prefectures such as Akita and Aomori in the north of Japan are expected 
fall to only 64 and 68 percent respectively of 2010 levels by 2040 (Kantei 2013).62 
Thus, while in the context of the demographic crisis of the Heisei era, coming 
decades are expected to witness varied outcomes of demographic change. In some cases 																																																								
62Overall nearly a third of Japan's 47 prefectures are expected to lose at least a quarter of their population 
by 2050. This population aging is even more apparent when the working age population alone is 
considered: by 2050, Akita, Aomori, Iwate and Kochi prefectures will all have working age populations at 
least forty percent smaller than in 2010, while Tokyo, Aichi, Okinawa and Shiga are expected to have 
roughly 80 percent of their 2010 working population, compared to 71 percent for the country as a whole. In 
contrast, all but three of Japan's prefectures are expected to have more seniors in 2050 than in 2010, while 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Okinawa are all forecasted to have at least 1.5 times as many seniors as in 2010, 
and the national total of seniors is expected to grow 1.3 times. Among those 75 and older – those most 
needing costly medical care – the total population is expected to grow by 1.6 times, while Kanagawa and 
Saitama expect to see more than twice as many people aged 75 and over by 2040 (Kantei 2013). In 
Kagoshima, the population of people over 75 will be the same as the population under 35, while Shimane 
will have as many people over 90 as under 10; Akita will have more people over 75 than under 40, and 
more people over 60 than under 60 (Kantei 2013).	
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(such as Akita), population aging will be combined with rapid population decline. In 
other cases (such as Tokyo), even if population decline is slower, the rise in the absolute 
number of seniors will be much more substantial. While the effects of this demographic 
crisis have only begun to be felt in the 2010s, as Japan's population has entered a period 
of absolute decline after many years of low birth rates, these trends show that it will 
continue for decades to come, and that the real consequences of the demographic crisis 
still await. Necessarily, this will require even greater expenditures in pensions, eldercare 
and health care to add to the already unsustainable levels of spending. 
 
10. Nation and ideology: 'Normal country' or tan'itsu minzoku? 
 In addition to these questions of social reproduction of the labour force, we must 
also ask what challenges the organic crisis has brought in relation to the socio-cultural 
aspect of social reproduction. As discussed in Chapter Four, post-war Japan's pacifist 
nationalism was long a source of nationalist solidarity, promoting a peaceful harmony 
among society anchored in a widespread commitment to democracy, human rights, peace 
and multilateralism. Yet the myth of ethnic homogeneity that was a part of this cultural 
framework also served as a barrier to any attempts to cultivate a more pluralist and 
multicultural society. 
 The organic crisis has thus brought two implications for Japan's cultural 
nationalism. First, globalization, demographic crisis and changing geopolitical relations 
have forced a rethink on Japan's ideology of tan'itsu minzoku and pacifist nationalism. 
While some leaders have pursued a more open and assertive Japan, such as Ozawa in his 
"normal country" doctrine, others within the LDP have called for a return to a more 
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conservative society that is less "masochistic about the past". In both cases changing 
conditions have disrupted the post-war cultural consensus. 
Second, labour shortages have led to growing calls for foreign workers since the 
1990s. In response, the state has pursued several programs, each of which has important 
implications for our understanding of Japanese identity, its relationship with non-
Japanese others, and the consequences for Japanese hegemony. Indeed, as Akashi (2014) 
has shown, in the wake of increasing labour shortages and projected population decline, 
Japan since the 1990s has seen the development of a disparate collection of policies 
aimed at foreign nationals in Japan that collectively amount to something akin to an 
immigration policy (see also Koike 1996; Hosono 2011). These include programs to take 
in ethnic Japanese nikkei from South America and foreign trainees since 1989, as well as 
care workers from the Philippines and Indonesia since 2008. Within this context, while 
business groups have generally pushed hard for more migrant workers, labour groups, 
including their representatives in the bureaucracy (the MHLW) have generally been 
opposed, citing concerns of the effects of competition with foreign workers for Japanese 
workers. 
 However, while a small number of voices, within the bureaucracy, LDP and civil 
society, spoke of the need for Japan to become a more open, pluralist society, accepting 
of immigrants, in order to solve its demographic crisis (many of which were based on 
neoliberal arguments), generally speaking a more conservative and inward policy that 
rejected immigrants and only begrudgingly accepted a limited number of temporary 
foreign workers through a patchwork of disparate programs that became the de facto 
policy during the Heisei era. While this meant that Japan has thus far avoided any serious 
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backlash to immigration as in Europe, needless to say the low levels of immigration did 
very little to solve the demographic and labour market challenges. 
 Overall, then, by the Heisei era, the underlying basis for Japan's pacifist 
nationalism was called into question from all sides: conservatives called for a re-
militarization and return to a more conservative, patriarchal and traditional social order; 
neoliberals called for greater pluralism and diversity in the name of global 
competitiveness along with a more assertive role for Japan within international society; 
those on the left called for a more serious commitment to peace – outside of the US 
umbrella – along with a stronger commitment to solidarity and support for all minority 
groups, coupled with a greater degree of pluralism and a more thoroughgoing escape 
from the remnants of pre-war nationalism. Yet in practice meaningful changes on 
immigration policy were relatively tepid and a wider discussion of the meaning of 
Japaneseness in the twenty-first century largely did not occur. 
 
11. Political ecology: Climate change, the nuclear turn and 3/11 
 The final factor behind the success of Japan's postwar hegemonic order – the easy, 
cheap access to national resources, including energy resources, that it enjoyed, was, by 
the end of the Heisei era, characterized by a vastly different set of conditions. In order to 
understand these conditions, we must ask, how did the state react to growing energy and 
environmental challenges caused both by the growing concerns over climate change and 
by the rising cost of oil? And what did the 3/11 disaster and nuclear meltdown tell us 
about the double-edged sword of forging a viable energy future for Japan? 
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First, the nuclear meltdown showed the problems of nuclear energy and created 
significant opposition to it. While nuclear energy was initially pursued beginning in the 
1970s to allow Japan to overcome its dependence on foreign oil, the period post-3/11 saw 
a major backlash against nuclear energy, which already accounted for close to 30 percent 
of electricity generated by then (WNA 2019). With various political parties and activist 
groups calling for a full denuclearization, the LDP has been in a tough situation: risk 
public backlash by defending nuclear power, or shut down generators and increase 
Japan's reliance on foreign gas and coal. The path chosen has generally been somewhat in 
between these two extremes. 
The second question, linked to the first, relates to climate change. If Japan is to 
abandon nuclear energy then the task of reducing greenhouse gas emissions caused by 
oil, gas and coal, which comprise the vast majority of its energy sources will be even 
greater. While Japan has made relatively strong progress in the adoption of solar power 
since the 2000s, the concomitant reduction of nuclear power generation has meant that 
efforts to curb the consumption of fossil fuels and thus meet greenhouse gas reductions 
targets (which were already underwhelming compared to other industrialized countries) 
will be insufficient (see also Kameyama 2017). 
 
Implications of the crisis  
 On what basis do we therefore argue that Japan of this period experienced an 
organic crisis? We suggest that it is important to consider the capacity of the ruling 
regime to fulfill its three main requirements: capital accumulation, political legitimation 
and social reproduction. 
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Summary of the economic accumulation crisis 
With regard to capital accumulation, the period from 1989 to 2012 was generally 
one of recession and stagnation punctuated by periods of slow growth. The stock market 
also fell very sharply over the course of 1990 and 1991, and stayed low throughout the 
rest of the period, never recovering. Domestic investment stalled, as firms preferred either 
to invest in production overseas or to horde their cash due to the lack of profitable sites 
for investment domestically, Along with a reduction in private capital investment, 
domestic consumption fell due to the overall depressed economic conditions. Moreover 
and unemployment grew, if ever so slightly, compared to historic levels, despite the 
declining size of the labor market after 1995. In sharp contrast with conditions even a 
decade earlier, wages remained relatively stagnant across the period. In many cases 
workers voluntarily accepted wage restraints (implicitly as an alternative to layoffs), but 
even this could do little to boost investment. As a result of these dynamics, GDP growth 
slowed, averaging only 1 percent over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Overall, these 
conditions amounted to a dynamic of economic deflation, which proved very difficult to 
escape. Indeed, despite various diverse attempts to reverse trend through deficit financing 
Japanese economy continued to be frail, sensitive to international turbulence and unable 
to revive domestic consumption or investment; it was a deep-seated economic crisis.  
One of the major causes of this crisis of depressed demand was the deregulation 
of the labour market and the ensuing rise in precarious labor. While deregulation was 
expected to restore conditions for profitable accumulation by giving capital access to a 
growing pool of cheap, flexible labour, this proved to be a double-edged sword by 
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creating an inescapable trap for domestic consumption. Thus, while the neoliberal 
reforms taken may have benefited Japanese domestic capital in certain ways (and they 
certainly benefited foreign capital in Japan), and political support for the LDP among the 
Japanese capitalist class remained unwavering throughout the crisis, it is hard to see the 
political economic dynamics of the 1990s and 2000s as anything other than a crisis of 
capital accumulation, and to consider the ensemble of policies taken as having succeeded 
in alleviating this crisis. 
 
Summary of the political legitimation crisis 
 Politically, after four decades of unbroken centre-right majority rule, Japan's 
ruling regime – led by the LDP – started to crumble. Indeed, the period of the 1990s and 
2000s saw constant swings back and forth between the LDP and both centre-left and new, 
centre-right reformist parties (particularly with the Upper House elections). Even when 
the LDP did win, it was under leaders who ran on promises of bold reform. Due to both 
economic stagnation and public backlash over a plethora of LDP corruption cases, 
political legitimacy of the hegemonic order reached a crisis point, as voters turned away 
from the LDP, and more precisely, the clientelist corporatism of the LDP-led order.  
However, the alternatives to that order, whether social democratic or neoliberal, 
were never well defined or wholeheartedly embraced, even by the politicians who 
espoused them. While bold reformist rhetoric was central to Japanese political discourse 
for nearly two decades, the reforms that ultimately passed were often tepid, as reformers 
stopped short of taking bold measures that risked alienating important interest groups. 
Thus, while in many ways the acute crisis of political legitimation was solved more 
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adequately than the other elements of the crisis, as the next chapter will show, many 
elements of the old, corrupt system remained intact. Moreover, aside from the backlash 
against government corruption and anxiety over the future of the economy, this era saw a 
massive increase in income and wealth inequality. While such inequality does not 
inherently negate the political legitimacy of the ruling regime, it does provide one more 
condition that complicates it. 
 
Summary of the social reproduction crisis 
Finally, how did the ruling regime of Heisei Japan fulfill the requirement of 
providing stable and legitimate conditions for social reproduction? In the wake of 
economic stagnation and neoliberal deregulation, the 1990s and 2000s saw a cratering of 
Japan's birth rate, falling to as low as 1.26 in 2009. In this context, and with the door 
virtually closed to immigration aside from a relatively small number of ethnic Japanese 
migrants from South America, population aging sped up, and became an increasingly 
profound social problem. While major welfare policies were created to solve the aging 
crisis, including pension system streamlining, publically funded eldercare, and other 
programs, these led Japan's previously lean welfare state to very quickly approach levels 
of spending similar to other developed countries without any clear means of paying for it 
(see also Estevez-Abe 2008). The result was a massive budgetary deficit that quickly 
ballooned into the largest public debt in the world. While the government tried several 
times to introduce a consumption tax at the behest of industry to pay for this spending, 
public backlash and economic frailty let to repeated postponement of such tax hikes, 
starving the government of much needed revenue. 
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Thus, overall, we can see how social reproduction provisions and conditions 
became increasingly non-functional, with the birth rate cratering, the population 
beginning to shrink, and welfare institutions unable to meet growing demand, in addition 
to problems of mounting public debt. Moreover, other social problems including the rise 
of hikikomori, karoshi, freeters, NEET, parasite singles and seniors dying alone, point to 
a deep and systemic crisis of social reproduction, as growing numbers of people feel 
isolated and alienated from society, unable to bear the pressures of a deregulated, 
insecure and exploitative work environment. Therefore, while the economic and political 
crises of the Heisei era received the most attention in conventional portrayals of Japan's 
organic crisis, this crisis of social reproduction is equally important to our understanding 
of the overall collapse of Japan's post-war hegemonic order.  
 
Conclusion 
 Overall we can see in this era how the conditions for stable hegemonic order were 
lost as dynamics of crisis emerged instead. Politically, the early 1990s saw Japan's post-
war political system reach its logical conclusion. This period thus saw increasing tensions 
among all of the major forces within Japan's historic bloc: unmoored from the project of 
developmentalism, businesses became increasingly self-interested and oriented towards 
immediate accumulation. The bureaucracy meanwhile became an object of scorn, and 
efforts from both the LDP and DPJ to rein it in had mixed results, increasing 
dysfunctionality without increasing accountability.  
 Economically, as a result of changing conditions of world order, economic 
globalization and the neoliberalization of Japanese firms, there appeared a number of 
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contradictions within Japan's economic system that proved impossible to reconcile and 
led to first the bubble economy, then the period of deflation until the 2000s. While 
Koizumi's tenure briefly saw a return to continuous growth, this was only due to 
favorable global conditions, and the period since 2007 saw a return to conditions of 
stagnation and recession. Moreover, while Koizumi's neoliberal reforms may have 
benefited capital in the short term, they led to an increase in inequality and 
precariousness, and foreshadowed the LDP's electoral defeats in 2007 and 2009. 
 Socially, the period saw a dramatic decline in the birth rates, as large numbers of 
young people no longer experienced the economic security needed to raise families, while 
social norms about the role of women in society changed, even as the system rooted in 
the male breadwinner, female housewife model did not change so quickly. Furthermore, 
bound by the shackles of its ethnically homogeneous ideology of tan'itsu minzoku, the 
government found it unable to increase immigration as a solution to the falling birth rate 
and shrinking population problem. While social programs were expanded in an ad hoc 
fashion at various stages, there was no cohesive and comprehensive plan to refashion the 
Japanese welfare regime for the 21st century, nor any reasoned means of paying for these 
new programs under stagnant economic conditions. 
While many of these changes had been building over time quantitatively since the 
1970s, by the 1990s many of them reached a breaking point and brought qualitative 
changes to the conditions of Japanese political order. With so many factors that had once 
collectively facilitated and maintained conditions amenable to capital accumulation, 
social reproduction and political legitimation now collectively worked to undermine the 
capacity of the ruling regime to achieve these three ends, and the crisis became 
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entrenched and seemingly unmovable, at least under the status quo. Even the 2009 
landslide electoral victory of the DPJ ultimately proved ineffective in facilitating any 
meaningful change. 
Overall, then, this chapter has argued that the above crisis conditions that have 
characterized Japan since the 1990s together amount to what Gramsci referred to as an 
"organic crisis." The crisis, thus, is deep-seated, complex and multi-faceted. Moreover, 
following Gramsci, we must understand organic crises as crises that prompt or necessitate 
attempts to reorder ruling relations and that fundamentally disrupt the careful power 
balance within an historic bloc. In attempts to resolve an organic crisis and restore 
conditions for hegemonic order, new coalitions are forged among powerful social forces 
and weaker or subordinate social groups are disempowered in the process. We can see 
how attempts to resolve various elements of Japan's organic crisis involved struggles over 
the relations of force within the hegemonic order that the LDP attempted to restore.  
Ultimately, however, each of these attempts at reform provoked reactions, and 
few of them became institutionalized. The DPJ's landslide election win in 2009 thus 
amounted to a widespread rejection of the LDP, yet the DPJ itself was unable to deal with 
the contradictions inherent in its own attempts to reorder relations within the historic 
bloc, and was demolished in the subsequent election. 
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Chapter Seven: Bonapartism and the return of the LDP under Abe 
This chapter considers developments over the past seven years, since the return of 
Abe Shinzō in 2012. It argues that during this period, the LDP-led hegemonic order has 
reasserted itself, largely breaking the political impasse that had existed for the previous 
two decades. However, though Abe's return brought not only renewed LDP dominance 
but also a renewed optimism over the future for many Japanese, this has occurred in a 
deceptive fashion similar to the way Marx framed the historical French leader Louis 
Napoleon and developed his concept of Bonapartism (see Chapter Three). While Abe's 
political comeback was driven by a bold agenda of economic and social revival similar in 
some ways to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal in 1930s' United States, the reality 
has been far different: while capital has enjoyed the benefits of a stock market boom, 
Abe's policies have done little to solve problems of economic stagnation, population 
decline and aging, economic precariousness and inequality.  
Moreover, since 2017, Abe has taken a further shift to the right by reviving his 
agenda of constitutional revision, increasingly authoritarian surveillance policies and 
remilitarization whilst simultaneously pushing more progressive policies, including a bill 
to expand immigration as well as promises of free day care and university tuition. Abe 
must therefore be seen as hiding a neoconservative agenda behind a veil of progressive 
and Keynesian rhetoric.  
 
Abe's political comeback  
 Born in 1954, Abe Shinzō comes from one of the most powerful political families 
in post-war Japan. Hailing from Yamaguchi Prefecture in the south of Honshu Island, 
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Abe's family members have been a dominant force among Yamaguchi's elected Diet 
members since the pre-war days. Both of Abe's grandfathers, Abe Kan and Kishi 
Nobusuke, served in the Diet, while the latter, who was convicted of war crimes for his 
role as the de facto political head in wartime Manchuria, went on to serve as Prime 
Minister (1957-1960) and remained an influential lawmaker and elder statesman until the 
late 1970s. Abe's great uncle and Kishi's brother Satō Eisaku served as Japan's longest 
serving post-war Prime Minister (until Abe himself broke the record) from 1964 to 1972, 
while Abe's father, Abe Shintarō was elected to the Diet eleven times between 1958 and 
1991, serving as leader of the Kishi faction and in four different cabinet posts while being 
poised to become party leader (and thus Prime Minister) himself before his sudden and 
untimely death at age 67. Indeed, it was his father's sudden death that brought Abe 
Shinzo, then 36 and working as his father's secretary, into politics, as he ran in his father's 
old district in the first post-reform election in 1993. 
 Abe spent the first decade of his political career as a rising star and the voice of a 
new, more hardline conservative wing of the LDP. Under the Koizumi administration, he 
served in two prominent positions, first as the Chief Party Secretary from 2003 to 2004 
and then as the Chief Cabinet Secretary from 2005 to 2006. During his early years as a 
lawmaker, Abe developed a reputation as a foreign policy zoku and a defense hawk, more 
in the image of his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke than his father (Sadoh 2012). Indeed, 
Abe was part of a new generation of conservative lawmakers enamored by constitutional 
revision and critical of the LDP's soft foreign policy positions, including the 1994 Kōno 
statement that recognized Japanese responsibility for wartime aggression (Envall 2011). 
During these years, Abe was heavily involved in efforts to repatriate Japanese nationals 
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who had been abducted by North Korea. Perceived by many during his time in the 
Koizumi administration as diligent and deferential, while also being young and from a 
powerful family, he was seen as Koizumi's chosen successor and tipped to lead the party 
after Koizumi (Burrett 2017; Pugliese 2017).  
Abe contested and won the 2006 LDP leadership election to succeed Koizumi. 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, his yearlong tenure as Prime Minister was 
highly unsuccessful. He was plagued by various scandals, while seen as a weak and 
ineffective leader, unable to challenge the party's old guard despite being leader himself, 
while surrounding himself with an inner circle of cronies and political friends ill-
equipped at running a government (Burrett 2017; Envall 2011). Moreover, Abe provided 
little in the way of a compelling vision for Japan, overly consumed by the pursuit of 
constitutional revision – a policy direction of very little interest to the general public, who 
were increasingly concerned with the growing inequality of Japanese society – indeed 
without presenting a cohesive economic vision for the country (Burrett 2017). After 
initially making promising gains in negotiations with China, Abe tarnished his image in 
the eyes of neighboring countries by calling into question the validity of the comfort 
women issue,63 while also associating with historical revisionists hoping to overturn the 
Kōno statement (Envall 2011). All of this led to a hefty defeat in the July 2007 Upper 
House election that caused the LDP to lose its double majority. Abe abruptly resigned 
exactly one year after taking office in September 2007, officially for health reasons. 
																																																								
63 "Comfort women" refer to women, mostly from Korea, who were forced by the Japanese military to 
work as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during World War II. Despite widespread consensus among 
historians, the degree of complicity of the Japanese government in organizing the comfort women program 
and the issue of whether comfort women worked consensually have long been questioned by conservative 
and nationalist forces in Japan, including Abe Shinzō. 
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 However, Abe made a sudden and emphatic comeback five years later in 2012, 
first winning the September 2012 LDP leadership election over Ishiba Shigeru and then 
winning the December 2012 general election in a landslide. Though Ishiba was more 
popular with the party membership, and won a plurality of membership votes, Abe won a 
majority of LDP lawmakers' votes on the second ballot, and thus rode to victory on the 
basis of the strong personal networks he had cultivated with his fellow lawmakers. In 
particular, he owed much of his success to a group of young and conservative lawmakers 
who had grown in significance following the party's 2009 electoral defeat, where many 
older members from moderate factions had been voted out (Burrett 2017). 
 
Part I: Abe's attempts to solve the organic crisis 
 Abe swept to power in 2012 on his bold economic agenda, a bundle of policies 
referred to collectively as Abenomics. Since taking office, he has also pursued reforms in 
areas of security, education, administrative and foreign policy. Moreover Abe has sought 
to shore up his own personal authority as well as the hegemony of the LDP. His 
government has advanced in attempts to not only resolve the crisis of social reproduction 
facing Japan to promote an image of Abe and the LDP as moderate or even progressive, 
providing a counterweight to their otherwise conservative agenda and ensuring political 
legitimacy for their project overall. 
 
Economic policies: Abenomics 
 Abenomics has been framed as involving three "arrows" that together combine a 
mix of Keynesian and neoliberal policies. The three arrows were first flighted from their 
		 258	
quiver in early 2013 in the aftermath of the LDP’s December 2012 electoral victory 
(Wakatabe 2015). The first arrow is based on the notion of targeted inflation. The Abe 
government has sought to induce inflation of two percent per year through quantitative 
and qualitative easing on the part of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) (Wakatabe 2015). The basic 
aim of targeted inflation is to cause currency devaluation, boosting exports and 
stimulating both private consumption and investment. Many leading economists have 
located the main cause of Japan’s crisis as chronic deflation, fostering a vicious cycle of 
low consumer spending and low private investment (Wakatabe 2015). According to the 
reflationist theory, inflation induces consumers to spend their (ever devaluing) savings, 
promoting corporate investment and ultimately wage increases as labour demand outruns 
supply, resulting in a virtuous cycle of growth. However, achieving inflation targets is 
impossible if banks themselves do not make loans instead of holding onto their assets 
(Wakatabe 2015). Shortly after taking office, Abe appointed a reflationist ally in Kuroda 
Haruhiko as Bank of Japan governor, who oversaw the introduction of the first arrow. By 
June 2013, the yen had fallen to 100 per dollar (compared to 83 yen per dollar in 
December 2012), while the stock market grew from less than 10,000 points to 15,000 
points between December 2012 and May 2013 (Dobson 2017). Thus, half a year in, early 
signs pointed to success, at least in devaluing the yen and generating a stock market 
boom. 
 The second arrow, flexible fiscal policy, includes public works and infrastructure 
spending financed by a new government bond program (Tiberghien 2014). The aim of the 
second arrow is to create jobs that produce economic multiplier effects, increasing private 
consumption and private investment. The second arrow of Keynesian fiscal policy was 
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first implemented through a fiscal stimulus package worth roughly 10 trillion yen – 2 
percent of GDP – in February 2013 (Hausman and Wieland 2014). Further stimulus 
worth 5 trillion yen spending was introduced in the fall of 2013, while the 2014 and 2015 
budgets each passed 96 trillion yen – the largest in history – and the government 
introduced an additional 3.3 trillion yen in late 2015 as a means of achieving the policy of 
"promoting the dynamic engagement of all citizens" (Shimada 2017). Despite record 
levels of spending, Japan's primary balance deficit actually fell from 6.7 percent to 3.3 
percent by 2015 due to the increased revenue generated from the 2012 sales tax hike, 
implemented under the Noda government, and for which the LDP was able to reap all of 
the awards without incurring any of the political costs. Overall, then, these two sets of 
policies – expansive monetary policy through quantitative easing and inflation targeting 
plus high-volume fiscal spending – characterized the first phase of Abe's economic policy 
from 2013 to 2015, and led to a stock market boom as well as a modest uptick in GDP 
growth, consumer spending and inflation, results that will be examined in greater depth at 
the end of the chapter. 
 
The third arrow of Abenomics 
While the first two arrows of Abenomics – monetary policy and fiscal policy – 
were launched right away and appear relatively straightforward, Abenomics' third arrow, 
the so-called "growth strategy," remained ill-defined for many years. According to 
Wakatabe (2015), the third arrow aims to create conditions for profitable investment and 
growth, and includes trade agreements like the TPP; deregulatory policy experiments in 
new special economic zones; labour market expansion through the promotion of women 
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and the elderly in the workforce; and regulatory changes that promote business 
investment, including corporate tax cuts. Indeed, in 2015, the Cabinet office outlined the 
growth strategy as having ten components: "… reducing corporate tax [1], improving 
corporate governance [2], encouraging venture capital [3] and stimulating innovation 
through technology [4] … promoting women’s participation [5], further flexibilising 
working practices [6], and attracting high-skilled foreign workers [7] … enhance[ing] the 
liberalization of the agricultural industry by … participation in the [TPP] [8] … creat[ing] 
an environment for new growth sectors including energy, environment and health care 
services [9] and its integration with Asia [10]" (Shibata 2017: 408). Among these goals, I 
want to focus on three broad areas: corporate reform (representing 1-4), agricultural and 
trade reform (representing 8-10), and labour market reform (representing 5-7). 
 
Corporate reform 
The Abe government introduced regulatory measures to promote risk-taking in 
the corporate sector and to encourage corporations to unleash hoarded cash through by 
altering the internal structural logic behind corporate activity through corporate reforms 
that compel Japanese firms to be more bold and risk-taking, rather than concerned with 
the long-term security of a low-risk, low-reward investment strategy (Lucarelli 2015). 
While corporate governance had traditionally involved an internal board of directors and 
an external auditor who lacked the power to challenge board decisions, 2002 corporate 
reform changed the pattern of corporate governance in Japan, allowing a much greater 
presence for outside directors, by stipulating that they must comprise more than half of all 
board members (Osviannikov 2017). Since the 1990s the proportion of Japanese 
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corporations' stock held by foreigners skyrocketed from 5 percent to over 30 percent by 
2014. Until 1990 over 70 percent of stock was held by Japanese corporations, banks and 
financial institutions. By 2014 they accounted for less than half (Osviannikov 2017). 
While corporate reform had previously occurred under the 2006 Companies Act of Abe's 
first term, which removed restrictions on the granting of stock options (Hasegawa, et al 
2017), corporate governance reform as part of Abenomics' third arrow has involved the 
Japan Revitalization Strategy. According to Osviannikov (2017), "the rationale of these 
reforms is to encourage corporate managers to take risky steps as a response to immediate 
market demand," (12), while reiterating the shareholder-centric notion that the main task 
of a firm is to maximize profits.  
According to Shibata (2017), Abe's plans move towards a more liberal, Anglo-
Saxon model characterized by short-term, market-mediated relations between firms, risk-
taking, the prioritization of shareholder valorization and cutting corporate taxes, which 
were reduced by 2.4 percent in 2014, to below 30 percent, similar to other OECD 
countries. It also involves an attempt to move away from the traditional employment 
model, what Vogel (2018) has termed "'membership-style' employment" and instead 
effect a shift towards a style of employment that removes work from the wider web of 
reciprocal social responsibilities of the lifetime employment system, or what Vogel terms 
"'job-style' employment" (275), thereby promoting a more flexible orientation towards 
work at the expense of the "corporate welfare" model. 
However, as Jayasuriya (2018) has argued, "the reorganisation of the corporate 
sector … has proved to be … difficult to accomplish […] far from a cohesive political 
project, the reform programme has been inconsistent and contradictory and unable to 
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build long-term coalitions" (597). Moreover, as Vogel (2018) has shown, the growing 
tendency for Japanese firms to pursue reforms to corporate governance that pay greater 
attention to shareholder concerns for short term profits "opens up the very real possibility 
that the Abe administration’s corporate governance reforms could undermine its labor 
market reforms" as the increased profits from reforms are quickly consumed by 
shareholder dividend payments and a declining proportion of profits actually make it to 
workers (291). Indeed, while the return on equity of Japanese corporations grew from six 
to eight percent between 2010 and 2016, the share of total income that went to labour fell 
from 66 to 61 percent between 2008 and 2015 (Vogel 2018).  
 
Agricultural and trade reform 
In 2010, DPJ Prime Minister Kan Naoto first proposed to join the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP), a planned free trade agreement involving a range of 
member states from around the Pacific, including Chile, Peru, Mexico, Canada, the US, 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam. Negotiations were 
further pursued during the Noda administration in 2012. Among major economic 
stakeholders, early negotiations were steadfastly supported by Keidanren and 
vociferously opposed by Nōkyō and the Japanese Medical Association. Other groups, 
including the main labour federation Rengō, took a position somewhere in the middle 
(Mulgan 2015). Despite general support from the business community, opponents of the 
TPP were well organized from the beginning. In November 2011, the chairman of 
Nōkyō's central administrative organ, JA-Zenchū, presented a petition to the Prime 
Minister's Office containing nearly 12 million signatures of voters opposed to the TPP, 
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and later conscripting 232 Lower House lawmakers – nearly half – to sign a similar 
petition (Mulgan 2015). While Abe had at first been skeptical of joining the TPP due to 
its requirements of a uniform elimination of tariffs, in 2013 he adopted it into his plans 
for the third arrow after US President Barack Obama gave him assurances that tariff 
sanctuaries would be allowed, including for agriculture (Kitaoka 2013; Solis and Katada 
2015). According to Honma (2015), "not all Japanese agricultural products are protected 
by high tariffs. … The problem is that a small number of high-tariff items are considered 
politically sensitive products" (96). "In the actual negotiations, however, Japan claimed 
exemptions from tariff abolition for five agricultural products: rice, wheat and barley, 
dairy products, sugar and starch crops, and beef and pork" (Honma 2015: 97). While TPP 
negotiations were temporarily halted and the agreement thrown into doubt after the 2016 
election of US president Donald Trump, the Japanese government continued to push for 
the creation of a pan-Pacific trade agreement, a goal that was realized (albeit without 
participation from the US) in 2018. 
 In addition to his support for trade liberalization, Abe has also advanced 
agricultural reform. According to Sasada (2015), part of the third arrow of Abenomics 
has been a proposal designed to reform Nōkyō, as the government perceives Nōkyō to be 
a barrier to increased competitiveness in agriculture as well as a vehicle for promoting 
measures that protect uncompetitive agricultural producers, undermining the 
competitiveness of Japanese agriculture, and hindering future trade negotiations, 
including TPP (Feldhoff 2017). Indeed, as Sasada (2015) has shown, reform of the 
political structure of Nōkyō, as well as efforts to remove its special privileges and to 
deregulate the organizational structure of its member organizations from purely 
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cooperative to a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative, non-profit and for-profit 
organizational forms, has been successful, even if the proposed reforms to Nōkyō only 
went half way. Nonetheless, agricultural reform and liberalization remain contentious 
issues. This is partly because of Nōkyō is still significant force: Nōkyō still retains a 
membership of nearly ten million (less than half of which are farmers) and its various 
financial institutions hold assets worth over 100 trillion yen. It also maintains a sizeable 
presence in the communities of small towns, often running gas stations, hospitals and 
grocery stores while also being the primary banking institution (Sasada 2015). Moreover, 
it is also because of the wider support within Japanese society for local (or at least 
domestic) agriculture, regardless of whether it is more expensive and less efficient (see 
also Hayes and Kawaguchi 2015), and concerns over the security consequences of an 
even lower food self-sufficiency ratio below the current level of just 40 percent that 
would likely result from agricultural liberalization (Honma 2015). 
 Overall, while the Abe government's plans to reform Japanese agriculture in order 
to make it more competitive under conditions of free trade have thus involved a fairly 
direct challenge to Nōkyō's interests, market-based agricultural reform itself is not new. 
Indeed, this policy approach dates back to Koizumi's strategy of "seme no nōgyō" 
(agriculture on the offense), which designed to reorient common sense around the costs 
and benefits to farmers of agricultural trade liberalization (Winkler 2017). In other words, 
there is a pathway to combining agricultural reform and trade liberalization in a way that 
benefits Japanese agrarian capitalism, but the politics of such an approach remain risky in 
the context of Nōkyō-dominated agrarian political discourse. 
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Labour market reform 
 Abenomics also involves changes to labour policy. In January 2017, the MHLW-
led Council for the Realization of Work-style Reform, which included the Japanese Trade 
Union Federation Rengō, developed a proposal to limit the number of hours of legal 
overtime work to 100 hours over a one month period, 80 hours per month over six 
months, and 60 hours per month over a year, with exemptions of five years for delivery 
and construction sectors (Vogel 2018). However, this proposal drew strong protests, with 
many suggesting that it was far too high a number. In 2017 the government also made a 
change in the long-time restrictions on dismissals under the Basic Labour Law that would 
allow cash compensation for workers who won wrongful dismissal cases, which labour 
unions saw as the first step in a broader liberalization of dismissal laws (Vogel 2018). As 
Shibata (2017) has argued, this proposed change to the labour dispute regulation system 
would make it easier to fire workers, thus further weakening workers' power in relation to 
capital, as "employers will be allowed to dismiss workers more freely as long as they pay 
certain costs for mediation and labour tribunal decisions" (410).  
 Then, beginning in 2018, Abe unveiled two new measures aimed at labour market 
reform. These included not only attempts to press for further labour market deregulation, 
this time of privileged salaried workers and in particular those in higher management 
positions so as to enable more flexible and ultimately longer days (at no cost to the 
company) but also far-reaching measures to expand immigration for both high and 
medium-skilled workers, which will be discussed below. The first "discretionary labour 
time" proposal sought to exempt high-level professionals from overtime limits, allowing 
them to be paid based on the number of hours expected to complete a job rather than 
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actual hours worked (Vogel 2018). While this proposal was temporarily shelved after an 
embarrassing episode of faulty data relating to the proposal that was presented to the 
Diet, it remains in the Abe administration's long-term sights. If and when it passes, such a 
policy will make it far easier for companies to induce unpaid overtime work on 
employees, despite the already critically high levels of karōshi, or death from overwork. 
 
Immigration reform 
In addition to policies aimed at further labour market deregulation, immigration 
reform has emerged since 2015 as a further means of countering the chronic labour 
shortage that poses increasing restraints on profits. Policies to admit highly skilled 
workers were created in 2015, through the Highly Skilled Foreign Professional Visa, 
which was an attempt to attract highly skilled foreigners in fields of science and 
technology, academia, business, and other professional fields. Based on a point system 
that weighs academic and professional achievements (including publications and patents), 
Japanese language ability, income and professional work experience, applicants are 
eligible for a special type of visa that includes fast-tracked permanent residency (within 
three years or in some cases one year), visa sponsorship for the applicant's parents and no 
restrictions to the field of work and other benefits (IBJ 2018). 
 Then, in 2018, the government quickly passed legislation to create a new system 
for medium and low skilled workers in 14 blue-collar occupational sectors (Schwarcz 
2018). These measures, which went into effect in April 2019, are aimed at admitting as 
many as 340,000 workers by 2024, and have received support from the business 
community, including Keidanren (Osaki 2018). They involve two new visa categories for 
		 267	
low and medium-skilled workers respectively, thereby greatly expanding the scope of 
occupational fields for which working visas can be granted. Upon its abrupt introduction 
to the Diet in the fall of 2018, the immigration bill was lambasted by various opposition 
parties critical of the lack of time given for reviewing the consequences of the legislation 
and for the lack of oversight measures included to ensure workers' safety, legal 
protections and social supports. However, while these programs imply a major shift in 
Japanese immigration policy, the government remains reluctant to refer to it as such, 
instead continuing to use the term "foreign workers" and denying that these workers can 
be termed "immigrants," while retaining formal obstacles to foreign workers' ability to 
achieve Japanese permanent residency by imposing five-year limits on their visas (Osaki 
2018). As I will consider in more detail below, this reticence to allow "foreign worker 
policy" to become "immigration policy" may allow the government to postpone difficult 
questions about the status of Japanese national identity and tan'itsu minzoku ideology, but 
it also prevents a solution to the problem of population decline. 
 
Womenomics 
 A further feature of Abenomics' "third arrow" is the expansion of women's 
participation in the paid economy, or "womenomics." The term does not originate with 
Abe, but was coined by the Tokyo bureau chief of Goldman Sachs, Kathy Matsui, in 
1999, before being appropriated first by the Koizumi administration in the early 2000s 
and later by Abe in 2013 (Dalton 2017). The impetus behind womenomics, both for 
Matsui and later for Koizumi and Abe, was the economic benefits that would come from 
a higher participation rate for women: it was estimated by the IMF that bringing women's 
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participation up from 63 percent to the G7 average of 70 percent would grow GDP by 4 
percent (Dalton 2017). Ultimately, however, womenomics has failed to deliver, 
particularly as the targets of raising women into leadership positions have gone unmet. 
According to Lechevalier and Monfort (2018), there is also something contradictory 
about Abe's womenomics push. On one hand, Abe has been very vocal about his goal of 
bringing women's share of leadership positions up from only 9 percent in the early 2010s 
to 30 percent by 2020, even though such targets look increasingly unattainable as little 
progress is made. At the same time, many of Abe's key appointments of women to key 
public sector leadership positions, including Hasekawa Michiko, who was made a 
director of state-owned broadcaster NHK, have openly voiced attitudes about gender that 
emphasize traditional roles for women as homemakers, leaving it unclear if such 
appointments challenge or reinforce traditional patriarchal norms and roles (Lechevalier 
and Monfort 2018). 
 As Dalton (2017) has argued, womenomics has focused primarily on the interests 
of women pursuing high ranking, career-track jobs, while largely ignoring the needs of 
the majority of women who work in more precarious jobs. While womenomics has 
sought to encourage the promotion of women to upper-echelon executive jobs, it has 
done nothing to challenge the underlying bases for Japan's enormous gender pay gap and 
the related gap between regular and (highly feminized) irregular employment (Chiang 
and Ohtake 2014). While only 22 percent of working men were employed in irregular 
jobs in 2012, 58 percent of working women were (Dalton 2017). Indeed, as Dalton (2017) 
has shown, it is the enormous commitments that working men and women must make to 
regular jobs with long working hours that render these jobs unavailable to the vast 
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majority of women who have to balance work with family commitments (see also 
Nemoto 2013a, 2013b). Thus, without efforts to address the tremendous work-life 
balance problem that plagues regular employment, and the lack of public resources for 
women to draw on to help reduce the burden of unpaid social reproductive work while 
they are also in the labour force, the government's goals of promoting women's 
participation in the formally employed work force are unlikely to be successful. 
 
Political policies: reorienting to the right 
 Abe's political policies – those geared around the question of Japan's legitimacy 
crisis – have taken a very different direction, and reveal more openly his neoconservative 
inclinations in five ways.  
  
Asserting control over the LDP  
One of the primary accomplishments of Abe has been his ability to shift the LDP 
to the right. In both in his election as party president in 2012 and even more forcefully in 
his re-election in 2015, Abe relied on support from a cohort of younger conservative 
lawmakers much like himself, while according to Burrett (2017), Abe was further able to 
consolidate his power through the appointment to Chief Cabinet Secretary of Suga 
Yoshihide, a shrewd politician who was highly respected throughout the party. This 
helped Abe remake the LDP in his own image while simultaneously winning support 
from formerly rival factions.  
 
Foreign policy: constitutional revision 
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 Another element of Abe's political agenda has been his attempts to restore 
nationalistic militarism – albeit very subtly – to the popular imagination. Remilitarization 
was a major component of Abe's first administration in 2006-07, and while he failed to 
make any progress in drafting a constitutional amendment to Article 9, he was successful 
in upgrading the military from the Department of Defense to a full-fledged Ministry of 
Defense (Easley 2017). 
Abe has continued to push for an expanded role for the SDF since his return to 
office, though in more subtle ways than before. Importantly, this has not taken the form 
of outright calls for remilitarization (by officially creating an "army," as the previous Abe 
government's proposal for constitutional revision did) or even a renunciation of Article 9, 
the clause in the constitution that forbids Japan from possessing offensive military 
capabilities and renounces militarist foreign policy. Instead, Abe has proposed a 
constitutional revision that merely adds a sentence to the existing Article 9, clarifying the 
constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces (Murakami 2019). Such a move has thus left 
Abe immune to outright accusations of militarization, helping him to maintain hegemony 
in the context of continued public support for Article 9 and for pacifism in Japan overall, 
without hurting his credentials as a conservative nationalist, since no previous Prime 
Minister has even come close to revising the constitution.  
However, these subtle moves must be balanced against other moves by Abe to 
further expand the scope of what is considered allowable grounds for SDF deployment 
within the scope of the constitution, in many ways pushing it beyond meaning. In other 
ways, Abe has overseen Japan's defense budget slowly grow after many years of decline, 
facilitating the construction of Izumo and Kaga, Japan's first post-war helicopter 
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destroyers (Easley 2017), while reviving the export of arms for the first time in five 
decades (Khilji 2015). Abe's militarist agenda has, in the context of continued public 
support for Article 9, thus operated within the scope of what is politically feasible, while 
nudging the terrain of political contestability on this question further to the right.  
 
"Foreign policy": historical and textbook revision 
Following David Campbell (1992) we can understand foreign policy as involving 
not only policies that directly deal with foreign country governments through established 
institutional channels but also the ways in which the foreign, the domestic, and the 
relationship between the two, are constructed within discourse, particularly through the 
media and education institutions. Therefore, it is important that we consider efforts to 
revisit the historical record of Japan's wartime actions and their portrayal in school 
textbooks as part of the attempt to reconstitute the Japanese nation and its relationship 
with Asian Others in national popular discourse. Along with his calls for constitutional 
revision, Abe's ability to subtly maintain a revisionist image among the right, by calling 
into question the veracity of claims about Japan's wartime record and the government's 
complicity in the comfort women issue, without ever outright denying official narratives, 
has enabled him to mobilize the party's right-wing base while staying within the grounds 
of acceptable discourse (Dobson 2017). 
 Another example of Abe's attempts to shift public discourse along more 
nationalist lines can be found in educational reforms tabled during his first term as Prime 
Minister in 2006, with the creation of mandatory moral education curriculum at the 
elementary and junior high school levels. These reforms, which were finally enacted in 
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2018-19, involve new requirements for graded assessment as well as the use of Ministry 
of Education (MEXT)-approved textbooks, while explicitly seeking to adopt "patriotism" 
as one of the education system's aims (Bamkin 2018). As Bamkin (2018) has shown, not 
only is this curriculum expressly designed to foster patriotism (aikokushin) among pupils, 
it has also been developed by LDP policymakers with the aim of stirring up nationalist 
sentiments in relation to territorial disputes with China, despite widespread unease among 
teachers over the new curriculum. 
 Abe has also had an indirect role in conservative educational reform through his 
membership in Nippon Kaigi. According to Fukuoka (2018: 323):  
Nippon Kaigi is ‘arguably…[the] most powerful nationalist lobby group’ in Japan 
and this ‘grass-roots conservative’ organisation has approximately 40,000 fee-paying 
members; its local branches count about 250 nationwide … there are about 290 
members of the Nippon Kaigi’s parliamentary league in the Diet along with around 
1,800 members at the local assemblies. Also important, PM Abe Shinzo … has been 
a ‘ special advisor’ since the inception of the organisation in 1997.  
 
Nippon Kaigi has been the leading advocate and pressure group for textbook reform, 
seeking to obtain MEXT recognition for revisionist historical textbooks that sanitize 
depictions of Japanese wartime aggression in Asia, particularly regarding the comfort 
women issue and the Nanking Massacre64 (Fukuoka 2018). Despite widespread 
opposition by the Japanese Teachers' Union (JTF), Nippon Kaigi has succeeded in 
pressing for changes to the rules over textbook selection, helping to empower local 
governments – and in most cases, centre-right mayors and assemblymen and women – 
instead of teachers themselves to hold primary authority over the selection of education 
																																																								
64 The Nanking Massacre (1937-38) was a major event in the Second Sino-Japanese War, where the 
Imperial Japanese Army invaded Nanking, China (today called Nanjing), killing between 40,000 and 
300,000 people, mostly civilians, and also committing mass rapes. 
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board members and textbooks, and leading to a growing uptake of revisionist textbooks, 
particularly in Tokyo and Yokohama (Fukuoka 2018). 
 
Asserting control over the bureaucracy 
 A fourth element of Abe's agenda has been attempts to shore up control over the 
bureaucracy. In some ways, this was prompted by the chaotic relationship that the DPJ 
had with the bureaucracy during its brief three years in power. Despite three years out of 
power, the LDP still had all the connections with the bureaucracy that had been 
developed over the past few decades, smoothing its transition back to power. 
 After returning to power in 2012, the LDP under Abe had a relatively easy time 
reasserting an amicable relationship with the bureaucracy. On one hand, Abe benefited 
from assuming the premiership after three years of a highly dysfunctional and combative 
relationship between the DPJ government and the bureaucracy. In that context, 
bureaucrats were hopeful of a return to a more cooperative relationship with the 
government, and willing to compromise with Abe much more than they otherwise would 
have (Burrett 2017). On the other hand, Abe, along with Suga, took great care to manage 
the bureaucracy, making appointments to top positions in order to expand their political 
influence over the bureaucracy while also giving former bureaucrats, such as Imai Takaya, 
key positions within the kantei (Prime Minister's Office), promoting good will between 
the government and bureaucracy. 
However, beginning in 2014, the government has pursued key reforms that have 
further changed the balance of power between the government and bureaucracy under 
revision to the National Public Service Law (Mishima 2017). These reforms include 
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measures to more tightly restrict amakudari appointments, while also expanding the 
kantei's scope of authority over bureaucratic appointments, potentially marking a decisive 
shift of power away from the bureaucracy and towards the Cabinet and PMO in ways the 
DPJ was never able to do. 
Among the new institutions established through the reforms is the Cabinet Bureau 
of Personnel Affairs, a body designed to nominate candidates for roughly 600 top-ranking 
bureaucratic appointments at the behest of the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, further strengthening Abe's institutional leverage over the bureaucracy (Kato 
2018). Thus, as Burrett (2017) has argued, "in passing legislation granting the prime 
minister more control over the appointment of senior bureaucrats, Abe has been able to 
promote civil servants sympathetic to his reform agenda to key positions" (423). These 
measures to strengthen cabinet and PMO control of the bureaucracy – moves that began 
under Hashimoto and Koizumi in the 1990s and 2000s and were tried unsuccessfully by 
the DPJ – have generally been seen as necessary steps in order to increase accountability 
in Japan's political system. Nonetheless, a number of scandals since 2014 have revealed 
the pitfalls of these reforms. 
In 2017, two major scandals, both indirectly involving Prime Minister Abe, were 
revealed by the Asahi Shimbun. First, in February the Ministry of Finance was revealed to 
have sold a parcel of public land in 2016 to an educational institution in Osaka, the 
Moritomo Gakuen kindergarten, for only 14 percent of the land's market value. Though 
the Prime Minister denied any involvement, Moritomo, a deeply conservative 
kindergarten known for having its students recite the Meiji era Imperial Rescript on 
Education every morning, had made Abe's wife Akie its honorary principal (Japan Times 
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2018b). The Finance Ministry claimed that the 86 percent discount on the land was 
justified by the high amount of industrial waste on the site (Japan Times 2017c). When 
pressed for more details, it claimed that records relating to the site exploration had been 
destroyed. Then, somehow, those same records showed up, only to have numerous 
sections redacted. Later, some of the redacted sections were revealed to include 
information relating to the Prime Minister's wife. While the top-ranking bureaucrat in 
charge of the sale was forced to resign after a sworn testimony to the Diet, he consistently 
denied having received any pressure from the PMO or cabinet in relation to either the 
land sale or the document redaction.  
Also in May 2017, the Asahi revealed another scandal, where bureaucrats had 
been pressured to approve the creation of a new department of veterinary science at Kake 
Gakuin, a college in Imabari, Ehime run by a close friend of Abe. Again, while the Prime 
Minister consistently denied any involvement, internal Ministry of Education documents 
revealed language implying that the licensing of the veterinary science department was 
"the Prime Minister's intent" (Japan Times 2017c). 
 While in neither of these cases has Abe's direct involvement in influencing 
bureaucratic decision-making for the benefit of friends – his wife's or his own – been 
proven, whether such direction took place is almost beside the point. In the aftermath of 
the National Public Service Law revision, the power to control top bureaucratic 
appointments has become so concentrated in the Prime Minister's hands that rather than 
improving bureaucratic accountability and executive authority through democratic (i.e., 
Cabinet-based) control of appointments, bureaucrats are increasingly pressured to curry 
favor with the Prime Minister, knowing that their future promotion opportunities depend 
		 276	
as much on objective and merit-based in-house appraisals as on personal approval by the 
Prime Minister. In this context, bureaucrats have increasingly engaged in self-censorship, 
or sontaku, afraid to make statements that could be potentially incriminating towards the 
Prime Minister (Kato 2018; Mulgan 2018). As Kato (2018) has argued, the concentration 
of control over the bureaucracy in the PMO's hands means that "political pressures are 
undermining whatever professional autonomy … civil servants may have had, effectively 
turning them into the prime minister’s errand boys." Overall, the two scandals, and the 
willingness of top bureaucrats to back Abe at all costs, reveal just how effectively the 
government has, through the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, reordered the 
relationship between the cabinet and bureaucracy. 
 
Control and pacification of the mass media 
 In an era in which the media – and television and the internet in particular – have 
become more important than ever to political success, in addition to the aforementioned 
efforts to assert control both within the party and over the bureaucracy, a final element of 
the Abe agenda has been his attempts to exert control over the media. These attempts 
have amounted to a carrot and stick approach designed both to promote pro-government 
perspectives and silence opposition through a range of tactics, including policy changes 
and more subtle intimidation tactics. 
 Attempts to manipulate the media for partisan advantage began shortly after the 
LDP returned to power, when Abe engineered an ideological makeover of the national 
broadcaster NHK in 2013, appointing as the new chairman and three board members 
close personal friends who shared his conservative nationalist perspective (Japan Times 
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2013; Mulgan 2015). In other ways, Abe has sought to ingratiate journalists who cover 
the LDP favorably: according to Facker (2016), "Abe dined with top political journalists 
and media executives more than 40 times during his first two years in office alone." 
 At the same time, the government has used a heavy-handed approach to stifle 
critics in the media on multiple occasions. In 2013, the government passed the Specially 
Designated Secrets Protection Law, a vague and potentially sweeping law that threatens 
to send journalists and whistleblowers in government to jail for up to ten years for leaking 
"state secrets," and a move that has been heavily criticized as undermining freedom of the 
press and journalists' abilities to investigate stories potentially damaging to the 
government (Jayasuriya 2018; Facker 2016). A further attempt to manipulate the media 
through legislation came in 2018, when the government proposed an amendment to 
Article 4 of the Broadcast Law that mandates political fairness, in attempts to do away 
with regulations that nominally prevent increasingly pro-government TV news sources – 
and NHK in particular – from excluding opposition perspectives (Asahi 2018a, 2018b). 
Along with these legal measures, the government has sought to silence opposition 
within the media through public admonishments. In 2014 Abe publically lambasted the 
Asahi Shimbun, Japan's second widest circulating newspaper and the most important 
source of government criticism and scrutiny, for minor factual inaccuracies in stories it 
had printed in the early 1990s on the comfort women issue, a move that led other media 
sources to display an open hostility towards the Asahi, harming its reputation (Facker 
2016). Then, in 2015, an outspoken critic of the government on TV Asahi's news 
program was fired after the government put pressure on TV Asahi's president (Facker 
2015). Finally, in 2016 Interior Minister Takaichi Sanae threatened to shut down TV 
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broadcasters who fail to provide balanced journalism, an ironic move given the 
government's attempts two years later to remove requirements for journalistic balance. 
In all of these ways, Abe has sought to exert control over the media, rewarding 
allies through appointments to the NHK board and exclusive access to top government 
officials, and punishing opponents through public bashing and increasingly authoritarian 
laws. As a result, Japanese journalism has been characterized by a growing tendency for 
journalists and media to seek to placate politicians through favorable coverage, a 
phenomenon known as sontaku that might be translated in English as sycophancy or 
obsequiousness (also discussed above as self-censorship) (Facker 2016). At the same 
time, journalists' commitment to the companies that employ them rather than to their 
profession has precluded any willingness for media companies to resist government 
kowtowing, further enabling the government's divide and rule strategy. In the process, 
while open opposition to the LDP and its agenda has become increasingly muted, Japan 
has plummeted in the rankings for press freedom compiled by Reporters Without Borders, 
from 11th place in 2010 to 72nd place in 2017 (RSF 2018; The Economist 2015). 
 
Social policies: solving the crisis of social reproduction? 
 However, we must not forget perhaps the most pressing element of Japan's 
organic crisis, its crisis of social reproduction. Abe's administration and its six policy 
promises suggest a policy inclination very different from both the neo-liberal economic 
policies and the neo-conservative defense and security policies, and rather reflecting a 
social democratic orientation. Yet as we shall see, its promises have thus far gone unmet, 
suggesting that they may have been little more than a charade designed to win favor with 
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economically marginalized groups, and exemplifying Marx's concept of Bonapartism, or 
an attempt on the surface to resolve class tensions through broadly hegemonic policies 
while in practice working to preserve dominant class rule.  
 
Pronatalism 
To target Japan's growing problem of shōshikōreika, in fall 2015 three new 
arrows of “stage two” of Abenomics were launched (Nikkei 2015). These arrows, more 
aspirational targets than tangible policies, comprise: 1) reaching a GDP of 600 trillion 
yen by 2020 (from 470 trillion in 2015); 2) increasing the total fertility rate to 1.8 (up 
from 1.4) by 2020; and 3) saving people from having to leave the labour force in order to 
care for their aging parents or other relatives (Nikkei 2015; Hayakawa 2015). The 
government proposed to reach their first target by promoting the hiring of women, the 
elderly and disabled people as well as by achieving a “productivity revolution.” It 
expected to reach the second target by creating 500,000 new free childcare spaces by the 
end of 2017 and by providing support for marriage and fertility treatment (Japan Times 
2015). Finally, it planned to achieve the third target by creating 500,000 new spaces in 
elderly care homes. Additionally, Abe said that he would raise the minimum wage to 
1000 yen per hour by 2020, an increase from around 800 in 2015 (Nikkei 2015). 
However, while the government's aims of increasing the number of publicly 
subsidized licensed daycare spots, eliminating waiting lists and pulling up the fertility 
rate to 1.8 all by 2020, it has thus far failed to deliver on any of these policies. In 2017, 
the fertility rate remained only 1.43, unchanged from 2013. With regard to childcare, the 
numbers are more ambiguous. The number of children using public daycare has grown 
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from 2.16 million in 2012 to 2.61 million in 2018 (Asahi 2019b), while the government 
has created over 500,000 new spaces in the same time frame. At the same time, the 
number of children on waiting lists remains at around 20,000 as of 2018, having only 
fallen from 25,000 in 2012 (MHLW 2018c). In this way, the government has kept up 
with growing demand (while the absolute number of children is falling, the percentage of 
pre-school aged children registered in childcare has grown from 33 percent in 2011 to 44 
percent in 2018) but has thus far been unable to eliminate the shortage of spaces. 
Nonetheless, the government succeeded in creating over a half million spaces, while 
pledging a further 776 billion yen in spending to make childcare free for all children aged 
3 to 5 and for those aged 0 to 2 from low-income families, paid for by the 2019 
consumption tax hike (Japan Times 2017b; Kyodo 2018). 
 
Education policy 
The government has also called for the elimination of tuition for all universities 
and high schools, including both public and private institutions. Opposition parties, for 
their part, have largely reiterated the need for such measures, with the right-leaning Japan 
Restoration Party even calling for a constitutional amendment to make all education, 
from pre-school to university, free (Japan Times 2017a). In December 2018, the 
government approved a program to eliminate tuition at national universities for youth 
from low-income households and reducing tuition costs for private universities by up to 
700,000 yen per year, while also granting study stipends worth between 350,000 and 
460,000 yen for those from low income families who live at home and 800,000 to 
910,000 yen for those who live away from their family home (MEXT 2018). 
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Poverty and welfare 
The government has also attempted to expand the scope of Japan's social safety 
net and increase the minimum wage. While Abe called for the minimum wage to be 
raised to 1000 yen an hour by 2020, it appears unlikely that this goal will be met. 
Nonetheless, the average national minimum wage has gone up every year since Abe took 
office, rising from 749 yen in 2012 up to 874 yen in 2018, an increase of 16.6 percent. In 
the six years preceding Abe's return to power in 2012, the minimum wage only increased 
11.1 percent (MHLW 2018b, 2018c) while under Koizumi (2001-2006) the minimum 
wage was increased by only 9 yen in total (from 664 to 673) (MHLW 2018c; 2001). Thus, 
though modest, and below the government's own initial aims, the minimum wage 
increases achieved under Abe must not be overlooked. 
Overall, then, we can see how the social policies pursued during Abe's tenure 
have, in contrast with the reactionary, authoritarian and militarist political policies 
outlined in the previous section, taken a cautiously progressive turn, increasing funding 
for education and childcare and raising the minimum wage. These moves must be 
understood in their overarching structural context: Japan's critical labour shortage and 
declining population clearly necessitate policies that promote women's participation in 
the labour force; the labour shortage means that Japan's labour market favors workers 
over employers, and the positive ratio of job openings to applicants, which has gone from 
1:2 in 2010 up to 3:2 in 2017 (Suruga 2017), is as much a product of demographic change 
as favorable economic conditions. Moreover, despite these structural conditions that 
favor workers, the government has done little to improve working conditions or workers' 
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security, other than with modest minimum wage increases. Nonetheless, the above set of 
policies indicate that, in contrast to the LDP under Koizumi, the Abe regime has begun to 
grasp the seriousness of Japan's crisis of social reproduction, and not only the economic 
but also political implications it is likely to have for Japanese hegemonic order. 
 
Part II: Consequences of Abe's reign for the hegemonic order? 
 In light of these various policies that the Abe government has taken up in its 
attempts to resolve the political, economic and social elements of Japan's organic crisis, 
what are the consequences of this political project for conditions of hegemonic order in 
Japan? How have the policies of the Abe regime fared in solving the multifaceted crisis 
facing Japan? 
 
Capital accumulation 
From the perspective of capital accumulation, early signs were that conditions had 
been restored by the stock market boom, while many thought that Abe's strategy had the 
right combination of neoliberal measures designed to boost investment and Keynesian 
measures designed to boost demand to help escape the crisis of deflation. The NIKKEI 
stock market doubled over the course of 2013 (Wakatabe 2015). The yen depreciated, 
GDP grew during 2013, and inflation reached target levels in 2014. However, due to the 
persistence of deflationary pressures in the economy (such as population decline and 
stagnant wages) inflation targeting has been hard to sustain, falling below one percent in 
2015, despite effectively negative interest rates since 2016 (Trading Economics n.d.). 
Moreover, the virtuous cycle of growth that quantitative easing and deficit spending was 
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supposed to bring has thus far amounted to little: capital expenditure has only grown by 
2.6 percent, real wages by 0.3 percent and private consumption by 0.2 percent (Nikkei 
2015). Furthermore, the Japanese economy has fallen back into recession twice, in spring 
2014 and summer 2015, and appears poised to do so a third time in 2019.  
Moreover, Abe's economic policies have not reached the middle and working 
classes, with wage growth stagnant despite the stock market boom, thus preventing any 
meaningful escape from structural conditions of deflation. Indeed, as of September 2013, 
just 16 percent of people had felt an improvement in Japan's economic conditions, while 
84 percent of people remained anxious about Japan's public financial conditions 
(Mochizuki and Porter 2013). More recently, a September 2018 poll found that the 
number who had felt an improvement had fallen to 11 percent, while those who had not 
remained at 84 percent (TBS 2018). In this way, then, it is difficult to say that Abe has 
succeeded in restoring conditions for capital accumulation, and whatever benefits his 
programs have brought to the Japanese economy are likely to be short-term only 
(Takahashi and Mizuno 2013; Lechevalier and Monfort 2018). 
 
Political legitimation 
 Overall, a number of dynamics characterize Abe's tenure from the perspective of 
political legitimation. First, he has succeeded both in asserting personal and factional 
dominance within his party and in asserting the LDP's dominance overall, winning three 
consecutive landslide elections in the Lower House and two more in the Upper House, 
with a two-thirds' majority of seats now held by the LDP and coalition partner Kōmeitō 
in the Lower House. Yet a deeper look shows that in the proportionate representation 
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vote, only 27 to 33 percent of voters have chosen the LDP as a party, with 67 to 73 
percent choosing other parties (including Kōmeitō). Moreover, beginning in 2012 the 
DPJ has splintered into several parties and although some of these have since reunited, it 
has remained fractured at every Lower House election, while the 2019 Upper House 
election saw the LDP lose 9 seats and outright majority control of the chamber (though it 
maintained its majority through its coalition with Kōmeitō. The LDP's overwhelming 
majority of seats thus has much more to do with the strategic benefits of working with 
Kōmeitō, the disunity and chaos of the centrist opposition, and overall distrust of 
potential alternatives (including the Japanese Communist Party) than with enthusiastic 
support for the Abe government (Burrett 2017).  
Abe's success in winning over other elements of the state and civil society, such 
as the media and bureaucracy, has been more mixed. He has used indirect and direct 
coercive means to silence opposition in the media and elsewhere. At the same time, due 
to his suspected personal involvement, scandals, including the Moritomo Gakuen and 
Kake Gakuen scandals in particular, have plagued his regime, partly as a consequence of 
renewed contradictions that have emerged between the normative function of the 
bureaucracy as a politically neutral and rational institution and the reality of greatly 
increased dependence of bureaucrats on the Cabinet, and Abe in particular, on a personal 
level, for their job security. The sontaku problem that has plagued relations between the 
government, media and bureaucracy, thus reflects the political contradictions that have 
emerged out of Abe's attempts to disarm opposition to his political project in both the 
bureaucracy and the wider civil society. Finally, Abe faces continued opposition to 
elements of the neoconservative agenda, and likely pressure over contradictions between 
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nationalist and militarist policies on one hand, and neoliberal policies (such as 
immigration) on the other, an issue to which I will return below. 
How do these policies aimed at shoring up control over the state and civil society 
fit with Abe's broader attempts to focus on the economy and make Abenomics the 
signature of his second premiership? While some have attempted to focus on the Abe of 
the second term as having learned from his mistakes of appearing too ideologically 
committed to right wing causes, such as constitutional revision and to have instead 
realized the importance of showing leadership in the interests of the whole of society 
through his economic policies, following Dobson (2017: 205), we must also recognize: 
Attempting to separate Abenomics from Abe’s nationalist agenda represents 
something of a false dichotomy and, rather like Schrödinger’s cat, Abe the 
pragmatist and Abe the nationalist exist together at the same time and are mutually 
reinforcing. In Abe’s worldview, Japan cannot provide a strong regional and global 
presence unless it emerges from its long-running economic malaise … Abenomics 
is as much about regional security, Japan’s status in the world and the Meiji-period 
slogan of fukoku kyohei (rich country, strong army) as it is about economic growth. 
 
However, although the 2012 election resulted in a landslide win for the LDP and their 
highest ever seat percentage, the win came with only 28 percent of the vote,65 only one 
percent higher than in their crushing defeat in 2009 (Kitaoka 2013). The 2014 and 2017 
elections brought slightly higher numbers, (each 33 percent) but still very low numbers 
for the LDP, challenging the idea that Abe's mix of bold economic policy and under the 
radar authoritarianism has succeeded in restoring widespread support for the LDP.66  
 																																																								
65 Numbers relate to the proportional representation portion of the electoral system only. Unlike in the 
single-member districts, where vote-splitting deters small parties from running and where the LDP-
Kōmeitō alliance enables much higher scores for both parties' candidates, in the PR section, all parties can 
compete equally without risks of vote-splitting, and vote distributions more accurately reflect partisan 
electoral support.	
66 2000 was the only election besides the most recent four where the LDP received less than 33% of the 
vote. 
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Social reproduction 
With regard to social reproduction, the government has also failed to address 
major challenges while retaining appealing rhetoric. Though the fertility rate recovered 
from a low of 1.26 to 1.43 in 2015, it has stayed at that level since then, despite Abe 
promising to raise it to 1.8 by 2020. Even so, Japan has witnessed fewer births and more 
deaths every year under Abe. In the short term, this has meant a labour crunch. In the 
long term, it points to an unprecedented social crisis characterized by not only a labor 
shortage but a massive revenue shortfall in the face of rapidly escalating welfare costs 
(just to maintain existing standards of living for the majority of people). Clearly, the 
piecemeal efforts to restore stable social reproduction have not been nearly enough. 
Sensing the scope of the crisis, the government has finally bent to the will of Keidanren 
in hastily pushing through (very worker-unfriendly) legislation that amounts to a major 
expansion of the intake of migrant workers to Japan. While the government has 
simultaneously included measures that guarantee that such workers will never meet 
requirements to obtain permanent residency and remained steadfast in calling these 
workers only temporary migrant workers instead of permanent immigrants, in the long 
run such a policy cannot possibly help assuage the long term effects of population aging 
and decline without these workers to stay permanently, something that would 
fundamentally at odds with Japanese ethnic nationalism and the ideology of tan'itsu 
minzoku.67 
																																																								
67 This is because guest workers that are only temporary do not in the long run lead to any net population 
(or workforce) gain. With Japan's population expected to shrink by at least 20 million by 2050, accepting 
300,000 guest workers per year, with each allowed to stay a maximum of ten years, would lead to at an 
increase in only 3 million people by 2050 (and a net population decline of 17 million), while accepting the 
same number of people as permanent immigrants every year would lead to an increase of ten million (plus 	
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 Thus overall, despite optimistic rhetoric, social policies have so far been 
ineffective; promises of a return to robust fertility rates, the elimination of daycare 
waiting lists, and other measures that would lead to more stable conditions of social 
reproduction continue to be made but after six years there is little to show for them. 
Moreover, it remains unclear whether Abe's commitment to resolving the crisis of social 
reproduction, and accepting the costs of such a program to the state and capital is genuine, 
or whether promises of increased welfare spending and bold social policy goals amount 
to little more than electioneering tactics. Regardless of the motive, these promises mean 
little if they do not amount to substantive improvement in the conditions of social 
reproduction, something that has yet to occur in any meaningful way.  
 
Part III: Analysis and conclusion 
Overall, we can see how Abe's wolf-in-sheep's-clothing Bonapartism is not likely 
to work in the long run insofar as it fails to address the root causes of the crisis and 
remains contradictory. In particular, three major contradictions exist within Abe's 
attempts to restore conditions for hegemonic order and resolve Japan's organic crisis. 
First, there is a contradiction between many of the more hardline neoconservative 
elements of Abe's political project and his attempts to resolve the chronic labour shortage 
that has become a major damper on economic growth through the liberalization of 
immigration (which has thus far been proposed in largely neoliberal terms at the behest of 
business interests). Attempts to strengthen the appeal of nationalist, militarist and tan'itsu 
minzoku ideology that stresses the uniqueness and difference of a homogeneous Japanese 																																																																																																																																																																					
potential family members). Looking even further forward, by 2080 the first scenario would still have only 
brought an increase of 3 million people to Japan, while the latter would have then brought 20 million. 
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race as well as their intrinsic and eternal goodness appear entirely incompatible with a 
society that increasingly relies on the active participation in public life of people from a 
range of cultures and societies and whose exclusion from the dominant national discourse 
is sure to cause tensions (especially if key questions of welfare and security for migrants 
are not given enough attention). While the government has thus far attempted to massage 
this contradiction on the side of nationalist conservatism by denying that these "foreign 
workers" are immigrants and instituting administrative hurdles to their ability to one day 
obtain permanent residence rights, such a policy cannot ultimately be a solution to the 
problem of population decline and labour shortage. 
Second, there is a contradiction between policies that the government has pursued 
in its attempts to – perhaps half-heartedly – resolve the crisis of social reproduction and 
win over welfare-minded citizens, including through universal daycare, reduced 
university tuition and other social policies on one hand, and other attempts to increase the 
competitiveness of Japanese capital through further labour market deregulation and the 
creation of jobs primarily in low-wage and insecure sectors of the economy on the other. 
In devoting a large amount of attention to social welfare policies – many of which were 
taken from the DPJ's policy book – Abe has followed a long-time LDP strategy of 
coopting popular policies of the left opposition and transforming them into bit-part 
elements of the LDP's overarching conservative political project, a political strategy that 
Gramsci referred to as trasformismo. While Abe might receive credit for pushing for 
moderate increases in the minimum wage, this is overshadowed by the complete 
stagnation in overall wages, despite a chronic shortage of labour. As Takahashi and 
Mizuno (2013) argue, attempts to make Japanese capital more competitive without 
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focusing more squarely on boosting value-added production and demand-driven growth 
are unlikely to work economically (given the impossibility of outcompeting countries 
such as China on prices alone) and only likely to be deleterious socially, exacerbating the 
social reproduction crisis. 
Finally, there is a contradiction between the policies needed to win elections, 
including renewed spending on social programs and infrastructure and tax cuts versus 
those needed to create a fiscal balance, whether they involve progressive policies such as 
tax increases on the wealthy and corporations, or more conservative options such as 
consumption taxes and spending cuts. Abe himself has already postponed an increase of 
the consumption tax to ten percent on two occasions, while the past 25 years in general 
have seen near constant budget deficits and led the state to amass a public debt that is 
250% of GDP. Continued borrowing is only possible under rates of ultra-low interest, and 
thus appears unsustainable in the long run (Lechevalier 2014). Moreover, while Japan's 
demographic crisis is already having major impacts on economic accumulation and social 
reproduction, the worst is yet to come. Japan's population has only fallen by roughly 2 
million people over the past decade since it peaked in the late 2000s. Yet absent major 
changes, it is expected to decline at a rate of nearly 1 million people per year by the 
middle of the century. In this context, Japan faces the possibility of a rapidly declining 
overall population and workforce and a rapidly expanding elderly population: in other 
words, constantly declining revenue streams and constantly growing welfare costs. As 
Abe has so far done little to prepare Japan for this budgetary crisis, it is difficult to see 
how his overall project holds a long term and permanent solution to the crisis. 
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Chapter Eight: Whither post-Abe Japan? Four scenarios for the future 
This chapter examines a number of scenarios for the future of political order in 
Japan post-Abe. It argues that as a result of the inherent contradictions between Japan's 
regime of accumulation and its regime of social reproduction, Japan's organic crisis can 
only be resolved in the long term through a reformulation of ruling relations that places 
the interests of the working class at the centre and particularly that prioritizes a 
revitalization of conditions necessary for progressive and stable social reproduction. 
However, it recognizes that the barriers to this, in the context of the Abe administration's 
return to power and the enduring power of capital, are high. The chapter therefore 
identifies a number of possible approaches to solving the crisis, considering the political, 
economic and social consequences of each of them. As the chapter considers what is at 
stake in each of these four potential pathways, it explores 1) the basic policy 
considerations of each scenario; 2) the relations of force, or political and social bases of 
support for each scenario; 3) how each scenario would fulfill requirements for social 
reproduction, political legitimation and economic accumulation; and 4) the problems, 
barriers and contradictions inherent in each model. 
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Figure 2: A political compass of the four ideal type future scenarios of Japanese ruling regimes. 
 
The neo-conservative option 
In its simplest form, neo-conservatism combines a relatively free market approach 
to economic policy with social conservatism and nationalistic, hawkish foreign policy. 
This sort of political program most obviously has its antecedents in the pre-war model of 
Japanese society, dating all the way back to the Meiji Restoration, where the logic of 
fukoku kyōhei (rich nation, strong army) served as the underlying ideological basis of 
state formation and empire-building. More recently, neo-conservatism has been a 
powerful political current among the right of the LDP, and a relatively coherent 
neoconservative program was articulated by the Nakasone administration, which 
balanced a shift towards neoliberal economic policies with an emphasis on militaristic 
nationalism. The substance of Koizumi's politics had much in common with Nakasone, 
particularly in his combination of neoliberal economic policies and nationalistic 
militarism. Indeed, it was Koizumi that oversaw the actual participation of Japanese 
troops in semi-active conflict during the Afghan and Iraq Wars, and Koizumi's regular 
visits to Yasukuni Shrine drew the ire of Chinese and Koreans while pleasing nationalists 
at home. 
However, the neo-conservative program is embodied more than anyone than by 
Abe Shinzō, and as such the neo-conservative scenario discussed below must therefore be 
situated within the elements of Abe's program – militarism, nationalism, authoritarian 
socially 
progressive 
economically 
progressive 
economically 
conservative 
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impulses towards opposition forces in the media, generally pro-business economic policy 
and a general dislike of the left – that have long defined him as a figure, rather than his 
more recent attempts to latch on to Keynesian fiscal and welfare policies.  
 
Overview 
 On economic policy, the neoconservative option mostly reflects neoliberal 
orthodoxy with some neo-communitarian elements (discussed below) in order to protect 
sectors of the economy deemed important to nationalistic interests. In contrast, on social 
policy, it is conservative, nationalistic, and patriarchal, emphasizing a return to traditional 
values, respect for authority, including the emperor, and a return to more traditional 
gender roles, emphasizing women's roles in the home. It would also pursue a more 
conservative approach to education, including through controversial policies such as 
Abe's promotion of aikokushin (love of one's country) within official school curriculum 
and textbook revision. Moreover, a neo-conservative program would seek a stronger 
revision of the constitution than that proposed by Abe, perhaps returning to the proposal 
developed by the LDP under the first Abe administration in the 2000s that included a 
larger role for emperor, the elimination of the total separation of religion and state, a 
withering of individual rights, and the re-establishment of a full-fledged military. 
Along with such constitutional reforms and remilitarization, under a neo-
conservative program Japan would pursue much more hawkish foreign policy, likely 
characterized by a more antagonistic relationship with China, Russia and the two Koreas. 
This would likely be combined with a strong alliance with the US, but not necessarily, as 
critique of the US alliance, both overtly and covertly, has long been a feature of neo-
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conservative rhetoric, most notably that of former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō, 
whose 1989 essay, The Japan that can say no, specifically took aim at a foreign policy of 
American subservience (Ishihara 1991). 
Under the neo-conservative model, Japan's welfare policy would follow the 
direction taken by reforms under the Nakasone and Koizumi regimes to be workfare-
centric, with piecemeal supports to ensure a modicum of stability for breadwinner-
dominant families. Immigration levels would likely be kept low, but a neo-conservative 
regime might not rule out importing temporary low wage guest workers to ensure that 
conditions for accumulation could be restored, at least in the short term. In this way, it 
may begrudgingly accept the immigration reforms pursued by the Abe government in 
2018 but remain vigilant in ensuring that "migrant worker policy" never turns into 
"immigration policy" that could lead to new rights claims among ethnic minorities, or 
other challenges to the ideology of tan'itsu minzoku. Finally, neo-conservative fiscal 
policy would rely on some tax increases – likely consumption tax – to pay for increased 
military spending, while the lean state model – what Abe has endorsed in the past as 
"small government" (chiisana seifu) – would otherwise be preserved, in order to reign in 
Japan's chronic deficit. 
 
Relations of force behind neo-conservatism 
 What are the relations of force behind a neo-conservative program? What political 
constituencies and actors would give such a movement political support? In many ways, 
we can see a neo-conservative project drawing on many of the same groups that have 
helped bring Abe to power. On one hand, it would involve conservative factions of the 
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LDP, especially the Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai, now by far the largest faction of the LDP 
and the base of Abe's support, as well as other conservative factions, such as the Shikōkai 
led by Asō Tarō. At the same time, it would include various conservative elements of the 
bureaucracy, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense (which Abe 
himself created as a full-fledged ministry) and with it the Self-Defense Forces, as well as 
parts of the Ministry of Education, and the anti-China faction of Foreign Ministry (see 
also Hook and Gilson 2011). While many of these departments may have been 
sympathetic to conservative ideas before, it is likely that the growing control over the 
bureaucracy that Abe has achieved through the revision of the National Public Service 
Law in 2014 has only made bureaucrats more likely to display obedience to the ruling 
regime. Moreover, other elements of the bureaucracy, particularly the economic 
ministries, would generally be comfortable with such a scenario, given the pro-business 
economic policies a neo-conservative regime would pursue. 
 Outside of the LDP and bureaucracy, a neo-conservative coalition would rely on a 
high degree of grassroots support from a number of nationalist and militaristic social 
groups such as the War Bereaved Association and Nippon Kaigi, various Shintō 
organizations, as well as support from a more disparate but extensive group of 
nationalists, including anti-Chinese and anti-Koreans, with which mainstream 
conservatives retain a measured distance. Though small, a number of other parties to the 
right of the LDP, including the Osaka Restoration Party and the Sunrise Party would also 
be important allies. Finally, a group of conservative organic intellectuals, primarily 
defense hawks from the fields of international relations and political science but also 
some neo-liberal economists, both at universities and in private research think tanks 
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would provide a major ideological and normative anchor for the neo-conservative 
coalition. These organic intellectuals also have expression in the mainstream media, most 
notably the increasingly reactionary and Abe-aligned NHK and the far right Sankei 
Shimbun, but also the centre-right Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's largest newspaper, and 
generally a standard-bearer for the LDP's consensus position on key issues. 
In contrast, the neo-conservative movement would face opposition from various 
other groups, including labour groups, liberal or left groups in civil society (including 
NPOs, consumer cooperatives and other social movement organizations), and from the 
bureaucracy's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, who has consistently pursued a 
more social democratic model for the welfare state since the 1970s. Corporations and 
major business organizations such as Keidanren would likely have a neutral attitude 
towards this type of hegemonic order, favoring generally pro-business economic policies 
while pushing for more liberal immigration policies in the face of labour shortages, just 
as they have until now. 
 
The neo-conservative solution to organic crisis 
 We can see how a neo-conservative political program could easily generate the 
relations of force necessary to construct a new historic bloc capable of seizing and 
maintaining power, considering the already great degree of institutional penetration of 
these forces within Japan's leading political institutions, particularly the LDP. Indeed, 
some may argue that under Abe, a neo-conservative seizure of power has already 
occurred. Yet any such program cannot achieve and maintain hegemonic status in the 
long term if it cannot solve the organic crisis that has plagued Japan since the 1990s, and 
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restore conditions for political legitimation, social reproduction, and capital 
accumulation. Therefore, we must ask how the neo-conservative coalition could possibly 
succeed in solving the organic crisis facing Japan. 
First, conditions for political legitimation could be restored through a return to 
militaristic nationalism, insofar as the public is persuaded into accepting a more 
authoritarian and hierarchical social order as the natural and just way of being Japanese. 
Indeed, by attempting to restore national pride by turning the page on the post-war 
through constitutional revision, disputing records of Japan's wartime atrocities and 
promoting a revisionist history, including through textbook reform that rejects the 
"masochism" of prevailing interpretations, and promoting "patriotism" (aikokushin) as a 
school subject all represent attempts by the Abe administration to advance this agenda. 
Second, conditions for stable social reproduction could be restored through a 
return to traditional gender roles and a greater acceptance on the part of both men and 
women of their responsibilities as husbands, wives, fathers and mothers, to nurture 
children for the kokutai (national body), regardless of the heavy burden and stress such a 
role entails without proper supports. However, while pressures against women's 
participation in public life remain, it is unclear how and whether a return to traditional 
gender division of labour would be compatible with the demands of the capitalist 
economy, given the chronic labour shortages facing Japanese society, as well as the 
backlash such a move would receive from a women's movement that appears increasingly 
assertive. To this end, as Abe has already sought to promote women's participation in the 
workforce, we would have to envision a newly constructed gender dichotomy that 
emphasizes women's roles as domestic caregivers and as (lowly paid and insecure) 
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workers in service sector jobs, especially in the care economy, in contrast with men's 
more traditional jobs as breadwinners. 
Finally, conditions for capital accumulation could be restored through a 
combination of pro-business neoliberal economic policies that promote profits plus 
greater compliance from the public as diligent workers, baby-makers and consumers. 
Neoconservatives would hope that a renewed nationalist vigor would inspire Japanese 
people to work hard and make great personal sacrifices in order to improve Japan's labour 
productivity, while Japanese firms would be pressured to take more risks and return to the 
nationalist orientation (pursuing business strategies that balance the national interest with 
profitability rather than solely focusing on profits) that partially characterized Japanese 
development capitalism until the 1990s. In some ways such a model would mirror that of 
the American economic recovery under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.  
 
Challenges and contradictions of neo-conservatism 
 The above suggests not only a credible means for the neo-conservative coalition 
to achieve power (indeed, arguably it already has) but also a way to transition short-term 
power into long-term hegemonic leadership by solving the organic crisis and its three 
most pronounced social, economic and political dimensions. Nonetheless, such a program 
would face social, economic and political challenges of its own, while its pursuit would 
likely generate new contradictions and problems. 
First, a return to traditional gender roles and militarism is likely to elicit strong 
resistance from pacifists, progressives and women in general, spelling a political crisis, 
while resistance from workers could be strong as well. While the Japanese left has long 
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been far removed from the echelons of power, many of the positions they have 
championed remain widely popular: while support for the pacifist constitution has 
remained strong throughout the postwar, public opinion on issues of gender equality, 
women's roles in public life and minorities have steadily become more progressive, 
despite the LDP's preponderant control of political power. Challenging these increasingly 
widespread progressive attitudes would thus require not only top-town legislation but also 
a process of cultural change, or as Gramsci would say, intellectual and moral reform, a 
process that cannot occur overnight but only through a long-term and organic war of 
position over the hearts and minds of civil society. As the previous chapter suggested, 
there is little evidence to suggest that such a cultural shift to the right has occurred. 
Second, the role of immigrants– if immigrants are seen as necessary to fill labor 
shortages – would also likely become a flashpoint given the existential challenges 
minorities pose to discourses of national homogeneity. As argued in Chapter Seven, there 
is no way to use term-limited guest worker policy as a means of solving the problem of a 
chronically shrinking population and labour force, as by the time the first group of 
migrant workers have to return home, each new migrant worker who arrives afterwards 
only replaces one who leaves, and subsequently there is nobody arriving to replace the 
declining domestic workforce. Thus, permanent settlement or immigration is the only 
long-term solution to the labour shortage problem, but one that creates major 
complications for the legitimacy of Japanese cultural nationalism, either prompting a 
cultural shift towards a more multicultural and pluralist society or breeding 
marginalization of ethnic minorities and eventually ethnic conflict (though as yet neither 
outcome is readily apparent). 
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Third, given that this scenario would see heightened economic inequality and 
precariousness for the Japanese working class, it is easy to see the backlash such a project 
would receive from working class forces rendered further insecure from such policies, 
even from those sympathetic to its other conservative and nationalist elements, just as the 
Nakasone and Koizumi governments faced backlashes to the oppressive effects of their 
austerity agendas in the early 1990s and late 2000s respectively. Only by successfully 
leading a transition towards a more nationalist culture could these growing conditions of 
inequality and precariousness be naturalized or legitimized. 
Finally, we must also consider the foreign policy barriers to this project. Foreign 
(and internal) scapegoating of minorities and enemies (including the left) was one way 
conditions of oppression and inequality were mediated in the pre-war period, yet this only 
led to colonialism and war. Would such a scenario be needed to shore up hegemony 
under neo-conservative rule? In a world where China's growing military and economic 
power is already posing challenges to Japan, it is unclear what foreign policy implications 
such a scenario might have. Overall, the neo-conservative program clearly faces 
numerous challenges in becoming and staying a viable option for Japan in the long term. 
 
The neo-liberal path 
A second option for Japan would be to pursue a more thoroughgoing neoliberal 
approach, extending the fragmentary neoliberal logic of the past 35 years into a more 
systematic and ideologically cohesive neoliberal program, opting for policies designed to 
promote immigration as well as women's full participation in public life as ways out of 
the labour shortage crisis and the wider crisis of social reproduction. While actually 
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existing neoliberalism in Japan has never reached the systematic level of English-
speaking countries, neoliberalism has powerful political antecedents in Japan and has 
long enjoyed a degree of ideological support from certain segments of the business 
community and from organic intellectuals, such as former UCLA scholar Ohmae Ken'ichi 
and economist and Koizumi confidante Takenaka Heizō. 
 
Overview 
Under a neoliberal scenario, economic policy would likely push for even further 
deregulation and privatization, trade liberalization, labor market deregulation, further 
efforts to promote stock-market-based corporate financing, shareholder-driven decision-
making, greater risk-taking at the corporate level and an end to subsidies and protections 
to the petit bourgeoisie; in general, it would involve a wholesale Americanization of the 
Japanese economy, along the lines called for by neoliberal critics of Japan (see, for 
example, Anchordoguy 2005; Katz 1998). 
In addition to economic policies designed to promote free markets and 
unrestrained capital accumulation, social policy would be minimal, but would emphasize 
individual rights and individual responsibility. Neoliberal social policies would likely 
promote women's participation in the workforce (without providing much in the way of 
protections for workers, male or female). The state would likely take a more negative 
view of traditional approaches to business-labour coordination that stress consensus-
based decision-making, instead seeking to further disempower labour unions, while 
lifetime employment would likely encounter a further challenge as efforts to promote 
performance based pay and flexible employment are strengthened. The government 
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would likely also pursue devolution and localization, grafting new responsibilities for 
service delivery onto local governments, without granting them new means of accessing 
the funds needed to fulfill program mandates. 
Somewhat in contrast to the neo-conservative approach, neoliberal foreign policy 
would likely be a continuation of current trends, with the SDF increasingly deployed in 
peacekeeping. Indirect support for US military endeavors, if carried out under a US 
president similar to Barack Obama or Bill Clinton, would continue, but Japan would also 
pursue strong economic ties with China, South Korea and other Asian neighbours, and 
hawkish attitudes towards nearby countries would become increasingly uncommon. On 
the contrary, reflecting the trajectory espoused in the TPP as well as other efforts to forge 
closer ties with the rest of Asia, regional cooperation would likely increase, insofar as 
Chinese and Korean governments were equally keen on pursuing free trading relations 
with Japan, as increasingly open access to the mammoth Chinese economy would be a 
major boon to Japanese capital. 
Welfare policy would be heavily workfare-based, with very little public supports, 
major cutbacks in areas of public pensions and public health insurance and their 
replacement with a dualized private system. Given the lack of public supports, seniors 
would be expected to retire later, or rely on informal family supports (or for more well-
off seniors, private pensions) to survive. The education system would also likely be 
opened up, granting more scope for profit-making activity than currently allowed under 
the current ostensibly non-profit education-corporation system, while public education 
would be increasingly defunded. Profit-making mandates would also be encouraged in 
hospitals and other institutions, and private insurance would be deregulated and promoted 
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as an alternative to the increasingly underfunded public system, drawing inspiration from 
the American model. 
In major contrast to the neo-conservative scenario, immigration policy would be 
much more open, allowing a blend of low wage and high skill workers from around the 
world to fill the gaping labor shortages in a wide range of economic sectors. This would 
be seen as the long-term or permanent solution to the falling population, as the domestic 
birth rate would likely not grow at all given the lack of public supports for mothers under 
a neoliberal scenario. As a result, a neoliberal Japan would likely also become a more 
pluralist and multicultural Japan, as "universal values" of industriousness and personal 
responsibility are emphasized above particularist cultural values. 
Finally, fiscal policy would likely see an initial prioritization of measures to rein 
in Japan's massive public debt. This would involve fiscal consolidation and debt 
reduction through significant program cutbacks, including publicly funded healthcare, 
education and pensions. Once fiscal balance is restored, a turn to tax cuts for corporations 
and the wealthy would be expected to follow in order to further promote profit-making. 
 
Relations of force behind neo-liberalism 
 What are the relations of force behind a neoliberal coalition in Japan? As with the 
neo-conservative program, a neo-liberal program could expect to enjoy a broad and 
powerful coalition of forces that could be decisive in forging a new historic bloc. While 
the neo-conservative scenario is primarily rooted in the LDP's now-dominant 
conservative factions and the pressure groups from society that they are highly integrated 
with (such as Nippon Kaigi), a neo-liberal historic bloc would be driven at its core by 
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dominant economic forces, and primarily transnational corporations and their political 
representative organizations, including Keidanren. Importantly, this would include not 
only Japanese corporations but also increasingly active foreign corporations with 
operations in Japan, who have been increasingly successful in pushing for neoliberal 
deregulation. However, we must also not overemphasize the affinity of established 
Japanese firms for neoliberalism. As Gotoh and Sinclair (2017) have shown, Keidanren 
has long sought to preserve many of the protectionist and clientelist elements of Japanese 
political economy, in contrast to more neoliberal groups such as the Dōyūkai and 
nouveau riche capitalists from Japan's IT startup firms, such as Rakuten CEO Mikitani 
Hiroshi and Softbank president Son Masayoshi, who have tended to be much more vocal 
advocates of neoliberalism. 
In addition to this core support base from the corporate sector, the neoliberal 
coalition would draw support from a range of political actors, including various forces 
within the LDP. In particular, the faction led by former Foreign Minister and Chair of the 
PARC Kishida Fumio and two-time Abe challenger and former LDP Secretary General 
Ishiba Shigeru, both of which have been characterized as more socially liberal and dovish 
than the now-dominant right wing faction could be more easily drawn to support a 
neoliberal program than a neoconservative one. Additionally, groups outside of the LDP, 
including the right of the former DPJ (Noda faction) and Ozawa Ichirō's Liberal Party 
represent a broadly neoliberal perspective reflected in Noda's championing of the TPP 
and fiscal restraint and Ozawa's long advocacy of neoliberal deregulation (Sadoh 2012). 
Within the bureaucracy, a neoliberal coalition could also potentially have many allies. In 
particular, the economic ministries – the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
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Economy, Trade and Industry, as well as the Bank of Japan – increasingly represent 
neoliberal positions (rather than the developmentalist positions of the past) and could thus 
be a key institutional base of support within the state. 
In the wider society, we might expect a neoliberal program to appeal to a range of 
groups, particularly well educated, white-collar workers in cities, for whom traditional 
social values and nationalism have declining appeal, but for whom neoliberal norms of 
consumer choice, low taxes and personal responsibility resonate well. Indeed, such voters 
were partially responsible for Koizumi's ability to push the LDP in a neoliberal direction 
against strong pressure from within the party to preserve the status quo. A neoliberal 
program would also enjoy support from a range of organic intellectuals, particularly in 
business-related think tanks (which many corporations have set up) but also in academic 
fields such as economics and political science, which are increasingly characterized by 
methodological individualist rational choice and pluralist approaches imported from 
American academia, and therefore cohere on an ideological level with neoliberalism's 
valorization of individual responsibility and freedom of choice. Finally, within the mass 
media, the centre-right Nihon Keizai Shimbun broadly speaks on behalf of a neoliberal 
vision for Japan and would be an effective mouthpiece for a neoliberal coalition. 
This is not to say that the relations of force behind a neoliberal project would 
necessarily be decisive. Indeed, there are good reasons why neoliberalism has thus far 
failed to gain hegemonic status in Japan, particularly including entrenched resistance 
from within the bureaucracy, certain factions of the LDP and still-influential petit 
bourgeoisie interest groups (especially Nōkyō). Though neoliberalism would receive 
strong tacit support from capital, unlike in many countries it would likely not enjoy vocal 
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support, given that there could be many important social forces opposed to it, including 
the petit bourgeoisie as well as nationalists opposed to immigration, not to mention 
labour unions (see also Brenner et al 2010). 
 
The neo-liberal solution to organic crisis 
How would a neoliberal program seek to resolve contradictions relating to 
political legitimation, social reproduction, and capital accumulation? First, conditions for 
political legitimation would only be restored through a widespread ideological shift 
towards neoliberal understandings of the virtues of free markets, freedom of choice, 
individual initiative and responsibility, as well as respect for diversity and other liberal 
values. These values would have to be rendered strong enough to eschew not only 
nationalistic identities but also to justify inequality and economic insecurity for a great 
many people. While neoliberal rhetoric became hegemonic in the US and UK by the 
1990s, with the Clinton and Blair governments both adopting neoliberal rhetoric in their 
political programs despite nominally representing the left of centre choices in their 
respective countries, Japan has not experienced such a full-blooded neoliberal cultural 
revolution to date. Nonetheless, the 1990s and 2000s experienced a growing trend 
towards neoliberal ideology in public discourse, with notions of personal responsibility 
(jiko sekinin) gaining in popularity. However, these seem to have faded in the wake of the 
2008 Financial Crisis and 2011 earthquake and tsunami, where the deleterious social 
effects of free market capitalism and the need for solidaristic ties in times of hardship 
were brought into renewed focus. A more systematic return to neoliberalism would 
require the revival of these earlier ideological currents. 
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Second, conditions for social reproduction, however regressive, would only be 
restored through the adoption of a mass immigration policy similar to the other Anglo 
states. Indeed, given that neoliberalism would necessitate the hollowing out of an already 
underfunded welfare state, it is difficult to imagine how the fertility rate could possibly 
increase, and thus how the labor shortage could be overcome, without a major turn to 
immigration policy. Fortunately for neoliberals, countries such as Canada enjoy robust 
population growth despite a birth rate only slightly higher than Japan, so this approach is 
not impossible in theory, regardless of the social costs it might bear on people's 
livelihoods. 
Finally, conditions for capital accumulation could be restored through a 
comprehensive neoliberalization of the economy that opens up numerous spaces to 
capital accumulation and generally seeks to provide optimal conditions for short-term 
profit making for capital. Liberalized trade, especially with Japan's Asian neighbors as 
well as further deregulation and privatization of the health and welfare sectors, among 
others, could provide a significant new scope for capital accumulation. Whether such a 
policy is likely to have much prospect of continuing for a long time in the wake of the 
other challenges likely to emerge is another question. 
 
Challenges and contradictions of neo-liberalism 
 However, a neoliberal program would also faces three challenges in its attempts to 
assert hegemony in Japanese society. First, a more systematic turn to neoliberal 
deregulation and liberalization would likely lead to heightened inequality and insecurity. 
Yet unlike in the neo-conservative scenario discussed above, this would occur without 
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any capacity to rally the public around a nationalist or militarist ideology. Such 
conditions could easily lead to a crisis of legitimacy and class conflict. The commitment 
to free market ideals and individual choice and responsibility would have to be very 
strong in order to overcome this problem, as they have proven to be in the US, Canada 
and elsewhere, where the ideology of personal responsibility has been powerful enough 
to shift blame for growing poverty and inequality away from the capitalist system and 
onto the backs of the poor themselves. 
Second, growing economic inequality and precariousness coupled with a turn 
towards superficial liberal rights and a high rate of immigration could potentially bring a 
significant degree of anti-immigrant backlash, if immigrants (rather than capitalist 
systemic forces) are targeted as the cause of declining economic security and prospects 
for ethnic Japanese workers. Such a scenario could prompt a reactionary shift towards 
right-wing nationalist populism, as we have seen in Europe and the US in the rise of the 
British UK Independence Party, the French Front National, the Alternative für 
Deutschland in Germany, the Italian Lega Nord and most prominently with the election 
of Donald Trump in the United States. 
Third, excessive economic deregulation, coupled with decreasing real wages is 
likely to cause the same sort of economic recession that occurred in Japan with the 1980s' 
bubble economy or in the United States and elsewhere with the 2008 financial and 
subprime mortgage crisis. Thus, even if such a scenario could restore conditions for 
profitable capital accumulation in the short term, it is even likely to cause long-term 
problems from the perspective of capital, not to mention the aforementioned challenges 
of political legitimacy and social reproduction. As Hashimoto and Mizuno (2013) have 
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argued, it is unlikely that any accumulation strategy that focuses predominantly on price 
competition and supply-side economics can bring long-term economic growth. 
 Overall, as we have seen over the past few years in Europe and North America, 
neoliberalism, and the social dislocation and insecurity it causes for a great many people, 
is highly at risk of facing challenges from both the left and the nationalist right. In Japan, 
it is easy to imagine such a scenario, and a subsequent turn towards neo-conservatism (or, 
though less likely, democratic socialism) in response to the new contradictions that would 
be opened under attempts to build a neoliberal hegemonic order. 
 
Back to the future: neo-communitarianism? 
 While the neoliberal and neoconservative programs appear the most plausible 
scenarios for Japan in the near future, there remains some – though perhaps dwindling – 
support for a return to the previous model of developmentalism combined with the 
construction state, what I have previously called "nationalist communitarianism" (Carroll 
2019). This model for the future, what I will term "neo-communitarianism" to 
differentiate it from the model that existed from the 1950s to the 1990s, requires slightly 
more imagination to appear viable. Indeed, since the old communitarian model ultimately 
came to be seen as incompatible with globalization and changing demographic conditions 
(in particular population aging) in the 1990s, it would appear that a return to that model 
would be even more unrealistic today, where both of those dynamics have only become 
more pronounced. Nonetheless, particularly in the context of a growing global backlash 
against globalization in many countries – driven by both the left and the right – it is not 
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impossible to see a return to at least some of the conditions that were more conducive 
with this model in previous decades. 
 
Overview 
What policies would characterize a neo-communitarian program? To start with, 
harkening back to the Construction State policies common until the 2000s (Miyamoto 
2008), economic policy would involve a return to protectionism coupled with 
developmentalist industrial policy, as well as public infrastructure spending, particularly 
to counter depopulation in the countryside. Moreover, such a model would promote a 
return to the lifetime employment system and attempts to promote stable breadwinner 
wages for a privileged, largely male workforce while also including extensive supports 
for the petit bourgeoisie through tax subsidies, special financing arrangements and 
protectionist benefits for small businesses. 
In contrast with the road taken under both neoconservative and neoliberal 
projects, social policy under a neo-communitarian program would involve attempts to 
promote a pacifist soft nationalism and conservatism with traditional gender values. Yet 
unlike under both neoconservative and neoliberal scenarios, egalitarianism would be a 
relatively important principle, which would be partially reflected in welfare policies. 
Under the neo-communitarlian model, therefore, welfare policy would see 
attempts to return to conditions of familialism and the welfare through work paradigm of 
the post-war (Miura 2012), with attempts to incentivize the return to household-based 
provisioning of many welfare functions and the curtailment of state-funded provisioning 
(even if such measures would be out of step with the continuing decline of extended and 
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nuclear family households). Attempts would be made to ensure that women and families 
have enough economic security to take on these roles primarily within the household. 
Pro-natal policies such as child subsidies would also be strongly emphasized, though 
publicly funded daycare that disrupts the traditional gendered division of labour might 
not be supported as strongly. Moreover, the state would seek to counter recent trends 
such as the decline in extended and nuclear families and falling rates of marriage through 
policies designed to incentivize and make possible a return to more traditional household 
structures, including extended families. 
Again harkening back to the post-war era, foreign policy might be characterized 
by a very low posture with support for the US, with as little development of military 
capabilities as possible. Cooperation with neighboring countries would be encouraged, 
including China and the Koreas, but not at the expense of the US alliance. In some ways, 
this foreign policy thus reflects the status quo up until now, and does not require any 
drastic change from the present context. However, insofar as the rise of China as not only 
an economic but also a military power prompts renewed conflict between Beijing and 
Washington, the role played by Tokyo in such a scenario is unclear. 
Unlike with the neoliberal program, immigration policy would be minimal, given 
that it undermines the ideology of ethnic homogeneity, or tan'itsu minzoku that 
characterizes part of the communitarian model, where ethnic community ties serve as the 
social basis for mutual aid and solidarity. The labour shortage facing Japan would 
therefore have to be solved through other means, primarily through strong neo-natal 
policies aimed at restoring fertility rates to levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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The neo-communitarian model clearly calls for a host of new public expenses, 
including through industrial policy, public works, and social welfare cash subsidies 
designed to encourage child rearing, along with the residual welfare institutions already 
in existence. How would the state pay for all of these programs? If the post-war record 
were to serve as the basis for post-Heisei fiscal policy, under the neo-communitarian 
model, fiscal policy would involve a low tax regime but would probably have to rely on 
corporate taxes and consumption taxes to sustain increased public works spending. 
However, such a model appears at face value to be fiscally unsustainable, particularly 
considering the divergent demographic conditions caused by population aging over the 
past forty years. Instead, a revenue shortfall would have to be compensated through 
increased income taxes, particularly on higher income earners, while reductions to public 
welfare expenditures (especially pensions) that serve as a push towards a renewed 
privatization (familialization) of various social reproduction functions – in particular 
eldercare– through a return to extended family households might also be necessary. 
 
Relations of force behind neo-communitarianism 
 Given that this project largely failed to respond to growing challenges of 
globalization and population aging in the 1990s and 2000s, which social groups could 
plausibly lead the charge to its re-instatement in the post-Heisei era? First and foremost, 
the most important group that supported the old model of clientelist corporatism would 
have to throw its weight behind a return to this program. The moderate factions of the 
LDP that support traditional clientelist public infrastructure spending, including those few 
remaining zoku lawmakers, and the old Tanaka-Takeshita faction, which long served as 
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the political basis for LDP clientelism from the 1970s to the 1990s, would thus be a 
necessary support group. In addition, such a program would rely on elements of the 
bureaucracy that had previously supported it, including the now reorganized Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (formerly the Postal Ministry), and the major "construction state" 
ministries, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT; formerly the 
Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transportation) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries (MAFF; formerly the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Fisheries). Whether these ministries would seek to cooperate in a return to the 
protectionist developmentalism of the construction state remains to be seen. 
 Outside of the main power blocs, such a coalition would require strong support 
from farmers and small businesses, groups that stand to lose from neoliberalization and 
have generally been its most vocal (and effective) critics. While these groups have 
declined numerically throughout the post-war era, they are still politically and culturally 
influential (Hayes and Kawaguchi 2015). Otherwise, a neo-communitarian project would 
seek to expand its historic bloc around a cross-class coalition that includes more 
conservative labour unions seeking to preserve the lifetime employment system and 
opposed to neoliberal deregulation yet also weary of a more dramatic left movement that 
challenges the power of capital, while also courting support from more inward fractions 
of capital who favor protected access to the home market over liberal access to foreign 
markets. Finally, support potentially rests with other parties, most notably Kōmeitō, 
which has long pushed for socially conservative yet economically egalitarian policies and 
courted the votes of the urban poor (without using class-based rhetoric). The People's 
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New Party, a small breakaway from the LDP that had opposed Koizumi's postal 
privatization and existed from 2005 until 2013, also reflected this perspective. 
 While a return to the neo-communitarian model of the post-war would no doubt 
draw support from the petit bourgeoisie who benefited most strongly from the old regime, 
it is unclear to what extend the Japanese capitalist class, and major business organizations 
such as Keidanren would support such a move. On one hand, Japanese capital long 
accepted and even openly supported the communitarian and clientelist political model of 
post-war Japan, recognizing how it shored up a high degree of political legitimation 
across class lines without giving real power to the working class. Insofar as a return to 
such a model could restore conditions of political hegemony and social security for the 
Japanese working class without overtly politicizing issues of class struggle and economic 
distribution, such a model may be in Japanese capital's strategic political interests. On the 
other hand, the growing drag that various elements of the old system posed to capital 
accumulation, including the rigidities of the lifetime employment system and the 
inefficiencies of supporting backwards economic sectors and the petit bourgeois, 
particularly in the context of chronic economic stagnation and budgetary deficits, may 
signal that Japanese capital is no longer willing to throw its support behind this system. 
 
The neo-communitarian solution to organic crisis 
 What characterizes the neo-communitarian solution to organic crisis? First, 
conditions of political legitimation might be restored through a return to the post-war 
model that brought significant growth and stability, while returning to the pacifist 
nationalism of the post-war that was still rooted in ethnic homogeneity but that 
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encouraged values of cooperation and solidarity (but not class struggle). In other ways, a 
return to more reactionary ideological positions would be required, such as a traditional 
gender division of labour. The still influential petit bourgeoisie would have much to gain 
and would be a key source of political support, given that there would be little in the way 
of support from organic intellectuals, liberal or conservative, who have largely abandoned 
the policies of the post-war model since the 1990s. Given that this model does not 
seriously offend any major groups, there would be much scope for it to maintain the 
political legitimacy required to become hegemonic, just as it did in previous decades. 
Second, conditions of social reproduction would be restored through a return to 
the welfare through work gender dual system that brought livelihood security for the 
majority of households up until the 1990s. An encouragement of women's return to their 
traditional roles coupled with the economic and society security to fulfill those roles, 
provided by husbands with stable jobs as well as various state efforts to promote familial 
security and stability, would help restore a social balance, including with the birth rate. At 
the same time conditions making it harder for women to have fulfilling careers would be 
a push factor towards marriage and childbearing, though these would no doubt draw 
staunch resistance from liberal and progressive forces, especially the women's movement. 
Finally, conditions conducive to capital accumulation could be restored through 
activist industrial policy geared at export promotion as well as policies designed to 
maximize labour output, including through male breadwinner flexibility and informal 
overtime work, conditions that were supported by the female housewife system and 
played a major role in buttressing the post-war boom. The gender dual system could 
potentially provide enough cheap and flexible (female) labour to complement the needs 
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of a large class of protected and well-paid (male) breadwinners. However, even if the 
corporatist-clientelist model of the developmentalist construction state was successful in 
securing conditions for stable capital accumulation in the post-war period, it seems that 
this is the hegemonic condition least likely to be maintained under a neo-communitarian 
model in the future, given the dramatically different structural conditions facing Japan 
today, including neoliberal globalization at the level of world order and substantial 
population aging within domestic society.  
 
Challenges and contradictions of neo-communitarianism 
Foremost, among possible challenges, are serious doubts as to whether this 
accumulation model can work in an era of globalization. While Lechevalier (2008) has 
argued that the post-war model in and of itself was not characterized by systemic 
contradictions that led to the crisis of the 1990s, and that it was precisely the neoliberal 
turn away from that model beginning in the 1980s that was the root cause of the crisis, as 
this dissertation has shown (particularly in Chapter Five) I am much less sanguine about 
the viability of this model under changing structural conditions, particularly considering 
the enormous fiscal costs to the state that this model already produced in an era of 
relatively smaller welfare needs. Given the extent to which public debt has grown and 
population aging has progressed since the 1990s, the fiscal and demographic crises of the 
2020s will be even worse than those of the 1990s and 2000s, and thus only sharpen the 
contradictions between the post-war model and the challenges facing contemporary 
society. Simply put, an already elderly society and workforce surely cannot support the 
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number of seniors could be supported through extended family households instead of the 
now extensive yet highly costly public welfare supports, including pensions and eldercare 
services. 
This therefore leads to serious doubts over how to pay for so much programming 
and keep all major groups satisfied, and without challenging the power of capital, which 
remains the elephant in the room, as it did throughout the post-war, where Japan's lean 
welfare model and weak extractive capacity must be seen as resulting partially from 
capital's power relative to labour. Beyond the fiscal balance sheet, a return to the past 
would also entail potential for conflict over women's roles in society, and if women are 
encouraged to return to roles as wives and mothers, rather than offered new opportunities 
to pursue careers in public life, there would certainly be a strong backlash. With women 
who work outside of the home – even those with young children – increasingly the social 
norm, Japanese society has transformed significantly since the 1990s in this regard.  
 
Counter-hegemony and a democratic socialist future 
 The final model for Japan in the 21st century is one that appears at face value to be 
the least likely in the immediate future, but perhaps one that could become increasingly 
likely as the social, political, economic and ecological contradictions of capitalism 
sharpen, both within Japan and globally. Occupying the lower left quadrant, and 
incorporating progressive social policies mixed with progressive economic policies, this 
is the social democratic, or democratic socialist future. However, while all of the four 
models discussed in this chapter are characterized by internal variegation, I want to make 
a particular point of discussing two varieties of this model – first, social democracy and 
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second, democratic socialism – and carefully clarifying their differences. While both 
socialism and social democracy value economic equality and support active state 
intervention in order to promote equality, they differ in a very important way on the 
question of whether they seek to directly challenge (and surmount) the power of capital, 
or whether they seek to leave it intact and ameliorate its negative effects through policy. 
Nancy Fraser (2001) has thus theorized the dichotomy of transformative redistribution 
(democratic socialism) that seeks to transform power relations in the economy on one 
hand, and affirmative redistribution (social democracy), that tries to redistribute the 
effects of capitalist economies while affirming the power dynamics that underlie them. 
 In the case of Japan, while between one quarter and one third of the electorate 
voted for socialists from both the JSP and JCP from 1960 until 1990 (while social 
democratic policies were advocated by the smaller DSP and arguably Kōmeitō), since the 
JSP's decline that began in the 1990s, this number has fallen dramatically (to around 10 
percent support for the JCP). In contrast, social democracy received greater policy 
penetration in the 1990s and represented the position of the left wing of the DPJ (which 
was affiliated with the Japanese Federation of Trade Unions), a tendency that has been 
carried over into its more left-leaning successor party, the Constitutional Democratic 
Party (CDP) that formed from the DPJ's implosion prior to the 2017 election. Clearly 
then, the electoral basis of support for democratic socialism, and even social democracy, 
has been in decline since the 1990s. 
 
Overview 
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 What policies would characterize a social democratic, or democratic socialist 
program? First, economic policy would be oriented towards activist intervention in the 
economy to promote equality, social stability, and environmental protection. Such a 
program would call for the strengthening of protections for workers and consumers and 
environmental rights, among other things. While a social democratic program would push 
for reregulation and an increase in the above protections, a democratic socialist program 
would add to this bolder efforts to challenge the power of capital, including through the 
nationalization of industries, likely starting with the transport and energy sectors. 
However, more important than this would be efforts to encourage community economies, 
empowering democratic control and management at the local level, including through 
existing groups, such as the consumer cooperatives and seikatsusha networks that have 
formed an important part of progressive social movements since the 1990s (Avenell 
2008). 
Social policy would seek to promote equality and human rights for all people, 
including women, ethnic minorities, disabled people and LGBTQ. Social policy would 
thus be geared around principles of feminism, multiculturalism, and pacifism, while 
eschewing nationalism, militarism and traditional hierarchies. It is unclear if the emperor 
system would be retained and on what terms. While the JCP formerly called for the 
repeal of the emperor system, this is no longer among their policies, and appears 
strategically unwise, given that the emperor system generally maintains broad (though 
not necessarily enthusiastic) support. On the other hand, a socialist program would also 
favor constitutional revision to guarantee strengthened rights for workers, LGBTQ, 
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women, and ethnic minorities, as well as environmental and social rights, while likely 
strengthening the constitutional commitment to pacifism and nuclear disarmament. 
In contrast to the largely US-focused foreign policy of the other programs, 
socialist foreign policy would be geared around multilateralism, neutrality and pacifism, 
ending the alliance with the US while pursuing closer ties with all countries, including in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. Under such a scenario Japan would pursue fair trade 
instead of free trade and look to play a much larger role in world affairs, albeit on 
completely different terms than until now. This foreign policy approach would involve a 
major pivot away from the Anpo. Yet in other ways it would retain Japan's strong post-
war commitment to multilateralism and the UN, which Japan would likely try to support 
even more and reorient in a direction more oriented towards global social and 
environmental justice. Rather than seeking alliance with other G7 countries, then, Japan 
would seek to engage in greater dialogue and cooperation among the developing and 
post-colonial countries that comprise the majority of members in the UN General 
Assembly, while perhaps pushing for a radical overhaul or repeal of the UN Security 
Council and the veto power enjoyed by the five nuclear powers. While Japan could 
strengthen its own monetary contributions to development through ODA, it might also 
seek to institute a broader global compact on development designed to enlist Northern 
countries (and their corporations) in a program of green, participatory democratic 
development in the Global South. 
Borrowing from the welfare policies pursued in the post-war era in Scandinavian 
countries, welfare policy would likely involve a robust expansion of public welfare 
provisions, amounting to a cradle-to-the-grave of universal programs, including paid 
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parental leave, free daycare, free education from pre-school through to university, free 
health care and moves to strengthen public pensions. Employment protections for 
workers and an end to precarious work would also be pursued (in other words, mandating 
that all workers are treated as regular employees), along with measures that further 
strengthen workers' rights regardless of gender, race, or sexual orientation. In addition, 
measures to reduce the "petit bourgeois" elements of Japan's health care system, by 
challenging the power of doctors and encouraging community and publically controlled 
health and welfare provisioning, and more general efforts to curtail or outright end 
private education, either by nationalizing private providers or by regulating them to 
ensure that no functional qualitative difference exists between public and private 
programs, could also be pursued. 
In contrast to the insular policies of neo-conservative and neo-communitarian 
programs, socialist immigration policy would involve a more open policy geared at 
welcoming people from around the world to Japan, but not solely for their ability to 
contribute to capital accumulation in Japan; equally for their ability to enrich Japanese 
society and culture. A socialist or social democratic immigration policy would also seek 
to admit more refugees to Japan, particularly in the context of growing ecological crisis 
stemming from climate change around the world. 
Finally, democratic socialist fiscal policy would involve greatly increased taxes 
for corporations and the wealthy in order to pay for robust welfare state expansions. 
Given the dire fiscal situation facing Japan already, it is unclear whether reductions in 
existing consumption taxes would be viable immediately, but their replacement with a 
full slate of progressive taxes likely would be a long-term fiscal goal. 
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Relations of force behind democratic socialism 
 What social forces would support a democratic socialist or social democratic 
program? To begin, such a program is the only one of the three that enjoys zero support 
from the LDP. Within the bureaucracy, there is also relatively little basis for support for 
truly left wing policies, although the welfare-related ministries, particularly the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare has often aligned itself with social democratic welfare 
models and developed proposals that more strongly reflected the interests of labour 
unions (such as Sohyō, Dōmei and Rengō) than those of business (and the Keidanren in 
particular) at shingikai deliberative councils, suggesting that MHLW bureaucrats could 
be supportive of at least a moderately social democratic model (Estevez-Abe 2008). 
 While a social democratic program is the only one of the three proposed here that 
would be comprehensively opposed by the LDP, two potential options exist for support 
among Japan's parties. On one hand, a social democratic model could enjoy support from 
the left wing of the former DPJ, which currently corresponds to the CDP, while also 
receiving passive support from the JCP and the tiny SDP. On the other hand, a more 
robust socialist program would be far too radical for the DPJ but would represent the 
program of the JCP. While the JCP has consistently been one of Japan's four major forces 
throughout the post-war era and maintains a committed and loyal membership (with a 
widely circulated party newspaper, Akahata) that generally obtains around ten percent of 
the vote at elections, under Japan's electoral system, this never translates into more than a 
handful of seats, and the JCP's national exposure is thus minimal (even if the degree of its 
support, in terms of intensity as much as extensity, is not far from the DPJ and Kōmeitō). 
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 Outside of state and party institutions, a socialist program could potentially enjoy 
support from certain segments of organized labour, as well as more loosely from 
unorganized sectors of the working class, including working women and precarious 
workers. While mainstream unions would be more amenable to a social democratic 
option (if even that), more radical unions, including those affiliated with the JCP, would 
likely support a more radical socialist option. Other than the working class, however, a 
left project would have little traction – and would likely face hostility – from the petit 
bourgeoisie and the capitalist class. 
Beyond these class forces, academic intellectuals from political science, sociology, 
and other social sciences – at least those on the left – would serve as an important group 
of organic intellectuals to a left wing movement, much as how foreign policy hawks from 
IR would serve as neo-conservative organic intellectuals, or mainstream economists 
might serve as neoliberal organic intellectuals. To these organic intellectuals we can add 
movement intellectuals from a myriad of non-governmental organizations and civil 
society groups, including environmental groups, women's groups, the peace movement, 
LGBTQ rights groups, and consumer cooperatives.  
Needless to say, socialism or social democracy would face staunch opposition 
from both capital and from nationalist conservatives, while likely facing resistance from 
other elements of the bureaucracy as well. There are good reasons why it has received so 
little recognition or support and faced so much suppression until now. The political 
barriers to its popularization remain enormous and must not be discounted. However, we 
can nonetheless envision a scenario where a left project mobilized the relations of force 
necessary to seize power. To do so, a process of intellectual and moral reform, and what 
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Gramsci called a war of position, would first be required. Organic intellectuals, left 
parties, unions and more than anything, left wing NGOs must be the starting point of this 
effort to build a Japanese post-modern prince, much as how Gill (2002, 2000) has 
theorized the role of social movement organizations as the starting point for a global post-
modern Prince. As Gramsci showed, the moment at which the war of movement becomes 
possible cannot be predicted beforehand; but insofar as the war of position has not been 
achieved, and relations of force necessary for seizing power have not been built, the 
opportunity to seize on a moment of conjunctural crisis will be missed. 
 
The democratic socialist solution to organic crisis 
 Insofar as these barriers to success could be overcome and relations of force 
necessary for a successful counter-hegemonic socialist project established, how would 
such a project seek to solve Japan's organic crisis? First, conditions for political 
legitimation – in order words, consent to ruling relations – would be restored both 
materially and ideationally. Materially, this would be by bringing conditions of economic 
and social security to the working and middle classes, thus enabling the vast majority of 
people to live under conditions of freedom from want and insecurity. Ideationally, the 
creation of a new national ethos geared around solidarity, human rights, and principles of 
equality and justice would buttress conditions for the democratic legitimacy of Japan's 
newfound hegemonic order. 
Second, conditions for social reproduction would be restored through the creation 
of robust welfare institutions that guarantee stability and security for all people, 
promoting work-life balance and giving all people the time and financial ability to live 
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freely and have the number of children that they desire (which would amount to around 2 
per woman based on surveys). Labour shortages would also be filled through a more open 
immigration policy, though not one geared around a logic of economic calculability over 
the utility of immigrant labour, but rather one that seeks to welcome people from a range 
of backgrounds for the cultural and social enrichment they can provide to Japanese 
society. 
Finally, under a social democratic scenario, conditions for capital accumulation 
could be restored only insofar as capital accepted the ethical basis for a social democratic 
Japan and identified it with their long-term interests, a notion that – however unlikely in 
the context of four decades of neoliberalism globally – could potentially be the focus of 
attempts to strike a renewed class compromise through some variety of green global 
Keynesianism. At the same time, social democracy could have benefits for capital, given 
that robust welfare institutions ensure a well-educated, secure and healthy workforce 
capable of dedicating attention and energy to work, though these benefits are less 
applicable to Japanese investments abroad than to Japanese and foreign capital that invest 
in Japan. Ultimately and in the long term, restoring conditions for social reproduction, 
while also encouraging women's full participation in the workforce is likely in the 
interests of capital, and this is the only scenario that seeks to do both things.  
 
Challenges and contradictions of democratic socialism 
However effective it might be in solving Japan's organic crisis, socialism faces 
significant questions relating to its viability, both in seizing power and in maintaining 
hegemonic conditions. First, is it possible to directly challenge the power of capital and 
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not pay a significant, or even prohibitive cost politically? Would Japan be immune from a 
capital strike or capital flight? While in past decades the loyalty of Japanese capital and 
capitalists to the national economy may have provided a safeguard against these risks, in 
an era of neoliberal globalization it is unclear if this would be the case. Second, how 
would the bureaucracy support or at least allow such a program to be advanced? Even if a 
left movement was able to win elections, what would it take to transform a powerful and 
resistive bureaucracy, without running into problems far worse than the DPJ did in 2009, 
when it tried to reform the bureaucracy in a fairly modest fashion? Third, how could the 
petit bourgeoisie possibly be brought onboard to such a project? Social democratic 
projects in the past, such as that of Sweden, have sometimes sought to forge a 
compromise between labour and capital that isolates the petit bourgeoisie from power. 
However, while this might gain support from capital and purge the economy of 
inefficient sectors, it would be politically risky in the case of Japan, where small 
businesses and farmers continue to have a high degree of public legitimacy and political 
influence. Conversely, courting the petit bourgeoisie into a counter-hegemonic coalition 
while isolating capital would be economically dangerous, bringing a return to the fiscal 
problems of the communitarian model (through the lavish supports for the petit 
bourgeoisie that such a move would entail) while simultaneously necessitating heavy 
welfare state spending, and without the support of capital.  
More fundamentally, as many have pointed out, there are contradictions in social 
democratic attempts to pursue economic and social policies that undermine conditions for 
capital accumulation, even if only in the short term, and empower labour politically 
whilst at the same time shying away from outright class struggle and attempts to 
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challenge the power of capital in a meaningful way. Social democratic policies are 
therefore likely to run into trouble this way, just as the post-war Keynesian class 
compromise ultimately ran into contradictions that brought about its own unraveling and 
the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, democratic socialist policies 
that seek to explicitly challenge the power of capital do not face this contradiction, but 
face a far greater political challenge, given their radical nature, while also being forced to 
deal with the question of how economies will be reordered to meet social needs if not 
under capitalist relations of production. Indeed, the complicated legacy of actually 
existing socialisms forces us to ask them and how, without the power of capital, 
economic relations would otherwise be ordered to ensure that the social and economic 
benefits that capital accumulation itself serves for hegemony (and thus for consensual 
political relations) can be maintained under an alternative system. 
Along with these domestic political obstacles, democratic socialism would face 
the greatest global political obstacles, including staunch opposition from other capitalist 
states (most notably the US) and global institutions of neoliberalism such as the World 
Bank and IMF, not to mention the risk of capital flight (by both foreign and domestic 
capital) and the other barriers socialism faces from the structural power of capital (Gill 
and Law 1989). In all these ways, then the social democratic or democratic socialist 
vision faces serious challenges politically, even if it offers the most compelling vision of 
a long-term solution to the organic crisis.  
 
Conclusion 
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 Overall, based on the scenarios presented in this chapter, what conclusion can we 
draw about where Japan is headed in the future? For one thing, all of these scenarios face 
enormous challenges. While the neo-conservative option is the closest to the status quo, it 
is likely to face challenges and see its contradictions deepen. Neo-conservatism combines 
pro-business economic policy with conservative and nationalistic social policies, relying 
on nationalism to shore up ideological support. Yet it is hard to see how social 
reproductive requirements could be fulfilled without some migrant workers, which leads 
to further contradictions with the nationalist ideology, especially since growing insecurity 
and class tensions accompany this model. In contrast, the neo-liberal option might be the 
second most likely in the short term, given the support it enjoys from leading forces 
within the incumbent historic bloc, in particular Japanese (and foreign) capital and 
economic segments of the bureaucracy. Indeed, compared to the neo-conservative 
program, neoliberalism might have stronger prospects as a solution to the crisis of capital 
accumulation. Nonetheless, it faces even greater barriers to succeeding politically. 
Though the neoliberal scenario provides a clear pathway to restored accumulation while 
bringing in immigrants to fill labour shortages, it faces the risk of encountering class or 
ethnic tensions due to the conditions of insecurity it is likely to bring to many people. If 
these tensions are class-based, they could potentially lead to socialist transformation, 
while if they are ethnic-based, they could lead to neo-conservatism or nationalist 
populism. 
The other two potential pathways are, for completely different reasons, clearly 
less likely in the immediate term. The neo-communitarian model invokes nostalgia for 
many but because it is unrealistic fiscally in the context of economic globalization and 
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Japan's now elderly society it is likely impossible to return to now. Indeed, the model's 
post-war success was contingent on very specific underlying structural conditions very 
different from those that exist in the present world. While the neo-communitarian model 
would provide greater security, and could potentially restore social reproduction 
(especially if it is combined with modest increases of migrant labour or immigrants) it is 
hard to see how it could generate capital accumulation or be fiscally sustainable given the 
changed conditions of globalization and demographic change. For that reason it remains 
the least likely scenario. In contrast, as a project that seeks to be truly participatory, 
democratic and represent the foundational interests of the majority of working class 
Japanese, democratic socialism provides the greatest potential for restoring conditions for 
widespread democratic legitimacy and stable and progressive forms of social 
reproduction but faces tremendous political barriers from virtually all established sources 
of power within Japanese society. Moreover, such a movement faces key questions of 
strategy regarding whether it would be worthwhile to try to pursue this option as a 
reformist social democracy or as a revolutionary socialist approach that does not try to 
cooperate with capital. 
Ultimately, we must remember that these four scenarios are all ideal types. They 
may be advocated in their pure forms, or in hybrid forms that attempt to make up for the 
contradictions of one with elements of another, just as how Koizumi tried to attach 
militarist and nationalist overtures to hardline conservatives to a program of neoliberal 
economic policy, the DPJ initially sought to marry neoliberal deregulation with social 
democratic welfare policies, and the Abe government has tried to combine neo-
conservative political policies with a mix of neoliberal and Keynesian economic and 
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social policies. Therefore, it is highly likely that in practice, further attempts to resolve 
the crisis will involve similar attempts to combine elements of these four programs, 
though it is unlikely that any such combination will provide a permanent solution to the 
crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 330	
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 This chapter seeks to do three things in providing a set of concluding remarks to 
the dissertation as a whole. First, it examines a number of central and general themes and 
dynamics that span across multiple chapters. Thus rather than returning to a summary of 
each chapter, it seeks to analyze the overarching themes explored over the scope of the 
entire dissertation. To that end, it will consider the broad sweep of post-war Japanese 
political economy by contemplating in turn each of the three conditions for hegemonic 
order discussed in the third chapter: political legitimation, capital accumulation and social 
reproduction, observing how overarching conditions relating to each of these 
requirements for hegemonic order have shifted over the course of the post-war era. 
Second, and building on this analysis of the Japanese case, it considers a number of 
overarching theoretical implications of the argument as a whole, particularly focusing on 
the relationship between hegemony and crisis, and the contradictions between conditions 
conducive to capital accumulation, political legitimation and social reproduction under 
capitalism. Third, it considers some of the empirical, conceptual and methodological 
limitations of this study, while also providing a number of ideas for future research that 
seeks to build on the theoretical and historical arguments developed in this dissertation. 
 
Conditions for hegemonic order: political legitimation 
Beginning with the first of three conditions for stable hegemonic order developed 
in the third chapter, we can see how dynamics of political legitimation affected the 
hegemonic order overall in various ways. First, as Chapter Four has shown, the post-war 
electoral and party system, which was characterized by a multi-member district electoral 
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system and a party system anchored around competition between a unified conservative 
party (the LDP) and a divided left opposition, not only provided structural conditions that 
heavily favored continuous LDP rule but also enabled an overall veneer of democratic 
legitimacy for the LDP and the system as a whole. This legitimacy emanated not merely 
from the regular holding of free and fair elections with relatively high voter turnout; it 
was also emboldened by the highly localized and clientelist version of politics that 
developed, partly as a result of the candidate-centric electoral machinery of kōenkai, 
which facilitated a high degree of clientelist incorporation of voters into the support 
networks of local lawmakers. Moreover, while all parties' candidates operated kōenkai, 
only the LDP's had access to public monies, which enabled them alone to make credible 
promises of local infrastructure spending. In addition to the advantages borne to the LDP 
from the electoral and party system, we must also consider the synergistic relationship 
between the bureaucracy and LDP lawmakers, including zoku lawmakers, in policy 
creation. The division of labour between these two forces combined long-term national 
interest policies developed by the developmentalist section of the bureaucracy that served 
the interests of the capitalist economy as a whole with politically popular, locally-tailored 
infrastructure spending developed by individual lawmakers in concert with the 
Construction State sections of the bureaucracy that brought in LDP votes while also 
helping to ensure the continued vitality of the petit bourgeoisie, a vital LDP constituency. 
However, these stable and favorable conditions ultimately proved to be 
temporary. As Chapter Five argued, beginning in the 1970s, elements of this system 
began to experience cracks that undermined its political legitimacy and therefore that of 
the LDP as well. While the kōenkai system, and the clientelist politics it fueled may have 
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been highly beneficial to the LDP, it ultimately came to be extremely costly. As the costs 
of running kōenkai grew (which were driven more by the pressures of intraparty 
competition than competition with the JSP, JCP and Kōmeitō), so too did the risks of 
corruption, given the tacit assumption that the corporations and organizations (including 
Nōkyō) funding kōenkai would receive payment in kind in return for their contributions. 
This was manifest in a number of explosive scandals, including most notably the Recruit-
Cosmos, Sagawa Kyūbin and Lockheed scandals, which each sullied the image of 
politicians in Japan, and eventually pushed the door open to change. Moreover, this 
system, and the clientelist infrastructure spending it required, became increasingly costly. 
Spending grew steadily in the 1970s, just as Japan's GDP growth rate declined, 
prompting the onset of a structural deficit. Thus by the 1980s, the system that had once 
been the basis for LDP hegemony was now a structural factor behind endemic corruption 
and inefficient and unaffordable public spending, dynamics that not only undermined 
political legitimation but also stood increasingly at odds with the interests of capital. 
As discussed in Chapter Six, by the 1990s these contradictions had accumulated 
to the point of sending the system into a crisis, which was foreshadowed by the LDP's 
1989 Upper House election loss to the JSP and brought about in earnest by the breakaway 
of the JRP and Sakigake and the subsequent formation of an anti-LDP coalition 
government in 1993. This coalition government was highly unstable and short-lived, but 
succeeded in passing electoral and campaign financing reform. While these measures 
were expected to eliminate LDP factions, zoku lawmakers, kōenkai and corruption more 
generally, twenty-five years on, the results appear mixed. Moreover, in hindsight the 
electoral and campaign finance systems were not the only problems with Japan's political 
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system. Indeed, while the LDP returned to power by 1996, the next two major LDP 
leaders –Hashimoto and Koizumi– each ran on agendas of political reform. Hashimoto's 
reforms were designed to decisively shift power from the bureaucracy to the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, further eliminating structural pressures for clientelist politics and 
making the system more accountable, while Koizumi tried to break the LDP from within, 
crushing the power of zoku lawmakers by removing their access to pork-barrel funds 
through the privatization of the Japan Post Bank. However, despite this apparent 
resolution to the political crisis, the next three leaders post-Koizumi displayed the same 
weakness and ineptitude as those of the past: in 2007 the LDP lost the Upper House 
election before failing to prevent the worst recession of the postwar period in 2008. Then 
in 2009 it was dramatically swept from power in a landslide election loss to the DPJ. Yet 
even the DPJ proved incapable of solving the problems of Japan's system, picking a fight 
with the bureaucracy that it later backed down from before being swept from power in 
2012 as dramatically as it had swept to power just three years later. 
Turning to the discussion of the current regime of Abe Shinzō and his attempts to 
restore conditions for stable hegemonic order in Chapter Seven, we must ask how Abe 
has solved the crisis of political legitimacy facing Japan? To that end, political dynamics 
under Abe have been characterized by three main tendencies. First, the LDP has now won 
six consecutive elections with nearly two thirds of total seats, suggesting a categorical 
return to electoral dominance. Yet these electoral wins have come with less than half of 
the share of the electorate that supported the LDP in the 1960s and are mostly due to the 
LDP's coalition with Kōmeitō and the lack of unity and coherence of the opposition. 
Second, despite a stellar resume as a hardline conservative, Abe has made use of a much 
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more moderate tone, championing welfare spending and wage increases while toning 
down nationalist conservative rhetoric, thus winning support among the broader public. 
Third, Abe has been effective in exerting control over forces that challenge his power, 
both through the State Secrets Act, which has put a damper on press critical of the 
government, and through the revision of the Civil Service Act, which has enabled Abe to 
do what the DPJ failed to do in gaining control over the bureaucracy by centralizing 
administrative power in the hands of the kantei. In light of this tenuous marriage of 
moderate and even progressive social and economic policies on one hand and 
authoritarian and reactionary security and political policies on the other, I have tried to 
frame Abe as a Bonapartist, who offers all things to all people on the surface, while 
actually representing little more than a reassertion of authority by the prevailing ruling 
elite. Ultimately, however, Abe's failure to orchestrate any more widespread societal 
lurch towards the nationalist conservative agenda he represents may be his Achilles heel. 
It is unclear if the reactionary changes he has pushed will outlast him, just as the 
neoliberal and militarist programs of Koizumi and Nakasone died when they left office. 
Looking to the future, then, as Chapter Eight has argued, we can predict that 
efforts to restore conditions for political legitimation will be various. Indeed, these will 
likely range from calls to push for a neoliberal pluralism based on personal responsibility, 
an emphasis on a truly democratic, pluralist pacifism via the social democratic model, a 
deepening of neoconservative nationalism a la Abe, and a return to the golden age of 
clientelism and personal network-based support. However, all of these models face 
challenges politically and potentially suffer from contradictions of their own. 
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Conditions for hegemonic order: capital accumulation  
We can also see how dynamics of capital accumulation impacted the post-war 
hegemonic order in varying ways over time. Again, as explored in Chapter Four, in the 
1950s and 1960s, Japan experienced unprecedented, sustained and stable growth, not 
only in GDP but also in real wages and labour productivity, while income and wealth 
disparities declined. While many factors account for this success, I argued that four in 
particular were of note. First, there was the favorable international context. This included 
not only the benefits of the US-Japan security alliance (Anpo), which ensured Japanese 
security under the American nuclear umbrella, guaranteed a stable and amicable trading 
relationship with the US and allowed the Japanese state to divert attention away from 
foreign policy and towards economic and industrial policy; it also included the post-war 
global political economic order of embedded liberalism, which combined a liberal trading 
order with domestically-rooted, Fordist economies and highly complemented the 
Japanese industrial policy of export-oriented developmentalism. Second, as Johnson 
(1982), Okimoto (1989) and others have discussed in greater detail, was the Japanese 
model of developmentalist industrial policy, whereby state intervention was used to 
promote infant industries, maximizing export competitiveness. Third, the keiretsu system 
further served as the basis for stable, trust-based relations among firms (and between 
firms and the state), providing another anchor for the high degree of stability that 
accompanied rapid growth. Finally, Japan's labour regime of lifetime employment, the 
seniority wage system and enterprise unionism served as the backbone for a highly 
productive and docile workforce, at least while the average worker was still young.  
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However, as discussed in Chapter Five, changing structural conditions posed new 
challenges for Japan's regime of accumulation, forcing adjustment by both the state and 
capital. These changes included the end of the Dollar-Gold standard and the wider 
decline of the embedded liberal system as well as the two oil shocks. These structural 
changes led to mounting trade frictions with the US and eventually the Plaza Accord, 
which played a role in the development of the bubble economy in the late 1980s. In 
response, the state, particularly under Nakasone, made major policy adjustments to 
position Japanese capital to benefit from globalization, including through various 
neoliberal measures aimed at financial and trade liberalization, labour market 
deregulation and privatization. Japanese firms, for their part, sought to maximize the 
benefits of an increasingly deregulated (or more precisely, liberalized) global economic 
order, developing transnationalized accumulation strategies that included significant 
outflows of capital into production facilities in both low-wage production zones in Asia68 
and the lucrative (and increasingly insecure) American export market, while also 
introducing novel production techniques such as the Just In Time production of Toyota in 
order to increase competitiveness in world markets. While all of these market-expanding 
dynamics ensured that Japanese capital could benefit from the 1980s' economic 
globalization, they also led to heightened volatility and insecurity as labour and capital 
alike were increasingly exposed to the vagaries of market forces. 
Out of these conditions of volatility and insecurity, as Chapter Six argued, the turn 
to the Heisei era in 1989 brought an abrupt end to the speculative real estate and asset 
bubble and ushered in a period of prolonged economic crisis and stagnation. While 																																																								68	Here (and below) I use Asia as shorthand for East and Southeast Asian developing countries other than 
China, including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.	
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interpretations of the causes of this prolonged crisis vary, I have argued that it can best be 
explained by considering a range of both organic and conjunctural dynamics that 
undermined conditions for capital accumulation. At the conjunctural level, the 
speculative bubble had led to a high volume of debt held by banks that became bad debt 
after the stock market crashed. Indeed, it took until the early 2000s for this bad debt 
problem to finally be resolved. Later on, hopes of recovery were dashed by Japan's 
entanglement in global economic crises, including the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which were exacerbated by Japanese capital's growing 
integration with global markets and the enduring frailty of the Japanese economy more 
generally. Yet these conjunctural dynamics were overshadowed by a range of organic 
conditions that prevented any escape from the crisis despite numerous reform measures 
and extensive (debt-funded) recovery packages. These include the increasing outflow of 
Japanese capital away from the domestic economy and towards Asia and later China; 
decreased consumer spending and debt deflation driven partly by growing poverty, 
economic precariousness and labour market deregulation; and population aging, which 
turned many of the advantages of Japan's lifetime employment system into disadvantages. 
Overall, while the period of the 1990s and 2000s saw many large Japanese firms continue 
to be competitive in a range of industries, under conditions of globalization the strength 
of Japanese capital was increasingly disconnected from the frailty of the Japanese 
domestic economy. 
In the context of this prolonged organic crisis, Chapter Seven considered how 
Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has tried to solve the crisis through his Abenomics agenda, a 
rhetorically bold program based on a mix of neoliberal and Keynesian economic policies 
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as well as ostensibly progressive social policies. However, while Abenomics' inflation-
targeting monetary policy and corporate tax cuts were successful in spurring a stock 
market boom in its first few years, it has overall failed to live up to expectations. Neither 
inflation nor GDP growth targets have been met, and perhaps most significantly the 
frailty of the Japanese economy has led Abe to postpone a consumption tax hike on two 
occasions, leading the public debt to only grow even as GDP growth remains near zero. 
While Abe has pushed for a range of labour market reforms, including those aimed at 
bringing more women into the workforce as well as a major increase in the admission of 
migrant workers, the majority of these jobs have been in low-paying and insecure sectors 
of the economy. This has meant that despite labour shortages (due to population aging 
and decline), real wages have not increased, and Abe's own goal of a permanent 
economic recovery driven by a virtuous cycle of increased consumer spending that leads 
to increased investment (and in turn to further wage increases) remains a pipe dream.  
Finally, looking ahead to the future post-Abe, Chapter Eight suggests that efforts 
to restore conditions for capital accumulation will be fought over between three main 
visions for society. Leading the charge, and already in the drivers' seat for most of the 
past twenty years, are more market-friendly approaches, whether neoliberal or 
neoconservative, which seek to make Japanese capital more competitive globally, 
whatever the effects for workers and small businesses likely to be displaced in the 
process. However, competing with this program is a long-standing force within the LDP's 
coalition: the neo-communitarian approach and its attachment to the interests of small 
businesses, even if they can only be defended through market-restricting measures. 
Finally, though currently a highly subaltern position, coming decades may see a rise of 
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more labour-centric approaches to political economy, which may include social-
democratic or Keynesian measures to restore conditions for economic growth by boosting 
demand (which Abe's policies have, rhetorically though not substantively, emphasized) as 
well as more radical socialist calls for an abandonment of the prioritization of capital 
accumulation altogether in favor of other means of achieving conditions of material 
security and a high quality of life for the majority of people. 
 
Conditions for hegemonic order: social reproduction 
Along with these long-term trends in dynamics relating to the maintenance of 
conditions of political legitimation and capital accumulation, we can also see the various 
ways through which dynamics of social reproduction affected the hegemonic order. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the post-war regime of social reproduction was rooted in what 
Miura (2012) has called the gender dual system, which involved a rigid division between 
stable male breadwinners and female housewives who also filled gaps in the economy 
under temporary, insecure, and low-paying conditions. Moreover, this regime of social 
reproduction also included a welfare regime that involved minimalist explicit welfare 
programming on one hand, and extensive policies geared at maintaining full male 
employment on the other, which generally included generous corporate welfare 
provisions. A third condition of Japan's regime of social reproduction was the persistence 
of extended family households, with three generations living under one roof, which 
placed the burden of eldercare on households (and usually on women), excusing the state 
from having to invest heavily in pension and care programs. A final condition of this 
regime of social reproduction lies at the level of culture and society, whereby a new 
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variety of nationalism combined a commitment to pacifism with a continued attachment 
to Japan as a homogenous ethno-nation (and thus excluded ethnic minorities from the 
national community). Overall, though this regime of social reproduction was rigid, highly 
restrictive to both women and men and exclusionary for some citizens (especially single 
women and minorities), it provided conditions for stable and secure social reproduction 
without a significant cost to the state. The fertility rate remained high enough to ensure a 
sizeable workforce, while the lack of welfare spending enabled the state to prioritize 
industrial policy and as well as policies aimed at curbing underdevelopment in the 
countryside. 
However, this regime of social reproduction started to face challenges beginning 
in the 1970s, particularly as prevailing structural economic and demographic conditions 
necessary for it began to shift. As Chapter Five showed, in the 1970s Japan's population 
started aging rapidly, while urbanization and the rise of individualistic cultural attitudes 
drove a shift away from extended family households. At the same time, as gender norms 
slowly started to change, more women entered the workforce, challenging the basis for a 
model of reproduction that relied more heavily on women's unpaid domestic labour rather 
than public provisioning for a range of services. In this context, the period beginning in 
the early 1970s saw a significant shift towards increased welfare spending, particularly on 
pensions. However, in the context of declining economic growth (for reasons discussed 
above) these spending increases prompted the onset of a fiscal deficit. Unwilling to 
introduce unpopular tax increases to restore a fiscal balance, the LDP of the 1980s halted 
welfare spending increases under the slogan of "fiscal consolidation without tax 
increases." While this approach proved immediately popular (and fit well with the 
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increasingly ascendant global neoliberal paradigm), it ultimately proved to be a missed 
opportunity to adapt Japan's regime of social reproduction to the demographic and 
economic changes that were poised to come. 
By the 1990s, these (largely predictable) demographic changes began to 
accelerate, just as the state was forced to deal with not only the post-bubble economic 
crisis but also the political crisis brought on by the Recruit Cosmos and Sagawa Kyūbin 
scandals. As Chapter Six argued, the 1990s saw a rapid decline in the fertility rate, due as 
much to the declining economic conditions as to the lack of a safety valve in Japan's 
regime of social reproduction. Indeed, childrearing was still thought of as a private 
domain and measures to address it remained inadequate (Osawa 2008). While women 
continued to enter the workforce both by choice and by necessity, they lacked supports to 
help them balance family and work, and many forewent the former out of necessity 
(Schoppa 2008). During this period, insecurity and poverty markedly increased due to 
neoliberal labour market deregulation, structural changes in the economy and the decline 
of lifetime employment. Moreover, population aging continued to put a burden on the 
state and the economy, and depressed economic conditions and neoliberal policies led to 
increased social insecurity that exacerbated the demographic crisis. While a number of 
measures were introduced to provide piecemeal supports to families, these proved to be 
woefully inadequate, and the fiscal crisis of the state and depressed economic conditions 
more generally precluded a more comprehensive solution to the crisis of social 
reproduction. Furthermore, while the decline in the fertility rate during the 1990s was not 
unique to Japan, and occurred in several European countries as well, Japan's enduring 
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cultural nationalism and ideology of ethnic homogeneity precluded any serious 
consideration of immigration as a solution to the mounting demographic crisis.69 
In the context of these crisis conditions for Japan's regime of social reproduction, 
Chapter Seven showed how Abe has tried to solve the crisis through a range of policies 
aimed at promoting women in the workforce, increasing daycare spaces, and even 
admitting migrant workers in order to alleviate the extreme labour shortage. However, 
while the government has been effective in creating new daycare spaces and facilities, it 
has failed to meet its targets for the elimination of wait lists. Moreover, while a record 
proportion of Japanese women now work outside the home (even passing the US in 
2018), most of the new jobs created for women workers have been insecure and low-
paying, and targets for the appointment of women to top positions in the private sector 
have been significantly underperformed. However, perhaps the biggest limitation of all 
has been the lack of significant increase in Japan's fertility rate, which remains stuck at 
1.43, while the birth rate continues to fall every year (as the death rate grows). Even the 
government's bold new migrant worker program, in its current form, cannot be a 
permanent solution to the labour shortage, since most of the migrant workers admitted 
through the program face legal obstacles to permanent settlement, and only permanent 
immigrants can provide a solution to the demographic crisis in the long term. In all these 
ways, there is little reason to be hopeful that Abe's social policies will succeed in solving 
Japan's crisis of social reproduction. 																																																								
69 While automation and robotics are often touted as possible solutions to the chronic labour shortage, it is 
important to remember that despite centuries of ongoing labour saving technological innovation since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution, more people today are employed in the capitalist economy than ever 
before in history. If all hitherto labour-saving technological innovations have only served to increase the 
demand for human labour on aggregate, there is little reason to expect that emerging technologies will do 
anything to reverse this basic dynamic of capitalism. 
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Looking ahead to the prospects for social reproduction in post-Abe Japan, Chapter 
Eight considered what future attempts to solve the crisis of social reproduction might 
involve. It argued that these attempts will vary between neo-communitarian, neo-
conservative, neo-liberal and social democratic approaches. The neo-communitarian, and 
to some extent the neo-conservative approach as well, seek to restore the old gendered 
division of labour through a return to active (male-oriented) employment maintenance 
programs on one hand and policies that incentivize women's roles as mothers (and 
secondarily as part-time workers) on the other. In contrast, neoliberal solutions to the 
crisis of social reproduction imply further efforts to mirror Japanese society after those of 
the neoliberal heartland in the US, Canada and Britain. In that sense they seek to erase the 
ethnic nationalist discourse and replace with a hegemonic discourse of personal 
responsibility (jiko sekinin) for economic security and life chances, while at the same 
time using mass immigration to provide capital with unbridled access to cheap labour at 
domestically, solving the labour shortage if not wider socio-cultural elements of Japan's 
crisis of social reproduction, including many of the dynamics of growing social isolation 
and anomie experienced by increasing numbers of people. Finally, a fourth vision for the 
solution to Japan's crisis of social reproduction is characterized by social democratic or 
democratic socialist efforts to greatly improve welfare institutions, social and community 
supports so that all people have the livelihood security needed to start families and so that 
women (and men) can comfortably balance the responsibilities of family and work. Such 
a program would also eschew ethnic nationalism for a more pluralist and solidaristic 
ethos that emphasizes the dignity and uniqueness of all people, while encouraging 
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immigration, less for the benefits that accrue to corporations and more for the cultural 
enrichment that people of diverse backgrounds might bring to Japanese society. 
While this section has thus far examined these three dynamics – capital 
accumulation, political legitimation, and social reproduction – in isolation, we must also 
consider how these three dynamics interact dialectically. In that regard, we can see how 
while initially reproduction, accumulation and legitimation were maintained in 
complementary ways, beginning in the 1970s we began to see contradictions among them 
due to structural, institutional and policy changes. Attempts to resolve flagging conditions 
in one area only led to more problems in another, and by the 1990s all three became 
dysfunctional. In particular, by the 2000s there was a vicious cycle between reproduction 
and accumulation: while poor accumulation conditions (such as depressed GDP growth) 
led to declining reproduction dynamics (including the sharp decline in the birth rate), 
attempts to restore conditions for profitable accumulation, through neoliberal 
deregulation in particular, proved futile partly because they only served to exacerbate the 
crisis of social reproduction, thus undermining conditions for stable accumulation in the 
long-term. At the same time, attempts to restore conditions or stable reproduction were 
largely avoided because they would have involved high costs to capital, undermining 
conditions for profitable accumulation. As a result, the crisis lurched forward, only 
temporary deferred through growing public debt. 
 
Overarching theoretical implications of argument 
Based on this above overview of the way dynamics relating to the three major 
requirements for stable hegemonic order – political legitimation, capital accumulation 
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and social reproduction – have changed over the course post-war Japan, what general 
conclusions can we make about the nature of hegemonic order, its contradictions and its 
relationship with organic crisis in capitalist societies? At its best, a capitalist hegemonic 
order can maintain all three of these things at the same time – though perhaps for not very 
long. Economic growth and capitalist profitability are fundamentally necessary 
conditions for capitalism in general. Moreover, as O'Connor (2003) has argued, capital 
accumulation is not only necessary for the capitalist class to maintain their power but also 
for the state to maintain its legitimacy, as the capitalist state requires economic growth in 
order to generate tax revenue necessary for all of its functions. Similarly, social 
reproduction is necessary for the long-term viability of the system, as without an 
adequate labor force, both in quantity and quality, capital accumulation is impossible. 
Political legitimacy is of course necessary to ensure conditions necessary for capital 
accumulation over the long term: the threat of revolution or serious resistance to the 
established economic order significantly undermines conditions of credibility, 
consistency and confidence necessary for capital to invest (Bakker and Gill 2003). 
When some but not all of these three conditions can be maintained, then there 
appear contradictions within the system and the potential for a crisis. However, it is 
important to note that while an economic or political crisis is immediate and pressing in 
its consequences for hegemonic order, a crisis of social reproduction occurs over a much 
longer time frame or it may be compressed into one or two generations. It may display 
morbid symptoms in the interim, while the most acute effects of the crisis might not 
occur for a generation. An abrupt decline in economic growth or political legitimacy is 
thus already a crisis situation and a real danger to hegemonic order, while a temporary 
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increase in inequality or a dysfunction of social reproduction mechanisms is more likely 
to manifest beneath the surface, with its negative socio-economic effects postponed 
temporally and hidden behind women's unpaid and paid social reproductive labour. Either 
way, we use the term conjunctural crisis to refer to the first type of crises that occur on 
relatively short time horizons. In some cases, a conjunctural crisis can be easily rectified 
without opening new contradictions. For example, a crisis of economic accumulation can 
be solved without the solution itself causing a crisis of social reproduction. The 
Keynesian model of counter-cyclical fiscal policy was designed to achieve this. However, 
in many cases, the solution to one conjunctural crisis will structurally necessitate the 
onset of another in a different area; in this case the crisis is not solved but merely 
deferred. The most common way is for an economic crisis of economic over-production 
or political legitimation to be solved through policies that themselves lead to crises of 
reproduction or legitimation. 
When most or all of these conditions become dysfunctional simultaneously, then 
there is clearly an organic crisis: an economic, demographic social, political and even 
cultural crisis with no easy solution. In this situation, not only do solutions to any single 
element of the crisis usually lead to a deepening of contradictions impacting another 
element of the crisis, the solutions themselves may be largely ineffective given how deep 
the crisis is and how the centrifugal forces behind the various elements of the crises 
coalesce. For example, with a combined crisis of capital accumulation and crisis of social 
reproduction, a solution to the crisis of accumulation might be to further deregulate 
conditions for labor while making corporate tax cuts in order to shore up conditions for 
profitable accumulation, but these pro-capital measures will only further exacerbate the 
		 347	
crisis of reproduction by undermining the livelihood security enjoyed by workers and the 
fiscal capacity of the state to fund social programs. The ensuing crisis of social 
reproduction then might dampen consumer spending, business confidence, and 
investment, leading to a renewed market downturn. In this way, we can see the complex 
dialectical relationship between the various requirements of hegemonic order.  
Overall, then, contemporary Japan's organic crisis has appeared intractable thus 
far because of how its various dimensions overlap in complex ways, and attempts to solve 
one element have only exacerbated other elements of the crisis. However, we must 
understand Japan's organic crisis as fundamentally a crisis of a capitalist society and of an 
economic system inherently beset by contradictions that can ultimately only be displaced 
but never completely transcended (see also Federici 2012). While some of the capitalist 
programs to solve the organic crisis (whether neo-liberal, neo-conservative, or social 
democratic) may succeed in temporarily displacing elements of the crisis, it is unlikely 
that a permanent, lasting solution is possible under capitalism. For this reason, it is only 
the democratic socialist option, which offers a qualitative break from the capitalist basis 
for Japanese political economy entirely, that offers a permanent solution to the conditions 
of crisis and contradiction facing Japanese society. 
 
Limitations of this study and suggestions for future research 
In closing, I would like to acknowledge a number of limitations of this study and 
then make a few suggestions for future research that might seek to build on some of the 
themes developed in this dissertation. First, while research for this project involved a 
systematic review of English language sources relevant to the study of Japanese political 
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economy of the post-war era, the scale of the project made it difficult to conduct a 
systematic review of all potentially relevant Japanese language literature. While a number 
of key Japanese language works were highly important to the empirical historical 
research, particularly into events from the pre-1990s era (for which there was 
comparatively less English language analysis available than for events post-1990s), I was 
surprised to find relatively little influential theoretical arguments about post-war Japanese 
political economy in Japanese that went beyond what was available in English, other than 
those made about the Construction State by Tarō Miyamoto and the Weberian analysis of 
Yasusuke Murakami. 
Second, the scope of the project undertaken ultimately precluded certain in-depth 
forms of primary empirical research, such as with interviews. While I had initially 
intended to engage in interviews as a means of data collection to supplement the 
historical and textual fieldwork, I ultimately found such a move to be unnecessary. 
Various informal discussions with experts in the fields of Japanese politics and political 
economy were highly illuminating and greatly helped to advance the research project, but 
they also suggested that for this particular project, there was less need for interview-based 
data collection than I had initially thought. Again, this was primarily due to the breadth of 
this project, which has by its very nature forced me to sacrifice detail and even nuance for 
scope of analysis.  
Third, some more attentive Gramscian readers may be unsatisfied by the 
closeness with which this project has engaged with the text of Gramsci's writings, or with 
the liberal application of some of his concepts to the case of post-war and contemporary 
Japan. Indeed, due to limits of space I have foregone a more thoroughgoing textual 
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engagement with Gramsci's work (or that of those who have come after him), instead 
providing more general explanations of his foundational concepts, while re-locating them 
within the context of post-war Japan. While there have been, and continue to be, 
important debates about the real meaning behind many of Gramsci's concepts, and their 
applicability beyond the organic context wherein they were initially developed, this work 
is not meant to contribute to such theoretical debates about the deeper meaning and status 
of Gramsci's theory, but simply to think about such questions in a Gramscian way. Thus, 
I believe that as a dialectical thinker highly attentive to the tentative and dynamic nature 
of history, Gramsci's concepts should be thought of as highly malleable, amenable to 
interpretation in a wide range of social and historical contexts and not set in stone.  
Based on these various limitations to the present study, then, let me conclude by 
suggesting that future research efforts, including my own, should use as a point of 
departure the big-picture analysis developed in this dissertation and seek to find more 
nuanced explanations and precise data that can strengthen the analysis further and help 
expand this research program. I hope that future work can therefore build on the insights 
developed here in meaningful ways. 
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